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The  enterprise  of  theological  ethics  is  not  one  with  which  to  trifle.  It  must  be 
taken  up  properly  -  and  this  can  mean  only  on  the  assumption  that  the 
command  of  the  grace  of  God  is  its  sole  content  -  or  it  is  better  left  alone.  ' 
Karl  Barth,  Chin-ch  Dogmatics  11/2  p.  533. ii 
ABSTRACT 
This  thesis  is  a  contribution  to  the  contemporary  reassessment  of  Karl  Barth's  social 
philosophy.  A  close  reading  of  the  English  translation  of  the  text  of  a  series  of 
posthumously  published  lectures  on  ethics  which  Barth  gave  in  the  universities  of 
Münster  and  Bonn  between  1929  and  1933  is  the  basis  of  the  work.  Previous  literature 
includes  no  discussion  of  the  lectures. 
The  thesis  argues  that  the  lectures  show  the  foundation  of  Barth's  thinking  both  of 
theology  as  a  science  and  of  ethics  as  a  part  of  dogmatics,  and  that  his  subsequent 
work  developed  these  ideas.  Barth's  intellectual  debt  to  Hegel  is  recognised  by 
showing  that  he  returns  to  the  fundamental  theological  questions  of  the  relationship 
between  faith  and  reason,  and  truth  and  method  in  the  form  in  which  Hegel  discussed 
them  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The  thesis  acknowledges  the  influence  of 
Barth's  helper,  Charlotte  von  Kirschbaum,  and  contrary  to  other  opinions  claims  that 
the  impact  of  Wilhelm  Herrmann's  thinking  on  Barth  remained  until  1933. 
Although  principally  about  material  from  the  period  1918  to  1933,  later  work  by 
Barth  is  included  in  the  study  to  give  evidence  for  the  proposals  that  his  ethical 
thinking  helped  shape  his  dogmatics,  and  that  his  later  ethics  show  development,  not 
stages  and  breaks.  A  discussion  of  criticisms  of  his  ethics  highlights  the  problem  of 
choosing  a  method  of  enquiry  that  is  appropriate  to  the  object  studied.  A  dialogue 
with  two  other  ethical  projects  helps  focus  attention  on  his  insistence  on  a  proper 
foundation  for  Christian  social  ethics.  The  thesis  argues  that  Barth's  work  is  a 
theological  ethic,  because  his  social  philosophy  gives  a  method  for  asking  appropriate 111 
questions  and  creates  a  way  of  considering  these  questions  from  a  Christian 
perspective. iv 
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Bibliography  279 Chapter  1  Introduction 
This  thesis  is  a  contribution  to  the  contemporary  Anglo-Saxon  reappraisal  of  Karl 
Barth's  ethics.  The  main  task  of  the  study  is  a  reassessment  of  Barth's  Christian  social 
ethics  written  between  1918  and  1933.  There  are  two  reasons  why  it  is  an  appropriate 
time  for  such  an  undertaking:  firstly,  the  recent  interest  in  Barth's  ethics  by  the 
scholars  Nigel  Biggar,  John  Webster,  and,  in  part,  Bruce  McCormack;  secondly,  the 
publication  of  material  on  ethics  written  by  Barth,  which  was  previously  unavailable.  ' 
The  study  examines  newly  published  material  by  Barth  on  ethics.  Primary 
consideration  is  given  to  the  series  of  lectures  on  ethics  given  by  him  at  the 
universities  of  Münster  and  Bonn  in  1928  and  1930.  To  inform  the  reading  of  this 
material  there  is  a  discussion  of  the  influences  on  him  during  this  period.  New 
material  is  discussed  on  Charlotte  von  Kirschbaum,  Wilhelm  Herrmann  and  Cornelius 
van  Til.  The  work  of  Herrmann,  Barth's  teacher  at  Marburg,  is discussed  at  length  not 
only  because  of  its  importance  as  one  of  the  main  foundations  of  Barth's  thought,  but 
also  because  of  its  continuing  influence  on  some  of  Barth's  critics.  Additional 
material  from  his  writings  after  1933,  from  Church  Dogmatics  and  the  three  essays 
published  in  Community,  State  and  Church  are  used  to  illustrate  two  points:  firstly,  to 
show  his  ethics  developing,  and  secondly,  that  social  ethics  were  a  primary  concern  of 
'  Nigel  Biggar,  The  Hastening  that  Mails,  (Oxford:  Clarendon,  1993) 
John  Webster,  Barth's  Ethics  of  Reconciliation,  (Cambridge:  CUP,  1995) 
John  Webster,  Barth's  Moral  Theology:  Human  Action  in  Barth's  Thought,  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark, 
1998) 
Bruce  McCormack,  Kail  Barth's  Critically  Realistic  Dialectical  Theology:  Its  Genesis  and 
Development,  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press;  1997) 2 
his  throughout  his  life.  Barth's  intellectual  debt  to  Hegel  receives  particular  attention. 
An  awareness  of  the  tradition  in  which  Barth  was  working  informs  the  reading  of  his 
critics.  Focusing  on  points  of  methodological  disagreement  shows  the  importance 
both  that  the  form  is  appropriate  to  the  object  of  study,  and  of  the  primacy  of  the 
spoken  word  in  the  tradition.  The  weakness  and  fragility  of  the  study  of  Christian 
doctrine  in  English  theology,  within  both  universities  and  the  church  are  recognised  as 
causes  of  hostility  to  Barth's  thought  in  England.  There  is  a  discussion  of  the 
criticisms  of  Barth's  ethics.  The  work  of  van  Til  receives  exacting  consideration  and 
detailed  treatment.  There  are  two  reasons  why  van  Til's  disapproval  receives  lengthy 
consideration:  firstly,  because  there  is  no  previous  discussion  of  van  Til's  work  and 
secondly,  because  of  its  continuing  influence.  The  thesis  calls  for  the  recognition  of 
von  Kirschbaum's  influence  on  Barth's  theology.  Scholars  have  overlooked,  and  even 
disregarded  her  contribution  to  Barth's  theological  ethics.  A  proper  estimate  is  made 
of  her  involvement  in  the  development  of  Barth's  ethical  writings,  particularly  the 
significance  of  her  participation  in  the  decision  not  to  publish  the  Münster  ethics  in 
his  lifetime. 
The  thesis  discusses  the  meanings  given  by  Barth  to  the  concepts  of  knowledge, 
experience  and  determination.  Concepts  of  knowledge,  as  used  by  him,  are  often 
different  to  the  way  such  concepts  are  commonly  understood  in  Anglo-American 
theological  and  philosophical  discourse.  A  long  history  of  suspicion  of  German 
theology,  in  many  English  theologians,  is  the  background  to  the  misreading  and 
misunderstanding  of  his  dogmatics.  In  the  Birbeck,  lectures  delivered  in  the 
University  of  Cambridge  in  1947  on  `The  Righteousness  of  God,  Luther  Studies', 
Gordon  Rupp  made  the  following  comment: The  virile  theological  tradition  deriving  from  the  Oxford  movement  has  made 
great  and  positive  theological  contributions  to  English  religion,  but  from  the 
tim-  of  Hurrell  Froude  onwards  its  blind  spot  has  been  a  rigid,  narrow  and 
wooden  hostility  towards  the  Reformers  and  their  works.  2 
Colin  Gunton  points  out  that  English  systematic  theology  suffered  much  damage 
during  the  nineteenth  century,  from  the  hostile  attitude  of  some  nationalistic 
Tractarians,  notably  Edward  Bouverie  Pusey.  They  questioned,  with  alarm,  the 
influence  of  Hegel  and  Schleiermacher  on  the  development  of  German  theology. 
Gunton  says,  that  as  a  result: 
A  breach  between  different  European  traditions  was  opened,  and  this  has 
meant  that  English  systematic  theology,  never  very  strong,  has  suffered 
injuries  from  which  it  has  not  yet  recovered. 
He  goes  on  to  say: 
The  form  of  English  systematic  theology  arises  from  an  essentially 
nationalistic  fear  of  continental  thought..  .  what  happens  is  that  nationalistic 
isolation  tends  to  institutionalise,  so  to  speak,  the  typical  problems,  just  as 
incest  can  inbreed  genetic  ones.  Strengths,  uncriticised,  become  weaknesses, 
while  weaknesses  are  magnified.  English  theology  tends  to  reflect  the 
weakness  of  English  thought  in  general:  a  suspicion  of  intellectuals  of  all 
kinds,  allied  to  a  tendency  to  naturalism  and  moralism.  Daniel  Hardy  has 
observed  that  these  are  the  reasons  why  English  theology  has  found  it  so  hard 
to  come  to  terms  with  the  theology  of  both  Schleiermacher  and  Barth.  '  They 
seem  to  say  things  that  it  is  simply  not  possible  to  say.  Because  of  inbred 
tendencies  the  English  simply  fail  to  understand  what  these  seminal  thinkers 
are  doing.  ' 
2  Gordon  Rupp,  The  Righteousness  of  God,  Luther  Studies,  (London:  Hodder  and  Stoughton,  1953)  p. 
4. 
3  Colin  Gunton,  `An  English  Systematic  Theology?  '  in  the  Scottish  Journal  of  Theology  46  (1993)  pp. 
479-96. 
4  Daniel  Hardy,  `The  English  Tradition  of  Interpretation  and  the  Reception  of  Schleiermacher  and 
Barth  in  England',  in  Barth  and  Schleiermacher.  Beyond  the  Impasse,  ed.  by  J.  Duke  and  R.  Streetman, 
(Philadelphia:  Fortress,  1988) 
5  Gunton,  `An  English  Systematic  Theology?  '  p.  492. 4 
Anglo-American  scholars  have  received  Barth's  Church  Dogmatics  with  a  lack  of 
comnrehension  and  his  ethics  with  hostility.  6  It  is  part  of  the  task  of  this  study  to 
contribute  to  the  current  reassessment  of  his  ethics  avoiding  misreading  and 
misunderstandings. 
Gunton  was  writing  specifically  about  the  situation  in  England  in  an  article  mainly 
criticising  the  Anglo-Catholic  section  of  the  Church  of  England.  In  Scotland,  the 
situation  is  very  different.  There  is  a  long  tradition  of  the  study  of  German  language, 
culture  and  theology  by  Scottish  theologians.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  work  of  the 
Revd  Professor  John  Caird  who  was  Professor  of  Divinity  of  the  University  of 
Glasgow  from  1862  to  1872,  and  became  Principal  and  Vice  Chancellor.  As  Principal, 
he  gave  the  Gifford  lectures  in  1892-1893  and  1895-1896.  '  His  brother,  Edward 
Caird,  was  Master  of  Balliol  College,  and  wrote  a  `Memoir'  of  John  as  a  preface  to 
the  published  version  of  the  lectures!  Writing  of  his  brother's  intellectual 
development  between  1847  and  1849  he  says: 
Still  more  important,  perhaps,  as  a  step  in  his  intellectual  progress  was  the  fact 
that  he  began  the  study  of  the  German  language  and  literature  and  brought  his 
mind  into  contact  with  the  theological  and  philosophical  thought  of  Germany.  9 
Discussing  Principal  Caird's  introductory  lecture,  `Theology  as  a  Science',  Edward 
Caird  writes: 
He  was  interested  in  Hegel  mainly  for  two  things:  first,  by  the  thoroughness 
with  which  he  carries  out  the  idealistic  principle,  and,  secondly,  by  the  strong 
6  Colin  Gunton,  Theology  through  the  Theologians,  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark,  1996)  p.  8. 
'John  Caird,  The  Fundamental  ideas  of  Christianity,  (Glasgow:  James  MacLehose,  1899) 
8  Edward  Caird,  `Memoir'  as  a  preface  to  John  Caird,  The  Fundamental  ideas  of  Christianity. 
9  Caird,  `Memoir'  pp.  xxxiii-xxxiv. 5 
grasp  of  the  ethical  and  religious  experience  which  is  perhaps  Hegel's  greatest 
characteristic.  " 
Writing  about  his  Gifford  lectures  as  a  whole  Edward  Caird  says: 
He  was  very  deeply  influenced  by  Hegel,  and  believed  himself  to  be  in  the 
main  interpreting  his  thought.  " 
As  early  as  1930,  the  University  of  Glasgow  awarded  the  Revd  Professor  Karl  Barth 
an  honorary  doctorate  of  divinity.  " 
1.1The  structure  of  the  thesis 
The  second  chapter  is  a  discussion  on  current  scholarship  on  Barth's  moral  theology 
principally  of  the  work  of  John  Webster.  In  the  third  chapter,  recently  available 
material,  the  posthumously  published  lectures  Barth  delivered  in  the  Universities  of 
Münster  in  1928  and  Bonn  in  1930,  is  examined  through  a  close  reading.  These 
lectures  form  the  focus  of  this  study  and  are  the  material  upon  which  the  call  for  a 
reassessment  of  Barth's  ethics  is  based.  They  have  not  previously  been  discussed  in 
any  detail.  In  the  fourth  chapter,  the  place  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  the  focus  of  discussion. 
Barth  has  often  been  accused  of  ignoring  the  third  person  of  the  Trinity  in  an  over- 
insistence  on  the  revelation  in  Jesus  Christ.  Again,  the  material  is  a  lecture,  `The  Holy 
Spirit  and  the  Christian  Life',  which  was  given  in  1929  and  has  received  little 
10  Caird,  `Memoir'  p.  Iii. 
"  Cuird,  `Memoir'  p.  lxxvii. 
12  Glasgow  University  Calendar  1929-1930. 6 
attention.  Development  in  Barth's  dogmatic  work  has  been  the  central  point  of 
controversy  among  scholars  who,  in  the  main,  have  ignored  his  ethics. 
Many  theologians  have  limited  their  interpretation  of  Barth's  work  to  his  early 
material  and  to  Dogmatics  in  Outline.  "  Their  argument  is  that  Barth  moved  from 
using  a  dialectical  method  in  Romans  to  analogy  in  Dogmatics  in  Outline,  and  their 
view  has  become  the  established  opinion.  "  This  interpretation  ignores  the  evidence  of 
the  thirteen  volumes  of  the  Church  Dogmatics.  Bruce  McCormack's  recent  study  has 
seriously  undermined  the  two-stage  hypothesis  of  a  move  from  dialectic  to  analogy. 
Although,  it  has  to  be  said  that  Boyd  notes  that  a  few  scholars  have  argued  against  the 
two-stage  hypothesis  before  McCormack's  study.  " 
Until  recently  scholarship  on  Barth's  work  has  been  dominated  by  an  examination  of 
the  two-stage  and  three-stage  hypothesises.  However,  close  study  of  other  material 
shows  development  in  Barth's  work;  not  breaks  or  stages.  The  material  may  be  found 
in  the  Münster  and  Bonn  lectures  of  1929  and  1930  and  the  later  work  on  ethics  in 
Church  Dogmatics  II  §  36.  The  material  discussed  later  in  chapter  six  shows  that  the 
lectures  include  the  main  ethical  themes  of  the  later  Church  Dogmatics.  This  evidence 
further  supports  the  view  that  Barth's  work  in  dogmatics  and  ethics  shows 
development,  not  breaks  or  stages. 
Any  discussion  of  Barth's  ethics  has  to  face  the  problems  of  human  freedom.  Chapter 
four  is  a  close  reading  of  a  small  section  of  Church  Dogmatics  IIU4  in  this  section, 
13  Karl  Barth,  Dogmatics  in  Outline,  trans.  G.  T.  Thompson,  (London:  SCM,  1993) 
14  Karl  Barth,  The  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  trans.  by  E.  C.  Hoskins,  (London:  OUP,  1933) 
15  Ian  Boyd,  `Dogmatics  among  the  ruins:  the  relevance  of  German  expressionism  and  the 
enlightenment  as  contexts  for  Karl  Barth's  theological  development',  (unpublished  doctoral  thesis: 
University  of  Edinburgh,  1996) 7 
pages  116-59,  Barth  discusses  what  he  means  by  human  determination  and  freedom. 
This  section  is  central  and  most  important,  as  here  Barth  answers  those  critics  who  so 
frequently  accuse  him  of  denying  room  for  human  freedom. 
Chapter  six  examines  more  specifically  Barth's  social  ethics  in  three  essays,  published 
over  a  ten-year  period.  "  He  delivered  the  first  essay,  `Gospel  and  Law'  as  a  lecture  in 
Barmen  in  1935.  The  second,  essay,  `Church  and  State'  published  in  1938,  appeared 
at  a  time  when  questions  about  the  relationship  between  the  church  and  the  state  were 
of  vital  importance  in  Germany.  In  1946,  Barth  delivered  `The  Christian  Community 
and  the  Civil  Community'  the  third  lecture  in  which  he  called  the  German  Confessing 
Churches  back  to  the  fifth  thesis  of  the  Barmen  Declaration  that  they  had  signed 
twelve  years  earlier. 
The  first  six  chapters  of  the  thesis  discuss  in  detail  most  of  Barth's  ethical  writings.  In 
chapter  seven,  the  attention  turns  to  three  of  Barth's  critics:  Cornelius  van  Til, 
Norman  Robinson  and  Robert  Willis.  "  These  three  scholars  provide  a  range  of 
criticisms  and  their  work  spreads  over  a  wide  span  of  time  from  van  Til  in  1938  to 
Robinson  in  1956  and  Willis  in  1971. 
Cornelius  van  Til  receives  the  most  attention,  because  his  criticism  of  Barth  is  the 
most  vehement  and  has  remained  influential.  van  Til  accused  Barth  of  basing  his  work 
on  modernist  philosophy  and  of  not  being  sufficiently  biblical.  Yet,  although 
16  Karl  Barth,  Conununity,  State  and  Church,  trans.  by  R.  Smith,  (Gloucester,  MA:  Peter  Smith,  1968) 
17  Cornelius  van  Til,  The  Nena  Modernism:  Ait  Appraisal  of  the  Theology  of  Barth  and  Brunner, 
(London:  J.  Clarke,  1946) 
Norman  Robinson,  Christ  and  Conscience,  (London:  Nisbet,  1956) 
Robert  Willis,  The  Ethics  of  Karl  Barth,  (Leiden:  E.  J.  Brill,  1971) 8 
mentioned  in  a  footnote  by  von  Balthasar,  van  Til's  work  has  not  previously  been 
discussed.  " 
Robinson  disagrees  with  van  Til's  opinion  and  says  Barth  theology  was  too  biblical 
and  left  insufficient  room  for  human  experience.  The  third  critic,  Willis,  begins 
sympathetically  but  by  the  end  of  his  work,  he  finds  Barth's  work  deficient  in  the  area 
of  human  autonomy  and  freedom.  Willis  also,  like  some  other  American  theologians, 
criticises  Barth  for  failing  to  take  a  stand  against  communism. 
Chapter  seven  also  takes  up,  in  section  7.4,  the  debate  about  the  foundation  of 
Christian  ethics  by  examining  the  work  of  Donald  Shriver,  and  Miroslav  Volf.  19  This 
discussion  provides  the  basis  for  chapter  eight,  which  contains  the  conclusions. 
The  concluding  points  are: 
1.  Christian  dogmatics  is  the  foundation  of  Christian  ethics. 
2.  Social  ethics  were  central  to  Barth's  thought  throughout  his  life. 
3.  Barth's  ethics  show  the  continuous  development  of  his  early  ideas  and  not 
radical  changes. 
4.  Barth  has  an  intellectual  debt  to  Hegel,  which  has  not  been  recognised  in 
Anglo-American  readings. 
5.  Through  misreading,  Barth  has  been  falsely  accused  of  disregarding  the 
freedom,  autonomy  and  hence  the  responsibility  of  the  human  subject. 
18  Hans  Urs  von  Balthasar,  The  Theology  of  Karl  Barth:  Exposition  and  Interpretation  trans.  by 
Edward  Oakes  (San  Francisco:  Ignatius  Press,  1992)  p.  61. 
19  Donald  Shriver,  An  Ethic  for  Enemies,  (Oxford:  OUP,  1995) 
Miroslav  Volf,  Exclusion  and  Embrace:  A  Theological  Exploration  of  Identity,  Otherness,  and 
Reconciliation,  (Nashville:  Abingdon  Press  1996) 9 
The  thesis  argues  for  the  premise  that  Barth  has  an  intellectual  debt  to  Hegel  similar 
to  that  of  the  relationship  between  Aquinas  and  Aristotle.  The  reading  of  the  material 
by  van  Tit  informs  and  reflects  this  understanding.  The  proposal  is  that  Barth, 
although  writing  among  the  ruins  of  the  Enlightenment  and  German  Expressionism, 
followed  the  intellectual  tradition  of  Kant  and  Hegel.  Barth,  who  took  Schleiermacher 
extremely  seriously,  realised  that  liberal  Protestant  theology  had  neither  the  strength 
nor  the  will  to  face  the  collapse  of  the  Weimar  Republic.  It  was  political  and  social 
ethics  that  took  Barth  back  to  concerns  raised  by  Hegel.  2'Those  concerns  have  to  do 
with  the  recognition  that  philosophy  and  theology  have  the  same  object,  the  truth, 
which  is God.  Hegel  says: 
Philosophy  lacks  the  advantage,  which  other  sciences  enjoy,  of  being  able  to 
presuppose  its  objects  as  given  immediately  by  representation.  And,  with 
regard  to  its  beginning  and  advance,  it  cannöt  presuppose  the  method  of 
cognition  as  one  that  is  readily  accepted.  It  is  true  that  it  does,  initially,  have 
its  objects  in  common  with  religion.  Both  of  them  have  the  truth  in  the 
highest  sense  of  the  word  as  their  object;  for  both  hold  that  God  and  God 
alone  is  the  truth.  21 
Barth  recognises  the  truth  of  this  statement  with  regard  to  theology  and  is  concerned 
to  establish  theology  as  a  science,  which  is  to  realise  that  it  does  not  have  its  object 
immediately  given  by  representation,  nor  can  it  presuppose  its  beginning  and  method 
of  advance.  Barth  says  of  Hegel's  doctrine: 
We  must  first  of  all  establish  that  with  what  we  have  come  to  know  as  his 
Christian  opposition  to  modem  consciousness,  Hegel  had  something  of 
decisive  and  lasting  importance  to  say,  or  to  recall,  to  theology,  and  not  only 
to  the  theology  of  his  age.  A  theology  which  is  jostled  by  philosophy  -  and 
20  Karl  Barth  `Hegel'  in  Protestant  Theology  in  the  Nineteenth  Century:  its  background  and  history. 
The  first  complete  translation  of  Die  Protestantische  Theologie  im  19.  Jahrehundert  (Evangelischer 
Verlag,  Zollikon,  Zürich,  1952)  Chapters  2,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,19,19,29  trans.  by  Brian  Cozens  and 
revised  by  the  editorial  staff  of  SCM  Press;  the  remainder  trans.  by  John  Bowden,  (London:  SCM 
Press,  1972)  pp.  384-421. 
21  G.  W.  F.  Hegel,  The  Encyclopaedia  of  Logic  Part  I  of  the  Encyclopaedia  of  Philosophical  Sciences 
with  Zusätze,  trans.  by  T.  F.  Geraets,  (Indianapolis:  Hackett,  1991)  p.  24. 10 
which  theology  is  not  -  is  just  the  one  which  has  often  forgotten  and  still 
forgets  that  the  truth  should  not  concern  it  less  than  philosophy  but,  on  the 
contrary,  much  more.  It  should  not  be  concerned  with  manifestations  of  life  in 
general,  with  some  kind  of  expressions,  declarations,  avowals,  assertions  and 
symbols  attempting  to  express  the  inexpressible  in  some  form  or  another,  nor 
with  a  kind  of  verbal  music-making,  nor  with  a  description  of  conditions  and 
circumstances,  nor  even  with  a  view  of  essentials,  however  deep,  but  with 
truth,  with  a  kind  of  knowledge  which  does  not  have  its  foundation  in  some 
kind  of  given  thing,  as  such,  but  in  the  link  of  this  given  thing  with  the  final 
origin  of  everything  given.  If  theology  does  not  speak  the  truth  in  this  sense, 
then  in  what  sense  can  it  assert  that  it  is  speaking  of  God?  Can  it  perhaps 
absolve  itself  from  the  earnestness  with  which  Hegel  equated  the  truth  and  the 
knowledge  of  God?  Dare  it  fall  short  of  Hegel  in  this  respect,  if  it  is  not  to 
stand  -  for  all  the  supposed  independence  of  its  source  of  knowledge  -  in  the 
shadow  of  philosophy,  philosophy  being  regarded  as  something  more 
important.  A  theology  whose  basis  was  merely  historical,  merely 
phenomenological,  could  in  fact  stand  in  this  questionable  shadow.  And  did 
not  nineteenth-century  theology  to  a  large  extent  stand  indeed  in  this  shadow 
when  and  after  it  passed  by  Hegel's  doctrine?  22 
The  quotation  from  Hegel  and  the  lengthy  extract  from  Barth  on  Hegel  are  included  to 
form  part  of  the  foundation  of  the  thesis.  The  method  of  theological  study  has  to  be 
appropriate  to  the  object.  The  form  is determined  by  the  object  and  is  the  object. 
There  is  no  fixed  property  and  not  even  language  is  owned.  The  method  is  more  like 
seeing  a  film  than  reading  a  text:  although  each  frame  is fixed  it  can  only  be 
understood  by  seeing  the  whole  film.  Although  Barth  won  a  Sigmund  Freud  prize,  in 
praise  of  the  eloquence  of  his  academic  prose,  the  text  is  an  antitext,  not  a  literary 
fixed  property.  23  Indeed,  in  this  respect  Barth  continues  in  the  Hegelian  tradition  in 
which  language  is  suspicious,  and  cannot  claim  to  encapsulate  the  Truth.  The  Truth 
revealed  makes  language  into  itself.  Thus,  the  main  concern  is  with  language  as  the 
form  of  exposition.  24  Therefore,  Barth  begins  his  ethics  with  a  discussion  of  method. 
The  method  has  to  be  appropriate  to  the  task  of  expounding  the  content.  The 
22  Barth,  Protestant  Theology  in  the  Nineteenth  Century,  p.  415. 
23  Letter  to  R.  Karwehl,  30  October  1968.  in  Eberhard  Busch,  Karl  Barth:  His  life  f-om  Letters  and 
Autobiographical  Texts,  trans.  by  John  Bowden  (London  SCM,  1976)  p.  494. 
24  See  `Skoteinos,  or  How  to  Read  Hegel',  in  Theodor  W.  Adorno  Hegel:  Three  Studies  trans.  by 
Shierry  Veber  Nicholsen  (Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press,  1994)  pp.  126-7. 11 
command  of  the  grace  of  God  is  its  sole  content,  and  using  a  method  appropriate  to 
that  content  is  the  necessary  assumption  of  any  exploration  of  Barth's  thought.  An 
appropriation  of  language  and  a  unification  of  form  and  content  occur.  Ethics  has  to 
ask  questions  about  what  is  the  case  now  that  God  has  chosen  to  reveal  himself  in 
Jesus  Christ.  The  object  of  study  imposes  these  parameters  upon  the  science  of 
theological  ethics. 
Barth  defines  science  as  the  study  of  the  experience  of  knowledge  of  an  object,  " 
saying,  `Knowledge  is  the  confirmation  of  human  acquaintance  with  an  object 
whereby  its  truth  becomes  a  determination  of  the  existence  of  the  man  who  has  the 
knowledge.  '26  The  object  of  investigation  creates  the  conditions  under  which  the 
subject's  knowledge  of  the  object  produces  the  subject's  experience  of  that  object. 
The  subject's  experience  of  the  object  is  the  determination  of  the  subject.  Barth  is 
working  within  a  neo-Kantian  framework  in  which  there  is  a  gap  in  human  knowledge 
between  the  knowledge  of  an  object  and  the  object  as  it  is  in  itself.  Boyd  makes  the 
perceptive  comment  that  McCormack's  attempt  to  establish  Barth's  Kantianism,  and 
thereby  to  distance  him  from  neo-Kantianism,  is  misconceived.  "  The  gap  is  the 
distinction  between  the  phenomena  and  noumena.  The  phenomena,  in  Barth's 
definition  of  knowledge,  are  the  experiences  of  an  object.  The  noumena  are  the 
objects  as  they  are  in  themselves.  God's  knowledge  has  no  distinction,  as  God  knows 
things  as  they  are  in  themselves.  Barth  claims  human  knowledge  only  becomes  real 
knowledge  when  the  gap  between  noumena  and  phenomena  is  eliminated  by  God's 
revelation.  How  then  does  human  language  express  this  real  knowledge?  Language 
25  Karl  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics,  Volume  I  The  Doctrine  of  the  Word  of  God,  part  1  trans.  by 
G.  W.  Bromiley,  2"d  edn,  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark,  1975)  pp.  10-1. 
26  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics,  I/1  p.  198. 
27  Boyd,  `Dogmatics  among  the  ruins'. 12 
itself  has  a  gap,  as  human  language  does  not  express  the  `true'  meaning  until  God 
reveals  it.  Wilhelm  Herrmann's  influence,  his  teacher  at  the  University  of  Marburg,  is 
the  source  of  Barth's  use  of  neo-Kantian  epistemology.  The  words  of  Herrmann 
illustrate  the  similarity  with  Barth's  thinking  on  revelation  and  his  own,  `Revelation 
as  a  Fact  inside  our  own  Experience,  but  Distinct  from  Ourselves,  Convincing  us  of 
God's  Working  upon  us.  '=R 
Graham  Ward  discusses  Barth's  neo-Kantian  thinking  in  relation  to  language  2'  and 
shows  how  God's  revelation  overcomes  the  linguistic  gap  between  the  Word  of  God 
and  the  word  of  man.  3°  Ward  also  discusses  the  preoccupation  with  the  paradoxical 
nature  of  theological  language  within  the  intellectual  and  cultural  context  of  Barth's 
time.  He  cites  the  works  of  Buber  and  Heidegger  as  having  similar  preoccupations 
about  religious  language"  Ward's  perceptive  analysis  of  Barth's  use  of  two  models 
of  language  will  inform  the  later  discussion,  in  chapter  five,  of  Barth's  understanding 
of  human  determination  through  the  revelation  of  God's  Word.  He  says,  `If  there  is  to 
be  knowledge  of  God,  if  there  is  to  be  theological  realism,  then  a  relation  must  be 
found  between  the  human  word  and  the  word  of  God.  '32  It  is  argued  later  that  this 
relationship  is  established  in  Barth's  understanding  of  human  determination.  This  is 
not  the  place  to  consider  in  depth  the  problem  of  the  relationship  between  divine  and 
human  speech,  but  some  observations  are  appropriate  and  necessary  to  an 
understanding  of  Barth's  thought  on  this  matter. 
28  Wilhelm  Herrmann,  The  Communion  ofthe  Christian  with  God:  Described  on  the  basis  of  Luther's 
Statements,  trans.  by  J.  Sandys  Stanyon  2°d  edn  (London:  Williams  and  Norgate  1906)  Chapter  11  §2p. 
59. 
29  Graham  Ward,  Barth,  Derrida  and  theLanguage  of  Theology,  (Cambridge:  CUP,  1995)  Chapter  One 
on  Logo  centrism. 
30  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics,  Volume  11  The  Doctrine  of  God,  part  1,  trans.  T.  H.  L.  Parker,  et  al 
(Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark  1957)  pp.  3-204. 
31  Ward  (1995)  p.  34. 
32  Ward  (1995)  p.  63. 13 
Kierkegaard  introduced  the  place  of  language  in  dialectical  theology  in  his  concept  of 
contemporaneity,  which  constitutes  the  essence  of  being  present.  Hans  Georg 
Gadamer  gives  a  lengthy  treatment  of  the  development  of  the  subject  in  Protestant 
thought.  33  McCormack  challenges  Ward's  understanding  of  the  relationship  between 
presence,  in  a  Derridean  sense,  and  God's  self-revelation: 
God  in  his  self-revelation  is  not  a  "presence"  in  the  Derridean  sense.  Rather, 
because  God  unveils  himself  by  veiling  himself  in  human  flesh  and  human 
words,  revelation  only  reaches  its  goal  in  the  human  knower  when  the  Holy 
Spirit  gives  us  the  "eyes"  or  "ears"  to  see  and  hear  that  which  remains  hidden 
to  outward  perception.  4 
William  Stacy  Johnson,  in  a  recent  work,  has  developed  the  discussion  about  the  gap 
between  the  language  of  God  and  the  language  of  men  and  women.  35His  innovative 
reading  suggests  that  Barth  provides  a  foundation  for  a  post-modern  theology. 
McCormack  claims  that: 
Johnson  has  moved  well  beyond  previous  attempts  to  read  Barth  as  a 
forerunner  of  post-modern  sensibilities  (e.  g.,  those  by  Walter  Lowe  and 
Graham  Ward).  " 
Johnson  claims  that  Barth  is  a  non-foundationalist,  because  he  claims  that  the 
reception  of  everything,  including  language,  is  given  in  revelation  as  the  eternal  now 
of  the  present.  Johnson  is  right  to  make  this  observation,  for  as  McCormack  says: 
Johnson  recognises  that  Barth  was  primarily  interested  in  making  claims 
about  the  nature  of  "reality"  (divine  and  creaturely)  37 
33  See  Hans-Georg  Gadamer,  Truth  and  Method,  (London:  Sheed  &  Ward,  1996)  p.  127. 
;4  Bruce  L.  McCormack,  `The  Mystery  of  God:  Karl  Barth  and  the  Postmodern  Foundation  of 
Theology  by  William  Stacy  Johnson',  Theology  Today,  55  1998-99  pp.  458-9. 
35  William  Stacy  Johnson,  The  Mystery  of  God:  Karl  Barth  and  the  Postmodern  Foundations  of 
Theology,  (Louisville:  Westminster  John  Knox  Press  1997) 
36  McCormack,  Theology  Today,  55  1998-99  p.  458. 
37  McCormack,  Theology  Today,  55  1998-99,  p,  458. 14 
Richard  Roberts  gives  due  acknowledgement  to  Hegel's  influence  on  Barth,  but 
criticises  him  for  his  neo-Kantian  solution  to  the  problem  of  time  and  eternity.  "  He 
considers  that  Barth's  concept  of  the  eternally  present  now,  which  is  made  true  in 
human  language  by  God's  revelation,  creates  problems  for  a  satisfactory  explanation 
of  God's  actions  in  time. 
Although  Johnson  is  right  to  make  the  point  that  Barth  does  not  presuppose  a 
foundation,  it  is  necessary  to  remember  that  Barth  writes  as  a  modernist.  He  believes 
in  the  existence  of  a  self,  which  is  the  subject  of  the  knowledge  of  the  experience, 
whereas  post-modern  philosophy  assumes  the  self  to  be  socially  constructed.  39  In 
addition,  he  resolves  the  distinction  between  knowledge  of  the  thing  in  itself  and 
human  knowledge  by  the  determination  of  the  subject  in  God's  revelation.  The 
subject  only  becomes  real  in  revelation.  For  him,  the  determination  of  the  subject 
becomes  the  object  of  study,  which  is  the  revealed  knowledge  of  God.  The  experience 
of  this  knowledge  is  the  determination  of  humanity,  and  takes  place  within  the  three 
persons  of  the  Trinity.  This  point  is  the  primary  connection  between  Barth  and  Hegel. 
The  fundamental  point  of  agreement  between  Barth  and  Hegel  is  that  the  object  of 
scientific  study  determines  the  appropriate  method  of  investigation.  Theology  is  the 
science  of  the  study  of  the  knowledge  of  God.  Both  Hegel  and  Barth  believe  it  is  the 
object  that  is  being  studied  that  determines  the  appropriate  methodology.  Therefore,  it 
follows  that  in  Barth's  and  Hegel's  thinking  theology  has  a  method,  which  is 
determined  by  its  object.  God  is  the  object  of  the  science  of  theology.  Since  God  is 
unique  and  not  a  member  of  a  set  of  objects  any  method  relating  to  the  investigation 
3"  Richard  Roberts,  A  Theology  on  Its  Way?  Essays  on  Karl  Barth,  (Edinburgh:  T&T.  Clark)  pp.  1-58. 15 
of  other  objects  would  be  inappropriate.  Knowledge  of  God  is  only  available  through 
God's  self-revelation,  because  both  the  revelation  and  the  means  of  receiving  it  are 
His  gifts.  Thus,  the  science  of  theology  must  remain  true  in  method  to  the 
determination  of  theological  knowledge.  Barth  maintains  this  truth  in  his  exposition  of 
dogmatics  and  ethics.  His  work  is  in  the  tradition  of  German  expressionism,  in  which 
form  and  content  remain  united  in  the  exposition  "0  There  can  be  no  pre-existing 
logical  structure  providing  the  form  into  which  knowledge  is  poured  as  the  content. 
The  truth  of  the  knowledge  is  in  the  method,  not  in  an  a  priori  logical  reality.  Barth's 
style  is dissimilar  to  that  of  an  Anglo-American  analytical  discourse  in  which  a 
sequential  development  logically  progresses  from  initial  propositions.  In  the  analytic 
tradition,  the  object  provides  the  content  and  the  underlying  Aristotelian  logic  gives 
the  form.  For  example,  in  the  analytical  tradition,  the  propositions  P  and  not  P  are 
mutually  exclusive.  Whereas,  in  Barth's  dialectical  thinking,  the  knowledge  of  the 
object  contains  the  thing  and  its  opposite:  one  requires  the  other.  He  comments 
appreciatively  on  Hegel's  innovation  that,  `Life  itself  is  not  a  unity  resting  in  itself, 
but  a  perpetual  a=  fron-a,  despite  of  the  whole  of  western  logic'.  "  Impossible 
possibilities,  stated  as  paradox,  are  the  truth  of  Barth's  dialectic.  For  him,  knowledge 
of  God  does  not  begin  with  propositions  but  with  both  the  form  and  the  content  of 
revelation.  There  is  no  underlying  and  presupposed  Aristotelian  logic  to  provide  an 
existing  form  into  which  God  pours  revelation  as  the  content.  Charles  Taylor  gives  the 
following  helpful  explanation  of  Hegelian  logic,  and  it  is  important  to  read  Barth  with 
39  Peter  Berger  and  Thomas  Luckman,  The  Social  Construct  of  Reality:  A  Treatise  in  the  Sociology  of 
Knowledge,  (Harmondsworth:  Penguin  1967) 
40  Roberts,  A  Theology  on  its  Way?  For  discussions  sympathetic  to  the  view  that  Barth  has  a 
considerable  intellectual  debt  to  Hegel,  particularly  the  two  essays  `Karl  Barth's  Doctrine  of  Time:  Its 
Nature  and  Implications',  and  `Karl  Barth  on  the  Trinity'. 
41  Barth,  Protestant  Theology  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  p.  413. 16 
this  in  mind,  because  readings  of  Barth  that  criticise  him  from  an  empiricist  viewpoint 
sometimes  overlook  their  own  imbedded  Aristotelian  logic: 
Hegel  holds  that  the  ordinary  viewpoint  of  identity  has  to  be  abandoned  in 
philosophy  in  favour  of  a  way  of  thinking  which  can  be  called  dialectical  in 
that  it  presents  us  with  something  which  cannot  be  grasped  in  a  single 
proposition  or  series  of  propositions,  which  does  not  violate  the  principle  of 
non-contradiction:  -  (p.  j-p).  The  minimum  cluster  which  can  really  do  justice 
to  reality  is  three  propositions,  that  A  is  A,  that  A  is  also  -A;  and  that  -A 
shows  itself  to  be  after  all  A.  42 
This  means  that  the  form,  which  is  the  dialectic,  is  appropriate  to  its  object  and  is  an 
expression  of  the  truth.  In  other  words  the  truth  is  the  method,  and  hence  the 
enormous  significance  in  this  thesis  given  to  form  43 
In  the  following  passage,  Barth  discusses  how  knowledge  of  God  is  only  available 
through  God's  self-revelation  and  dismisses  as  irrelevant  knowledge  of  God  obtained 
from  elsewhere.  "  His  words  clearly  illustrate  the  distinctiveness  of  his  concept  of  the 
knowledge  of  God,  and  how  it  differs  from  the  concept  of  knowledge  of  God  derived 
from  methodologies  that  presuppose  the  existence  of  propositional  logic: 
We  start  out  from  the  fact  that  through  His  Word  God  is  actually  known  and 
will  be  known  again.  On  principle,  we  have  to  reject  any  anxiety  about  this 
occurrence  as  not  only  superfluous  but  forbidden.  Knowledge  of  God  within 
the  Christian  Church  is  very  well  aware  that  it  is  established  in  its  reality  and 
to  that  extent  also  called  in  question  by  God's  Word,  through  which  alone  it 
can  have  reality,  and  on  the  basis  of  which  alone  it  can  be  fulfilled.  However, 
precisely  because  the  knowledge  of  God  cannot  call  itself  in  question  in  its 
effort  to  understand  itself,  it  cannot  ask  whether  it  is  real  from  some  position 
outside  itself.  " 
42  Charles  Taylor,  Taylor,  Hegel,  (Cambridge:  CUP,  1997)  p.  80. 
43  See  Hans-Georg  Gadamer,  Truth  and  Method,  Part  II  pp.  171-212-  for  a  discussion  about  the 
question  of  truth  in  the  human  sciences. 
44  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics  II/1  p.  270. 
45  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics,  11/1  p.  4. 17 
The  knowledge  he  is  discussing  determines  the  subject.  As  the  knowledge  of  the 
experience  reveals  reality,  the  object  is  seen,  retrospectively,  to  have  determined  that 
reality.  He  asks  the  reader  to  keep  in  mind  Anselm  of  Canterbury's  methodology,  " 
particular  in  his  proofs  of  God,  47  and  also  his  own  subsequent  work  on  Anselm  4R  He 
rejects  the  idea  that  there  may  exist  outside  the  knowledge  of  God  a  position  or  theory 
through  which  questions  about  that  knowledge  may  be  decided.  It  is  necessary  to  keep 
this  point  in  mind  during  the  study  of  his  ethics.  Before  asking  questions, 
understanding  must  come  from  within.  Entering  the  system  is  the  means  of  making  a 
beginning  with  Barth,  as  with  Hegel.  Using  this  method  questions  are  usually 
answered  more  profoundly  than  the  way  in  which  they  have  been  formulated. 
The  defining  moment  of  all,  past,  present  and  future  reality  was  the  entry  of  Christ 
into  humanity,  which  was  a  new  and  unpredictable  event.  When  Barth  compares  the 
entry  of  Jesus  Christ  into  the  world  with  the  entry  of  the  Commendatore  in  his 
beloved  Mozart's  Don  Giovanni,  49  it  was  the  newness  and  unpredictability  of  the 
event  that  he  wished  to  emphasise.  5°  This  unique  phenomenon  necessitated  prophetic 
utterance  as  the  only  possible  form  of  prediction.  The  event  could  only  be  anticipated 
as  that  which  could  not  be  anticipated,  as  by  the  prophet  Isaiah  when  he  declares, 
. 
`Thus  saith  the  Lord 
... 
Remember  ye  not  the  former  things,  neither  consider  the 
things  of  old.  Behold  I  will  do  a  new  thing'.  "  Philosophers,  seers,  astronomers  or 
scientists  could  not  have  foretold  this  prediction.  Human  reason  could  neither 
46  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics  II/1 
47  Anselm  of  Canterbury  Proslogian  2-3 
48  Karl  Barth,  Fides  quaerens  intellectum  :  Ansehn's  Beweis  der  Existenz  Gottes  im  Zusammenhang 
seines  theologischen  Progranuns,  (Munchen  :  Kaiser,  1931) 
49Zwischen  den  Zeiten  2  (1923):  31. 
so  I  am  indebted  to  Professor  Michael  Banner  for  the  acuteness  of  this  observation  see:  Turning  the 
World  Upside  Donn  (and  Some  Other  Taskc  for  Dogmatic  Christian  Ethics.  )  An  inaugural  lecture  from 
the  Department  of  Theology  &  Religious  Studies  King's  College,  London  by  Michael  Banner, 
F.  D.  Maurice  Professor  of  Moral  &  Social  Theology  delivered  on  16  October  1996. 18 
anticipate  nor  define  the  event  of  God's  revelation  or  its  outcome.  Both  the  newness 
and  the  unpredictability  of  the  event  are  the  major  themes  of  Barth's  work.  These 
themes  appear  continuously  from  his  early  revolutionary  commentary  on  St.  Paul's 
Letter  to  the  Romans52  to  the  closing  pages  of  his  magnum  opus  forty  years  later.  " 
The  seriousness  with  which  he  elaborates  these  two  themes,  and  the  way  in  which  he 
pursues  them  relentlessly  to  show  how  reality  is  determined,  coupled  with  the  beauty 
and  elegance  of  the  resulting  theology  make  his  work  worthy  of  study.  However, 
there  is  more  to  reading  Barth  than  simply  the  appreciation  of  his  elegant  exposition. 
He  combines  all  the  aesthetic,  religious  and  ethic  elements  with  style  because  God  is 
their  author.  The  religious  experience  of  reading  him  is  therefore  also  aesthetic  and 
necessitates  an  ethical  response.  The  style  of  writing  reflects  his  acceptance  of  the 
reality  of  God's  revelation  with  thanksgiving  and  joy.  The  style  is  elegant,  form  and 
content  are  one,  and  there  is  no  superfluity  of  language,  no  flamboyance  of  style  and 
no  intrusive  ego.  The  Church  Dogmatics  is  a  classic  text,  which  pursues 
uncompromisingly  the  purity  and  clarity  of  the  truth,  not  only  for  the  joy  of  aesthetics 
but  also  as  a  prophetic  call.  It  is  prophetic,  and  many  consider  it  to  be  the  greatest 
work  of  moral  theology  since  Aquinas. 
Like  Aquinas  Barth  returns  to  the  sources  of  dogmatics:  the  Scriptures  and  the  works 
of  the  early  church  fathers,  and  confronts  the  Post-Enlightenment  condition  of 
alienation.  In  so  doing,  he  goes  back  beyond  the  theologies  of  Luther  and  Calvin  and 
engages  with  Augustine,  Aquinas  and  Bonaventure,  and  is  able  to  reject  from  the 
Reformation  theology  doctrines  that  he  considers  ill  formed.  For  example,  he  is 
willing  to  discard  Luther's  two-kingdom  doctrine  and  its  four  hundred-year-old 
51  Isaiah  43.18-19,  and  65.17f 
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legacy  of  the  division  of  church  and  state.  This  rejection  is  discussed  fully  in  Chapter 
6.  As  a  theologian  writing  in  the  Reformed  Protestant  tradition,  Barth  might  be 
expected  to  move  away  from  Luther,  but  surprisingly  he  treats  Calvin  similarly,  as  he 
is highly  critical  of  Calvin's  natural  theology.  Even  though  Barth,  as  is  well  known,  in 
his  debate  with  Brunner,  rejects  any  form  of  natural  theology  he  does  incorporate  a 
form  of  it  within  his  doctrine  of  creation.  54  The  Word  of  God  received  in  revelation 
does  become  a  form  of  natural  theology.  Chapter  3  discusses  this  point. 
However,  Barth  does  not  stay  within  the  walls  of  the  theological  house  that  he  has 
constructed.  He  takes  his  own  advice  and  walks  through  and  out  the  other  side  into  the 
fresh  air  of  the  world  and  engages  with  people: 
A  good  theologian  does  not  live  in  a  house  of  ideas,  principles  and  methods. 
He  walks  right  through  all  such  buildings  and  always  comes  out  into  the  fresh 
air  again.  He  remains  on  the  way.  " 
Uniquely  Barth  has  seen  and  emphasised,  the  newness  of  the  birth,  death  and 
resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ,  and  how  these  events  have  created  a  boundary,  which 
restricts  reason  within  the  limits  of  human  thought.  Reason  has  thus  been  properly 
determined  by  the  entry  of  God  into  the  world,  and  the  outcome  is both  ontic  and 
noetic.  Thus  defined  and  limited  reason  receives  its  freedom  to  be  that  which  it  is. 
Humanity,  and  its  experience  and  knowledge  are  all  determined  by  these  events. 
Because  these  events  determine  humanity  no  a  priori  philosophical  presuppositions 
may  be  brought  to  the  theological  task.  Natural  theology  is  rejected,  and  must  be  seen 
53  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics. 
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for  what  it  is,  a  human  self-determining  desire,  and  Barth  states  that  revelation  cannot 
be  made  into  a  form  of  natural  theology.  As  revelation  and  its  knowledge  cannot  be 
appropriated,  there  is  no  possibility  of  building  a  body  of  knowledge.  Barth's  work  is 
therefore  a  dogmatic  theology  that  must  be  begun  anew  each  day,  thus  we  cannot  turn 
to  Barth's  work  looking  for  solutions  to  today's  questions.  However,  we  can  look  to 
Barth  for  a  way  to  understand  our  position  and  for  a  description  of  the  moral  space  in 
which  we  act. 
The  newness  of  the  event  of  God's  incarnation  in  Christ  was  not  intended  to  sweep 
away  the  old  creation  that  existed  before  Christ.  Through  his  incarnation,  God 
initiates  a  renewal  of  the  old  creation,  and  forms  a  new  one,  which  establishes  a  new 
relationship  between  God  and  humanity.  This  relationship  is  a  covenant  in  which  God 
has  chosen  men  and  women  as  partners.  A  covenant  is  not  a  contract  as  there  are  no 
preconditions,  and  no  penalty  clauses.  Contracts  are  legally  enforceable  agreements, 
whereas  covenants  are  pure  acts  of  generosity.  Barth  sees  Christian  marriage  as  the 
nearest  human  analogy  to  God's  covenant.  As  covenant  partners  with  God  how 
should  humans  act?  This  is  the  question,  that  Barth  answers  in  his  discussion  of  both 
the  ethical  and  the  moral  dimensions  of  life.  Throughout  his  ethical  writings  Barth 
argues  that  an  ought  proceeds  from  an  is,  for  it  is  only  when  we  know  who  God  is  that 
we  know  how  to  act. 
To  the  question  how  can  we  know  the  God  who  is  completely  other  Barth  replies  that 
we  can  know  God,  because  He  freely  chose  to  enter  human  history.  He  reminds  us 
that  God  is  not  hiding  behind  Jesus  Christ,  and  that  we  are  not  required  to  engage  in 
philosophical  speculation  about  the  possible  attributes  of  an  unknowable  God,  He  has 
chosen  to  reveal  himself  in  the  life,  death  and  resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ.  Therefore, 21 
we  can  know  what  it  is  we  ought  to  do.  The  is  precedes  the  ought.  In  Barth's  phrase, 
`dogmatics  itself  is  ethics  and  ethics  is  also  dogmatics.  "'  The  phrase  asserts,  that  a 
description  of  the  acts  of  God  is  a  description  of  an  action  to  which  certain  human 
action  correctly  and  of  necessity  corresponds,  and  which  thus  creates  it  and  evinces  it. 
Barth's  argument  is  that  revelation  defines  both  itself  and  the  means  by  which  it  is 
received,  as  the  experience  and  the  knowledge  of  the  experience  are  the  revelation. 
Revelation  is  its  own  object  and  creates  its  own  subject.  God's  self-revealing 
revelation  determines  both  ontically  and  noetically  those  to  whom  he  chooses  to  be 
revealed.  The  New  Testament  contains  the  human  records  of  those  who  witnessed  to 
the  revelation  of  the  life,  death  and  resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ.  These  are  Barth's 
presuppositions  and  his  starting  point,  and  from  this  position  he  struggles  with  what 
can  be  said  about  God,  as  God  reveals  Himself  to  men  and  women  as  partners  in  that 
revelation. 
Whilst  at  Marburg  Barth  assimilated  much  of  the  thinking  of  Herrmann  who  was  his 
teacher,  who  tried  to  find  a  middle  path  between  those  two  philosophical  giants, 
Hegel  the  German  idealist  and  Kierkegaard  the  existentialist.  Barth  later  rejected 
existentialism  and  in  his  essay  on  Hegel  repeatedly  draws  attention  to  his  thought: 
Only  someone  who  does  not  understand  Hegel's  philosophy  can  miss  its 
peculiar  greatness.  Again  and  again  we  find  we  must  think  three  times  before 
contradicting  it,  because  we  might  find  that  everything  we  are  tempted  to  say 
in  contradiction  of  it  has  already  been  said  within  it,  and  provided  with  the 
best  possible  answer.  It  is  great  in  two  ways:  first,  looked  at  in  itself,  because 
it  has  seized  upon  and  implemented  an  idea  that  is  at  once  simple  and  all- 
embracing,  the  at  least  relative  truth  of  which  is  self-evident.  It  has  done  this 
so  energetically,  that  whatever  attitude  we  adopt  towards  it  we  cannot  help 
hearing  it  and  coming  to  terms  with  it.  It  is  possible  to  bypass  Fichte  and 
Schelling,  but  it  is  as  impossible  to  pass  by  Hegel,  as  it  is  to  pass  by  Kant. 
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And  the  promissory  nature  of  the  truth  Hegel  enunciated  and  the  ease  with 
which  it  lends  itself  to  equalisation  will  perhaps  be  even  greater  than  the  case 
of  Kant  for  someone  who,  as  a  theologian,  must  finally  say  `No'  to  Hegels' 
Barth  understood  more  clearly  than  most,  that  the  theological  problems  discussed  by 
Hegel  in  the  nineteenth  century  had  not  been  resolved,  but  merely  bypassed.  The 
questions  are: 
What  is  the  proper  relationship  between  faith  and  reason? 
What  is  the  place  of  human  religious  experience? 
How  should  human  freedom  and  autonomy  be  understood? 
In  addition  to  these  questions,  there  is  always,  in  the  science  of  theology,  the  more 
particular,  peculiar  and  intransigent  question  of  how  to  make  a  beginning.  Barth  has 
an  intellectual  debt  to  Hegel  who  discussed  the  questions  and  provided  a  method, 
which  is  simple  in  its  beginning  and  comprehensive  in  its  outcome.  He  has  a  lesser 
debt  to  Kierkegaard,  who  provided  the  insight  that  God  is  wholly  other,  and  the 
concept  of  the  contemporaneity  of  the  Word.  "R 
Barth's  theology  is  an  inverted  mirror  image  of  Hegel.  However,  unlike  Hegel,  he 
offers  no  prolegomena.  Hegel  discussed  a  way  of  moving  from  Kant's  sense  certainty, 
and  evolved  a  way  of  beginning  the  task  of  thinking  about  thinking  which  is  the  task 
of  philosophy.  59  Without  a  similar  form  of  introduction,  reading  Barth  is  conceptually 
difficult.  There  is,  on  his  part,  an  unspoken  assumption  that  the  readers  will  know 
Hegel,  and  be  able  to  unlock  the  text;  sadly,  this  is  not  usually  the  case.  For  Anglo- 
57  Barth,  Protestant  Theology  in  the  Nineteenth  Century:  Its  Background  and  History  p.  396. 
sR  Soren  Kierkegaard,  Philosophical  fragments;  or  a  fragment  of  philosophy  by  Johannes  CJbnacus, 
(Princeton,  N.  J.:  Princeton  University  Press,  1962)  Ch.  4,  and  elsewhere. 23 
American  readers  Hegel  has  long  remained  a  deeply  mysterious  and  difficult 
Continental  European  outside  mainstream  Anglo-American  analytical  thought.  In  the 
main  Anglo-Saxon  theologians  have  disregarded  Hegel.  There  are  exceptions;  Gunton 
refers  to  Hegel,  and  quotes  from  his  Phenomenology  of  Spirit,  in  which  the  reader  is 
taken  from  where  they  are  to  a  place  from  which  they  can  begin.  "°  However,  Gunton 
accuses  Hegel  of  the  sin  of  immediacy,  which  means  God  is  available  to 
consciousness  as  it  thinks  about  itself.  This  is  a  misunderstanding.  A  reading  of  the 
foreword  to  Encyclopaedia  of  Logic,  Hegel's  major  work,  corrects  this  misreading.  " 
God  gives  himself  to  consciousness,  and  only  then  does  he  become  available  to  it. 
Hegel  further  explains  that  the  Spirit,  who  is  experienced  in  consciousness  and 
reflected  on  in  self-consciousness  is  the  second  person  of  the  Trinity.  He  says,  the 
Gospel  accounts  witness  to  the  faith  of  the  disciples  who  had  yet  to  receive  the  gift  of 
Truth.  He  says  faith  was: 
Declared  to  be  only  the  beginning  and  the  fundamental  condition  for  that 
which  was  still  incomplete.  Those  who  believed  in  that  way  still  did  not  have 
the  Spirit;  they  were  to  receive  it.  The  Spirit,  the  truth  itself,  the  Spirit  that 
leads  us  into  all  truth,  comes  only  later  than  that  faith.  2 
Hegel  explains  that  the  gift  of  the  Spirit  at  Pentecost  would  lead  humanity  into  truth 
through  the  process  of  thinking  about  thinking.  He  thought  the  Spirit,  the  third  person 
of  the  Trinity,  would  be  made  manifest  through  philosophy.  Although  Hegel  believed 
his  philosophy  was  true,  he  was  not  so  vain  as  to  believe  it  to  be  unique.  He  thought  a 
philosophy  was  of  its  time,  and  during  his  lifetime  the  Ideal  Absolute  dominated. 
Hegel  believed  philosophy  is  of  its  time  and  Barth  believed  that  theology  was  of  its 
59  G.  V.  F.  Hegel,  The  Phenomenology  of  Spirit,  trans.  by  A.  V.  Millar,  (Oxford:  OUP  1977) 
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time,  and  during  his  lifetime  the  problem  of  human  experience  was  dominant.  Hans 
Urs  von  Balthasar,  a  Roman  Catholic  theologian,  does  appreciate  the  relationship 
between  Barth  and  Hegel  and  in  his  stylistic  and  sensitive  treatment  of  Barth's  work 
says: 
Barth  scales  mountains.  He  has  chosen  for  his  standpoint  a  summit  so  high 
that  faith  can  survey  the  whole  meaning  and  plan  of  the  divine  economy. 
For-inally  considered  this  is  very  similar  to  the  stance  adopted  by 
Schleiermacher  or  Hegel,  although  Barth  never  leaves  the  standpoint  of  pure 
theology  and  never  sketches  out  a  philosophy  as  such  or  metaphysics  that 
could  bridge  the  divide  between  theology  and  philosophy.  What  Barth  has  in 
fact  done  is  to  invert  the  Hegelian  intent  but  in  the  Hegelian  manner:  as  Hegel 
tried  to  absorb  the  assertions  of  theology  into  a  more  comprehensive 
philosophy,  Barth  orders  all  the  paths  of  human  wisdom,  philosophical  and 
religious,  around  the  central  core  of  a  purely  theological  view.  " 
Boyd,  in  an  unpublished  Ph.  D.  thesis,  takes  up  the  theme  of  Barth's  work  being  an 
inverted  image  of  Hegel's  writing  in  his  interesting  discussion  of  the  relationship 
between  German  expressionism  and  the  work  of  artists  and  Barth.  ` 
Barth,  like  Hegel,  is  concerned  with  the  problem  of  making  a  beginning.  Both  search 
for  the  truth  by  beginning  with  Scripture,  and  in  using  dialectic  methods.  Whilst  it  is 
necessary  to  read  Barth  as  part  of  the  tradition  of  German  Idealism,  it  is  also 
important  to  delineate  the  distinctiveness  of  his  thought,  particularly  in  the 
development  of  ethics  from  dogmatics.  To  read  Barth  without  Hegel  can  lead  to  a 
misunderstanding  of  Barth's  methodology.  Both  authors  require  the  reader  to  enter  the 
system  at  any  point  and  a  beginning  will  be  achieved.  Both  their  works  develop  in 
similar  circular  spirals,  which  repeat  themselves  on  different  levels,  and  from 
different  perspectives,  thus  the  beginning  can  be  regained  from  any  starting  point. 
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With  both  theologians,  no  adequate  reading  can  be  undertaken  from  a  neutral  position 
outside  the  systems  they  have  created.  Any  supposed  neutral  position,  which  attempts 
to  transcend  and  judge  the  system  from  an  external  omnipotent  place  of  judgement  is 
a  fantasy  and  leads  to  misreading  and  disappointment.  The  repeated  hostile  criticisms 
of  both  Barth  and  Hegel  from  Anglo-American  analytical  readings  confirm  this  point. 
Hegel  was  investigating  the  movement  of  the  third  person  of  the  Trinity,  the  Holy 
Spirit,  which  is  the  gift  that  brings  truth  into  the  world,  and  becomes  known  through 
the  consciousness  of  experience.  He  says: 
The  human  import  of  consciousness,  which  is based  on  thinking,  does  not 
appear  in  the  for-in  of  thought  straightaway,  but  as  feeling,  intuition, 
representation  -  which  are  forms  that  have  to  be  distinguished  from  thinking 
itself  as  a  for-m.  bs 
If  the  task  of  the  philosopher  is  to  think  about  thinking,  then  he  must  explain  how  the 
knowledge  of  being,  which  comes  into  being  in  consciousness,  becomes  apparent. 
This  process  Hegel  describes  in  the  phrase,  'what  is  actual  is  rational  and  what  is 
rational  is  actual.  '  It  must  be  remembered  that  he  believed  in  the  existence  of  the 
world  of  objects,  and  his  task  was  therefore  to  bring  together  the  real  and  the 
phenomena,  a  task  defined,  and  begun,  but  not  completed,  by  Kant.  In  this  task 
philosophy  and  theology  share  the  same  object,  which  is  the  knowledge  of  the  truth, 
and  both  Barth's  theology  and  Hegel's  philosophy  share  the  belief  that  God  is  Truth. 
The  similarity  between  the  two  theologians  continues  as  both  use  scripture  as  their 
starting  point.  However,  they  choose  different  events  in  scripture  and  use  different 
63  Hans  Urs  von  Balthasar,  The  Theology  of  Karl  Barth:  Exposition  and  Interpretation  trans.  by 
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methodologies  for  their  beginnings.  Hegel  uses  the  recorded  account  of  those  who 
witnessed  the  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit  to  the  Church  at  Pentecost,  which  brought  the 
truth  and  set  them  free.  Barth,  on  the  other  hand,  uses  the  recorded  accounts  of  the 
birth,  death  and  resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ.  Hegel  employs  pneumatology  in  his 
account  whilst  Barth  employs  Christology.  Despite  their  differences  of  approach,  both 
of  their  accounts  are  soundly  grounded  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  and  are 
expositions  of  the  doctrine. 
For  Hegel  reality  is  defined  by  consciousness.  There  is  a  process,  a  dynamic,  which 
expresses  itself  in  the  movement  of  the  dialectic.  The  thing  and  everything  that  is  not 
the  thing  become  combined  in  thought,  until  their  unity  provides  a  new  thing  and  its 
negation.  The  process  constantly  repeats  itself  in  the  negation  of  the  negation  until  it 
becomes  at  home  with  itself  in  pure  thought,  the  Idea. 
For  Barth  there  is  no  teleologically  determined  goal,  because  reality  has  already  been 
defined  by  the  entry  of  Christ  into  the  world.  Here  we  have  the  inversion,  a  mirror 
image  of  Hegel's  beginning.  Barth's  dialectic  holds  together  the  impossible 
possibilities  of  God  and  man,  time  and  eternity,  finite  and  infinite,  and  it  expresses  the 
paradox.  In  Barth's  dialectic,  the  movement  is  not  in  the  dialectic  but  in  the  gradual 
working  out  of  what  must  be  true,  following  Christ's  entry  into  the  world.  Hegel's 
dialectic  on  the  other  hand  has  movement  in  the  synthesis  between  what  is  and  what  is 
not,  which  takes  place  in  thinking  about  thinking.  Barth  insists  there  can  be  no 
synthesis  in  human  thought,  for,  he  says,  it  is  only  through  the  incarnation  of  Jesus 
Christ,  who  is both  God  and  man  that  synthesis  is  possible. 
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We  now  return  to  the  beginning  of  this  introduction  to  take  up  again,  and  examine, 
Barth's  concept  of  knowledge  and  the  place  of  experience.  Hegel  established  the 
universal,  the  `Here'  and  the  `Now'  of  space  and  time,  in  consciousness,  and  the 
awareness  of  them  in  thinking  about  thinking.  '  He  argued  that  philosophy  brings  to 
consciousness  the  awareness  of  itself  and  its  determination  of  actuality. 
Barth  has  inverted  this  position  by  arguing  that  actuality  is  given,  and  its  reception  is 
determined  in  God's  self-revealing  act.  He  says,  following  the  event  of  revelation  that 
the  task  is  to  describe  how  thinking,  determined  by  the  revelation  of  God,  explores 
what  must  now  be  reality.  In  Hegel's  work,  there  is  a  movement,  the  movement  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  in  history  towards  actuality,  whereas  in  Barth's  work,  an  event  in  history, 
the  Incarnation,  has  determined  actuality.  The  theologian's  task  is  to  express  the  event 
in  the  doctrine  of  the  church  in  a  systematic  way,  which  ensures  the  cohesiveness  and 
coherence  of  the  doctrine  and  its  relationship  with  culture  and  intellectual  ideas. 
Therefore,  Barth  in  his  theological  method  defines  reality,  humanity,  and  the  moral 
space  in  which  life  is  acted. 
Barth's  methodology  explores  and  explains  what  must  be  the  case  following  God's 
revelation  in  and  through  the  action  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  In  the  Ethics,  he  investigates 
what  God's  revelation  means  for  humanity.  The  lectures  are  an  examination  of  the 
consequences  of  God's  acts  of  revelation.  He  explains  that  the  event  of  God's  acts  is 
revealed  in  the  three-fold  form  of  creation,  reconciliation  and  redemption  and  that 
they  determine  the  truth  of  all  reality.  God's  act  of  revelation  establishes  that  life  is  a 
gift,  and  His  acts  of  reconciliation,  revealed  through  Jesus  Christ,  institute  the  truth  of 
humanity.  The  Incarnation  of  Jesus  Christ,  he  says,  creates  the  reality  of  the 
See  G.  W.  F.  Hegel,  Phenomenology  of  Spirit,  section  A  pp.  58-79. 28 
relationship  between  God  and  mankind.  The  event  of  God's  act  of  reconciliation,  he 
explains,  establishes  a  covenant  relationship  with  men  and  women.  Barth  emphasises, 
like  no  other  theologian,  the  significance  this  covenant  has  for  man's  actions.  If,  as  he 
says,  the  event  of  God's  revelation  determines  human  then  this  reality  is  accepted  by 
man's  obedience  to  God,  and  thus  forms  the  ethical  act.  God's  self-revelation  in  Jesus 
Christ,  he  says,  determines  the  actions  of  self-determining  men  and  women. 
The  apparent  paradox  in  Barth's  statement,  the  determining  of  self-determining  men 
and  women,  causes  difficulties  for  many  thinkers  in  the  Anglo-American  theological 
tradition.  The  Enlightenment  assigned  a  central  role  to  freedom  in  the  formation  of 
human  identity,  and  consequently  autonomy  became  an  essential  concept  of  that 
freedom.  Thus,  freedom  of  self-determination  determines  the  autonomy  of  human 
individuality.  The  Enlightenment  stresses  that  individual  responsibility  is  the  result  of 
free  autonomous  actions,  and  moral  philosophy,  or  ethics,  is  a  discussion  of  the 
content  of  these  actions.  Human  autonomy  establishes  itself  and  defines  reality  by 
acting  over  against  the  other  and  the  world.  It  is  this  position  that  Barth  challenges  in 
Ethics. 
The  idea,  which  developed  during  the  Enlightenment,  that  the  autonomous  mind  acts 
freely  and  independently,  and  assesses  and  judges  reality,  led  to  the  interpretation  of 
God's  revelation  through  Jesus  Christ  as  a  myth.  The  autonomous  mind,  which 
expresses  itself  in  human  freedom,  dismisses  the  authoritarian  demands  imposed  on  it 
from  an  external  source.  Thus  the  Word  of  God,  as  received  in  the  Decalogue  and  the 
Sermon  on  the  Mount  is  relevant  only  in  as  much  as  it  agrees  with  a  prior  human  view 
and  judgement.  From  this  viewpoint,  philosophical  foundations  become  the  only  basis 29 
for  ethical  judgements,  and  moral  philosophy  becomes  a  discussion  of  values  and  the 
balancing  of  outcomes.  Barth's  moral  theology  however  opposes  this  view.  ' 
His  work  has  had  a  major  influence  on  twentieth  century  theology  as  he  radically 
reinterpreted  our  understanding  of  reality,  humanity  and  of  the  moral  space  in  which 
human  beings  act.  Reality,  he  argues,  is  determined  in  the  threefold  revelation  of  the 
Word  of  God  as  Creator,  Redeemer  and  Reconciler,  and  not  in  presupposed  or  given 
categories  defined  by  consciousness.  For,  he  says,  life  is  God's  gift  and  not  "my  life" 
which  is  a  creation  of  the  self-assertive  ego.  In  theological  ethics,  it  is  the  concrete 
command  of  God  that  defines  the  moral  space,  whereas  in  philosophical  ethics 
abstract  ideas  of  the  good  define  the  moral  space.  His  descriptions  of  reality, 
humanity  and  of  the  moral  space  witness  to  God's  self-revelation  as  an  event  within 
the  Trinitarian  being  of  God.  The  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  is  therefore  both  the  starting 
point  and  the  basis  of  exposition  for  all  of  Barth's  theological  work. 
In  the  Ethics  he  argues  for  a  reinterpretation  of  the  Trinitarian  being  of  God.  He 
rejects  both  the  God  of  classical  theism  and  of  the  theologies  of  immanence.  He 
contends  that  God's  being  is  revealed  in  God's  acts,  as  He  creates,  redeems  and 
reconciles.  God  freely  chooses  to  reveal  himself  in  these  acts,  and  The  New 
Testament  is  the  interpretation  of  those  who  witnessed  God's  revelation  in  Jesus 
Christ. 
There  is  not  another  God  hidden  behind  the  revelation  of  Jesus  Christ,  because  God 
has  chosen  to  be  in  his  becoming.  6s  It  is  the  gift  of  faith  in  and  through  the  Holy  Spirit 
67  On  this  point  Boyd  says:  `The  loss  (or  rejection)  of  the  belief  that  the  human  to/os  is  given  by  a 
particular  act  of  divine  grace  enters  theology  in  the  transformation  of  the  understanding  of  revelation 30 
that  enables  those  who  receive  it  to  accept  the  revelation.  The  Trinity  contains  all  and 
men  and  women  neither  bring  nor  provide  anything.  God  gives  all.  Here  Barth  is 
continuing  to  follow  the  path  between  Hegel  and  Kierkegaard  set  by  his  teacher 
Herrmann.  However,  Barth  decisively  rejects  Herrmann's  beginning  in  immediacy 
and  inner  feeling.  69  God's  immanent  being  is  inseparable  from  his  economic  being, 
and  theology  is  not  required  to  choose  between  an  objective  and  a  subjective 
orientation.  The  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  provides,  `an  answer  to  the  question  of  the 
God  who  reveals  Himself  in  revelation'.  "  The  attention  Barth  gives  to  ontology 
resists  subjectivity  its  reduction  of  theology  to  affective  or  moral  discourse.  He 
follows  Hegel's  logic,  by  keeping  ontology  and  epistemology  together.  Hegel  rejected 
Aristotelian  logic  in  which  form  is  a  given  and  content  can  then  be  provided,  leading 
to  its  application  to  different  situations.  For  Hegel  and  Barth  form  and  content  remain 
united.  Revelation  is  the  dominant  principle  of  Barth's  theological  ethics;  it  is  not  an 
abstract  idea  of  good,  or  a  general  truth.  Revelation  is  an  evert  in  which  ontology  and 
epistemology,  form  and  content  are  united.  Barth  describes  event  in  the  lectures  thus: 
In  accordance  with  the  doctrine  of  revelation  in  the  prolegomena  to  dogmatics 
we  cannot  lay  too  much  stress  on  the  fact  that  the  dominant  principle  of 
theological  ethics,  the.  sanctifying  Word  of  God,  is  to  be  understood  as  an 
event,  a  reality  that  is  not  seen  at  all  unless  it  is  seen  as  a  reality  that  takes 
place.  " 
Throughout  his  theological  development,  Barth  remained  a  committed  realist.  He 
insists  on  the  existence  of  God  as  wholly  other,  and  as  the  source  of  all  knowledge. 
such  that  human  reason  acts  as  a  criterion  by  which  revelation  can  be  measured,  assessed,  judged  and, 
ultimately  rejected'.  `Dogmatics  among  the  ruins',  p.  209. 
611  See  John  WVebster's  introduction  to  the  discussion  in  Eberhard  Jüngel's  God's  Being  Is  in  Becoming. 
69  See  Wilhelm  Herrmann,  The  Communion  of  the  Christian  ºt'ith  God,  Chapter  III  §  27.  'The 
Foundation  of  a  Christian  System  of  Ethics.  '  "It  must  be  clearly  shown  how  far  the  natural  impulse  of 
one  who  is blessed  in  communion  with  God,  is  following  the  tendency  towards  that  which  makes  him 
blessed  when  he  gives  himself  in  hearty  surrender  to  his  neighbour.  " 
70  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics  CD  1/1  pp.  311  f. 
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His  `method'  illustrates  three  significant  points:  the  first  is  the  symbiotic  relationship 
between  dogmatics  and  ethics;  the  second  is  that  there  is  no  system;  and  the  third  is 
that  there  is  no  definitive  human  endeavour,  all  is  prolegomena.  '2 
In  this  `method,  '  where  no  human  thought  is  definitive  and  nothing  can  be  assumed; 
each  day  begins  afresh  with  the  Word  of  God.  Method  establishes  content  as  in 
Barth's  social  philosophy  there  is  no  system.  He  gives  examples,  but  no  system.  For 
example,  he  gives  a  way  of  looking  at  the  State,  but  it  is  not  an  Ideal  State,  and  he 
resolutely  refuses  to  construct  a  human  system  for  that  would  be  to  limit  God's 
freedom  and  establish  human  autonomy. 
In  summary  it  is  clear  that  readings  of  Barth  from  a  position  of  imagined  neutrality 
will  inevitably  fail,  and  the  truth  that  Barth  discusses  will  be  lost  in  fruitless  debates 
about  human  freedom  and  responsibility.  Barth  reminds  the  Church  that  the  truth  is 
that  Christ's  entry  into  the  world  is  a  new  event  that  determines  everything.  It  assures 
our  salvation  and  our  place  as  God's  covenant  partners.  He  says,  our  actions  must 
follow  from  these  events.  The  ethical  question  is  are  our  actions  obedient  to  this 
reality?  Answering  this  question  is,  for  Barth,  the  task  of  Christian  ethics. 
There  are  several  good  reasons  for  continuing  to  study  Barth's  writings.  First,  he  has 
reworked  the  traditions  of  Luther  and  Calvin.  Second,  until  the  questions  raised  by 
him  are  resolved  the  study  of  his  work  is  not  exhausted.  The  study  of  Leibniz,  for 
example,  does  not  stop  simply  because  he  is  a  pre-Enlightenment  figure.  Fourth, 
classical  texts  are  worthy  of  study  because  the  questions  they  ask  need  to  be  reworked 
72  Barth,  The  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  trans.  by  E.  C.  Hoskins,  (London:  OUP,  1933)  p.  10.  [The  Preface  to 
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in  the  language  and  models  of  thought  of  our  time.  Fifth,  and  this  is  the  focus  of  the 
thesis,  new  and  important,  material  on  his  ethics  is  now  available,  which  enables 
modern  scholars  to  predict  the  overall  shape  Barth's  ethics  would  have  taken  had  it 
been  completed  For  example,. 
Since  its  publication,  scholars  have  discussed  the  importance  of  church  Dogmatics, 
and  the  debate  continues.  The  Trinitarian  foundations  of  Barth's  thought  are  the 
subjects  of  several  theses.  Some  theologians  use  material  from  Church  Dogmatics  as 
a  critique  of  modernity,  and  they  call  for  a  re-establishment  of  Christian  foundations 
in  theology.  "  Others  have  drawn  on  Barth  to  establish  a  Trinitarian  foundation  for  the 
re-ordering  of  human  relationships.  "  Some  scholars  read  Barth's  dogmatics  as  an 
ethic  of  the  other,  and  as  the  foundation  of  a  theology  appropriate  for  resolving  ethnic 
conflicts.  "  Others  claim  Barth  as  a  source  of  post-modern  theology.  '  Yet,  despite  all 
this  current  scholarship  on  Barth's  dogmatics  there  is  still  considerable  hostility  to  his 
ethics.  There  are  some  notable  exceptions,  and  this  thesis  refers  to  recent  publications 
on  the  ethics  that  bring  the  richness  of  Barth's  thinking  in  his  theological  ethics  before 
scholars  so,  that  a  re-assessment  may  be  made  of  its  significance. 
73  Colin  Gunton,  The  One,  the  Three  and  the  Many  God,  Creation  and  the  culture  of  Modernity 
(Cambridge,  CUP,  1993) 
7;  Alan  Torrance,  Persons  in  Communion:  An  Essay  on  Trinitarian  Description  and  Hannan 
Participation:  IVith  SpecialReference  to  Volume  One  of  Karl  Barth's  Church  Dogmatics,  (Edinburgh, 
T&T  Clark,  1996) 
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Chapter  2A  reassessment  of  Karl  Barth's  moral  theology 
Discussion  of  Barth's  ethics  has  intensified  recently  in  Anglo-Saxon  theology.  The 
interest  has  been  generated  by  publications  from  the  scholars  Nigel  Biggar,  John 
Webster,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  Bruce  McCormack. 
Biggar  and  Webster  have  argued  for  a  reappraisal  of  Barth's  moral  theology.  ' 
However,  both  moral  theologians,  in  arguing  their  cases,  have  chosen  to  give  little 
attention  to  questions  about  moral  freedom,  which  arise  so  frequently  in  criticisms  of 
Barth's  work.  This  thesis  is  a  contribution  towards  rectifying  that  omission. 
Webster's  work  follows  the  German  Evangelical  theological  tradition  of  Barth  and 
Eberhard  Jüngel.  He  has  translated,  from  the  German  into  English,  some  of  Jüngel's 
writings  and  has  published  commentaries  on  Jüngel's  work.  '  Ringel,  who  is  Professor 
of  Systematic  Theology  and  Philosophy  of  Religion,  at  the  University  of  Tübingen, 
Germany,  is  the  natural  successor  to  Barth,  and  considered  the  world's  foremost 
teacher  and  interpreter  of  his  work.  Webster's  most  recent  writings  have  continued  the 
process  of  integrating  Anglo-American  and  Genpan  theology  the  separation  of  which 
was  discussed  in  the  introduction  to  this  thesis.  In  a  recent  work,  John  Webster  has 
argued  for  a  reappraisal  of  Barth's  ethical  writings'  There  are  two  reasons  that 
support  Webster's  claim.  The  first  is  that  material  on  ethics  by  Barth  has  recently 
1  Webster,  Barth's  Moral  Theology 
Biggar,  The  Hastening  that  Waits 
2  Webster,  God's  Being  is  in  Becoming 
3  Webster,  Berth's  Ethics  of 
Reconciliation 34 
been  published  for  the  first  time,  and  the  second  is  that  there  is  a  new  attitude  towards 
Barth's  work. 
Webster's  claim  is  made  against  the  background  of  a  more  general  reconsideration  of 
Barth's  work  following  the  publication  of  McCormack's  study  on  Barth's  early  work.  ' 
McCormack  argues  that  Barth's  theology  is  dialectical  from  beginning  to  end,  and  not 
as  previously  understood  as  moving  from  dialectic  to  analogy.  Although  there  has 
been  a  renewed  interest  shown  in  Barth's  work,  it  is  nevertheless  true,  as  Webster 
says  that  the  study  of  Barth's  ethics  is  still  in  its  infancy. 
There  are  three  works  by  Barth,  which  have  recently  become  available  in  English. 
The  first  is  Ethics,  published  in  English  in  1981.  This  is  a  translation  by  Bromiley  of 
the  German  edition  of  Barth's  lectures  on  ethics  given  as  courses  at  the  University  of 
Münster  in  1928  and  1929,  and  the  University  of  Bonn  in  1929  and  1930.5  These 
lectures  represent  Barth's  first  systematic  account  of  Christian  ethics.  The  two  sets  of 
lectures  are  published  in  English  as  a  single  volume;  in  German  they  appeared  in  two 
volumes:  Ethik  11928  published  in  1973  and  Ethik  11  1928/1929  in  1978.6 
The  second  work  is,  The  Christian  Life  published  in  English  in  1981.  This  work  is  the 
English  version  of  the  surviving  drafts  of  the  final  unfinished  volume  of  Church 
4  McCormack,  Karl  Barth's  Critically  Realistic  Dialectical  Theology 
5  Karl  Barth,  Ethics,  trans.  by  G.  W.  Bromiley,  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark,  1981) 
6  Karl  Barth,  Ethik  I.  Vorlesung,  Münster,  Sommersemester  1928,  ed.  Dietrich  Braun  (Zurich:  TVZ, 
1973) 
Karl  Barth,  Ethik  II:  Vorlesung,  Münster,  Wintersemester  1928/29,  ed.  Dietrich  Braun  (Zurich:  TVZ, 
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Dogmatics.  Had  it  been  completed  it  would  have  formed  Volume  IV,  Part  4  of 
Church  Dogmatics.  ' 
The  third  work  is  Barth  on  Calvin.  The  first  German  edition  was  published  in  Zurich 
in1922  as  Die  Theologie  Calvin.  The  English  translation  by  Bromiley  was  not 
published  until  1995.8 
These  three  works  provide  evidence  that  Barth's  ethical  concerns  were  consistent 
throughout  his  work  from  the  1928  Ethics  to  the  Fragment  IV/4  The  Christian  Life.  ' 
In  1998,  John  Webster  published  the  second  of  his  works  on  Barth's  moral  theology. 
He  made  the  following  observation  about  the  body  of  material  referred  to  above: 
Close  study  of  Barth's  ethical  writings  is  still  in  its  infancy.  Recent  years  have 
certainly  witnessed  a  number  of  attempts  to  break  down  what  had  become  a 
(largely  Anglo-American)  reading  of  Barth  as  either  indifferent,  or  hostile,  or 
even  incompetent  in  his  approach  to  questions  of  human  moral  action.  Yet  a 
great  deal  of  work  needs  to  be  done.  What  is  required  more  than  anything  else 
is  detailed  study  of  Barth's  writings  which,  by  close  reading  tries  to  display 
the  structure  and  logic  of  his  concerns  without  moving  prematurely  to  making 
judgments  or  pressing  too  early  the  usefulness  (or  lack  of  it)  of  Barth's  work 
for  contemporary  moral  theology.  " 
Webster,  whilst  recognising  there  is  a  case  to  be  answered  against  those  who  claim 
Barth's  theology  leaves  no  room  for  human  self-determined  action  and  therefore  no 
possibility  of  responsibility  for  human  freedom,  does  not  in  his  exposition  specifically 
respond  to  the  critics.  He  says  of  the  recent  publications  in  English  of  Barth's  ethics: 
7  Karl  Barth,  The  Christian  Life,  Church  Dogmatics  IV,  4,  Lecture  Fragments,  trans.  by  G.  W.  Bromiley, 
(Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark,  1981) 
K  Karl  Barth,  The  Theology  of  John  Calvin,  trans.  by  G.  W.  Bromiley,  (Grand  Rapids,  MI:  Eerdmans, 
1995) 
9  The  fragments  from  the  literary  remains  were  published  in  English  in  1981. 
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This  material  calls  into  question  any  idea  that  Barth's  theology  before  the 
Church  Dogmatics  can  be  construed  as  a  kind  of  inhumane  transcendentalism, 
or  that  his  establishment  of  an  independent  theological  stance  did  not  involve 
him  giving  serious  attention  to  ethical  issues.  To  read  these  lectures  is  to  come 
to  see  that  Barth's  response  to  the  theological,  political  and  moral  culture  of 
his  day,  and  his  espousal  of  a  set  of  counter-positions  was  as  much  a  matter  of 
ethics  as  it  was  of  doctrines.  " 
There  is  no  detailed  study  of  Barth's  ethical  writing.  The  recently  published  works,  on 
Barth's  moral  theology,  by  Webster  and  Biggar  have  begun  the  task.  Their  work  has 
stimulated  an  interest  in  reading  Barth's  work  as  moral  theology.  Webster, 
particularly,  has  begun  a  reappraisal  of  Barth.  He  argues  that  the  entire  Barth  corpus 
should  be  readjust  as  much  as  a  work  of  moral  theology  as  a  work  of  dogmatics. 
There  is  much  work  still  to  be  done  both  on  a  detailed  exposition  from  a  close  reading 
of  Barth's  lectures,  and  also  an  engagement  with  Barth's  critics  from  within  the  text. 
The  first  and  most  important  of  the  criticisms  is  the  claim  that  Barth's  ethics  deny  any 
forni  of  human  freedom. 
Biggar,  whilst  acknowledging  the  problem,  brushes  aside  the  question  of  human 
autonomy  and  claims  that  the  question  of  human  moral  freedom  is  merely  an 
anthropological  problem.  Having  dismissed  the  question,  he  published  a  work  on 
Barth's  ethics,  which  has  become  a  standard  work.  '2  Speaking  of  Barth's  conception 
of  determined  freedom  he  says: 
It  is  true,  of  course,  that  the  freedom  to  reject  the  liberating  grace  of  God  is  the 
freedom  to  enter  voluntary  into  bondage.  But  if  the  ultimate  spiritual  and 
moral  commitments  of  human  beings  are  to  retain  their  dignity  and  weight, 
then  it  is  just  such  a  paradoxical  freedom  that  they  must  possess.  At  this  point 
in  his  account  of  human  freedom  we  believe  that  Barth  fails.  13 
1  Webster,  Barth  s  Moral  Theology  p.  2. 
12  Biggar,  The  Hastening  that  Waits 
'3  Biggar,  The  Hastening  that  Waits  pp.  5/6. 37 
McCormack  has  recently  challenged  von  Balthasar's  description  of  Barth'swork  as 
having  two  turning  points.  '  He  says,  `If  there  is  one  point  on  which  all  recent  Barth 
scholarship  agrees  it  is  that  von  Balthasar's  belief  in  a  second  `break'  in  Barth's 
development  cannot  be  sustained.  "'  He  argues  that  von  Balthasar  failed  to  see  Barth's 
use  of  the  dialectic  form  in  Church  Dogmatics  and  therefore  misread  Barth's  use  of 
the  concept  analogiafidei.  Barth's  writing  contains  the  dialectic  form  within  the 
analogia  fidel.  This  dialectic  is  the  relationship  between  God  and  man  that  Barth 
discusses  in  general  ethics  within  the  Doctrine  of  Creation,  and  in  the  special  ethics  of 
The  Doctrines  of  Redemption  and  Reconciliation.  von  Balthasar's  understanding  of 
the  central  concept,  "God  and  Christ,  God  and  man",  without  the  dialectic  form  of  the 
covenant  relationship,  allowed  for  a  reading  of  Barth  which  appeared  to  give  all  to 
God's  Command  and  nothing  to  man  within  the  partnership.  In  addition,  von 
Balthasar  confused  two  different  theological  concepts  and  categories.  In  Barth's  work, 
dialectic  is  a  method,  whereas  analogy  is  a  category,  and  is  an  analogy  of  faith.  These 
observations  are  important  for  any  discussion  about  human  moral  freedom  since  they 
rightly  place  the  emphasis  of  the  dialectic  on  covenant  relationships.  McCormack's 
primary  thesis,  which  is  that  Barth's  work  shows  the  continuation  of  a  critical  realistic 
dialectic  throughout,  has  its  critics. 
Boyd  has  challenged  McCormack's  position  by  pointing  out  that  criticisms  of  von 
Balthasar's  dual  hypothesis  were  made  soon  after  publication  in  1951.16  They  have, 
14  von  Balthasar,  The  Theology  of  Karl  Barth:  Exposition  and  Interpretation  (1992) 
15  McCormack,  Karl  Barth's  critically  realistic  dialectical  theology  p.  14. 
16  Hans  von  Balthasar,  Karl  Barth:  Darstellung  und  Deutung  seiner  Theologie  (Köln:  J.  Hegner,  1951) 38 
says  Boyd,  continued,  since  then,  to  be  part  of  the  debate  about  Barth's  development 
of  dialectical  method.  " 
The  new  material  further  illustrates  that  Barth's  ethical  ideas  in  the  early  work  are,  in 
the  main,  worked  out  and  developed  more  fully  in  the  later  work.  It  provides  the 
evidence  to  show  that  his  ethics  did  not  undergo  the  radical  changes  between  the 
"early  Barth"  and  the  "later  Barth"  that  some  critics  have  wanted  to  find.  Neither  does 
the  new  material  support  the  four-stage  hypothesis  for  Barth's  work  put  forward  by 
Will  Herberg: 
We  have  then  schematically  expressed,  four  Barth's:  (1)  first,  the  "pre- 
Barthian"  Barth  of  the  liberal  period;  (2)  next,  the  "proto-Barthian"  Barth  of 
the  first  edition  of  The  Epistle  to  the  Romans;  (3)  then  the  "early-Barthian" 
Barth  of  the  second  edition  of  The  Epistle  to  the  Romans  (1922)  and  of 
Christian  Dogmatics  (1927);  and  (4)  finally  the  "late-Barthian"  Barth  of  the 
Church  Dogmatics  (1932  to  date).  For  our  purposes,  [social  ethics]  it  is  the 
third  and  fourth  phases  that  are  important,  particularly  the  shift  of  theological 
orientation  between  them.  'R 
It  is  a  central  proposition  of  this  thesis  that  a  study  of  Barth's  theological  writings 
from  1911  to  1965  shows  that  ethics  were  of  central  concern  to  him  from  the 
beginning  to  the  end  of  his  work,  and  were  the  primary  force  that  shaped  the  Church 
Dogmatics.  At  the  beginning  of  his  career  Barth  engaged  with  theological  social 
ethics  and  in  the  autumn  of  1911  gave  a  series  of  lectures  with  the  title,  `Jesus  Christ 
and  the  Social  Movement.  79  He  continued  to  write  and  speak  about  theological  social 
ethics  until  his  death.  In  addition,  the  view  that  his  ethics  did  not  undergo  a  radical 
change  but  followed  a  process  of  development  is  central  to  the  argument  of  this  thesis. 
17  Boyd,  Dogmatics  Among  the  Ruins 
'R  See  Will  Herberg,  the  introductory  essay  `The  Social  Philosophy  of  Karl  Barth,  '  in  Community, 
State,  and  Church  (1968)  p.  15. 39 
Recently  published  works  show  that  the  concept  of  development,  not  that  of  stages  or 
breaks,  is  the  only  satisfactory  way  of  interpreting  the  evidence.  The  materi-l  does  not 
support  McCormack's  view  of  Barth's  early  rejection  of  Herrmann's  neo-Kantianism. 
19  The  correspondence  following  in  the  local  newspaper  is  discussed  in  Hunsinger,  Karl  Barth  and 
Radical  Politics,  pp.  19-45.  For  detailed  and  informative  discussions  of  the  history  of  Barth's  ethical 
development  see  McCormack,  Karl  Barth's  Critical  Realistic  Dialectical  Theology  pp.  78-92. 40 
Chapter  3  The  Münster  and  Bonn  Ethics 
Karl  Barth  was  Professor  of  Dogmatics  and  New  Testament  Exegesis  at  the 
University  of  Münster  between  October  1925  and  March  1930.  He  delivered  a  series 
of  lectures  on  ethics  in  the  autumn  of  1928,  '  and  the  winter  of  1929.2  Barth  gives  the 
date  of  the  first  lecture  as  the  3`d  November  1928'  He  repeated  the  lectures  at  Bonn 
with  some  additional  material  in  the  summer  and  winter  of  1930.  '  At  Münster  Barth 
was  in  debate  with  G.  Wünsch  his  colleague,  '  Heinrich  Barth  his  brother,  the 
philosopher  Heinrich  Scholz,  the  religious  philosopher  Heinrich  Knittermeyer,  and 
with  leading  representatives of  Roman  Catholic  theology.  '  In  addition,  from  1927,  he 
was  a  regular  member  of  a  theological  group  composed  largely  of  lay  Catholics. 
Münster  is  a  predominantly  Roman  Catholic  town,  unlike  Göttingen  where  he  had 
previously  lived.  McCormack  reports  that  the  group  included  the  following: 
Dr  Bernard  Rosenmüller  (an  instructor  in  philosophy  of  religion  in  the 
Münster  philosophy  faculty)  and  his  wife;  Dr  G  Hasenkamp  (the  editor  of  the 
Miinsterischen  Anzeiger)  and  his  wife;  and  the  Catholic  student  pastor  Dr 
Robert  Grosche.  There  were  occasional  visitors  such  as  the  Catholic 
philosopher  of  religion,  Theodore  Steinbüchel.  ' 
1  Barth,  Ethik  I 
2  Barth,  Ethik  II 
3  See  the  letter  K.  B.  to  E.  Th  (Münster)  in  Revolutionary  Theology  in  the  Making.  Barth  Thurneysen 
Correspondence  1914-1925  p.  247. 
°  Barth,  Ethics 
5  G.  Wünsch  published,  Theo%  Ethik  in  1925  see  a  reference  to  the  work  in  CD  11/2  p.  534. 
6  Dietrich  Braun,  Editor's  Preface,  Ethics  p  A. 
7  McCormack,  Karl  Barth's  Critically  Realistic  Dialectical  Theology  p.  377. 41 
Barth  invited  the  Jesuit  theologian  Erich  Przywara,  who  was  von  Balthasar's  teacher, 
to  give  an  address  in  Münster  in  February  1929.  '  This  event  shows  B^rth  was  in  an 
ecumenical  dialogue  with  Roman  Catholics,  which  was  remarkable,  especially  when 
considered  alongside  the  anti-Catholic  polemic  of  Herrmann,  who  had  been  his 
teacher  at  Marburg.  '  Further  evidence  of  Barth's  relationship  with  Przywara  also 
appears  in  his  response  to  Emil  Brunner,  "  in  which  he  reprimands  Brunner  for  not 
understanding  the  Roman  Catholic  position  on  prevenient  grace,  saying: 
If  he  had  derived  his  information  from  the  works  of  E.  Przywara  he  would 
have  found  that  this  great  exponent  of  the  doctrine  of  analogy  long  ago  used  a 
phrase  of  the  fourth  Lateran  Council  and  also  the  whole  Kierkegaardian 
_ 
dialectic  to  interpret  the  ability  to  despair  and  real  despair  in  a  Roman 
Catholic  sense.  For  Przywara  maintains  that  this  correlation  is  included  and 
preserved  in  the  Augustinian-Thomist  scheme  of  natura,  gratia  praeveniens 
and  gratia  gratum  faciens.  He  not  only  did  but  he  could  justifiably  interpret  it 
in  a  Roman  Catholic  sense.  " 
The  content  of  the  lectures  reflects  these  debates,  and  reading  them  is  to  engage  with 
both  Barth  and  his  dialogue  partners.  They  open  with  a  discussion  of  the  knowledge, 
form  and  content  of  ethics.  In  the  first  lecture,  he  defines  ethics  as  a  component  of  the 
Christian  religion,  and  from  this  definition  he  argues  that  it  follows  that  ethics  is  a 
theological  discipline  and  that  the  object  of  study  is  the  goodness  of  human  conduct. 
He  opens  his  discussion  by  defining  ethics  as  a  science: 
8  Erich  Przywara,  `Das  katholische  Kirchenprinzip',  Zwischen  den  Zeiten,  7  (1929)  see  McCormack, 
Karl  Barth  's  Critically  Realistic  Dialectical  Theology  p.  383. 
9  Wilhelm  Herrmann,  The  Communion  of  the  Christian  with  God  Described  on  the  basis  ofLuther's 
Statements,  section  28  `Eternal  Life  in  Bearing  the  Cross  and  in  One's  Moral  Calling,  '  The  first  edition 
was published  in  Marburg  in  1886  and  translated  into  English  in  1895.  This  passage  is  taken  from  the 
second  English  edition  translated  by  J.  Sandys  Stanton  from  the  fourth  German  edition  of  1903  and 
published  in  1906,  see  chapter  1  pp.  19  -  51. 
10  "No!  Answer  to  Emil  Brunner",  in  Natural  Theology  (1934) 
11  Barth  and  Brunner,  Natural  Theology,,  p.  116. 42 
Ethics  is  the  correctness  of  the  Christian's  Christianity,  its  validity,  origin, 
and  wvor-th.  The  goodness  of  human  conduct  can  be  sought  only  in  the 
goodness  of  the  Word  addressed  to  man.  12 
He  argues  that  theological  ethics  is  a  science,  which  is  auxiliary  to  the  science  of 
dogmatics.  It  is  a  science  because  it  has  an  object  of  study  and  a  method  of  study.  Its 
object  of  study  is  the  goodness  of  human  conduct,  and  its  method  of  study  is  human 
reflection  on  God's  revelation. 
Scientific  disciplines  make  knowledge  claims  about  their  objects  of  study,  and  they 
use  appropriate  methods  to  collect  and  validate  that  knowledge.  Barth  applies  these 
criteria  to  theological  ethics,  which  he  claims  is  a  science.  He  says  if  the  object  of 
study  is  `the  question  of  the  goodness  of  human  conduct,  73then  knowledge  of  the 
object  of  study  is  `the  special  elucidation  of  the  doctrine  of  sanctification.  "'  The 
means  of  validation  is  `the  reflection  on  how  far  the  Word  of  God  proclaimed  and 
accepted  in  Christian  preaching  effects  a  definite  claiming  of  man.  "5  Through  his 
definition  of  ethics  and  the  object  of  study,  and  crucially,  the  method  and  form  of 
knowledge  Barth  places  the  task  of  the  study  of  theological  ethics  firmly  within  the 
church.  His  definitions  define  the  limits  of  the  task  and  suggest  methods  that  result  in 
appropriate  validation.  Here  Barth  is  developing  a  new  foundation  and  a  new 
epistemology  for  Christian  theological  ethics.  By  being  scientific  in  methodology  and 
logical  in  exposition  he  is  reacting  against  the  prevailing  cultural  understanding  of 
Christian  ethics. 
1'  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  15. 
13  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  3. 
14  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  3. 
15  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  3. 43 
Barth's  time  at  Münster  coincided  with  a  period  of  interest  in  existentialism,  during 
which  Kierkegaard's  thinking  received  a  renaissance.  Schleiermacher  and  Herrmann 
reflect  this  appeal,  and  Barth  had  read  both  of  them  when  a  student  in  Berlin.  "  A 
further  existentialist  influence  was  Thurneysen,  Barth's  life-long  friend,  who  was  a 
disciple  of  Troeltsch.  "  It  was  a  point  in  time  when  dogmatics,  it  seemed,  had  been  lost 
in  ethics. 
By  1922  the  second  edition  of  Der  Römerbrief  had  been  published  inaugurating  what 
came  to  be  called  "the  theology  of  crisis"  or  "dialectical  theology.  ""  Whilst  the  Ethics 
of  1928  do  not  belong  completely  to  the  dialectic  phase  of  Romans  neither  do  they 
completely  embrace  the  principle  of  analogy  evident  in  Church  Dogmatics.  Braun,  in 
the  Editor's  Preface  to  Ethics  lucidly  suggests  that  they  form  a  bridge,  which  links  the 
1922  essay  Das  Problem  der  Ethik  in  der  Gegenwart  to  the  Church  Dogmatics  of 
1928.19  However  seductive  the  idea  of  a  bridge  is,  it  should  not  be  overlooked  that 
Ethics  contains  examples  of  both  dialectic  method  as  form  and  of  analogy  as  content. 
In  the  past  scholars  have  over  emphasised  the  idea  that  Barth  moved  from  dialectic  to 
analogy  in  his  theological  method.  20  Some  caution  is  necessary  therefore  in  accepting 
Braun's  "bridge"  idea  although  his  suggestion  is helpful. 
Barth's  intellectual  debt  to  Hegel  is  a  major  theme  of  this  thesis  and  the  differences  in 
their  dialectic  need  to  be  examined  at  this  point.  They  differ  in  two  important  and 
16  Friedrich  Schleiermacher's  Speeches  on  Religion  to  its  Cultured  Despisers  and  Wilhelm  Herrmann's 
Ethik. 
17  See  McCormack,  Karl  Barth's  Critically  Realistic  Dialectical  Theology  pp.  37-8. 
'g  Barth,  Der  Römerbrief,  2°d  edn,  (Munich,  1922) 
19  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  vii. 
20  See  McCormack,  Karl  Barth's  Critically  Realistic  Dialectical  Theology  for  a  criticism  of  the 
paradigm  that  Barth  moved  from  dialectic  method  to  analogy. 44 
distinctive  ways:  firstly,  for  Barth  there  is  no  synthesis  in  human  thought  and 
secondly,  the  dialectic  does  not  describe  movement  toward-  the  Idea. 
Hegel's  dialectic  describes  the  way  things  appear,  as  consciousness  becomes  aware  of 
itself  in  self-consciousness.  Throughout  this  process,  each  sense  impression,  whether 
recognised  in  consciousness  as  thought,  feeling,  or  intuition,  realises  the  necessity  that 
it  includes  everything  that  is  not  the  thought  in  itself.  Consequently,  sense  impression 
is  not  as  reliable  as  previously  supposed,  since  it  breaks  down  in  a  process  of  thesis 
and  antithesis,  only  to  find  that  the  third  position  of  synthesis  breaks  down  under  the 
same  recognition.  Thus  in  Hegel's  dialectic,  there  is  movement  towards  a  synthesis  in 
the  Idea.  Nature  and  spirit  become  reconciled  when  the  Spirit  is  at  home  with  itself.  21 
Of  course,  for  Barth,  reconciliation  has  already  taken  place  in  God's  decision  to 
reveal  Himself  as  God  the  creator,  God  the  redeemer  and  God  the  reconciler. 
Therefore,  the  dialectic  has  no  necessity  to  describe  movement;  synthesis  is  not 
possible  in  human  reason,  because  it  has  occurred  for  all  time  in  the  Incarnation  of 
Jesus  Christ.  When  he  argues  that  God's  reality  cannot  be  made  into  a  system,  saying: 
`God's  reality,  a  reality  we  do  not  control,  absolute  actual  reality  cannot  be  used  to 
form  a  system',  he  means  by  the  word  "system"  a  concept  that  has  its  origin  in  a 
single  idea.  Hegel  gives  a  system;  whereas  Barth  points  to  a  way,  saying: 
The  one  Word  is  God's  own  Word  which  we  cannot  speak  but  can  only  hear 
spoken  to  us.  And  what  we  hear  is  threefold.  This  is  why  we  cannot  make  of  it 
a  system.  If  it  were  a  system,  we  should  have  to  trace  it  back  to  one  word.  A 
system  has  a  central  point  or  cardinal  statement  from  which  all  the  rest  can  be 
deduced.  The  reality  of  God's  Word  is,  of  course,  the  central  point  on  which 
everything  turns  here.  We,  however,  have  no  word  for  this  reality.  Naturally 
we  can  and  must  recognise  it  as  such  but  we  have  only  words  relating  to  it  and 
`1  Hans-George  Gadamer,  Hegel's  Dialectic,  trans  by  P.  Smith  (New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press, 
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not  a  word  for  it.  These  words  are  creation,  reconciliation,  and  redemption. 
They  do  not  denote  a  system  but  a  way.  2- 
Barth  is  emphasising  that  we  do  not  have  at  our  disposal  the  synthesis.  God  is  the 
synthesis  but  not  a  synthesis  that  we  have  made  or  can  make.  ='  Reason's  task  is  not 
synthesis  but  the  description  of  the  event,  which  is  the  mystery  of  how  God  and 
humankind  are  held  in  eternal  unity  in  Jesus  Christ.  Thus,  Barth's  dialectic  describes 
not  movement  but  a  paradox. 
Even  with  these  differences  there  are  similarities  between  the  dialectics  of  Hegel  and 
Barth  that  need  to  be  examined.  Readers  of  Ethics  may  want  to  apply  Gadamer's 
comment  on  Hegel's  dialectic  to  their  understanding  of  Barth's  dialectic: 
Hegel's  dialectic  is  a  continual  source  of  irritation.  Even  one  who  has 
succeeded  in  making  his  way  through  the  tumultuous  logic  of  Plato's 
Parmenides  has  mixed  feelings  about  it  -  his  sense  of  logic  is  offended;  yet  he 
feels  speculative  exhilaration  at  the  same  time.  " 
Barth's  dialectic  describes  that  which  already  has  been  accomplished.  It  is  not  a 
movement  towards,  but  the  consequence  of  an  event.  God's  being  goes  before  and 
theological  thinking  follows.  God's  being  is  prevenient  as  it  proceeds,  and  precedes 
human  inquiry.  The  differentiation  that  is  made  here  between  being  and  act  is 
intended  logically  but  not  ontologically.  Webster  says,  `Barth  does  not  ask  what  it 
means  to  speak  of  God,  but,  rather,  in  what  sense  God  must  be  spoken  of  in  order  that 
our  speaking  is  about  God.  '25  Here  Barth  follows  Hegel's  logic  by  keeping  ontology 
and  epistemology  together  within  the  concept  of  event.  He  differs  from  Hegel  in  that 
he  insists  that  the  event  is  not  a  unity  from  which  a  system  evolves.  His  dialectic 
22  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  53. 
23  Barth,  Ethics  p.  54. 
24  Gadamer,  Hegel's  Dialectic,  p.  3. 46 
describes  a  mutually  regarding  pair  which  are  distinct  and  separate.  The  dialectic  pair 
is held  together  in  a  paradox  not  of  a  necessity  but  of  decision;  each  is  an  analogy  of 
the  incarnation  in  which  God  and  man  are  united  in  Christ. 
Both  Barth  and  Hegel  believe  that  the  truth  of  an  object  is  expressed  in  its  form  and 
content  and  both  are  necessary  to  the  knowledge  claimed.  They  both  describe  an 
object  by  what  it  is,  and  by  what  it  is  not;  that  is  both  the  negative  and  the  positive.  26 
The  dialectic  is  both  the  form  and  the  content  of  the  statement.  The  truth  of  the  object 
cannot  be  stated  as  a  proposition  which  is  either  true  or  false.  Propositions  give  the 
form  in  which  truth  is  stated  and  which  is  later  to  be  filled  with  content.  A  pre- 
existing  form  which  can  be  applied  to  different  types  of  content  is  not  acceptable  to 
either  Barth  or  to  Hegel  as  a  method  appropriate  to  the  object  of  their  study.  They 
describe  statements  not  as  propositional  but  as  dialectical  in  which  the  negative 
requires  the  positive  and  the  positive  requires  the  negative.  The  dialectic  then 
becomes  the  appropriate  form  for  expressing  the  truth  of  the  object.  They  both  believe 
that  religion  and  philosophy  have  the  same  object,  which  is  the  truth,  and  both  believe 
God  is  the  truth.  However,  for  Barth,  the  Word  of  God  addressed  to  man  in  Jesus 
Christ  is  the  revealed  truth  whereas  for  Hegel  the  truth  evolves  in  the  Spirit's  self- 
consciousness  of  itself  through  history. 
A  further  important  divergence  between  Hegel  and  Barth  is  in  their  approach  to  the 
Doctrine  of  the  Trinity. 
25  Webster,  God's  Being  Is  in  Becoming,  p.  1. 
26  Hegel  Phenomennology  ofSpirit,  pp.  58-66. 47 
Hegel  considers  the  task  as  philosophical  whilst  Barth  understands  it  as  theological. 
Hegel  understands  the  movement  of  the  Spirit  bec"ming  at  home  with  itself  as  the 
process  of  thinking  about  thinking,  which  is  therefore  a  philosophical  problem. 
Barth  on  the  other  hand,  sees  the  thinking  about  the  being  of  God  that  follows  God's 
being  as  a  theological  problem.  His  theological  methodology  describes  the  claiming 
of  man  by  the  Word  of  God,  as  God's  commission.  The  commission  includes  man's 
task,  which  is his  presentation  of  obedience  to  God's  Word.  The  task  of  theological 
ethics  is  the  description  of  this  presentation.  2'  He  further  states  that  the  commission 
creates  the  methodology,  which  is  appropriate  in  form,  content  and  method.  This 
point  is  significant  because  critics  of  Barth's  ethics  have  not  considered  the  suitability 
of  methodology,  as  they  assume  that  philosophical  methodologies  are  appropriate  for 
the  study  of  theological  ethics.  In  addition,  sufficient  consideration  has  not  been  taken 
of  Barth's  specific  theological  use  of  the  concept  of  knowledge,  which  is  discussed 
later  in  the  thesis.  =R  Barth's  critics  have  misread  him  on  this  point,  and  this 
misreading,  it  must  be  emphasised,  have  led  to  gross  misunderstandings.  29 
Barth  explains  his  methodology  in  section  three  of  the  introduction  to  the  lectures,  and 
its  significance  is  explained  in  three  sections: 
1.  The  claiming  as  God's  creature. 
2.  The  claiming  as  a  pardoned  sinner. 
3.  The  claiming  as  the  heir  to  the  kingdom  of  God. 
27  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  45. 
`R  Chapter  7,  sections  7.1,7.2  and  7.3. 
29  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  45. 48 
Although  expounded  in  sequence  the  three  sections  can  be  seen  as  viewpoints  of  one 
object.  Each  viewpoint  is  further  explored  in  f'ur  sub-divisions: 
1.  The  uniqueness  of  the  ethical  standpoint. 
2.  The  normative  form  of  the  noetic  basis. 
3.  The  decisive  content  of  the  ethical  command. 
4.  The  fulfilment  of  the  ethical  demand. 
Barth's  explanation  of  his  methodology  unfolds  from,  `what  must  be  the  case',  and 
continues  by  elucidating  the  consequences.  Two  points  follow;  the  first  is  that,  `the 
way  in  which  the  questions  are  to  be  raised  and  answered  is  not  a  formal  matter  but  a 
matter  of  finding  the  right  basic  concepts"'  and  the  second  is  the  structure  of  the 
task,  `the  Word  of  God  subject  of  the  claiming  man,  as  the  command  that  sanctifies 
him'.  "  Therefore  theological  ethics  seeks  and  finds  the  goodness  of  human  conduct 
in  the  event  of  an  act  of  God  himself  toward  man,  an  act  of  his  speech  and  self- 
revelation  to  him.  The  `good'  is  obedience  to  this  reality.  The  concept  of  event, 
which  Barth  introduces  in  the  Ethics,  is  developed  further  in  Chinch  Dogmatics  as 
an  act  in  which  being  becomes  and  becoming  is  a  function  of  God.  God's  being  is 
located  in  the  event  of  God's  coming  into  the  world.  T.  F.  Torrance  describes  Barth's 
complex  ideas  about  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  clearly: 
The  fact  that  in  the  incarnation  God  became  man  without  ceasing  to  be  God, 
tells  us  that  his  nature  is  characterised  by  both  repose  and  movement,  and  that 
his  eternal  Being  is  also  a  divine  Becoming.  This  does  not  mean  that  God  ever 
becomes  other  than  he  eternally  is  or  that  he  passes  over  from  becoming  into 
being  something  else,  but  rather  that  he  continues  unceasingly  to  be  what  he 
30  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  49. 
31  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  61. 49 
always  is  and  ever  will  be  in  the  living  movement  of  his  eternal  Being.  His 
Becoming  is  not  a  becoming  on  the  way  toward  being  or  towards  a  fullness  of 
being,  but  is  the  eternal  fullness  and  the  overflowing  of  his  eternal  unlimited 
Being.  Becoming  expresses  the  dynamic  nature  of  his  Being.  His  Becoming 
is,  as  it  were,  the  other  side  of  his  Being,  and  his  Being  is  the  other  side  of  his 
Becoming.  His  Becoming  is his  Being  in  movement  and  his  Being  in 
movement  is  his  Becoming.  32 
Torrance's  elucidation  of  Barth's  thinking  on  the  Trinity  finds  a  way  into 
understanding  Barth's  concept  of  the  event.  In  his  own  words  Barth  says: 
In  accordance  with  the  doctrine  of  revelation  in  the  prolegomena  to  dogmatics 
we  cannot  lay  too  much  stress  on  the  fact  that  the  dominant  principle  of 
theological  ethics,  the  sanctifying  Word  of  God,  is  to  be  understood  as  an 
event,  a  reality  that  takes  place.  In  ethics  no  less  than  dogmatics  God's  Word 
is  not  a  general  truth  which  can  be  generally  perceived  from  the  safe  harbour 
of  theoretical  contemplation.  Nor  is  it  a  being  from  which  an  imperative  may 
be  comfortably  deduced.  God's  Word  gives  itself  to  be  known,  and  in  so 
doing  is heard,  man  is  made  responsible,  and  his  acts  take  place  in  that 
confrontation.  The  Word  of  God  is  the  Word  of  God  only  in  act.  The  Word  of 
God  is  decision.  God  acts.  Only  with  reference  to  that  reality  which  is  not 
general  but  highly  specific  can  theological  ethics  venture  to  answer  the  ethical 
question.  Its  theory  is  meant  only  as  the  theory  of  this  practice  33 
Here  we  see  that  Barth  shows  particular  awareness  of  the  problems  of  ontology.  It  is 
important  to  recognise  that  he  keeps  ontology  and  epistemology  together  in  the 
concept  of  event.  As  Webster  says  the  concept  of  event  `prevents  a  subjective 
reduction  of  theology  to  affective  or  moral  discourse'.  " 
In  the  lectures  Barth  states  that  the  events  of  the  life,  death  and  resurrection  of  Jesus 
Christ  place  `life  under  a  three-fold  necessity',  which  God  commands  as  God  the 
creator,  God  the  reconciler  and  God  the  redeemer. 
3'  T.  F.  Torrance,  The  Christian  Doctrine  of  God  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark,  1996)  p.  242. 
33  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  50. 
34  Webster  in  God's  Being  Is  in  Becoming  p.  xx. 50 
The  first  command,  from  God  the  creator  defines  the  necessity  of  the  first  event, 
which  is  the  life  that  God  gives  each  ind-eidual.  These  are  Barth's  original  italics,  and 
they  emphasise  the  importance  for  him  of  the  concepts  of  life  and  necessity  when 
defining  the  event  of  God's  command  as  God  the  creator.  Barth  wants  us  to 
understand  these  words  in  this  specific  usage.  From  the  necessity  of  life  as  an  event  of 
God  the  creator  it  follows  that  life  is  a  gift  and  not  a  possession.  This  important 
distinction  is  relevant  to  the  foundation  of  Christian  ethics  as  it  establishes  them  as  a 
theological  ethic.  Radically,  he  does  not  begin  his  definition  of  the  good  in 
philosophical  discourse.  It  is  to  be  sought  first  in  the  reality  of  human  existence,  and 
not  in  the  classical  virtues,  because,  `this  existence  rests  on  God's  creation  and 
therefore  on  his  will'  35 
The  second  necessity,  which  comes  from  the  command  of  God  the  reconciler,  is  the 
necessity  of  law. 
The  third  necessity,  which  comes  from  the  command  of  God  the  redeemer,  is  the 
necessity  of  promise. 
Barth  continues  by  outlining  that  within  these  three  necessities  there  are  three  areas  in 
which  the  distinctiveness  of  the  specific  knowledge  of  the  claims  of  God  the  creator, 
God  the  reconciler  and  God  the  redeemer  are  worked  out. 
The  first  is  the  living  of  a  life  whose  ends  are  totally  determined. 
35  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  55. 51 
The  second  is  the  necessity  of  the  law  as  human  authority  as  it  encounters  us.  He  says 
our,  `conduct  is  under  the  contradicti^n,  direction,  and  instruction  of  fellowmen  who 
are  superior  to  us  because  they  meet  us  with  authority.  '  This  authority,  `determined  as 
the  law  of  the  good  is  necessarily  the  divine  command  which  strives  against  us  and 
which  we  cannot  refuse  to  accept  as  such.  '  Here  we  see  Barth  placing  both  the  law 
and  those  in  authority  as  part  of  the  divine  command.  Although  this  places  a  necessity 
on  individuals  to  obey  the  law  it  places  a  greater  responsibility  on  those  who  exercise 
authority,  as  they  are  to  respond  in  obedience  to  the  divine  command  and  recognise 
they  are  part  of  that  divine  command. 
The  third  necessity  is  the  distinctiveness  of  the  threefold  command  to  the  place  given 
eschatologically  to  conscience.  By  conscience  Barth  does  not  mean  a  pre-existing 
inner  voice  which  prompts  us  to  do  the  good  but  rather,  `the  necessity  of  promise,  in 
the  voice  of  our  conscience'.  " 
It  is  at  this  point  in  the  lectures  that  `order'  appears  for  the  first  time  in  the  statement, 
`The  command  of  God  the  Creator,  the  necessity  of  life,  is  obviously  in  content  the 
necessity  and  command  of  order".  The  `obviously'  here  refers  to  Barth's  earlier 
comment  claiming  that  he  is  following  a  well-known  path  of  reformation  theology. 
He  wants  his  audience  to  accept  that  his  argument  is  a  return  to  the  true  teaching  of 
the  Reformers.  A  tradition  that  he  thinks  has  been  lost  through  the  existentialist 
emphasis  on  inner  experience. 
36  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  57. 
37  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  57. 52 
How  does  the  event  of  God's  Word  as  event,  relate  to  the  existence  of  the  command 
of  God  as  orders  of  creation?  Is  tr°  event  of  God's  Word  constrained  by  the  natural 
theology  of  orders?  Barth  resolved  this  inconsistency  in  1942  in  a  discussion  on 
divine  election  in  which  he  undertakes  a  detailed  examination  of  the  history  of  the 
doctrine  of  predestination  and  concludes  that  election  is  part  of  the  doctrine  of  God;  a 
unique  position  to  take  within  Reformed  Christian  theology.  3R  A  consequence  of  this 
position  is  the  rejection  of  any  form  of  self-righteousness  as  for  example  in  the 
following  of  the  pre-existing  orders  of  creation.  However  this  was  not  his  position  in 
the  lectures  in  which  orders  were  still  an  important  point  of  his  argument. 
He  refused  to  allow  publication  of  the  lectures  during  his  lifetime.  The  reason  is  his 
use  of  the  first  orders  of  creation  in  Ethics  I.  These  orders  of  creation  are  work, 
marriage,  and  the  family,  followed  by  equality  and  leadership,  and  are  the  principles 
that  guide  human  action  that  are  grounded  in  culture  and  exist  before  revelation.  39  The 
concept  of  order  he  introduces  earlier  by  discussing  the  question:  `what  does  God 
want  in  claiming  us  for  himself?  4°  He  answers  by  referring  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
threefold  use  of  the  law  which  is  a  well-known  theme  of  reformation  theology.  In  this 
law  both  Christian  necessity  and  the  Christian  content  of  God's  law  are  fully 
described  as  coming  from  the  command  of  God  the  Creator.  The  necessity  of  life  is 
therefore  part  of  the  content  of  the  command  of  order  :  41  In  the  original  text  he  uses  the 
word  "Ordnung"  which  can  be  translated  as  either  "order"  or  "ordinance".  "Ordnung" 
refers  to  the  natural  law  and  not  the  revealed  law. 
3"  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics  11/2  pp.  60-76. 
39  Barth,  Ethics,  Chapter  2,  'The  Command  of  God  the  Creator'. 
40  Barth,  Ethics,  pp.  45-61. 
41  Barth,  Ethics,  section  §3,  "The  Way  of  theological  ethics.  "  p.  57. 53 
Barth  quickly  moves  on  to  tell  us  that  the  natural  law  is  confirmed  and  indeed  only 
becomes  established  through  revelation.  In  the  first  necessity,  God  as  creator,  Barth  is 
concerned  with  the  law  of  nature  and  he  says,  `There  is  the  command  of  law  but  what 
occupies  us  here  is  materially  the  problem  of  the  law  of  nature  which  is  not  set  aside 
but  confirmed  and  established  by  revelation'.  ''  Here  we  see  as  late  as  1931  in  Barth's 
theology  the  confirmation  of  natural  theology  by  revelation,  not  set  aside,  but 
confirmed  and  established  by  revelation.  This  is  exactly  the  position  taken  by 
Herrmann  in  his  discussion  about  the  natives  of  New  Holland.  They  have,  he  says,  the 
innate  capacity  to  receive  revelation  without  which  evangelism  would  have  been 
ineffectual.  Herrmann's  influence  remained  in  Barth's  work  at  least  until  1931. 
Therefore  McCormack's  claim  that  the  break  with  Herrmann's  liberalism  occurred  in 
1915  cannot  be  upheld.  "  Four  years  later  Brunner  wrote  in  a  similar  way  when  he 
said: 
But  in  faith,  taking  our  stand  upon  the  revelation  in  Jesus  Christ,  we  shall  not 
be  able  to  avoid  speaking  of  a  double  revelation:  one  in  creation  which  only 
he  can  recognise  in  all  its  magnitude,  whose  eyes  have  been  opened  by  Christ; 
and  of  a  second  in  Jesus  Christ  in  whose  bright  light  he  can  clearly  perceive 
the  former.  " 
Even  the  most  perfect  theology  will  in  the  main  be  unable  to  get  beyond  the 
double  statement  that  as  concerns  the  heathen,  God  did  not  leave  himself 
without  witnesses,  but  that  nevertheless  they  did  not  know  him  in  such  a  way 
that  he  became  their  salvation45 
Barth  responded,  in  1934,  to  this  position  with  the  famous  "Nein!  "  saying: 
42  Barth,  Ethics  p.  58. 
43  McCormack  Barth'c  Critically  Realistic  Dialectical  Theology,  `Through  all  the  phases  of  his 
development  after  the  break  with  Herrmann  liberalism  in  1915,  Karl  Barth  was a  critically  realistic 
dialectical  theologian'.  Conclusion,  p.  464. 
44  Natural  Theology  pp.  26-7. 
45  Natural  Theology  p.  27. 54 
Ethics  will  be  quite  a  good  and  useful  thing  if  it  always  remembers  the 
commandment  of  God.  In  contrast  to  Brunner's  ethics  it  should  not  be  based 
on  a  dogmatic  presuppc9ition  of  those  mythical  "ordinances".  " 
Barth's  rejection  of  "Ordnung"  occurred  between  late  1930  and  1934.  John  Baillie,  in 
the  introduction  to  Natural  Theology,  quotes  Barth  as  saying  that  it  was,  "roughly 
after  1929"  that  a  divergence  began  to  manifest  itself  between  his  views  and  that  of 
Brunner.  47  Barth  criticises  Brunner's  use  of  Ordnung  saying: 
Brunner's  fourth  assertion  is  partly  an  exposition  of  the  third.  It  treats 
separately  of  the  "ordinances"  the  constant  factors  of  historical  and  social  life 
...  without  which  any  communal  life  is  conceivable,  which  in  any  way  be 
tenned  human. 
Yet  as  late  as  the  spring  of  1931  in  the  University  of  Bonn  Barth  was  lecturing  in 
ethics  and  saying: 
The  Command  of  God  the  Creator  the  necessity  of  life  to  which  we  subject 
ourselves  in  obedience  to  our  calling  is  obviously  in  content  the  necessity  and 
command  of  Order.  " 
In  the  original  text  the  word  used  is  "Ordnung"  translated  as  order: 
Das  Gebot  des  Schöpfergottes,  die  Lebensnotwendigkeit,  der  wir  uns 
gehorsam  unserem  Beruf  unterwerfen,  ist  offenbar  inhaltlich  die 
Notwendigkeit  und  das  Gebot  der  Ordnung. 
Further,  in  a  letter  to  Brunner,  dated  the  second  of  June  1930  Barth  used  exactly  the 
same  word  "Ordnung".  However  by  1934  Barth  has  taken  a  contrasting  position, 
which  is  seen  here: 
46  Natural  Theology  p.  128. 
47  Natural  Theology  p.  5. 
48  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  96. 55 
The  Holy  Ghost,  who  proceeds  from  the  Father  and  the  Son  and  is  therefore 
revealed  and  believed  to  be  God,  does  not  stand  in  need  of  any  point  of 
contact  but  that  which  he  himself  creates  49 
Ethics  will  be  a  good  and  useful  thing  if  it  always  remembers  the 
commandments  of  God.  In  contrast  to  Brunner's  ethics  it  should  not  be  based 
on  a  dogmatic  presupposition  of  those  mythical  "ordinances".  " 
However  "Ordnung"  was  inconsistent  with  Barth's  criteria  for  ethics  as  a  theological 
science  which  he  discussed  in  the  first  lecture  in  1928.  By  his  definition  the  object  of 
investigation,  good  human  conduct,  can  only  be  known  by  reflecting  of  how  far 
preaching  reflects  the  Word  of  God.  Good  human  conduct  can  only  be  known  because 
of  God's  revelation  of  Himself.  There  can  be  no  presuppositions.  Therefore,  any  ideas 
that  good  human  conduct  may  be  deduced  from  cultural  norms,  as  a  form  of  natural 
theology,  must  be  rejected. 
Why  did  it  take  Barth  four  years  to  realise  the  inconsistency  of  his  ethics  of  the  orders 
of  creation?  One  possible  explanation  is  the  continuing  influence  of  Herrmann  and  of 
his  argument  that  the  natives  of  New  Holland  have  the  capacity  to  receive  revelation. 
The  influence  is  apparent  as  late  as  the  spring  of  1931. 
Having  discussed  Herrmann's  influence  on  Barth  it  is  now  possible  to  continue 
examining  the  lectures  of  Barth  which  first  appeared  in  English  in  1981.5' 
49  Karl  Barth,  Letters  Karl  Barth  to  Emil  Brunner  Briefwechsel  1916-1966  Bonn,  2.6.1930. 
50  Natural  Theology  p.  37. 
51  The  editors  of  the  Swiss  Gesamtausgabe  published  the  lectures  in  1973,  in  a  two-volume  edition  as 
Ethik  1,1928  and  Ethik  11,1928/1929.  Geoffrey  Bromiley  translated  the  two  volumes  into  English  in 
1981.  The  lectures  Ethics  1  and  Ethics  11  were  condensed  into  one  volume  and  published  as  Ethics.  The 
published  work  is known,  as  Text  B.  It  contains  Text  A,  the  full  text  of  the  1928/1929  lectures, 
supplemented  by  additional  material  from  the  1930  lectures.  Text  B,  the  collected  material,  is  referred 
to  in  this  thesis  as  the  Münster  and  Bonn  Ethics. 56 
Until  recently  this  material  has  received  little  attention  from  scholars  and  there  are 
several  reasons  for  th;  s  lack  of  interest.  52  Obviously  the  main  reason  is  the 
withholding  of  the  material  by  Barth  himself.  However  even  since  their  publication 
the  lectures  have  attracted  little  interest.  The  only  review  received  in  Anglo-American 
journals  was  in  Theology  in  which  Helen  Oppenheimer  half-heartedly  recommends 
the  work  to  specialists:  " 
This  is  hardly  a  book  about  ethics,  either  in  the  philosophical  sense  of 
considering  what  `right'  or  `good'  means,  or  in  the  practical  sense  of 
considering  what  people  ought  specifically  to  do.  Nor  would  it  make  a  good 
introduction  to  Barth's  thought. 
It  is  dauntingly  long  and  diffuse,  with  very  little  help  given  to  the  reader  in 
relating  it  to  the  subsequent  development  of  Barth's  thought.  Yet  it  is  hard  to 
regret  the  time  spent  in  reading  it. 
If  `middle  axioms'  and  the  study  of  the  substance  of  ethical  problems  is  what 
we  want,  Barth's  Ethics  is  the  wrong  book.  Yet  it  would  be  a  pity  if  only 
Barthians  were  to  taste  the  characteristic  flavour  of  his  thinking.  That  is  why 
this  review,  unable  to  recommend  the  book  except  to  specialists,  has  relied 
upon  quotations  rather  than  summary  to  try  in  a  backhanded  way  to  commend 
it  after  all. 
So,  Barth's  lectures  are  damned  with  faint  praise  and  declared  uninteresting.  Of  those 
few  theologians  who  took  an  interest  most  found  themselves  hostile  to  Barth's 
position  due  to  the  commonly  held  belief  that  in  his  ethics  man  is  so  dominated  by 
God's  command  that  there  is  no  room  for  human  freedom.  This  objection  to  Barth's 
ethics  will  be  discussed  at  greater  length  in  chapter  five  of  this  thesis. 
Despite  these  rejections  the  Ethics  remain  important  for  three  reasons: 
52  Recent  works  by  Nigel  Biggar  1993,  Bruce  McCormack  1997,  and  John  Webster  1995  and  1998. 
53  Helen  Oppenheimer,  `Barth  Ethics'  in  Theology  1982  no.  85  pp.  315-317. 57 
1.  They  demonstrate  the  development  of  Barth's  thinking  between  1924  and 
1932.54 
2.  They  show  Barth  rethinking  ethical  foundations. 
3.  They  are  the  first  draft  of  the  ethical  sections  of  Church  Dogmatics. 
His  rethinking  of  ethical  foundations  is  presented  in  three  stages: 
1.  Ethics  is  a  science 
2.  Ethics  forms  a  part  of  the  doctrine  of  sanctification. 
3.  Ethics  reveals  the  relationship  between  God  and  man. 
Barth  argues  that  in  theology  the  object  of  study  is  God,  the  method  of  inquiry  is 
revelation,  and  the  form  and  content  of  the  knowledge  is  sanctification.  He  says, 
dogmatics  compares  the  preaching  of  the  church  with  the  teaching  of  the  Bible, 
whereas  the  science  of  ethics  seeks  an  answer,  in  the  Word  of  God,  to  the  question  of 
human  conduct. 
By  the  Doctrine  of  Sanctification  Barth  means  the  reflection  on  how  far  the  Word  of 
God  proclaimed  and  accepted  in  Christian  preaching  effects  a  claim  on  man.  The 
incarnation  of  the  birth,  death  and  resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ  establishes  a  covenant 
relationship  between  God  and  man,  and  this  relationship  creates  man's  sanctification. 
54  Karl  Barth,  `Unterricht  in  der  christlichen  Religion',  ii  Die  Lehre  von  Gott/Die  Lehre  vom 
Menschen,  1924/1925,  ed.  Heinrich  Stoevesandt  (Zurich:  TVZ,  1990).  ET  The  Göttingen  Dogmatics, 
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An  understanding  of  the  concept  of  event  is  central  to  any  appreciation  of  Barth's 
ethics.  He  says  in  the  opening  lectures,  `We  believe  that  in  theological  ethics  we  have 
to  seek  and  find  the  goodness  of  human  conduct  in  the  event  of  an  act  of  God  towards 
man,  the  act  of  his  speech  and  self  revelation  to  him'.  55  Here  we  see  Barth's 
description  of  event  as  an  act.  In  an  event,  act  and  being  are  not  separated  but  held 
together. 
In  classical  Christian  theism  there  is  a  separation  between  God's  being  and  God's 
acts.  God's  being  is  wholly  other  and  cannot  be  known.  There  is  nothing  we  can  say 
about  God's  being,  and  we  should  remain  silent,  as  the  only  possible  theological 
concept  of  God's  being  is  that  of  via  negativa.  The  method  argues  that  we  know  that 
God  can  be  nothing  like  us.  As  we  are  finite  and  corruptible  God  must  be  infinite  and 
incorruptible.  Obviously  other  attributes  can  be  listed  and  attached  to  God's  being  as 
analogical  descriptions.  However  God  is  always  somewhere  beyond  his  acts.  How  we 
understand  God's  actions  in  the  world  and  how  we  respond  to  these  acts,  are  the 
subjects  of  philosophical  speculation.  Having  rejected  classical  theism's  doctrine  of 
God  he  replaces  it  with  a  doctrine  of  God  in  which  God  is known.  He  says  God  is 
known  in  the  event  of  an  act  of  speech  and  self-revelation  towards  man.  This 
knowledge  involves  man  in  a  conflict  because,  `God's  Word  gives  itself  to  be  known, 
and  in  so  doing  is  heard,  man  is  made  responsible,  and  his  acts  take  place  in  that 
confrontation'.  " 
Barth  tells  us  the  Word  of  God  is  the  Word  of  God  only  in  act.  The  goodness  of 
human  conduct  arises  out  of  God's  speaking,  and  thus  points  away  from  man  to  God. 
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`The  good  in  human  conduct  is  its  determination  by  the  divine  commanding'.  57  Here 
we  see  that  r  arth  has  chosen  a  new  foundation  for  Christian  ethics.  He  places  the 
goodness  of  human  action  within  the  doctrine  of  God.  It  is  in  God's  choosing  to 
become  wholly  other  in  the  event  of  the  incarnation  that  God  establishes  a  covenant 
relationship  within  which  man  is determined.  He  radically  redefines  the  doctrine  of 
God  so  that  the  goodness  of  human  action  is  found  in  God  and  not  in  man.  God  is  in 
the  event  of  revelation,  and  man  is  determined  in  that  event. 
Man,  says  Barth,  lives  in  and  not  apart  from  his  act.  In  this  he  is  an  analogy  of  God 
whose  being  and  acting  are  one.  Being  is  not  an  abstract  concept  which  acquires 
attributes  but  is  an  act.  Barth  is  maintaining  being  and  becoming  in  the  event  of  God's 
act,  which  means  philosophically  that  the  event  unites  ontology  and  epistemology.  In 
traditional  ethical  discussions  being,  or  ontology,  is  the  given  from  which  actions  are 
performed.  Knowledge  about  the  person  who  performs  the  act  is  a  description  of  his 
actions.  Epistemology  is  the  philosophical  description  of  the  knowledge  of  the  act.  In 
Barth's  position  man  is  not  a  being  who  acts  but  rather  the  act  is  man's  being. 
In  addition  to  giving  a  new  foundation  to  Christian  ethical  thought,  this  is  an 
important  shift  because  God's  act  creates  our  knowledge  avoiding  the  problems  of 
knowledge  that  are  inherent  in  the  distinction  between  noumena  and  phenomena. 
Ethical  questions  are  questions  of  existence  for,  Barth  says,  `as  we  will,  we  are,  what 
we  do  we  are'.  He  has  reshaped  Augustine's  discussion  of  the  two  wills,  who  says: 
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So  my  two  wills,  one  old,  the  other  new,  one  carnal,  the  other  spiritual,  were 
in  conflict  with  one  another,  and  their  discord  robbed  my  soul  of  all 
cone°ntration.  SR 
Barth  describes  the  will  not  as  an  act  of  a  being  but  as  one  determined  by  God's 
creative  act.  Therefore  he  says:  `a  good  act  is  one  in  which  the  will  conforms  to  God's 
command'.  For  Barth  there  is  no  inward  turn,  as  in  Augustine,  to  seek  the  will  of  God 
in  one's  being.  Human  self-determination  is determined  by  God's  act  of  self- 
revelation  not  by  cogito  ergo  sum. 
The  lectures  are  organised  sequentially.  Each  has  three  sections,  which  are  the  Word 
of  God  as  creation,  the  Word  of  God  as  reconciliation  and  the  Word  of  God  as 
redemption.  In  addition  each  of  the  three  aspects  is  in  correspondence  with  the 
perichorisis  of  the  Trinity  and  is  part  of  the  others. 
In  the  lectures  he  states  that  God  commands  the  orders  of  creation.  He  first  expresses 
the  Command  negatively  giving  a  list  of  items  which  are  not  the  Command;  and  then 
positively,  by  listing  what  is  the  Command.  This  dialectic  style  of  expression 
establishes  the  negative,  which  is  human  abilities,  and  having  dismissed  it  goes  on  to 
describe  the  positive,  which  is  God's  acts.  The  following  statement  is  an  exemplar: 
'God's  word  is  not  anainnesis  -  not  self-reflecting  recollection,  but  a  reminder.  '  S' 
Ananmesis  is  the  recovering  of  knowledge  already  known  and  that  knowledge  is 
possessed  ontologically  before  God's  revelation.  Socrates  expresses  this  view  in  his 
idea  that  the  teacher  is but  a  mid-wife  who  gives  birth  to  that  which  already  exists. 
Barth  however  insists  there  can  be  no  pre-existing  knowledge  before  revelation,  no 
58  Augustine,  Saint,  Bishop  of  Hippo,  Confessions,  trans.  by  Henry  Chadwick,  (Oxford:  OUP,  1991) 
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prior  ontology.  This,  of  course,  conflicts  with  his  use  of  the  doctrine  of  the  orders  of 
creat;  -)n. 
The  concept  that  revelation  is  the  source  of  knowledge  first  appeared  in  Barth's  early 
work  on  the  Word  of  God  in  Christian  Dogmatics  in  Outline.  This  point  shapes  the 
rest  of  his  theology.  Thus  by  establishing  revelation  as  the  source  of  knowledge  he 
overcomes  the  Kantian  breach  between  the  truth  of  being  and  the  truth  of  doing  and  in 
so  doing  makes  the  detached  consciousness  of  the  observer  inappropriate  to 
experience  and  knowledge  of  the  object.  Barth's  disagreement  is  illustrated  by  the 
following  words  by  Kant: 
This  discussion  as  to  the  positive  advantages  of  critical  principles  of  pure 
reason  can  be  similarly  developed  in  regard  to  the  concept  of  God  and  of 
simple  nature  of  our  soul;  but  for  the  sake  of  brevity  such  further  discussion 
may  be  omitted.  [From  what  has  already  been  said,  it  is  evident  that]  even  the 
assumption  -  as  made  on  behalf  of  the  necessary  practical  employment  of  my 
reason  -  of  God,  freedom,  and  immortality  is  not  permissible  unless  at  the 
same  time  speculative  reason  be  deprived  of  its  pretensions  to  transcendent 
insight.  For  in  order  to  arrive  at  such  insight  it  must  make  use  of  principles 
which,  in  fact,  extend  only  to  objects  of  possible  experience,  and  which,  if 
also  applied  to  what  cannot  be  an  object  of  experience,  always  really  change 
this  into  an  appearance,  thus  rendering  all  practical  extension  of  pure  reason 
impossible.  I  have  therefore  found  it  necessary  to  deny  knowledge,  in  order  to 
make  room  for  faith  bo 
This  thesis  will  not  undertake  a  detailed  examination  of  the  development  of  the 
concept  of  knowledge  from  Kant  to  Hegel  and  Barth  as  Jüngel  has  provided  an 
excellent  detailed  discussion.  " 
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For  Barth  the  source  of  knowledge  is  the  revelation  of  the  object.  Revelation  is  the 
s(-irce,  the  method,  the  form  and  the  content  of  knowledge  of  God.  His  early  lectures 
expound  this  important  part  of  his  thinking  which  centres  on  the  question  of 
conditioned  and  unconditioned  truth  which  he  introduced  in  the  very  first  lecture  of 
Ethics.  He  describes  ethics  as  the  unconditioned  truth  that  assesses  the  truth  of  all 
psychological,  historical  and  legal  inquiries  into  human  actions  which  are  all 
conditioned  truths.  62  The  point  is  taken  up  later  where  unconditioned  truth  only 
becomes  real  in  action. 
If  there  is  such  a  thing  -  ?!  [as  the  good]  So  long  as  we  ask  generally  and 
theoretically  whether  there  is  such  a  thing,  we  can  in  fact  only  ask 
hypothetically.  But  the  hypothesis  ventured  here  is  the  thesis  of  the  original 
unconditioned  truth  which,  since  it  can  appear  only  on  the  surface  of  general 
hypothetical  thinking,  indicates  the  limit  of  this  thinking  and  also  its  own 
superiority.  Hence  the  question  whether  there  is  such  a  thing  cannot  be 
answered  generally  and  theoretically  because,  if  it  exists,  it  is  not  a  general 
theoretical  truth.  How  can  anything  general  and  theoretical  be  said,  then, 
about  its  revelation  and  knowledge?  The  universal  validity  of  this  revelation 
and  knowledge  is  the  universal  validity  of  the  task  and  proclamation  of  the 
church,  of  which  there  should  be  agreement  that  this  truth,  as  the 
unconditioned  truth  which  alone  is  universally  valid,  is  not  general  and 
theoretical  but  practical  truth,  and  that  its  revelation  and  knowledge  can  and 
will  become  real  only  in  the  event  of  man's  action.  ' 
In  the  second  part  of  section  five  of  the  Ethics  Barth  in  his  characteristic  style  then 
discusses  the  consequences  for  other  perceptions  of  the  good  and  points  out  why  they 
are  inadequate,  he  says: 
Thus  the  truth  of  the  good  is  the  truth  by  which  we  are  measured  as  we  act,  the 
verdict  towards  which  we  go.  If  we  take  seriously  the  positive  giveness  of 
the  command  against  which  there  is  no  appeal,  then  it  cannot  be  just  a  rule,  an 
empty  form,  to  which  we  must  give  content  by  our  action,  so  that  the  form  of 
the  action  stands  under  the  command  and  its  content  under  our  caprice.  This 
idea  seems  to  be  unavoidable  wherever  the  court  to  which  we  obey  or  disobey 
in  our  moral  decision,  whether  it  be  the  idea  of  the  good,  or  the  more  or  less 
6'  Bath,  Ethics,  pp.  4-5. 
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categorical  imperative  understood  in  Kant's  or  some  other  sense,  or  the  will  of 
God,  or  our  own  conscience  -  wherever  this  court  is  thought  of  as  something 
that  is  indefinite  in  its  content,  wherever  it  is  made  into  a  purely  formal 
concept  whose  truth  has  first  to  be  investigated' 
The  Ethics  show  that  Barth's  theology  is  a  reply  to  the  Enlightenment.  He  recognises 
absolutism  and  the  concept  that  man's  decisions  come  from  his  social,  moral  and 
cultural  life  and  sees  them  as  an  inheritance  from  the  Enlightenment  which  he  neither 
rejects  nor  opposes.  Rather  he,  `seeks  to  overcome  it  by  effecting  its  inversion,  or 
rather  seeking  to  conforni  to  the  decision  which  matters,  the  divine  decision  which  has 
already  overcome  it.  'bs 
The  Ethics  is  important  because  it  is  the  only  complete  structured  set  of  Barth's 
lectures  and  because  it  is  the  first  draft  of  Church  Dogmatics.  In  Ethics  Barth 
rethought  ethical  foundations  and  gave  a  general  sketch  of  ethics  that  would  be  further 
developed  at  the  end  of  each  volume  of  Chin-ch  Dogmatics  as  the  doctrine  of  the 
command  of  God.  This  doctrine  is  the  basis  of  the  ethics  in  Church  Dogmatics  II/2. 
The  command  of  God  the  creator  forms  the  ethical  content  of  the  chapter  of  special 
ethics  in  the  doctrine  of  creation  in  Church  Dogmatics  III/4.  In  addition  there  is  the 
doctrine  of  Baptism  as  the  first  ethical  act  in  Church  Dogmatics  IV/4.  Although  there 
are  some  sections  of  the  ethics  of  reconciliation  available  Barth  was  unable  to 
complete  the  ethical  sections  of  Church  Dogmatics.  This  fact  gives  added  importance 
to  the  Münster  Ethics  because  it  is  the  only  complete  draft  of  the  doctrine  of 
sanctification. 
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3.1  Influences 
Five  main  influences  formed  the  background  to  Barth's  lectures  on  ethics.  The  first 
clear  influence  was  his  theological  education.  The  second  was  the  intellectual  and 
cultural  movement  known  as  German  expressionism.  The  third  was  the  period  of 
Barth's  pastorship  at  Safenwil  where  his  duties  included  preaching  to  the  church 
community.  The  fourth,  was  World  War  I,  and  the  final  influence  was  Charlotte  von 
Kirschbaum.  With  the  exception  of  von  Kirschbaum's  influence  on  him  during  this 
period  the  rest  have  received  full  treatment  in  the  literature.  McCormack,  in  a  recent 
work,  has  pointed  to  the  growth  of  German  expressionism  influencing  Barth's  move 
to  the  use  of  dialectic  as  a  method.  `  Boyd  also  draws  attention  to  the  influence  of 
German  expressionism  on  Barth's  work  and  has  produced  interesting  evidence  linking 
Barth  with  leading  expressionist  artists  of  the  period  67 
However,  any  discussion  of  Barth's  theology  of  this  period,  but  particularly  his  ethical 
thought,  must  give  due  regard  to  the  importance  of  von  Kirschbaum's  influence.  Her 
role  and  significance  in  his  theological  development  have  been  mainly  disregarded. 
With  the  exception  of  Busch's  biography  of  Barth,  and  Eleanor  Jackson's  recent 
collection  of  von  Kirschbaum's  writings,  she  has  been  practically  ignored.  "  Her 
impact,  particularly  on  Barth's  ethical  thought,  deserves  and  demands  consideration. 
In  addition  to  the  above  points  the  influence  of  Herrmann  justifies  further  comment 
because  of  Barth's  development  of  dogmatics  as  the  foundation  of  ethics  and  because 
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of  his  continuing  influence  on  some  of  Barth's  critics.  Indeed  the  discussion  in 
chapter  seven,  `Critical  readings  of  Karl  Barth's  ethics'  has  its  roots  in  Herrmann's 
work. 
3.1.1  Charlotte  von  Kirschbaum 
The  thesis  now  turns  to  pay  particular  attention  to  Charlotte  von  Kirschbaum  whose 
influence  on  Barth  during  the  period  under  discussion  has  been  much  under  estimated. 
He  pays  tribute  to  von  Kirschbaum  in  the  introduction  to  Church  Dogmatics  III/3: 
I  should  not  like  to  conclude  this  Preface  without  expressly  drawing  the 
attention  of  readers  of  these  seven  volumes  to  what  they  and  I  owe  to  the 
twenty  years  of  work  quietly  accomplished  at  my  side  by  Charlotte  von 
Kirschbaum.  She  has  devoted  no  less  of  her  life  and  to  the  growth  of  this  work 
than  I  have  myself.  Without  her  co-operation  it  could  not  have  been  advanced 
from  day  to  day,  and  I  should  hardly  dare  contemplate  the  future  which  may 
yet  remain  to  me.  I  know  what  it  really  means  to  have  a  helper.  69 
The  comment  should  not  be  taken  as  the  usual  polite  thanks  to  a  secretary.  Barth 
describes  von  Kirschbaum  as  a  "helper",  which  reflects  the  relationship  between  men 
and  women  described  in  Genesis.  7°  This  translation  is  from  The  New  Revised 
Standard  Version  and  follows  Luther's  translation  which  uses  eine  Gehilfin  (qualified 
assistant)  for  "helper".  "  However  Karl  Barth  and  von  Kirschbaum  quote  from  the 
Zurich  Bible,  "eine  Gehilfe  schaffen,  die  ihm  ein  Gegenüber  sei.  "'=Both  translations 
use  Gegenüber  to  describe  the  relationship.  Jackson  says: 
Here  it  [Gegenüber]  has  the  nuance  of  "sounding  board",  even  "sparring 
partner",  "other  half'.  That  was  how  von  Kirschbaum  herself  saw  her 
Eleanor  Jackson,  The  Question  of  Woman.  The  collected  writings  of  Charlotte  von  Kirschbaum,  trans. 
by  John  Shepherd  edited  and  with  an  introduction  by  Eleanor  Jackson,  (Michigan:  Eerdmans  1996) 
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relationship  to  Barth,  but  also  how  she  understood  the  basic  relationship 
between  men  and  women  when  it  is  not  debased  by  sin  or  sickness.  " 
In  a  discussion  on  sexuality  Barth  writes: 
Our  sexuality  constitutes  a  second  circle,  or  a  unique  double  circle,  of  the 
determination  in  which  we  all  must  live.  We  do  not  live  merely  as  men  but  as 
males  or  females.  We  must  add  at  once:  We  live  as  males  and  females.  Or  as 
we  ought  to  put  it,  we  live  as  males  or  females  in  the  indissoluble  mutual 
relation  of  males  and  females.  7° 
At  the  end  of  his  discussion  Barth  sums  up  his  thoughts  about  the  relationship 
between  men  and  women  in  the  quotation  from  Genesis  2:  18  to  which  he  may  have 
been  referring  in  Church  Dogmatics  in  his  appreciation  of  von  Kirschbaum: 
We  can  sum  up  positively  all  that  has  been  said  thus  far  in  that  other  saying 
from  the  creation  story  in  Genesis  2:  18:  "Then  the  Lord  God  said,  `It  is  not 
good  that  man  should  be  alone;  I  will  make  him  a  helper  fit  for  him.  "'  The 
serious  purpose  of  what  makes  the  male  male  is  that  according  to  the  saying  of 
the  Creator  it  is  not  good  for  him  to  be  alone,  that  in  the  power  of  this  saying  a 
helper  will  be  given  him.  And  the  serious  purpose  of  what  makes  the  female 
female  is  that  she  is  this  helper.  " 
She  was  born  on  the  24th  of  June  1899.  Her  father,  to  whom  she  had  been  devoted, 
died  when  she  was  seventeen.  Jackson  writes: 
Her  father's  death  in  1916,  commanding  the  sixth  Bavarian  Infantry  Division 
in  France,  devastated  her  and  reduced  the  family  circumstances  to  such 
poverty  that  with  the  wartime  shortages  and  price  inflation  she  suffered 
malnutrition  and  serious  damage  to  her  health.  76 
It  is  also  apparent  that  her  relationship  with  her  father  had  estranged  her  from  her 
mother.  After  her  father  the  next  most  important  influence  on  her  was  Georg  Merz,  a 
Lutheran  pastor,  who  prepared  her  for  confirmation.  Merz,  with  Barth,  edited 
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Zwischen  den  Zeiten.  He  was  godfather  to  Barth's  fourth  child  Robert  Mathias  and 
was  a  regular  visitor  to  the  Barth  family.  He  introduced  von  Kirschbaum  to  Barth's 
writings  and  took  her  to  Barth's  lectures.  They  were  both  invited  to  spend  a  holiday  in 
the  summer  of  1924  with  Barth  and  his  family  at  Bergh,  a  mountain  retreat  outside 
Zurich.  During  the  holiday  it  was  suggested  to  von  Kirschbaum  that  she  should  train 
as  a  secretary.  Ruedi  Pestalozzi,  a  successful  businessman,  who  owned  the  holiday 
chalet  and  was  Barth's  friend,  paid  for  the  cost  of  her  training. 
The  following  year  Barth  moved  from  Göttingen  to  Münster  to  take  up  his  post  at  the 
university.  As  Nelly  Barth's  wife  was  imminently  expecting  a  baby  and  their  house  in 
Göttingen  was  proving  difficult  to  sell  Barth  moved  to  Münster  on  his  own.  He  lived 
in  lodgings  where  von  Kirschbaum  visited  him  in  February  1926  a  month  before  his 
family  arrived.  Jackson  comments: 
It  seems  to  have  marked  the  beginning  of  her  romantic  involvement  with  him, 
and  her  commitment  to  do  all  she  could  to  advance  his  work.  " 
He  was  forty-four,  she  twenty-seven.  In  April  1929,  before  beginning  to  deliver  the 
series  of  lectures  on  ethics,  Barth  took  sabbatical  leave  until  the  end  of  September  that 
year.  He  retreated  to  Bergli,  where  von  Kirschbaum  was  among  the  guests  and  thus 
began  their  long  partnership.  On  14  October  1929  she  moved  into  the  Barth  family 
home  Jackson  says,  `It  is  important  to  understand  that  von  Kirschbaum  was  not  an 
employee  but  was  treated  as  a  family  member'.  78  Gertrud  Staewen,  a  friend  of  Barth's 
since  1922,  became  Charlotte's  life  long  friend  described  her  in  a  letter: 
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I  see  her  before  me  now  as  she  was  in  those  early  years  when  I  first  got  to 
know  her  -  it  must  have  been  around  1928  -  and  as  she  lives  in  my  memory: 
dressed  in  fluttering  pale  blue  silk  clothes  matching  her  lovely  blue  eyes, 
sensitive,  delicate,  but  possessed  by  a  scintillating,  concentrated  energy  that 
was  never  loud  but  always  present.  This  energy,  this  zest  for  life,  she  had 
decided,  entirely  and  completely,  to  exist  only  for  one  single  human  being,  for 
his  well-being,  for  his  peace  of  mind,  for  his  friends  and  for  his  students.  79 
In  1926  Barth  began  to  send  von  Kirschbaum  manuscripts  to  correct  and  her  influence 
on  Barth's  theology  can  be  seen  from  this  period.  The  works  included  a  new  edition 
of  Römerbrief  and  a  volume  of  his  Göttingen  lectures,  lectures  on  the  Epistle  to  the 
Philippians,  and  most  important  of  all  Die  Lehi-e  vorn  Worte  Gottes:  Prolegomena  zur 
C/iris/lichen  Doginat1k'.  R°  Of  the  latter  Jackson  says  of  von  Kirschbaum  influence: 
This  was  Barth's  first  attempt  at  a  project  that  resulted  in  the  fourteen  volumes 
of  the  Church  Dogmatics.  The  first  plan  did  not  work  to  his  satisfaction,  and 
he  laid  it  aside,  von  Kirschbaum  had  caught  the  vision  and  would  not  let  it 
rest.  When  Die  Kirchliche  Dogmatik,  volume  I,  part  I  (Die  Lehre  vom  Worte 
Gottes),  appeared  in  1932  as  a  result  of  her  encouragement  and  hard  work,  the 
material  was  completely  reorganized  and  a  subtle  theological  shift  had  taken 
place,  as  the  title  suggests.  For  from  the  outset  von  Kirschbaum  was  far  more 
than  a  secretary  and  offered  her  criticisms  and  comments,  even  her  advice  as 
to  whether  something  should  be  published.  " 
It  is  also  now  clear  that  von  Kirschbaum  would  have  been  deeply  involved  in  the 
decision  not  to  allow  the  publication  of  Barth's  lectures  and  that  she  would  have 
known  of  the  content  of  the  lectures  before  they  were  delivered. 
3.1.2  Wilhelm  Herrmann 
Barth  began  studying  theology  in  Bern  but  finding  the  view  very  conservative,  like 
many  Swiss  students  moved  to  Germany  in  quest  of  a  more  liberal  theology.  In  Berlin 
von  Harnack  influenced  him  but  most  importantly  Herrmann  also  influenced  him. 
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This  influence  lasted  much  longer  than  most  scholars  think.  He  recalls  his  first 
reading  of  Herrmann's  Ethics  as  intense  an  experience  as  St.  Paul's  on  the  road  to 
Damascus.  He  said: 
The  day  almost  twenty  years  ago  in  Berlin  when  I  first  read  his  Ethik  I 
remember  as  though  it  were  today...  on  that  day  I  believe  my  own  independent 
interest  in  theology  began.  82 
After  Berlin  he  moved  to  Marburg  to  be  able  to  study  dogmatics  and  ethics  with 
Herrmann.  There  he  met  Thurneysen  who  was  to  become  a  life  long  friend,  and 
Rudolph  Bultmann,  and  he  became  Martin  Rade's  editorial  assistant  on  the  magazine 
Die  Christliche  Welt.  83 
Theology  in  Marburg,  at  that  time,  followed  the  influential  school  of  Albrecht  Ritschl 
and  Herrmann  was  a  member  of  his  school.  McCormack  writes: 
The  hallmark  of  this  theological  movement  was  its  commitment  to  a  churchly 
theology,  oriented  towards  God's  Self-revelation  in  the  historical  person  of 
Jesus  Christ.  " 
However  a  split  developed  among  Ritschl's  followers.  The  disagreement  was  about 
the  place  and  role  of  history  in  theology.  Young  Ritschlians  believed  that  the 
development  of  the  historical-critical  method  had  made  the  acceptance  of  a 
supernatural  conception  of  revelation  unacceptable.  Influenced  by  the  study  of 
comparative  religions  and  Hegelian  ideas  of  progress  through  history,  they  believed 
Christianity  was  the  highest  form  of  evolved  religion.  They  also  thought  Christianity 
might  be  superseded  by  a  higher  religious  form.  Their  views  diverged  from  the 
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received  Ritschlians  non-historical  view  and  by  1897  the  split  had  become  a  division, 
students  at  Marburg  had  to  choose  between  theology  as  history  and  theology  that 
overcame  historicism.  Herrmann  offered  such  a  theology  and  the  young  Barth  adopted 
it  enthusiastically.  McCormack  gives  a  lengthy  treatment  of  Herrmann's  influence  on 
Barth.  RS 
As  Herrmann  had  contempt  for  scientific  knowledge  he  became  interested  in  securing 
a  theological  epistemology  beyond  the  reach  of  scientific  attack.  R6  He  needed  a  way  of 
bridging  the  gap  between  the  phenomena  and  the  nounnena.  How  can  we  have 
knowledge  of  God?  What  methods  of  acquiring  knowledge  are  appropriate?  How  can 
these  methods  be  validated?  These  questions  were  uppermost  in  his  thinking. 
His  most  significant  work  attempts  to  answer  these  questions.  "  His  response  is  to 
protect  the  church  that  finds  its  traditional  doctrines  attacked  by  scientific  method.  In 
so  doing  he  wanted  to  appeal  to  the  tens  of  thousands  of  people  who  could  no  longer 
accept  the  truth  of  traditional  doctrines  and  who  rejected  Protestant  Christianity 
because  it  required  agreement  to  doctrinal  confession  as  initiation  to  the  church.  He 
offers  an  alternative  saying: 
He  today  who  is  willing  to  see,  can  find  the  way  which,  even  in  a  world 
altered  by  science,  leads  those  who  seek  God  to  Christ.  " 
Herrmann  thought  the  Protestant  church  was  wrong  in  requiring  assent  to  biblical 
truths  and  doctrine  as  a  requirement  for  membership  arguing  that  it  was  not  a  burden 
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laid  on  Roman  Catholics.  He  thinks  that  through  religious  experience  it  was  possible 
to  obtain  a  key  that  would  unlock  the  secrets  of  doctrine: 
One  who  comes  under  the  grasp  of  the  spiritual  character  of  Jesus  wins  a  right 
appreciation  of  doctrines  about  the  person  of  Jesus,  so  that  he  can  find  even  in 
them  the  one  thing  great  and  precious  to  him  above  all  else  in  the  world,  the 
power  of  the  personal  spirit  over  men  who  are  yearning  to  become  conscious 
of  God.  " 
He  claims  that  knowledge  of  doctrine  and  biblical  truth  become  available  only 
through  personal  experience.  In  this  way  he  hoped  to  remove  biblical  and  doctrinal 
truths  from  the  attack  of  the  historical-critical  method.  He  needed  to  stress  that;  `The 
doctrine  that  springs  from  faith  has  necessarily  an  infinite  variety  of  forms.  '9° 
Herrmann  says  that  what  unites  Christians  is  not  doctrine  but,  `the  likeness  of  our 
ways  of  thinking,  and  the  unity  of  the  revelation  by  which  that  likeness  is  caused.  '9' 
Having  claimed  religious  experience  as  the  source  of  knowledge,  Herrmann  has  to 
establish  that  this  knowledge  is  true  knowledge.  To  protect  it  from  accusations  of 
mysticism  he  argues  that  knowledge  gained  by  religious  experience  is  expressible.  He 
says  that  the  difference  between  mysticism  and  the  Christian's  inner  life  is  acute 
because  mysticism  remains  silent,  whilst  the  revelation  of  God  can  be  expressed  in 
words: 
We  hold  that  the  ineffable  in  religion  can  indeed  be  experienced,  but  only  in 
connection  with  that  which  can  be  put  into  words.  Apart  from  this,  the 
experience  would  lack  Christian  definiteness  and  the  consciousness  of  being 
true.  Thus,  we  escape  mysticism  without  loosing  the  truth  it  contains.  92 
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Herrmann  argued  that  mysticism,  `refuses  to  be  satisfied  with  a  mere  longing  after 
God,  or  to  remain  on  the  way  to  Him,  but  is  determined  to  reach  the  goal,  and  rest 
with  God  Himself.  '93Whereas,  he  says: 
The  Christian  has  a  positive  vision  of  God  in  the  personal  life  of  Jesus  Christ. 
This  vision  of  God  does  actually  set  us  free  from  the  world  because  it  leads  us 
to  deny  self,  and  is  grasped  and  realized  only  in  connection  with  this  moral 
impulse.  " 
Herrmann  thinks  that  a  person's  actions  show  if  they  have  a  true  knowledge  of  God 
and  it  is  in  the  moral  life  that  we  can  see  who  has  experienced  the  knowledge  of  the 
inner  reality  of  Jesus.  Thus  ethics  give  objective  reality  to  religious  experience,  by 
expressing  that  inner  experience  and  uniting  Christians  in  moral  acts.  Moral  behaviour 
is  the  requirement  for  church  membership  as  it  indicates  the  truth  of  the  person's  inner 
experience  of  Jesus.  Thus  ethics  unlocked  the  truth  of  doctrines. 
Nevertheless,  how  do  we  know  that  Herrmann's  religious  experience,  exhibited  as  the 
moral  life,  is  not  simply  subjective  knowledge?  He  answers  this  criticism  in  a  passage 
that  is  a  reflection  of  Harnack's  work  by  drawing  attention  to  Luther.  He  says: 
That  teaching  of  Luther  to  which  we  will  and  can  hold  is  his  prophetic  word, 
in  which  he  expresses  what  he  has  experienced,  the  revelation  of  God  as  his 
own  redemption  95 
However,  says  Herrmann,  we  live  in  a  different  time  to  Luther  and,  `No  one  can  still 
hold  to  the  idea  that  all  words  of  Scripture  being  the  word  of  God  are  infallible 
expressions  of  the  truth.  '96He  has  removed  himself  from  the  historical  Luther  but 
remained  with  Luther's  inner  experience  of  God's  revelation.  In  the  same  way,  he 
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detaches  himself  from  the  historical  Jesus  but  remains  with  the  Christian's  religious 
experience  of  Jesus'  inner  life  thus  avoiding  Lessing's  `wide  ugly  ditch:  '  the  problem 
of  how  an  accident  of  history  can  become  a  universal  of  reason.  Knowing  a  priori 
Jesus'  inner  life  is  a  means  of  bypassing  the  historical-critical  method  and  unlocking 
the  secrets  of  the  biblical  texts. 
He  argued  that  the  capacity  to  receive  religious  experience  is  innate  and  universal.  For 
example,  he  says  that  evangelism  is  only  effective  with  native  peoples  who  have  no 
knowledge  of  God  because  they  have  an  inbuilt  capacity  to  receive  it.  He  strongly 
argues  that  without  such  an  ability  being  universal  and  innate  evangelism  would  be 
ineffective: 
We  by  no  means  wish  to  assert,  even  for  a  moment,  that  the  savages  of  New 
Holland  have  no  knowledge  of  God,  no  pulsations  of  true  religion,  and 
therefore  no  communion  with  God.  97 
Here  we  see  Herrmann  maintaining  that  there  is  a  universal  knowledge  of  God  before 
revelation.  Herrmann  claims  that  his  illustration  of  the  natives  of  New  Holland  being 
able  to  benefit  from  evangelism  shows  that  knowledge  of  God  is  innate  and  universal. 
He  then  goes  on  to  argue  that  non-Christians  observing  the  moral  life  being  lived  out 
in  the  Christian  community  have  the  innate  and  universal  ability  to  be  lead  to  an 
appreciation  and  acceptance  of  the  inner  life  of  Jesus.  The  religious  experience  of 
Jesus  is  the  content  of  the  Christian  moral  life,  as  Herrmann  says:  `The  concrete 
reality  amid  which  we  actually  live  must  be  the  nourishment  of  our  inner  life,  '98  and 
adds  of  the  natives  of  New  Holland  who  are  not  living  Christian  moral  lives,  `but  we 
do  not  know  through  what  medium  such  knowledge  and  such  communion  reaches 
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them.  "  At  this  point  Herrmann's  use  of  ethics  as  the  universal  foundation  for 
Christianity  collapses,  because  it  assumes  an  existing  Christian  moral  community,  and 
is  therefore  culturally  conditioned.  It  is  an  aspect  of  natural  religion  that  Barth  in  the 
Ethics  further  elaborates  in  the  orders  of  creation. 
Herrmann  argues  that  the  moral  life  illustrates  an  inner  religious  experience. 
However,  since  that  experience  is  united  in  an  innate  and  universal  ability  to  receive 
knowledge  of  God,  it  exists  outside  time  and  space  and  is  not  then  bound  by  history. 
As  religious  experience  is  outside  the  constraints  of  time  and  space  it  unites  all 
Christians  in  the  inner  life  of  Christ.  True  knowledge,  therefore,  does  not  come  from 
assenting  to  doctrine,  which  is  susceptible  to  the  criticism  of  the  scientific  and 
historical-critical  method,  but  from  observing  the  moral  life  of  the  Christian 
community  which  illustrates  the  inner  unity  with  Christ.  Herrmann  summarises  his 
epistemology  thus: 
A  man  has  found  God  Himself  only,  when,  through  the  influence  of  what  he 
has  laid  hold  of  as  God's  revelation,  his  own  existence  in  the  world  has 
become  serious  and  important  to  him  and  his  neighbour  has  drawn  close  to  his 
heart.  Only  when  these  impulses  to  take  the  world  seriously  and  to  serve  our 
neighbour  arise  within  us  do  we  receive  from  God  the  highest  good,  elevation 
into  a  Divine  life  -a  life  in  and  with  God  -  By  turning  in  this  manner  to  the 
world  and  to  other  men,  we  turn  to  God  Himself  come  to  a  life  common  to 
ourselves  and  Him.  Thus,  through  the  heartfelt  desire  for  God  that  is  kindled 
by  His  revelation,  the  Christian  is  driven  to  commune  with  the  world  in  work 
and  in  service  of  his  fellows.  10° 
He  avoids  the  attack  of  the  historical-critical  method  on  biblical  truths  and  Christian 
doctrine  but  his  ethic,  which  is  culturally  determined,  defeats  the  logic  of  his 
argument  because  he  subjects  Christian  truths  to  definition  by  cultural  norms. 
98  McCormack,  Karl  Barth's  Critical  Realistic  Dialectical  Theology,  p.  64. 
99  McCormack,  Karl  Barth's  Critical  Realistic  Dialectical  Theology,  p.  62. 75 
This  was  Barth's  inheritance.  McCormack  finds  Barth's  thinking  diverging  from 
Herrmann's  liberal  theology  as  early  as  1911  and  suggests  the  split  was  complete  by 
1914.101  In  the  Ethics,  Barth  works  out  a  new  foundation  and  epistemology  for 
Christian  ethics  in  response  to  Herrmann's  theology.  However,  Herrmann's  influence 
is  not  over  until  much  later,  as  can  be  seen  in  the  evidence  of  the  orders  which  form 
part  of  the  lectures  to  which  we  now  turn. 
3.2  The  Münster  and  Bonn  Ethics 
The  lectures  are  divided  into  two  sections.  The  first,  Ethics  I  given  in  the  first 
semester  is  in  three  sections:  `Introduction',  `The  Reality  of  the  Divine  Command', 
and  `The  Command  of  God  the  Creator'.  The  second,  Ethics  II  given  in  the  second 
semester  is  in  two  further  sections  with  an  appendix,  they  are,  `The  Command  of  God 
the  Reconciler',  `The  Command  of  God  the  Redeemer',  and  an  appendix  thesis  on 
`Church  and  State'.  The  division  of  the  material  follows  Barth  the  familiar  pattern  of 
three-fold  revelation  of  God  the  Creator,  God  the  Reconciler,  and  God  the  Redeemer. 
In  the  first  lecture  Barth  defines  his  relationship  with  his  dialogue  partners.  His  first 
statement  which  is directed  to  his  brother,  Heinrich  Barth  the  neo-Kantian 
philosopher,  makes  a  distinction  between  theological  and  philosophical  ethics.  `2  He 
defines  theological  ethics  as  the  study  of  the  goodness  of  human  conduct  determined 
by  revelation  whilst  philosophical  ethics,  he  states,  begins  with  the  study  of  the 
human  response  to  that  reality.  The  first,  theological  ethics,  is  the  claim  of  God  and 
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the  second,  philosophical  ethics,  is  the  claim  of  the  neighbour;  both  have  the  goodness 
of  human  conduct  as  their  object.  1'  He  attempts  to  neither  defend  theological  ethics 
from  the  attack  of  philosophical  ethics  nor  write  an  apology  for  it.  He  understands  that 
the  entry  of  theological  ethics  into  the  ethical  debate  is,  historically,  a  recent  event  and 
he  recognises  that  philosophical  ethics,  of  whatever  form,  has  a  long  history  of 
engagement  in  the  discussion.  He  likens  the  arrival  of  theological  ethics  into 
philosophical  ethics  to  the  entry  of  the  children  of  Israel  into  Canaan.  His  claims  are 
radical: 
On  the  field  of  ethical  deliberation,  which  is  apparently  open  to  all  kinds  of 
other  possible  investigations,  and  which  has  been  long  since  lit  up  and  worked 
over  by  a  whole  series  of  what  are  often  very  serious  investigations,  there 
takes  place  the  entry,  or,  one  might  say,  the  invasion  of  a  rival  whose 
investigation  differs  in  such  an  extraordinary  way  from  all  other  possible  and 
actual  investigations  that  on  their  part  doubt  as  to  the  legitimacy  of  this  act 
seems  almost  unavoidable,  especially  as  this  rival  is  in  no  position  to  behave 
peacefully  as  one  partner  in  discussion  among  many  others.  But,  modest 
though  its  entry  may  be  formally,  and  primitive  though  its  intellectual 
equipment  may  perhaps  appear,  it  advances  the  claim  that  it  is  the  one  that 
with  its  investigation  has  the  last  word  which  absorbs  all  others.  1°4 
He  then  examines  the  consequences  of  his  position  in  relation  to  the  position  of  his 
three  dialogue  partners: 
1.  The  theological  existentialism  of  Schleiermacher  and  his  follower  Herrmann. 
2.  The  Neo-Kantian  philosophical  ethics  of  Heinrich  Barth. 
3.  The  thinking  of  the  Catholic  group,  which  includes  Erich  Przywara. 
Barth  rejects  the  first  case  as  apologetics,  the  second  as  partnership  and  the  third  as 
the  Roman  Catholic  position.  The  objection  is  similar  in  each  case;  because  of  the  fall 
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reason  is  in  no  position  to  judge  revelation.  There  is  therefore  no  knowledge  before 
revelation: 
There  are  Christians  only  in'Christ  and  not  in  themselves,  only  as  seen  from 
above  and  not  from  below,  only  in  faith  and  not  in  sight,  and  not  therefore  as 
there  are  Mohammedans,  Buddhists,  and  atheists,  or  Roman  Catholics  and 
Protestants.  'os 
Having  defined  his  relationship  to  his  dialogue  partners  Barth  continues  discussing 
four  foundational  problems: 
1.  Ethics  as  an  auxiliary  science. 
2.  Ethics  as  the  doctrine  of  sanctification. 
3.  Revelation  as  the  source,  form  and  content  of  knowledge  about  God. 
4.  Distinguishing  dogmatics  from  ethics  and  the  forming  of  the  right 
relationship  between  dogmatics  and  ethics. 
As  we  have  previously  seen  that  he  defines  ethics  as  a  science:  `Ethics  as  a 
theological  discipline  is  the  auxiliary  science.  "'  This  opening  definition  illustrates 
the  influence  of  Herrmann  who  wanted  to  protect  theology  from  attack  by  scientific 
critical  biblical  scholarship.  Barth  achieves  this  by  claiming  that  theology  is  a  science 
in  which  the  object  of  study  defines  the  methodology.  God  is  the  object  of  theological 
study  and  as  God  is  unique  the  theological  method  is  unique.  Comparisons  of 
methodologies  are  appropriate  between  other  sciences,  because  they  have  similar 
objects,  whereas  theology's  object  is  unique  and  its  methodology  is  beyond  contrast. 
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Barth  says  therefore,  that  theological  method  is  necessarily  self-validating.  This  is  the 
point  of  difference  between  his  scientific  method  and  that  of  Herrmann.  A  further 
contrast,  which  has  already  been  discussed  is  in  the  object  of  study  of  theological 
ethics,  which  is  the  study  of,  `the  question  of  the  goodness  of  human  conduct',  and  the 
answer  to  the  question,  `is  sought  in  the  Word  of  God',  whereas,  Herrmann  sought  the 
answer  in  religious  experience.  107  Barth  rejects  Hermlann's  opinion  that  religious 
experience  is  the  source  of  the  knowledge  of  the  goodness  of  human  conduct  and 
establishes  it  in  the  Word  of  God.  However,  it  must  be  stressed,  that  Herrmann's 
influence  on  Barth  is  frequently  underestimated  in  an  all  too  frequent  desire  to  distant 
him  from  existentialism  but  his  influence,  as  a  dialogue  partner,  is  apparent 
throughout  the  Ethics. 
The  task  of  the  reader  of  Barth's  ethics  is  to  criticise  from  inside  the  methodology, 
and  not  to  import  methodologies  that  are  inappropriate  to  the  object  of  study.  His 
definition  of  the  relationship  between  ethics  and  the  doctrine  of  sanctification  gives  a 
broader  context  for  the  methodology  of  theological  ethics: 
As  a  special  elucidation  of  the  doctrine  of  sanctification,  it  is  a  reflection  on 
how  far  the  Word  of  God  proclaimed  and  accepted  in  Christian  preaching 
effects  a  definite  claiming  of  man.  1°8 
Discussing  the  definition  of  theological  ethics,  Barth  is  in  discussion  with  his  dialogue 
partners.  He  continues  his  definition  of  ethics  by  saying  that,  `ethics  is  equivalent  to 
morals',  which  he  defines  as  the  philosophy,  science  or  discipline  of  the  modes  of 
human  conduct  or  the  constancy  of  human  action.  However,  in  defining  ethics  in  this 
way  he  says  it  is  not  distinguishable  from  the  study  of  the  psychology  of  the  will,  or 
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the  habits  of  the  science  of  law.  109  Then  follows  an  example  of  his  method  of 
exposition,  he  says  what  ethics  is  not,  and  having  rejected  all  opposite  positions  says 
what  ethics  must  be.  In  his  argument  the  negative  precedes  the  positive.  The 
definitions  of  ethics  given  by  his  Catholic  dialogue  partners  provide  the  content  of  the 
negative;  ethics  is  not  custom,  habit  or  law.  His  own  position  reflects  his  belief  that 
the  negative  precedes  God's  revelation  and  is,  therefore,  unreality: 
Whenever  the  task  of  ethics  is  undertaken  as  a  real  task,  however,  it  is 
understood  as  one  that  differs  from  tasks  of  these  other  disciplines. 
The  insertion  of  `real'  is  important  because  in  Barth's  methodology  the  negative  does 
not  follow  from  God's  revelation.  He  continues  with  the  positive  statement  which  is 
the  `real',  since  it  does  follow  from  God's  revelation: 
The  morality  or  goodness  of  human  conduct  which  ethics  investigates  has  to 
do  with  the  validity  of  what  is  valid  for  all  human  action,  the  origin  of 
constancies,  the  worth  of  everything  universal,  the  rightness  of  all  rules.  With 
such  concepts  as  validity,  origin,  worth,  and  rightness  we  denote  provisionally 
and  generally  that  which  transcends  the  inquiries  of  psychology,  cultural 
history,  and  jurisprudence  -  the  transcendent  factor  which  in  contrast  is  the 
theme  of  ethical  inquiry.  "' 
This  example  of  Barth's  method  of  structuring  and  conducting  the  debate  with  his 
dialogue  partners  in  Münster  is  indicative  of  his  more  general  style  of  argument  in  the 
Ethics  and  later  in  the  Church  Dogmatics.  One  by  one  he  sinks  his  opponents'  ships 
until  only  his  is  left.  To  remain  afloat  the  reader  must  climb  aboard  and  accept  that 
only  Barth's  ship  is  seaworthy.  His  method  is  persuasive  but  it  isolates  him  and  his 
theological  ethics. 
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Barth  continues  by  defining  ethics  as  transcendental,  validating  and  universal,  and  in 
so  doing  points  out  that  ethics,  defined  in  this  way,  has  not  always  been  recognised  as 
a  theological  task.  "'  He  says  that  even  though  Tertullian  thought  Christians  should 
accept  the  demands  of  a  perfect  Christian  life  and  realise  them,  later  writers  such  as 
Basil  and  Ambrose,  thought  it  necessary  to  describe  ethics  only  for  those  living  the 
religious  life.  "2  Even  the  ethical  section  of  Aquinas's  Summa  theologia  has  its  basis  in 
Aristotle  and  is  concerned  only  with  the  life  of  the  clergyman  and  the  monk.  "'  Of  the 
reformers,  he  says  Luther  does  not  give  a  good  reformation  example  of  independent 
ethics";  and  that  even  Calvin's  strong  interest  in  the  ethical  question  does  not  prevent 
him  from  embodying  in  his  dogmatics  his  discussion  of  the  regenitive  significance  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  and  of  faith  and  the  law  and  obedience  to  it.  15 
Phil  Butin  says  of  Barth's  study  of  the  historical  sources: 
Too  often  the  seriousness  and  intentionality  with  which  Barth  immersed 
himself  in  the  historical  sources  of  both  the  broader  Christian  and  specifically 
Reformed  traditions,  especially  in  the  programmatic  and  formative  years  after 
the  publication  of  the  Romans  commentaries,  is  overlooked.  '  16 
Barth  says  it  was  in  the  seventeenth  century  that  the  followers  of  the  reformers  began 
to  make  explicit  what  the  reformers  had  taken  for  granted:  that  theology  is  not  only  a 
theoretical,  but  also  a  practical  task  and  he  cites  the  Lutherans,  Thomas  Venatorius 
and  George  Calixt.  "'  Christian  morality  at  that  time  began  to  acquire  a  new 
importance  among  Roman  Catholic,  Lutheran,  and  Reformed  theologians.  Barth  says 
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that  in  the  eighteenth  century  moral  theology  took  the  lead  from  dogmatics  and  claims 
that  Schleiermacher  brought  doctrine  and  moral  teaching  into  a  mutual  relationship 
but  within  a  framework  built  on  a  superior  discipline  called  ethics.  He  points  out  that 
Herrmann  and  Troeltsch,  with  some  modifications,  confirmed  and  readopted 
Schleiermacher's  view  of  ethics  one  hundred  years  later.  "'.  In  the  nineteenth  century 
there  were  attempts  to  swallow  up  dogmatics  in  ethics  in  accordance  with  theories 
that  the  church  would  gradually  disappear  into  the  state. 
Barth  pointed  to  the  possibility  that  the  renewal  of  interest  in  the  ethical  task,  and  the 
determining  of  theology  resulting  from  the  Kierkegaardian  renaissance,  might  work 
itself  out  in  the  direction  of  the  gradual  disappearance  of  the  church  in  the  state. 
Theological  ethics,  conducted  in  this  way,  would  finally  destroy  the  church  not  build 
it  up.  19  Klaus  Scholder's  influential  work  on  the  relationship  between  the  Third  Reich 
and  the  German  churches  shows  this  to  have  been  a  prophetic  statement: 
As  early  as  March  [  1933]  the  new  Chancellor  [Hitler]  had  established  contact 
with  the  two  great  churches.  The  aim  of  the  negotiations  which  he  had 
energetically  pressed  forward  during  the  summer  of  1933  was  a  Reich 
concordat  for  the  German  Catholics  and  a  single  Reich  Church  for  the  German 
Protestants.  This  was  in  order  to  bind  both  great  churches  to  the  Third  Reich, 
each  in  its  own  way,  and  to  rule  out  any  attempt  at  opposition  from  this 
quarter.  The  passing  of  both  plans  at  the  cabinet  meeting  on  14  July  1933 
underlined  the  basic  political  significance  of  these  developments.  "' 
Having  reviewed  the  historical  development  of  ethics,  Barth  moves  on  to  establish  the 
foundation  of  ethics  in  dogmatics  and  establishes  a  dialectic  relationship  between 
them  in  which  each  remains  distinctive  and  distinguishable.  He  later  strengthened  this 
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argument,  but  in  the  Ethics,  the  establishing  of  theological  ethics  in  dogmatics  is  not 
yet  fully  realised,  because  he  retains  the  doctrine  of  the  Orders  of  Creation.  "' 
However,  he  has  set  up  the  basis  for  finding  the  knowledge  of  God  in  revelation.  He 
also  begins  distinguishing  dogmatics  from  ethics  that  enables  him  to  begin  placing 
ethics  within  dogmatics. 
Barth  frequently  uses  concepts  drawn  from  Euclidean  geometry  to  structure  the 
content  of  his  lectures.  For  example,  he  uses  the  image  of  four  overlapping  circles  to 
describe  the  orders  of  creation  in  the  following  way: 
We  shall  now  proceed  in  four  circles.  It  is  divine  order  that  we  must 
understand  and  live  out  our  life-act  as  work.  It  is  a  divine  order  that  our  sexual 
life  should  have  its  place  and  limit  and  fulfilment  in  the  relation  of  marriage. 
It  is  a  divine  order  that  our  life  with  others  should  have  its  basic  form  in  the 
life  of  the  fam  ily.  And  it  is  divine  order  that  all  other  fellowship  among  men 
should  take  place  under  the  guidance  of  the  other  two  inseparable  principles  of 
quality  and  leadership.  " 
He  is  fond  of  such  illustrations  and  they  appear  throughout  his  work.  However  they 
often  constrain  the  thinking  by  imposing  a  static  form  on  a  dynamic  content  which 
can  make  the  content  seem  two-dimensional. 
In  his  first  lecture,  Barth  speaks  about  the  relative  newness  of  the  independence  of 
ethics  in  theology  being  a  problem  for  establishing  the  foundations  of  theological 
ethics  in  dogmatics.  He  suggests  that  the  independence  of  ethics  in  theology  causes 
the  problem  by  creating  a  tendency  for  ethics  to  swallow  up  dogmatics.  '`'  This 
problem  points  to  a  question:  assuming  that  in  some  sense  and  context  theology  has  to 
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discuss  the  goodness  of  human  conduct,  is  it  appropriate  or  advisable  to  do  this  in  the 
form  of  a  separate  discipline  from  dogmatics?  Those  who  advocate  the  positive  results 
of  separating  ethics  from  dogmatics  usually  try  to  show  how  far  different  inquiries 
and  methodologies  really  underlie  the  two.  However,  separating  dogmatics  from 
ethics  has  the  negative  result  of  placing  dogmatics  under  the  suspicion  of  being  an 
idle  intellectual  game.  Barth  thought  all  attempts  at  methodological  separation 
between  dogmatics  and  ethics  are  ethically  suspect  because,  with  great  regularity, 
there  takes  place  in  all  such  attempts  a  suspicious  change  in  direction  and  a  suspicious 
change  of  subjects,  namely,  that  God  is  transplanted  by  man.  '24  He  thought  it  vitally 
important  to  point  out  the  consequences  of  this  change  of  subject  for  the  development 
of  social  ethics,  he  says: 
It  is  not  true  that  pious  man  has  to  work  at  the  coming  of  the  kingdom  of  God. 
[He  has  to  pray  for  the  coming  of  the  kingdom  of  God  -  but  this  is  something 
different.  ]  It  is  not  true  that  he  is  related  to  God's  Word,  as  subject  is  to 
object.  All  these  are  notions  that  are  possible  only  on  the  basis  of  an  idea  of 
synthesis  and  continuity  between  nature  and  supernature  -  an  idea  which 
ruined  the  ancient  Catholic  Church  and  which  signified  a  repenetration  of  the 
church  by  paganism.  ' 
Barth  rejects  any  attempt  to  describe  the  synthesis  of  God  and  man  as  the  basis  of  the 
goodness  of  human  conduct.  He  says  obedience  to  God's  Command  is  the  only  basis 
of  good  human  conduct.  The  Biblical  accounts  of  those  who  witnessed  the  life,  death 
and  resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ  reveal  God's  command. 
For  the  purposes  of  expression,  he  has  to  discuss  each  aspect  of  these  accounts 
separately  but  understanding  depends  on  seeing  each  section  of  his  lectures  as  part  of 
the  other.  The  method,  as  discussed  earlier,  is  more  like  seeing  a  film  than  reading  a 
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text:  although  each  frame  is  fixed  it  can  only  be  understood  by  seeing  the  whole  film. 
He  asks  what  questions  the  revelation  of  God  as  creator  elicit.  Of  course,  some  of  the 
questions  he  asks,  and  the  answers  he  gives  relate  specifically  to  his  time.  However, 
some  have  a  universal  relevance.  An  example  is  Barth's  insight,  mentioned  earlier, 
that  life  is  a  gift: 
We  do  not  live  any  kind  of  life  according  to  our  own  caprice.  As  we  know 
ourselves  in  God's  Word,  we  are  oriented  to  our  fellows  and  we  live  a  life 
whose  specific  ends  are  totally  determined  and  which  actualises  that 
orientation  in  a  particular  way.  As  thus  determined  our  life  has  a  necessity  by 
creation.  Our  life  itself  then  becomes  for  us  the  divine  command.  126 
Here  Barth  discusses  the  questions:  What  is  the  divine  command,  and  how  does  it 
reveal  itself?  "'  He  also  discusses  the  knowledge  of  the  Truth,  which  is  the  object 
shared  by  theology  and  philosophy.  This  debate  is  at  the  core  of  his  lectures  on  ethics 
and  he  is  in  dialogue  with  Kant  and  Hegel  establishing  the  grounds  for  making 
knowledge  claims  and  the  means  of  assessing  their  validity.  The  argument  is  about 
the  formation  of  an  appropriate  epistemology  for  the  science  of  theological  ethics.  He 
is  developing  a  theological  claim  about  the  knowledge  of  the  Truth  against  the 
background  of  the  philosophical  claims  made  by  Kant  and  Hegel.  Their 
epistemologies  provided  the  foundation  for  the  resurgence  of  interest  in 
existentialism.  This  renaissance  led,  in  theology,  to  ethics  swallowing  dogmatics.  To 
show  the  importance  of  Barth's  arguments  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  questions 
Hegel  discussed  in  relation  to  knowledge  of  the  Truth. 
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When  he  began  his  work  Hegel  was  conducting  a  dialogue  with  Kant  with  a 
discussion  of  "sense  certainty"  as  the  source  of  all  "knowledge  claims".  12'He  takes  his 
readers  from  the  certainty  they  have  of  the  truth  of  the  knowledge  gained  by  their 
sense  experience,  shows  them  the  confusions  and  misunderstandings  of  this 
knowledge,  and  leads  them  to  a  philosophical  point  of  view  from  where  they  may 
begin  to  understand  the  Truth. 
Hegel  challenges  the  reader's  confidence  in  Kant's  certainty  of  the  senses  as  the 
source  of  Truth.  He  begins  the  pursuit  of  the  knowledge  of  the  Truth  with 
consciousness  becoming  aware  of  itself  in  self-consciousness.  His  claim  is  that 
objects  of  knowledge  which  present  themselves  as  sense  experience,  in  feelings,  and 
in  thought,  are  real  only  as  consciousness  becomes  aware  of  them.  Of  course,  self- 
consciousness  is  the  awareness  of  consciousness  as  an  object.  This  is  the  process  of 
thinking  about  thinking  which  Hegel  calls  philosophy.  Hegel  thus  shows  that  Kant's 
certainty  of  sense  is  misleading  and  confusing.  He  says  the  knowledge  of  Truth  begins 
at  the  point  when  what  is  rational  is  actual,  and  what  is  actual  is  rational.  129 
Of  course,  Hegel  was  not  saying  what  exists  is  real  or  rational  but  rather,  by  actuality 
he  means  the  synthesis  of  essence  and  existence  that  takes  place  in  thinking.  He  is 
claiming  that  thinking  unites  ontology  and  epistemology,  and  that  this  is  the  rational, 
which  is  the  actual. 
When  discussing  the  Reality  of  the  Divine  Command  Barth  enters  the  dialogue  and 
begins  by  considering  Hegel's  self-conscious  consciousness  as  the  source  of 
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empirical,  speculative  and  metaphysical  truth  and  then  takes  the  foundation  of  the 
discussion  from  philosophy  to  theology.  He  points  out  that  the  non-participant 
spectator  is  the  shadow  side  of  knowledge  and  that  this  shadow  is  the  ineradicable 
remnant  of  subjectivity.  Therefore,  the  question  of  its,  questions  the  truth  of  all  truths. 
Barth's  description,  "the  shadow  side  of  knowledge"  is  a  reference  to  Hegel's 
philosophical  discussion  of  what  the  world  ought  to  be.  13°  Hegel  says  philosophy 
always  comes  on  to  the  scene  too  late  to  describe  how  the  world  ought  to  be.  The 
thought  about  the  world  appears  only  when  actuality  is  already  there  cut  and  dried 
after  its  process  of  formation  is  complete.  Hegel  says,  "The  owl  of  Minerva  spreads 
its  wings  only  with  the  falling  of  the  dusk.  "131  Barth  takes  Hegel's  argument  further 
saying  that,  theologically,  the  description  of  consciousness  becoming  aware  of  itself 
in  self-conscience  and  in  the  process  forming  actuality  is  in  shadow  even  in  bright 
daylight.  He  describes  the  problem  the  shadow  casts  over  scientific  knowledge,  which 
is  the  problem  of  objectivity.  He  follows  his  usual  methodology,  firstly  explaining  the 
defect  in  present  thinking,  and  secondly  describing  the  truth. 
He  reminds  his  audience  that  in  scientific  knowledge  the  content  of  a  general  truth 
may  be  either  correct  or  incorrect.  A  truth  is  general  as  far  as  the  specific  person  who 
asserts  it  is  of  no  significance,  which  means,  as  far  as  possible,  ignoring  subjectivity. 
In  addition,  general  truth  is  theoretical  if  any  onlooker  can  assert  it.  It  is  therefore  a 
theoretical  truth  that  I  am  a  spectator  of  my  own  life.  Scientific  knowledge  however, 
assumes  truth  will  not  be  hurt  if  I,  as  observer,  am  a  condition  of  it.  This  shadow  side 
of  subjectivity  conditions  the  criteria  of  truth  as  true  criteria  of  Truth.  He  claims 
subjectivity  cannot  be  disregarded  for  it  is  the  question,  he  says: 
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But  no  matter  what  our  view  of  it  may  be,  all  these  truths  are  in  fact 
challenged  as  such  by  the  question  which  we  would  like  to  exclude  as  much 
as  possible  when  we  think  generally  and  theoretically  but  which  includes 
within  itself  our  general  and  theoretical  thinking.  Whether  we  pay  attention  to 
it  or  not,  this  question  is  posed  and  it  is  the  ethical  question.  132 
General  truths  are  true  only  as  far  as  the  life  of  the  observer  is  part  of  the  truth  of  a 
higher  order.  Barth  is  claiming  that  general  truth  relies  on  the  ethical  question,  the 
question  of  us,  because  the  subjective  observer  brings  being  to  the  general  truth. 
Being  for  Barth  is  only  true  when  it  is determined  in  the  event  of  God's  act;  being  is 
with  the  creator,  and  it  is  not  possible  to  investigate  the  creator,  as  a  further  general 
truth  of  a  higher  order.  This  solves  the  problem  of  subjectivity  in  theological  ethics. 
General,  theoretical  and  conditioned  truths  contain  being  and  non-being  because  the 
observer  brings  the  universal  to  the  observation.  Hegel  described  this  universal  as  the 
`I'  that  gives  the  `Here'  and  `Now'  to  the  sensible  world.  "'  The  universal  `I'  through 
consciousness  brings  into  being  both  being  and  non-being: 
Negation  is  inherent  in  a  property  as  a  determinateness,  which  is  immediately 
one  with  the  immediacy  of  being,  an  immediacy  that,  through  this  unity  with 
negation,  is  universality.  "' 
For  Barth  being  and  non-being  only  become  united  in  the  universal  as  far  as  the 
observer's  life  is  lived  in  response  to  the  divine  command.  Only  then,  do  general 
truths,  whatever  their  content,  whether  internally  correct  or  false,  become  true.  In 
Hegel's  discussion  of  the  Universal,  it  is  the  `I'  that  gives  the  `Here'  and  `Now'  to  the 
sensible  world  and  the  universal  is  the  Spirit  manifest  in  consciousness  becoming 
aware  of  itself  in  self-conscious.  Applying  the  thinking  to  religion  Hegel  says: 
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Religion,  for  example,  has  its  absolute  value  within  itself,  but  other  purposes 
are  supported  and  upheld  at  the  same  time.  Christ  said,  "Seek  ye  first  the 
kingdom  of  God,  and  all  these  things  shall  be  added  unto  you"  [Matt.  6:  33]. 
Our  particular  purposes  can  be  attained  only  insofar  as  what  is  in  and  for  itself 
attained.  13' 
Barth  takes  Hegel's  position  and  places  it  not  in  the  gift  of  the  Spirit,  but  in  the 
revelation  of  Christ.  It  is  because  of  the  incarnation  that  non-being  becomes  being  as 
the  universal  is in  the  covenant  relationship  of  God  with  humanity  in  Jesus  Christ. 
Barth  achieves  what  Hegel  never  could,  which  is  a  separating  of  God  and  man,  but  a 
separation  united  in  the  incarnation.  He  says  of  this  position: 
It  is  as  one  who  is  unconditionally  loved,  as  one  whom  a  decision  has  been 
made,  that  I  am  summoned  to  move  on  to  a  decision  that  the  very  next 
moment,  i.  e.,  to  be  the  one  I  am,  not  to  elect  but  to  be  elected  and  to  confirm 
my  election,  to  fulfil  my  decision  the  decision  that  has  been  made  about  me, 
to  be  the  one  whom  God  loves  in  my  own  decision  in  virtue  of  God's 
decision.  "' 
He  establishes  the  question  of  being  in  our  ethical  response  to  the  three-fold  command 
of  God,  as  the  command  of  God  the  creator,  God  the  reconciler  and  God  the 
redeemer.  He  unites  ethics  with  the  otherness  of  God  in  and  through  the  command  of 
God. 
The  Truth  of  all  general  truths,  including  the  Here  and  Now  of  space  and  time 
are  true  only  insofar  as  the  subjective  onlooker,  spectator  or  non-participant 
observer  stand  in  the  question  whether  my  life  and  therefore  my  action  and 
my  theörein  has  a  part  in  the  truth  of  a  basically  different  and  higher  order,  in 
the  truth  of  the  good.  "' 
Here  we  can  see  the  influence  of  Herrmann,  and  Kierkegaard.  As  we  have  seen  before 
the  command,  as  Barth  is  using  the  concept,  comes  from  Kierkegaard's  interpretation 
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of  Lutheran  theology.  "'  The  command  of  God  makes  a  "claim".  A  claim  is  something 
lasting,  its  justification  is  the  pr"imaly  thing,  and  because  it  lasts  it  is  enforceable  at 
any  time.  A  claim  is  not  abstract  it  always  exists  against  someone  and  is  therefore 
always  enforceable.  Unlike  a  contract,  a  claim  is  not  a  fixed  demand  agreed  on  by 
both  sides,  but  is  the  ground  for  future  action.  The  claim  of  faith  begins  in  the 
preaching  of  the  gospel,  which  reinforces  it.  It  has  a  "contemporaneity"  and  to  be 
present  at  the  claim  of  God's  command  is  to  take  part  in  the  redemptive  act.  The 
command  as  claim  is  analogous  to  the  "contemporaneity"  of  the  Mass  as  both  are 
redemptive  acts.  139Gadamer  makes  the  following  observation  about  Kierkegaard's 
interpretation  of  the  claim: 
What  unfolds  before  us  is  so  much  lifted  out  of  the  ongoing  course  of  the 
ordinary  world  and  so  much  enclosed  in  its  own  autonomous  circle  of 
meaning  that  no  one  is  prompted  to  see  some  other  future  or  reality  behind 
it.  '4° 
Barth  later  develops  the  concept  of  "contemporaneity"  into  the  idea  of  God's 
determination  of  our  self-determination  by  saying  we  live  in  unreality  until  our 
response  to  the  Command  of  God  orders  our  lives.  "'  The  claim  against  us  made  by 
God's  command  determines  all  Truth.  Barth  says  that  even  the  words  we  use  do  not 
have  any  meaning  until  they  become  part  of  God's  claim.  Truth  creates  truth,  but  it  is 
not  another  general  truth,  which  can  be  challenged  by  a  higher  order  truth.  Without 
God's  gift,  we  are  in  unbelief,  unreality  and  untruth.  This  is  a  strange  new  world: 
The  determination  our  existence  by  the  command,  our  new  life  in 
sanctification  in  which  we  move  on  from  the  decision  of  this  moment  to  that 
of  the  next,  is  a  being  in  relation  to  this  reality.  We  have  no  control  over  the 
138  Soren  Kierkegaard,  Philosophical  fragments;  or  a  fragment  of  philosoplry  by  Johannes  Climacur, 
Chapter  4  (Princeton,  N.  J.:  Princeton  University  Press,  1962) 
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reality,  nor  have  we,  therefore,  over  its  relation  to  our  existence.  ---  The  new 
life  cannot  be  abstracted  from  the  free  giving  act  of  God:  "in  him  we  live  and 
move  and  have  our  being"  [Acts  17:  28].  14` 
Barth  describes  the  principles  that  guide  human  action  as  the  first  orders  of  creation; 
these  are  work,  marriage  and  the  family.  He  also  includes  'equality  and  leadership'  as 
orders.  1' 
In  Ethics  I,  Barth  is  reading  back  into  the  orders  of  creation  the  contextual  values  of 
his  time  about  work,  marriage  and  family,  equality  and  leadership  and  applies  the 
prevailing  social  principles  to  assess  human  actions.  Two  questions  arise  from  his 
thinking:  firstly,  are  work,  marriage  and  the  family  universal  ethical  criteria,  or  are 
they  requirements  only  for  Christians?  Secondly,  do  these  criteria  apply  over  all  time, 
or  are  they  relative  to  a  specific  historical  moment?  Their  solution  poses  two 
problems  for  Barth:  the  first,  is  the  place  and  significance  of  history,  and  the  second, 
is  the  status,  future  and  salvation  of  those  who  he  places  outside  God's  divine 
command. 
We  can  now  consider  the  two  problems  as  Barth  explores  work  as  the  first  order  of 
creation.  He  knew  about  the  problem  of  unemployment.  As  early  as  1925,  Thurneysen 
\ 
wrote  to  him  about  its  effects  among  his  congregation: 
The  whole  situation  here  is  bleaker  than  ever.  The  embroidery  industry  goes 
more  and  more  to  pieces  and  unemployment  is  the  order  of  the  day.  I  no 
longer  know  what  it  is  like  and  how  things  go  in  a  congregation  with  normal 
working  conditions.  Almost  everyday  one  is  surrounded  with  distress, 
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hardship,  sighing  on  all  sides.  And  one  is  helpless.  Also  it  becomes  clear  how 
little  modern  man  is  equipped  in  his  character  to  endure  hardship.  " 
By  1928  unemployment  in  Germany  had  reached  appalling  numbers,  inflation  was  out 
of  control,  and  the  German  economy  was  bankrupt.  The  Great  Depression  gripped 
America  and  the  New  York  stock  exchange  collapsed  on  24  `h  October  1929,  known  as 
Black  Thursday.  As  a  result,  the  investment  of  foreign  capital  in  Germany  fell  from 
five  thousand  million  Deutsch  Marks  in  1928  to  two  and  half  thousand  million  in 
1929  and  by  1930,  it  was  just  seven  hundred  million.  Germany  was  both  military  and 
financially  disarmed. 
Hitler's  National  Socialist  Party  took  advantage  of  this  situation  by  making  promises 
of  employment,  promises  that  in  the  main  they  kept.  As  a  result  the  Nazis  gained  a 
remarkable  increase  in  seats  in  Parliament;  rising  from  twelve  in  1928  to  one  hundred 
and  seven  in  1930,  making  them  second  to  the  Social  Democrats. 
Against  this  background,  Barth  lectured  that  work  is  the  first  order  of  creation.  He 
says  nothing  about  those  who  are  unemployed,  and  his  silence  on  the  subject  appears 
to  place  them  outside  the  orders  of  creation.  By  making  work  the  first  order  of  God's 
creatioi,  he  makes  full-employment  a  necessity  for  all  states,  which  requires  a 
constant  and  sustainable  growth  in  the  economy.  Along  with  most  others  in  Germany, 
he  seemed  unaware  of  the  true  political  situation  and  the  significance  of  Hitler's  rise 
to  power.  Scholder  emphasises  Barth's  apparent  ignorance: 
Since  he  had  come  to  Germany  in  1921,  the  Swiss  theologian  had  not  been 
much  bothered  about  political  questions,  whether  outside  or  inside  the  church. 
He  had  devoted  all  his  energies  and  passion  towards  developing  his  theology. 
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It  is  extremely  significant  that  in  his  lively  correspondence  with  Eduard 
Thurneysen,  which  kept  his  friend  in  Switzerland  regularly  up  to  date  with  all 
important  developments,  the  name  `Hitler'  appears  only  once  between  1921 
and  1930.1°5 
Barth  acknowledged  criticisms  of  the  orders  of  creation  and  as  a  result  refused  to 
allow  the  publication  of  the  lectures  during  his  lifetime.  Therefore,  it  is  not  necessary 
in  this  thesis  to  make  a  prolonged  criticism  of  his  use  of  the  doctrine  of  the  orders  of 
creation.  However,  his  frequently  quoted  comment  that  the  theologian  should  act  with 
the  Bible  in  one  hand  and  the  newspaper  in  the  other  does  not  appear  to  have  guided 
his  thinking  in  Münster.  His  lectures  do  raise  wider  questions  about  the  relationship 
between  the  system  and  ethics  in  his  theology.  He  is  systematic,  but  does  he  offer  a 
system  for  answering  individual  ethical  questions?  A  discussion  of  the  remaining 
lectures  now  follows,  explores  that  question. 
It  has  to  be  recognised  that  Barth's  Ethics  are  both  historically  and  culturally 
conditioned.  For  example,  he  places  a  discussion  of  trans-oceanic  air  flight  in  the 
section  on  suicide,  arguing  that  putting  oneself  in  danger  by  taking  such  flights  is  in 
the  same  moral  category  as  suicide.  Improvements  in  technology  have  dramatically 
diminished  the  level  of  risk  in  flying,  and  so  Barth's  statement  that  trans-oceanic 
flying  can  be  compared  to  suicide  does  not  apply  to  us.  However,  his  recognition  that 
life  is  a  gift  from  God  and  not  a  personal  possession  is  a  universal  claim  and  is  the 
foundation  from  which  man  can  evaluate  his  actions.  From  this  position  putting  one's 
life  in  danger  can  be  compared  to  suicide. 
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Barth  also  uses  the  topical  discussion  of  trans-oceanic  flights  in  a  section  on  calling  in 
which  he  claims  no  calling  is  neutral  saying  even  technology,  which  is  thought  to  be  a 
pure  action,  threatens  the  lives  of  others.  He  says: 
Now  that  the  Atlantic  has  just  been  flown  for  the  first  time  from  east  to  west, 
in  Germany  the  fact  that  a  German  did  it,  not  an  Englishman  or  a  Frenchman, 
is  what  has  stimulated  the  enthusiasm  with  which  this  event  has  been  hailed.  146 
He  goes  on  to  explain  that  theological  ethics  does  not  speak  an  ultimate  word  but  only 
a  series  of  penultimate  words,  and  that  the  necessity  of  life  is  one  such  penultimate 
word.  It  is,  he  says,  one  unavoidable  and  general  valid  standpoint.  The  command  of 
God  the  Creator  includes  more  than  life.  Life  is  only  a  component  of  the  command. 
However  as  something  commanded,  life  is  not  something  over  which  we  have  control. 
He  says,  `Life  is  a  gift',  ''  and  as  such  `Life  belongs  primarily  to  God,  secondarily  to 
us.  '  148 
Since  life  is  a  part  of  the  command  of  God  it  follows  that  to  live  is both  necessary  and 
good,  and  is  in  obedience  to  God  the  creator.  Barth's  position  relativises  the  will  to 
live  and  to  do  good  acts.  Since  an  individual's  work  is  not  good  just  because  he  wills 
his  life  and  because  he  wills  and  does  good  acts  his  actions  are  only  good  if  willed  in 
obedience  to  the  Will  of  God  the  Creator.  As  a  result,  Barth's  position  on  suicide  is 
very  different  to  most  other  ethical  judgements.  As  life  is  a  gift,  necessary  and  good, 
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direction,  taking  35V2  hrs.  from  Baldonnel  in  Ireland  to  Greenly  Island. 
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and  willed  in  obedience  to  the  Creator,  then  suicide  is  the  most  striking  negation  of 
life.  It  is,  he  says,  `a  wrong  decision  on  the  threshold  of  eternity'.  149 
He  rejects  materialism  and  spiritualism  because  life  is  willed  with  both  body  and  soul 
as  a  whole,  a  totality.  He  warns  against  materialism  particularly  the  excesses  of 
capitalism  and  he  has  some  harsh  words  for  the  owners  of  stocks  and  shares.  The 
latter  seems  somewhat  surprising  from  a  Swiss  middle-class  gentleman! 
He  says  that  although  the  command  of  God  is  to  an  individual  person  at  a  specific 
place  and  time  there  are  also  universal  demands,  due  to  the  necessity  of  metabolism, 
sexuality  and  sleep.  "'  Therefore,  it  is  obedience  to  the  command  to  for  us  to  will  these 
necessities.  Here  he  hesitates:  the  mode  of  speech  changes  from  the  imperative  to  the 
questioning  and  he  asks,  `are  there  not  aberrant  forms  and  corruption  of  this  will  for 
satisfaction  which,  far  from  really  satisfying  the  needs  of  hunger  and  love,  threaten 
the  life-act  itself?  ""  He  then  tells  us  `We  have  in  mind  alcoholism  and  prostitution, 
and  also  the  puzzling  dilemma  of  so  called  homosexuality'. 
When  Barth  discusses  the  relationship  between  men  and  women  he  begins  with  the 
Genesis  account  of  Adam  and  Eve  in  the  Garden  of  Eden.  His  use  of  the  Bible  in  this 
way  is  a  form  of  natural  theology.  This  biblical  foundation  allows  him  to  criticise 
voluntary  celibacy  saying,  `even  though  he  does  it  for  the  kingdom  of  heaven's  sake' 
the  celibate  cannot  avoid  asking  how  this  relates  to  the  command  of  creation 
regarding  human  life.  152  Similarly,  he  sees  hunger  strikes  as  negations  of  the 
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command.  However,  he  is  restricted;  he  cannot  judge  by  saying  what  is  right  or 
wrong,  but  believes  he  can  interpret  God's  decision: 
If  ethics  is  to  keep  to  the  point,  then  even  in  the  face  of  the  most  striking 
impossibilities  it  must  keep  on  putting  questions,  or  rather  showing  they  are 
already  put.  It  should  not  hand  out  good  or  bad  testimonies.  It  should  not 
judge.  Knowing  the  radical  antithesis  of  good  and  bad,  it  should  point  to  the 
command  of  God  which  alone  can  really  and  properly  judge,  and  which  will 
tell  each  of  us  what  is  good  and  bad.  "' 
It  is  an  unhappy prospect  for  suicides,  alcoholics,  prostitutes,  homosexuals,  celibates, 
and  hunger  strikers,  because  it  seems  only  married  heterosexuals  can  be  obedient  to 
the  command.  However,  he  adds  an  important  codicil  to  these  injunctions,  reminding 
us  that  we  are  not  to  judge  who  is  obedient  to  the  command  of  God  the  Creator. 
Obedience  to  the  command  includes  the  will  to  be  healthy,  the  will  to  be  happy  and 
the  will  to  be  individual.  The  will  to  be  individual  applies  not  only  to  each  of  us  but 
also  to  the  individuality  of  nations  and  families  and  voluntary  societies.  "' 
He  radically  revised  his  opinion  of  the  orders  of  creation  seeing  them  as  a  form  of 
natural  theology.  This  limits  the  need  for  criticisms  of  his  requirement  for  the 
necessity  of  family,  work  and  marriage  as  orders.  However,  in  his  sexual  ethics  the 
necessary  requirements  of  a  biblical  foundation  remain  under  the  command  of  God. 
His  use  of  the  Bible  as  a  form  of  natural  theology  limits  his  understanding  of  the 
relationships  possible  between  men  and  women  to  the  ideal  of  Adam  and  Eve. 
The  next  section  of  the  thesis  will  discuss  how  Barth  works  out  obedience  to  the 
command  of  God  in  social  ethics.  He  makes  a  surprising  statement  when  he  claims 
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that  the  study  and  pursuit  of  theological  ethics  is  not  an  obvious  task,  which  is  neither 
original  nor  self-evident,  because  there  has  not  always  been  a  theological  ethics 
Augustine,  Aquinas,  Herrmann  and  many  other  theologians  believed  they  were 
writing  theological  ethics.  He  claims  all  these  previous  ethics  had  their  foundations  in 
philosophy:  Augustine  in  Plotinus,  Aquinas  in  Aristotle  and  Herrmann  in 
Kierkegaard.  "'.  When  Barth's  theological  ethics  comes  on  the  scene  it  does  so,  he 
says,  as  a  newcomer,  which  faces  an  already  well-established,  confident  and 
acknowledged  authority.  Theological  ethics,  he  says,  has  only  one  possible  foundation 
which  is  obedience  to  the  Command  of  the  Word  of  God  as  revealed  to  the  church  in 
the  proclamation  of  the  Gospel  and  the  administration  of  the  sacraments.  He  describes 
the  situation  as: 
A  kind  of  annexation  comparable  to  the  entry  of  the  children  of  Israel,  against 
which  objections  can  obviously  be  made,  into  the  land  of  Canaan,  where  other 
nations  claimed  to  have,  if  not  an  original,  at  least  a  very  ancient  right  of 
domicile.  "' 
He  repeats  the  biblical  illustration  latter  in  the  Church  Dogmatics,  making  more 
explicit  the  theme  begun  in  Münster.  Again,  he  emphasises  the  newness  of  theological 
ethics,  its  incompatibility  with  philosophical  ethics  and  predicts  a  hostile  reception.  15' 
This  reaction  is  not  surprising  when  he  says: 
We  have  to  realize  how  far-reaching  is  this  change  in  the  conception  of  ethics. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  general  history  of  ethics,  it  means  an  annexation  of 
the  kind  that  took  place  on  the  entry  of  the  children  of  Israel  into  Palestine. 
Other  peoples  had  for  a  long  time  maintained  they  had  a  very  old,  if  not  the 
oldest  right  of  domicile  in  this  country.  But,  according  to  Josh.  927,  they  could 
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now  at  best  exist  only  as  hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water.  On  no  account 
had  the  Israelites  to  adopt  or  take  part  in  their  cultus  and  culture.  Their 
liveliest  resistance,  therefore,  could  be  expected,  and  their  existence  would 
necessarily  be  for  the  Israelites  an  almost  invincible  temptation.  Ethics  in  the 
sense  of  that  general  conception  is  something  entirely  different  from  what 
alone  the  Christian  doctrine  of  God  can  be  as  a  doctrine  of  God's  command. 
Whatever  form  the  relationship  between  the  two  may  take,  there  can  be  no 
question  either  of  positive  recognition  of  Christian  ethics  by  that  conception 
or  of  an  attachment  of  Christian  ethics  to  it.  Christian  ethics  cannot  possibly 
be  its  continuation,  development  and  enrichment.  It  is  not  one  disputant  in 
debater  with  others.  It  is  the  final  word  of  the  original  chairman  -  only 
discussed,  of  course,  in  Christian  ethics  -  which  puts  an  end  to  the  discussion 
and  involves  necessarily  a  choice  and  separation.  '"' 
Barth's  seemingly  surprising  position  follows  logically  from  the  statement  that  he 
makes  at  the  beginning  of  his  lectures:  `The  truth  of  God  is  not  a  general  and 
theoretical  and  consequently  a  conditioned  truth'.  He  points  again  to  the  stark  contrast 
between  the  truth  of  God  and  statements  of  fact  which  are  general,  theoretical  and 
conditioned  truths.  He  explains  that  factual  statements  are  general  to  the  extent  that, 
as  far  as  possible,  they  ignore  individual  subjectivity  and  that  such  statements  are 
theoretical  only  as  far  as  onlookers  assert  them,  who  as  far  as  possible  are  non- 
participants.  The  observer's  knowledge  conditions  the  truth  of  factual  statements.  The 
ineradicable  remnant  of  subjectivity  without  which  there  can  be  no  objectivity  is 
present  in  the  truth  of  all  factual  statements. 
Therefore,  theological  ethics  cannot  begin  its  discussion  in  personal  experience,  nor 
with  the  concepts  of  classical  virtues,  nor  in  naive  interpretations  of  the  categorical 
imperative,  which  are  all  general,  conditioned  and.  theoretical  truths.  "'  Equally  for  the 
15"  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics  11/2  p.  518. 
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same  reason  conscience,  as  `the  totality  of  our  self-conscience',  cannot  take  the  role 
of  arbiter  in  theological  ethics.  "' 
However,  he  does  allow  a  place  for  the  informed  conscience,  which  he  discusses  at 
the  end  of  the  lectures.  Unfortunately,  it  is  clear  that  he  was  running  out  of  time 
because  the  pace  quickens  and  the  subjects,  including  conscience,  receive  less 
detailed  treatment  and  his  position  on  the  informed  conscience  is  not  as  clear  as  we 
might  wish. 
He  rejects  the  view  that  conscience  is  part  of  the  natural  order.  Conscience  is  not  part 
of  the  command  of  God  the  creator  therefore  it  cannot  be  part  of  created  order. 
Theological  ethics  cannot  contain  a  natural  theology,  which  appeals  to  conscience  as 
the  arbiter  of  God's  command.  There  is  a  place  for  conscience  in  theological  ethics,  as 
an  eschatological  concept,  under  the  command  of  God  the  Redeemer.  Conscience, 
under  the  guidance  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  brings  future  happenings  into  present 
possibilities.  However  at  this  point,  at  the  beginning  of  the  lectures  where  he  is 
discussing  the  command  of  God  the  Creator,  he  dismisses  conscience  as  a  concept 
that  has  a  primary  position  and  rejects  the  concept  of  conscience  as  a  detached  arbiter, 
or  moral  conscience. 
Barth  insists  that  there  is  no  place  for  Biblicism  as  a  foundation  for  theological  ethics. 
The  Biblical  imperatives,  he  says,  including  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount  are  specific  to 
the  time,  place  and  people  who  received  the  Command.  They  were  concrete  then  but 
are  now  relative  commands  to  be  understood  as  witness  to  revelation.  The  command 
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not  to  kill,  ''  or  the  command  to  love  one's  enemies,  162  are  orientated  towards  the 
absolutely  concrete  command  but  are  themselves  only  relatively  concr"te.  163 
Theological  ethics  has  its  foundation  in  the  command  as  it  is  revealed  in  the  present 
as  the  Word  of  God  the  Creator,  God  the  Reconciler  and  God  the  Redeemer,  which  is 
specific,  absolute  and  unconditioned  truth.  Barth,  in  the  lectures,  then  continues  by 
explaining  how  this  revelation  is  received. 
In  the  third  lecture,  he  explains  that  judgment  is  the  form  in  which  God  reveals  his 
command.  "  Judgment  is  the  work  of  sanctification.  In  earlier  lectures  lie  argued  that 
the  doctrine  of  God  contains  ethics,  but  now  he  takes  the  further  important  step  in 
arguing  that  ethics  is  also  more  precisely  contained  within  the  doctrine  of 
sanctification  as  the  expression  of  God's  chosen  relationship  with  his  creation.  To 
express  this  relationship  he  introduces  the  subject  of  God's  covenant  relationship 
which  is  the  theme  that  dominates  all  his  future  theology: 
The  command  is  not  given  to  us  without  the  promise  that  we  are  God's 
elected  covenant-partners  whom  he  loves.  "' 
He  proceeds  cautiously,  carefully  explaining  that  as  a  theologian  he  is  not  alone  in  his 
view  that  the  gift  of  faith  justifies  God's  elected  covenant  partners.  He  wants  to 
establish,  and  strongly  emphasises,  the  point  that  he  is  following  the  teachings  and  the 
tradition  of  Reformed  theology;  `to  confess  that  not  alone  but  in  the  consensus  of  the 
Christian  church  do  I  adopt  the  position  I  do'.  '  He  wants  to  emphasise  the  gift  of 
grace  as  being  a  freely  given  gift  in  which  we  are  judged,  forgiven  and  sanctified,  a 
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gift  which  we  can  neither  grasp  for  ourselves  or  believe  for  another.  It  is,  he  reminds 
us,  that  in  taking  our  baptism  seriously  we  remember  it  as  a  sign  of  the  promise, 
`which  is  given  to  each  of  us  personally,  and  truly,  as  a  sign  of  promise  for  our 
thinking,  and  therefore  with  epistemological  significance.  ""  He  then  describes  God's 
covenant  relationship,  the  gift  of  faith  and  our  subsequent  baptism,  as  having  an 
epistemological  significance.  He  means  that  it  is  only  within  the  covenant  relationship 
that  our  knowledge  becomes  real,  and  that  previously  we  were  in  unreality.  Our 
present  sinful  unreality  becomes  real  in  as  much  as  we  see  that  we  are  in  unreality,  the 
negative  is  not  removed,  but  illuminated  by  the  promise  received  in  baptism.  This  is 
why,  in  later  works,  he  speaks  of  baptism  as  our  first  act  of  obedience  to  God's 
command  describing  it  as  the  first  ethical  act,  because  it  is  our  public 
acknowledgement  of  God's  gift  of  faith.  168  However,  we  would  not  be  able  to  make 
this  act  if  we  had  not  received  the  gift  of  faith  through  grace;  therefore,  infant  baptism 
is  to  be  discarded  as  part  of  the  Roman  Catholic  doctrine  that  grace  perfects  nature. 
For  Barth  baptism  is  the  first  ethical  action,  and  is  the  event,  which  arises  from 
actions  that  determine  being.  Hence,  baptism  has  both  ontological  and 
epistemological  significance. 
This  is  why  he  says  theological  ethics  cannot  speak  out  of  human  understanding  but 
only  from  bearing  witness  to  the  concrete  action  of  the  Holy  Spirit  through  our 
baptism  and  membership  of  the  church.  He  describes  the  event  of  baptism  as  the 
human  "yes"  which  coincides  with  the  divine  "yes",  and  becomes  an  eschatological 
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reality  in  Jesus  Christ.  "'  The  covenant  relationship  establishes  that  holiness  is  an 
eschatological  concept,  and  not  a  perfecting  of  human  nature  through  grace  and 
works.  Therefore,  theological  ethics  cannot  be  a  means  of  achieving  holiness. 
He  rejects  what  he  describes  as  the  two  extreme  positions:  the  Protestant  theology  of 
the  cross,  and  the  Roman  Catholic  theology  that  grace  perfects  nature.  Both,  he  says, 
lead  to  a  judicial  conception  of  salvation  in  the  Western  Ordo  Salutis  with  undesirable 
consequences  for  the  understanding  of  revelation,  the  self  and  the  place  of 
conscience.  "' 
He  continues  by  discussing  how  the  Command  of  God  the  Creator  as  part  of  the  three- 
fold  command,  of  God  the  Creator,  God  the  Reconciler  and  God  the  Redeemer, 
applies  to  our  existence  as  human.  "'  His  position  contrasts  sharply  with  those  he  has 
just  rejected: 
We  should  not  weaken  the  significance  of  the  command  by  forgetting  that  it  is 
always  the  command  of  God  the  Creator  and  always  applies  to  us  also  as 
creatures.  It  does  not  begin  to  apply  to  us  as  transgressors  and  as  those  who 
are  reconciled  again  to  God;  it  applies  to  us  also  already  as  those  who  exist. 
Our  existence  as  such  is  not  a  hiding  place  where,  appealing  to  our  ignorance 
of  good  and  evil  and  free  from  God's  command  we  think  we  can  be  left  alone. 
The  command  obviously  conies  already  to  Adam  and  Eve  in  paradise  before 
the  fall.  12 
Although  life  is  included  in  the  command  of  God  the  Creator  to  his  creatures  the 
command  is  more  than  just  life;  it  is  a  component  of  the  Command.  Therefore  life  as 
such,  is  not  something  to  which  the  individual  has  a  claim,  nor  is  it  something  over 
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which  the  individual  has  control,  because  life  belongs  primarily  and  originally  to  God, 
and  only  secondarily  to  the  individual  life,  it  is  only  a  competent  of  what  is 
commanded  and  cannot  be  made  the  only  standpoint  of  theological  ethics.  "'  He 
criticises  Herrmann  on  this  point  because  in  protecting  theology  against  naturalism  he 
made  life  the  only  standpoint  of  theological  ethics.  In  doing  this,  Barth  says, 
Herrmann  turned  from  Christian  theology  to  protecting  idealism.  ";  Barth  wants  to 
insist  that  under  the  Command  of  God  the  Creator,  life  is  a  penultimate  word  not  the 
final  word. 
Life,  as  defined  by  Barth,  is  a  broad  idea,  which  defines  humanity  and  establishes 
reality.  Human  autonomy,  integrity  and  freedom  express  life,  and  this  domain 
constitutes  theological  ethics. 
To  explore  this  domain  theologically,  he  firstly  explains  the  true  meaning  of  human 
autonomy.  Life,  as  created  by  God,  is  separate  and  distinct  from  God  and  we  are, 
therefore,  only  real  and  autonomous  in  relation  to  God  and  the  belief  in  an 
independent  position  apart  from  God  is  unreality. 
Secondly,  God  creates  life  specifically  as  individuals.  Distinctness  and  individuality 
are  the  realities  of  life. 
Thirdly,  God  creates  life  in  time,  which  means  existence  is  identical  with  itself  in  the 
flow  of  moments,  the  same  before  and  after,  through  movement  and  change.  Although 
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life  shares  with  God  qualities  of  inunutability  and  actuality  it  also  takes  part  in 
continuity  and  change. 
Fourthly,  it  follows  from  the  above  that  created  life  takes  part  within  the  qualities  of 
God,  which  are  on  loan  to  us. 
Fifthly,  life,  which  exists  through  God,  begins  in  and  with  itself  and  therefore  life  is 
freedom,  because  it  has  no  dependence  outside  its  creator. 
The  concepts  of  autonomy,  actuality,  and  freedom  as  defined  by  Barth  are  the 
foundations  of  his  theological  ethics,  and  they  also  delineate  what  it  is  to  be  human. 
Life,  says  Barth,  `is  obviously  placed  in  the  command  of  God  that  is  issued  to  me, 
whatever  it  may  be'.  "', 
Individuality,  as  described  above  in  the  five  aspects  of  created  life,  is  the  most  salient 
thing  about  the  foundation  of  Barth's  ethics.  Theological  ethics  begins  with  the 
individual  who  is  required,  by  the  command,  to  affirm  life  whilst  realising  that  it  is 
only  relative,  and  that  death  should  not  be  brought  on  or  hastened.  There  is  a  created 
will  to  live.  Although,  Barth  points  out,  life  under  the  command  of  God  may  have  to 
be  sacrificed,  but  even  so  death  would  continue  to  be  an  affirmation  of  life.  16  He 
says,  Jesus  chose  this  possibility  when  lie  went  up  to  Jerusalem  in  opposition  to  the 
wish  of  his  disciples  who  said,  "this  will  never  happen  to  you""' 
175  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  123. 
176  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  126. 
177  Matt  16.22 104 
We  have  previously  heard  that  Barth  thinks  that  theological  ethics  under  the  command 
of  God  the  creator  must  consider  suicide  differently  to  most  other  ethics.  Here  he 
expands  on  his  position  by  saying  that  both  the  created  will  to  live  and  the  possibility 
of  the  sacrifice  of  life,  under  the  command  makes  the  judgement  of  suicide  radically 
different  to  that  of  most  ethics.  In  relation  to  the  possibility  of  suicide,  the  church  has 
to  consider  the  divine  command.  Its  task  is  two-fold,  whilst  not  propagating  the 
doctrine  that  suicide  is  reprehensible  and  forbidden,  it  must  also  not  advance  the 
opposing  doctrine,  that  of  permitting  suicide.  "'  His  discussion  of  suicide  is  typical  of 
his  method.  He  examines  both  extremes  of  behaviour  and  rejects  them  with  the 
important  qualification  that  the  command  of  God  is  the  source  and  judgement  of 
theological  ethics.  He  asks,  how  can  others  judge  if  an  act  suicide  is  under  the 
command  of  God? 
It  is  precisely  when  we  stand  by  the  position  that  we  should  not  judge  people 
and  actions  but  consider  the  command  of  God  that,  in  the  face  of  the 
possibility  of  suicide,  we  cannot  see  too  clearly  that  even  a  voluntary  death,  if 
it  is  to  be  right,  must  not  rest  on  permission  -  for  what  does  permission  mean 
if  we  ourselves  have  to  decide?  -  but  must  be  done  in  conformity  with  the 
command.  1' 
Barth  has  argued  that  God  creates  life  and  gives  it  as  an  individual  specific  gift.  He 
says  God  loans  the  attributes  of  life  with  constancy  over  space  and  time.  He  now 
describes  the  conditions  under  which  life  is  lived;  the  necessities  of  metabolism  and 
sexuality.  Created  life  is  characterised  by  hunger,  love  and  tiredness,  and  the  will  for 
their  satisfaction.  He  says  theological  ethics  has  no  guidance  to  offer  the  exercise  of 
the  created  will: 
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We  need  not  answer  the  question  in  what  circumstances  it  is  good  to  will  and 
act  in  accordance  with  these  conditions,  to  care  for  the  satisfaction  of  the 
needs  of  hunger,  sex  and  sleep.  God's  commana  tells  us  when  and  how  and 
how  far  this  is  good,  and  no  ethics  must  interrupt  at  this  point"" 
Again,  his  methodology  is  similar  to  that  which  he  used  in  the  discussion  on  suicide. 
He  offers  two  extremes,  rejects  them  and  chooses  a  middle  path  with  the  qualification 
that  God's  command  is  the  judge  of  good  conduct.  He  chooses  Lucullus  the  glutton 
and  Don  Juan  the  seducer  at  the  extreme  of  over  satisfying  needs,  and  the  Indian 
hunger-virtuoso  and  the  celibate  monk  as  example  of  the  under  satisfaction  of 
primitive  needs.  He  suggests  again  a  middle  path  of  `sensible'  consumption  and  again 
says  we  cannot  judge,  saying: 
But  if  ethics  is  to  keep  the  point,  then  even  in  the  face  of  the  most  striking 
impossibilities  it  must  keep  on  putting  the  questions,  or  rather  showing  they 
are  already  put.  It  should  not  hand  out  good  or  bad  testimonies.  It  should  not 
judge.  Knowing  the  radical  antithesis  of  good  and  bad,  it  should  point  to  the 
command  of  God  which  alone  can  really  and  properly  judge,  and  which  will 
tell  each  of  us  what  is  good  and  bad.  'R' 
The  command  of  life  enters  into  our  actions  in  relation  to  the  created  needs  of  life. 
There  is  a  requirement  to  maintain  good  health  by  considering  the  possibility  of 
particular  diets,  sporting  activity  or  the  need  for  a  physician,  and  to  take  all  necessary 
action  to  avoid  sickness  is  a  requirement  of  the  command  of  life.  He  reminded  his 
audience  that: 
Jesus  constantly  thought  it  necessary  to  set  up  against  sickness  the  sign  of  the 
immanent  kingdom  of  God  in  the  form  of  his  miracles  of  healing.  '82 
Again,  as  with  previous  discussions,  theological  ethics  cannot  become  prescriptive  or 
offer  universal  solutions  but  only  raise  questions  in  obedient  response  to  the  command 
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of  life.  He  says,  God  commands  the  affirmation  of  life  not  only  by  the  creation  but 
also  by  the  hope  of  the  resurrection.  Neverthele?  s,  concerns  about  our  health  are  not  to 
become  benevolent  demons  to  which  we  bring  worship  and  belief  and  serve  with  a 
concentration  and  enthusiasm  which  make  it  seem  dubious  whether  it  really  is  a 
matter  of  the  health  of  the  real  man.  By  the  phrase  "the  real  man",  he  means  that  the 
body  is  not  our  totality.  God  creates  us  with  a  body  and  a  mind.  Therefore,  we  need  to 
be  aware  of  the  requirement  to  nourish  our  minds  keeping  them  healthy  and  free  from 
disease.  He  says  health  is  unequivocally  present  when  the  life  that  is  not  our  own  is  at 
the  disposal  of  its  creator.  Therefore,  either  the  extreme  position  of  resignation  in  the 
face  of  sickness  or  the  will  to  be  healthy  at  all  costs  are  equally  impossible  in  relation 
to  the  command;  we  are  to  seek  a  middle  way. 
It  is  the  task  of  theological  ethics  to  describe  the  reality  of  created  life  in  all  its 
fullness,  remembering  that  the  created  will  to  live  contains  the  affirmation  of  pleasure. 
As  created  life  we  want  to  be  happy  but  this  is  problematic,  because  there  is  good 
pleasure  and  bad  pleasure.  We  are  unable  to  draw  the  line  between  them,  but 
theological  ethics  points  out  we  have  a  warning  when  the  will  to  enjoy  life  collides 
with  the  affirmation  of  its  primitive  needs  or  the  will  to  be  healthy.  "'  However,  he 
says,  the  will  to  live  in  this  form  finds  its  criteria  within  itself,  because  real  life 
belongs  to  God  and  our  joy  in  life  is  according  to  his  good  pleasure  and  not  ours:  ` 
Lack  of  character,  lack  of  the  courage  to  confess  oneself,  the  sloth  of  making 
less  of  oneself  than  one  should,  the  torment  of  making  oneself  other  than  one 
is-all  these  are  threatened  by  the  question  whether  there  is  any  will  to  take 
seriously  the  life  that  one  has  been  loaned.  "' 
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Barth  has  been  discussing  the  meaning  of  the  command  of  God  the  Creator  for  the 
individually  created  life  but,  of  course,  this  l""e  is  lived  in  relationships.  How  is  the 
individual  life  understood  within  the  command  of  God  the  creator,  as  a  life  affirmed 
in  the  determinations  of  other  created  life  around  it?  How  are  we  to  exercise  our  needs 
in  relationship  to  others?  The  asserting  of  our  will  to  live  in  relationships  is  the  will 
for  power,  "'  and  the  will  has  its  roots  in  eighteenth  century  German  expressionism, 
Herder's  `Knifte'"187 
The  simple  affirmation  of  life  expresses  the  will  for  power  and  the  will  to  satisfy 
natural  needs  originating  in  the  command  for  life.  They  are  health,  happiness  and 
individuality.  The  will  to  be  healthy,  the  will  to  be  happy,  and  the  will  to  be  individual 
all  mean  that  I  also  have  the  will  for  power.  The  will  to  power  is  required  to  achieve 
what  is  necessary  in  all  these  matters,  and  demands  lordship  over  the  possibilities  that 
arise  in  all  three  areas. 
In  discussing  the  will  to  power  Barth  is  conducting  a  dialogue  with  Nietzsche,  of 
whom  he  says: 
He  hated  the  morality  of  Christianity  as  a  slave  morality  because  in  it  he 
seemed  to  recognise  the  epitome  of  the  impotence  or  indolence  of  the  far  too 
many  -  something  he  had  first  hated  in  the  by  no  means  Christian  morality  of 
the  German  cultural  philistine  of  the  seventies.  1R' 
Whilst  he  accepts  Nietzsche's  criticism  of  Germany  he  warns  against  Nietzsche's 
approval  of  the  French  spirit  for  he  believes  that  no  society  is  exempt  from  the  desire 
for  absolute  power.  The  will  for  absolute  power  is  always  manifesting  itself  in 
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society,  and  he  gives  the  example  of  the  rise  of  Roman  imperialism  with  its 
reincarnation  in  certain  popes.  It  is  interesting  to  wonder  if  he  was  aware  of  the  rise  of 
imperialism  in  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  of  his  time  in  the  relationship  forged 
between  the  papal  nuncio,  Eugenio  Pacelli,  and  Adolf  Hitler 
Klaus  Scholder,  whose  work  is  considered  the  definitive  history  of  the  relationship 
between  the  Third  Reich  and  the  German  Churches,  says  Pope  Benedict  XV's  action 
in  May  1917  in  sending  Eugenia  Pacelli,  their  most  gifted  young  diplomat,  expressed 
the  Curia's  special  relationship  with  German  Catholics: 
At  the  time,  however,  no  one  could  have  had  any  inkling  what  importance  this 
decision  was  to  have.  In  fact,  first  as  Nuncio  in  Munich  and  Berlin,  then  as 
Cardinal  and  Secretary  of  State  in  Rome,  and  finally  as  Pope  Pius  XII,  Pacelli 
became  increasingly  the  key  figure  of  the  German  church.  'K9 
The  agreements  reached  between  Pacelli  and  Hitler  were  imperialistic  and  in  direct 
opposition  to  the  will  of  the  German  bishops,  clergy  and  laity.  During  this  period  as 
we  have  seen,  Barth  was  in  discussion  with  a  group  of  leading  Roman  Catholics  laity 
in  Münster,  and  also  is  recorded  as  having  had  a  private  two-hour  discussion  with  the 
Roman  Catholic  theologian,  Przywara  in  February  1929.  Evidence  is  now  available  of 
the  extent  and  the  effect  of  imperialism  in  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  in  its 
relationship  with  the  Third  Reich.  Cornwall  in  his  recent  biography  of  Pope  Pius  XII, 
says: 
The  acquiescence  of  the  German  people  in  the  face  of  Nazism  cannot  be 
understood  in  its  entirety  without  taking  into  account  the  long  path,  beginning 
as  early  as  1920,  to  the  Reich  Concordat  of  1933,  Pacelli's  crucial  role  in  it, 
and  Hitler's  reasons  for  signing  it.  The  negotiations  were  conducted 
exclusively  by  Pacelli  on  behalf  of  the  Pope  over  the  heads  of  the  faithful,  the 
clergy,  and  the  German  bishops.  When  Hitler  became  Pacelli's  partner  in 
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negotiations,  the  concordat  thus  became  the  supreme  act  of  two  authoritarians, 
while  the  supposed  beneficiaries  were  correspondingly  weakened, 
undermined,  and  neutralized.  190 
It  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  Barth,  through  his  contacts  with  German  Roman 
Catholics,  did  know  about  the  problem  of  imperialism  in  his  own  time,  and  may  not 
have  been  referring  only  to  the  past  in  his  reference  to  the  imperialism  of  certain 
popes.  Barth  also  cites  as  the  will  to  power,  the  cases  of  Mussolini,  and  the  desire  for 
absolute  power,  leading  to  the  destruction  of  life,  which  drove  the  technological 
achievements  of  the  First  World  War.  He  also  reminds  his  audience  of  the  power  of 
money  at  both  an  individual  and  a  national  level.  ' 
Theological  ethics  has  to  remind  its  listeners  that  only  God  has  absolute  power  and 
that  all  human  power  is  relative.  The  true  life  of  the  creature  shows  in  weakness. 
Whether  individual  power  demonstrates  strength  or  weakness  is,  Barth  reminds  his 
listeners  due  to  God's  good  pleasure  the  real  power  of  our  lives  is  not  bound  up  with 
our  victory  or  triumph.  "'  The  criterion  of  a  true  will  to  power  is  whether  an  individual 
or  nation  can  live  with  the  breaking  of  its  will.  The  will  for  absolute  power  may  be 
broken  without  causing  a  disaster  for  life,  the  lion  is  just  as  well  able  to  be  a  lamb. 
This  is  the  possibility  of  the  power  of  Jesus  Christ.  "' 
Barth's  ethics  discuss  the  actions  of  the  individual,  not  of  groups  or  nations.  The 
individual's  response  to  the  Word  of  God  is  the  foundation  of  his  ethics,  and  baptism 
is  the  first  ethical  act.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  these  individual  descriptions  apply  to 
nations.  Does  God  speak  his  Word  to  nations?  Who  receives  and  witnesses  to  it? 
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Presumably,  the  church  receives  the  Word  and  witnesses  to  the  nation.  He  does  not 
work  out  the  details  of  the  relation  hip  between  church  and  state  and,  without  this 
discussion;  the  next  stage  of  his  argument  is  weak. 
In  a  development  of  Hegel's  master  and  slave  argument,  he  says  that  the  criterion  of 
the  will  to  power  applies  to  individual  relationships.  Now  he  argues  it  also  applies  to 
relationships  between  nations.  However,  is  it  possible  to  move  from  an  individual 
ethic  to  a  social  philosophy,  which  describes  the  actions  and  relationships  of  nations? 
He  does  not  answer  these  questions  in  the  lectures  but  discusses  the  relationship  later 
in  three  essays,  which  receive  close  attention  in  Chapter  6. 
There  is  however  a  further  important  condition  to  his  argument  about  the  relationship 
between  individual  and  social  ethics,  which  is  that  the  command  of  God  the  creator  is 
part  of  the  threefold  command  of  God  the  creator,  God  the  reconciler  and  God  the 
redeemer.  Consequently,  he  argues  that  the  created  will  to  power,  as  the  command  of 
God  the  creator,  is  a  penultimate  word,  not  the  final  word.  Therefore,  he  rejects 
naturalistic  ethics,  which  claims  life  as  the  criteria,  as  exemplified  in  Albert 
Schweitzer's  work.  He  says  of  Schweitzer: 
His  concept  of  reverence  or  respect  for  life  expresses  very  beautifully  and 
carefully  what  is  at  issue  here.  It  is  not  a  question  of  our  relation  to  our 
fellows  or  neighbours  as  such.  Our  fellows  become  an  ethical  problem 
through  the  command  of  God  the  Reconciler,  and  this  problem  cannot  simply 
be  subsumed  under  the  concept  of  the  life  of  others.  "' 
Barth  says  life  is  not  an  overarching  concept  that  demands  reverence  for  the  other. 
The  common  relationship  creatures  have  with  God  their  creator  evokes  respect  for 
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life,  and  not  a  reverence  for  life  itself.  Therefore  Barth  views  all  forms  of  life  with 
respect,  `awe',  `piety'  and  `sym  'athy',  because  the  divine  command  of  God  can  mean 
life  or  death  at  any  time.  This  is  true  not  only  for  us  but  also  for  the  other.  Life  is  a 
gift  from  God  that  is  on  loan  to  us  and  is  not  possessed  as  our  life.  Life  is  not  a 
primary  principle  of  ethics  because  it  is  not  ours. 
He  argues  that  our  responsibility  is  to  recognise  that  what  we  do  or  fail  to  do  can 
mean  the  life  or  death  of  the  other.  Our  acts  thus  represent  God's  action  towards 
creation.  We  have  solidarity  with  all  creatures  because  we  realise  they  are  in  the  same 
relation  to  the  Creator  as  we  are,  not  because  of  a  primary  principle  of  life: 
To  act  in  that  awe  in  face  of  the  threatened  nature  of  all  creaturely  life,  and  in 
that  responsibility  for  what  our  own  inaction  or  action  means  for  it  is  to  act 
with  respect  for  life.  195 
He  says  theological  ethics  must  ask  the  question,  has  the  command  been  heard  when 
the  slaughterhouse  and  vivisection,  the  chase,  and  the  pitiless  locking  up  of  all  kinds 
of  forest  animals  and  birds  behind  the  bars  of  zoological  gardens,  present  no 
questions.  "'  He  asks  do  we  have  a  commission  from  God  to  do  these  things  to 
creation.  He  again  warns  against  taking  extreme  positions  of  either  extreme 
sentimentality  or  extreme  brutality.  He  wants  to  point  out  that  respect  for  the  life  of 
other  creatures  does  not  begin  in  discussions  about  human  relationships  but  with 
hearing  the  claim  when  it  addresses  us  in  the  silence  of  "the  groaning  of  creation.  ""' 
On  the  other  hand,  Barth  recognises  that  the  problem  of  plant  and  animal  life  can  only 
have  propaedeutic  significance  in  relation  to  the  problem  of  human  life.  Life  is  lived 
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in  relationship  with  the  other.  Theological  ethics  must  raise  questions  about  this 
relationship.  However,  these  questions  must  arise  from  the  context  of  Barth's  views 
about  the  gift  of  life  and  the  mutuality  of  the  relationship  all  creatures  have  with  God 
their  creator.  The  question  of  the  command  of  God  the  creator  is  the  question  of 
human  beings  living  together.  `Mutual  responsibility  of  the  promotion  and  restriction 
of  life,  which  in  fact  we  constantly  cause  one  another'.  "' 
It  has  to  be  remembered  that  there  is  also  much  more  to  be  considered  about  humanity 
under  the  command  of  God  the  reconciler  and  God  the  redeemer.  Barth's  theological 
ethics  do  not  follow  a  linear  path.  He  considers  each  of  the  threefold  relationships  of 
God  as  God  the  creator,  God  the  redeemer  and  God  the  reconciler  in  turn.  His 
geometrical  illustration  describes  each  relationship  as  a  circle  with  its  centre  within 
the  circumference  of  the  other  two  circles.  Theological  ethics  needs,  in  addition  to 
considering  of  the  command  of  God  the  creator,  to  recognise  the  commands  of  God 
the  redeemer  and  of  God  the  reconciler.  It  is  not  the  responsibility  of  men  and  women 
to  redeem  the  world  or  to  judge  it. 
Under  the  command  of  God  the  creator,  Barth  discusses  the  questions  of  killing  in 
self-defence,  capital  punishment  and  war.  It  is  interesting  that  within  the  Command  of 
God  the  Creator  Barth  begins  his  consideration  of  these  questions  of  the  absolute  will 
to  power  not  with  scripture  but  with  the  "plank"  argument.  The  point  is  worth 
emphasising,  because  of  the  accusation  made  against  him  in  an  earlier  section  of  this 
thesis  of  using  the  Bible  as  a  form  of  natural  theology. 
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He  discusses  the  will  to  power  of  two  people,  stranded  on  a  plank  in  the  middle  of  the 
ocean,  as  the  foundation  of  a  discussion  about  killing.  The  plank  will  only  support  one 
person;  neither  will  drown  voluntarily  to  save  the  other.  He  says  the  person  who 
wants  to  kill  me,  and  against  whom  I  am  defending  myself,  is  already  fundamentally 
in  the  position  of  defending  himself  against  me.  '"This  is how  Barth  understands  the 
situation  on  the  plank,  albeit  transposed  to  the  use  of  pistols: 
Since  my  defence  was  successful,  he  not  I,  had  to  die,  and  I  murdered  the 
murderer  before  he  murdered  me,  the  problem  in  the  situation  has  been 
complicated,  for  in  fact  -I  do  not  know  unconditionally  whether  he  would 
have  gone  to  extremes,  for  I  took  from  him  the  chance  to  decide  -  in  fact, 
then,  I  am  the  one  who  first  and  alone  willed  and  did  the  decisive  thing,  the 
killing  of  another  -  he  was  not  yet  my  murderer  when  I  killed  him  -  and  it  is  I 
who  must  see  to  it  how  I  can  justify  myself  for  shooting  and  by  what 
commission  I  did  it  notwithstanding  the  awe  and  responsibility  that  were 
commanded  of  me  in  relation  to  his  life.  200 
Discussions  about  killing  in  self-defence  must  face  the  problem  of  assuming  the  role 
of  the  judge,  because  of  this  problem;  there  can  be  no  general  permission  to  kill  in 
self-defence  in  spite  of  the  naive  view  that  it  is  self-evident.  He  also  discusses 
duelling  and  tyrannicide  as  examples  of  the  "plank"  problem  and  of  the  latter  gives  a 
current  example.  With  the  "plank"  example,  Barth  creates  the  basis,  which  enables 
him  to  take  up  the  question  of  capital  punishment.  He  approaches  the  question  as  a 
problem  for  the  individual  saying,  `If  I  simply  ask  in  general  about  the  possibility  of 
capital  punishment  instead  of  asking  very  concretely  whether  I  myself  would  be 
prepared  to  carry  it  out,  my  question  is  not  to  the  point'.  201After  discussing  theories  of 
retributive  justice,  which  he  dismisses,  he  returns  at  the  end  of  his  argument  to  the 
question  of  individual  responsibility  in  the  context  of  the  command  of  God  the 
creator.  The  test  of  the  Christian  supporter  of  capital  punishment  is  for  the  individual 
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to  be  able  to  do  what  the  state  demands  at  the  peril  of  his  own  soul's  peace  and 
salvation.  He  says,  `Jv'tice  will  then  be  done  to  respect  for  life  whether  the  death 
penalty  be  abolished  or  upheld,  and  that  alone  is  the  final  issue  in  ethical  reflection  on 
this  matter'.  202 
Again  Barth's  social  ethics,  within  the  command  of  God  the  Creator,  are  based 
entirely  on  individual  responsibility.  His  approach  to  the  discussion  of  war  and 
conscientious  objection  remains  consistent;  if  we  want  to  accept  the  possibility  of  war 
then  we  must  accept  that  it  stands  close  to.  the  position  of  executioner.  '03The  aim  of 
war  is  killing,  and  arguments  about  fighting  for  the  king,  laying  down  one's  life  for 
friends,  the  volle,  or  the  fiihr-eiprinzip  all  avoid  the  moral  issue.  They  seek  the  ethical 
subject  in  a  hypostasis  which  represents  and  magnifies  the  individual.  The  "plank" 
argument  continues  to  apply.  There  is  the  distinction  however  to  be  made  between 
capital  punishment  and  war,  in  the  latter  the  affair  is  not  the  individual's  in  a  general 
sense,  but  as  a  member  of  a  group.  However,  Barth  continues  to  apply  the  individual 
argument  by  saying,  `War  is  my  people's  emergency  and  therefore  it  is  my  emergency 
too'.  Of  conscientious  objection  he  says: 
Ethics  can  as  little  condemn  conscientious  objection  to  military  service  as  it 
can  to  any  other  possibility  of  human  action,  but  it  has  to  remind  the  objector 
that  he  cannot  possibly  have  clean  hands  in  relation  to  the  coming  war  of  his 
country  if  he  thinks  he  does  not  share  the  responsibility  of  his  country  because 
he  does  not  bear  arms.  204 
As  with  the  argument  about  killing  in  self-defence  the  question  is  about  the  created 
will  to  power,  but  in  this  case  of  a  people: 
200  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  147. 
'01  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  151. 
202  Barth,  Ethics,  p.  154. 115 
We  will  because  we  need  and  we  need  because  we  will:  we  will  coal  and 
potash,  iron  and  petroleum,  market  outlets,  commercial  treaties,  transportation 
routes,  colonie?,  and  as  security  in  a  future  war,  frontiers  which  form  natural 
defence  lines,  and,  finally,  as  the  crown  and  sum  of  all  else,  we  will  and  need 
prestige,  world  status,  respect  for  our  colours  as  the  presupposition  of  future 
and  wider  actualisation  of  the  will  for  power.  ---  To  realize  soberly  and 
realistically  the  actualisation  of  the  will  to  power  is  what  politics  and 
especially  war  is  all  about,  is  the  first  concrete  task  of  ethical  reflection  on 
war.  That  does  not  mean  war  is  ethically  condemned  but  that  it  is  seen  in  its 
true  reality.  205 
Barth  draws  attention  to  the  true  cost  of  those  that  take  part  in  war  in  contrast  to  those 
who  remain  at  home,  `the  idealists,  romantics  and  the  professors  of  theology  who 
were  along  way  away  from  the  shooting  that  had  to  be  directed  at  other  men'.  206  His 
ethical  argument  about  war  is  the  same  as  his  argument  about  killing  in  self-defence: 
it  is  the  plank  argument.  Again  we  hear  that  theological  ethics  cannot  forbid  or 
promote  war  but  must  point  to  the  command  and  say,  that  in  peace  and  war  we 
humans  are  measured  by  this  command.  Our  lives  are  a  gift,  our  attributes  are  a  loan 
and  our  judgements  are  not  the  final  word,  in  killing  in  self-defence,  we  are 
murderers. 
He  discusses  other  forms  of  taking  of  human  life,  abortion  and  euthanasia,  in  a  similar 
way.  All  these  discussions  about  the  taking  of  human  life  are  examples  of  a  general 
point;  they  fall  within  the  common  concept  of  competition.  This  idea  implies  a  contest 
between  the  will  to  live  of  one  person  and  the  will  to  live  of  another  person.  The 
living  of  life  is  a  game,  a  serious  game.  The  "plank"  argument  again  applies.  `If  I  beat 
a  rival  in  this  contest,  he  is  not  just  beaten  comparatively  but  struck  in  his  very  will  to 
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live,  in  his  being,  his  will,  his  ability'.  207Our  struggle  for  being  does  not  begin  with 
events,  but  ever+s  show  the  true  state  in  which  human  life  together  exists.  Therefore, 
life  is  lived  as  appropriation.  208  `I  live  as  I  grasp  after  this  or  that  which  I  need  to 
satisfy  my  needs  or  to  give  me  pleasure  or  simply  to  test  and  prove  my  strength,  or 
which  I  want  to  lay  by,  perhaps,  as  a  reserve  for  future  use'.?  ®The  will  to  live  is  not 
oriented  to  need  as  in  capitalism  and  imperialism,  but  takes  the  form  of  appropriation, 
and  a  natural  limit  cannot  be  set  for  this  form  of  appropriation.  Action  becomes 
competition.  `As  I  live  for  myself,  I  necessarily  live  against  others'.  210The  subject  of 
competitiveness  is  too  large  for  a  thorough  treatment  within  the  time  Barth  has 
available  in  the  lectures.  He  therefore,  gives  six  general  points  as  indicators  to  the 
form  of  theological  ethics,  which  are  quoted  in  full: 
A  first  point  is  that  the  question  is  put  no  less  sharply  when  I  do  not  consider- 
that  my  seeking,  taking,  and  appropriating  in  accordance  with  the  will  to  live 
implies  fighting,  upsetting,  and  robbing  others  than  when  I  expressly  find  for 
it  some  explanation  and  motivation. 
Assuming  that  we  are  acting  with  less  naive  vitality,  that  we  now  know  more 
or  less  clearly  what  we  are  doing,  we  must  still  be  on  guard  against  a  whole 
series  of  mystifications,  obscurations,  and  exculpations  by  which  we 
constantly  try  to  escape  responsibility  for  the  militant  character  of  the 
actualisation  of  our  will  to  live.  211 
Responsibility  will  also  be  no  less  if  my  competing  is  not  perhaps  an 
expression  of  my  individual  egoism  but  a  collective  egoism.  (Relationship 
between  the  individual  and  the  state.  ) 
Another  mystification  is  to  try  to  evade  responsibility  for  the  militant 
character  of  our  actions  by  appealing  to  good  intentions  in  performing  them. 
The  end  does  not  sanctify  the  means. 
We  have  also  to  realize  that  the  responsibility  for  our  part  in  the  struggle  for 
existence  is  not  lessened  by  the  fact  that  as  a  rule  it  probably  takes  place  in 
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certain  generally  recognised  forms  of  tradition,  custom  and  law.  (Property) 
(Privilege)(Equal  pay)  a  morality  that  has  practical  success,  as  its  reward 
could  fin°lly  be  one  which  also  makes  this  reward  its  goal. 
We  have  to  point  out  finally  that  there  also  seems  to  be  in  life  a  series  of 
possibilities  that  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  struggle  for  existence,  so  that  the 
question  of  the  command  of  the  respect  for  the  life  of  others  does  not  apply  to 
them.  (Technology,  scholarship,  church,  literature,  art  and  sport)  Is  love 
exempt  from  the  problems  of  competition?  I  Corinthians  13  eschatological 
concept.  212 
He  moves  on  to  discuss  how  these  commands  are  carried  out  in  the  life  of  the 
individual  Christian,  using  the  concept  of  calling,  which  he  develops  into  individual 
vocations.  We  each  have  a  vocation  into  which  we  are  called.  Our  vocation  is  a  claim 
upon  us.  We  cannot  judge  if  another  has  fulfilled  their  vocation,  nor  can  we  know  if 
we  have  fulfilled  our  own.  The  possibility  of  following  one's  vocation  is  given  in 
God's  grace  and  cannot  be  appropriated.  Prayer  is  the  appropriate  response  to  the  gift 
of  one's  particular  calling.  Discrimination  and  discernment  take  place  in  prayer  and 
are  guided  by  the  general  pointers  that  Barth  has  given.  Extreme  position  must  be 
taken  only  after  certain  knowledge  that  this  is  God's  will.  All  acts  are  taken  in  full 
awareness  that  life  is  a  gift,  as  are  possessions,  and  that  in  our  acts  we  become 
ourselves.  On  this  point  Barth  is  strangely  near  the  Catholic  position,  which  Aquinas 
takes  from  Aristotle,  that  our  habits  make  us,  and  which  Dante  so  vividly  portrays  in 
The  Divine  Comedy.  Yet,  there  are  important  differences  because  Barth  is  saying 
more.  He  means  that  our  very  being  only  becomes  so  in  our  acts,  and  does  not  exist 
without  action.  He  also  believes  that  the  gift  of  our  vocation  is  not  a  given,  but  is 
constantly  renewed  and,  of  course,  is  open  to  change  under  God's  free  decision.  The 
gift  must  be  prayed  for  and  received  with  grateful  thanks.  Again,  Barth  unfolds  what 
must  be  the  case  if  God  has  chosen  to  reveal  himself  in  Jesus  Christ.  There  is  no 
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possibility  of  an  inherent  quality  through  which  individuals  express  themselves. 
Charles  Tzylor  in  his  outstanding  work  on  Hegel  traces  the  roots  of  this  form  of 
individuality  to  Herder,  Taylor  says: 
The  Herderian  idea  that  my  humanity  is  something  unique,  not  equivalent  to 
yours,  and  this  unique  quality  can  only  be  revealed  in  my  life  itself,  `Each 
man  has  his  own  measure,  as  it  were  an  accord  peculiar  to  him  of  all  his 
feelings  to  each  other'.  The  idea  is  not  just  that  men  are  different;  this  was 
hardly  new;  it  was  rather  that  the  differences  take  on  a  moral  import;  so  that 
the  question  could  arise  for  the  first  time  whether  a  given  life  was  an  authentic 
expression  of  certain  individuals  or  people.  213 
Barth  has  taken  this  idea  from  the  reformed  tradition  and  given  it  a  theological  basis 
in  the  command  of  the  gift  of  life  of  God  the  creator.  His  understanding  of  the 
individual's  relationship  with  God  is  the  basis  of  his  ethics.  Barth's  theological  ethics 
are  not  discovered  and  worked  out  primarily  as  a  member  of  society,  but  through  the 
individual  life  of  prayer  as  it  takes  place  within  the  church.  We  should  understand 
ourselves  as  those  who  seek  to  be  self-enclosed,  and  whose  seriousness  and  supposed 
scrupulosity  would  drop  away,  if  only  we  would  keep  to  the  promise  and  let  ourselves 
be  told  that  we  are  the  children  of  God.  214As  children,  we  should  do  what  is 
appropriate  and  play  and  all  seriousness  should  fall  away: 
The  rigidity  of  our  obedience  which  is  no  true  obedience,  the  strictness 
anxiety  with  which  we  observe,  watch,  and  harass  ourselves  and  others, 
sincerely  supposing  it  to  be  for  the  best,  the  hardness  of  thought,  speech  and 
will  which  now  usually  characterize  what  are  thought  to  be  the  best  of  people, 
the  far  too  self-conscious  and  self-assertive  of  those  who  want  to  be  Christians 
in  earnest  -  all  this,  if  it  would  not  become  nothing  and  certainly  would  not 
change  into  its  opposite,  would  at  least  become  inwardly  different,  because 
good  Christians  would  be  what  they  are  voluntarily  and  joyfully,  and  their 
obedience,  attitude,  work,  relation  to  others,  and  whole  responsibility  to  God 
would  be  like  children's  play.  Need  I  say  that  repentance  before  God  and 
service  to  ones  neighbour  are  possible  only  on  this  basis,  in  the  light  of  the 
eschatological  reality  of  our  existence?  Without  this  light  we  always  take 
Zia  Taylor,  Hegel,  p.  17. 
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ourselves  much  too  seriously  to  be  able  to  ready  to  seek  forgiveness  of  our 
sins  from  God  and  to  forgive  others  their  sins  from  our  hearts.  To  be  obedient 
an,  '  not  just  to  seem  to  be  so  obviously  have  to  be  engaged  in  that  change,  in 
putting  off  the  old  man  and  putting  on  the  new  [cf.  Eph.  4:  22-24].  But  what 
does  this  mean  except  that  we  ought  to  do  we  now  want  to  do?  What  can  it 
mean  except  that  we  play  instead  of  trying  to  work  with  the  seriousness  which 
is  appropriate  only  in  face  of  that  strange  and  hostile  command?  How  can  we 
obey  if  we  will  not  learn  that  before  God  we  can  only  play?  215 
Here  Barth  is  using  play,  an  important  term  in  German  expressionism,  theologically. 
Schiller  says  that: 
Man  only  plays  when  he  is human  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word,  and  he  is 
only  fully  human  when  he  plays.  "' 
Having  discussed  the  contents  of  the  Münster  Ethics,  the  influences  on  Barth  at  the 
time  and  the  background  against  which  he  was  working,  we  move  on  in  the  next 
chapter  to  consider  the  accusation,  frequently  made,  that  his  ethics  are  so  dominated 
by  the  command  of  God  that  there  is  no  room  for  the  work  and  action  of  the  Holy 
Spirit. 
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Chapter  4  The  Christian  Life 
This  chapter  investigates  the  role,  function  and  purpose  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  Barth's 
theological  ethics.  He  gave  a  lecture  on  the  subject  in  1929,  a  significant  date,  because 
he  delivered  it  between  the  lectures  on  ethics  given  in  Münster  in  1928/29  and  those 
given  in  Bonn  in  1930/31.  The  occasion  was  a  "theological  week,  "  for  pastors,  and 
students  to  catch-up  on  new  developments  in  theology.  The  programme  for  the  week 
included  a  lecture  by  Barth's  brother  on  "The  Concept  of  the  `Spirit'  in  German 
Idealism.  " 
It  would  have  been  a  reasonable  expectation  at  the  time  to  expect  the  brothers  to 
mount  an  attack  on  German  idealism.  Indeed,  Heinrich  Barth's  lecture  called  for  a 
return  to  a  proper  foundation  to  philosophy  and  to  the  work  of  Kant.  Karl  Barth's 
lecture,  given  the  following  day,  contained  a  radically  different  approach,  not  a  return 
to  Kant,  saying  nothing  of  that  of  which  we  cannot  speak,  but  directly  facing  and 
confronting  the  problems  of  Christian  theology  which  Kant  and  Hegel  raised.  His 
claim  being  we  can,  and  must,  speak  of  that  which  we  hear  revealed. 
All  references  in  this  chapter  are  to  Birch  Hoyle's  translation  of  the  lectures  with  the 
English  title  The  Holy  Ghost  and  the  Christian  Life.  '  A  new  edition  with  minor 
amendments  and  with  a  foreword  by  the  editor  Robin  W.  Lovin,  appeared  in  1993.2 
1  Karl  Barth,  The  Ho/j,  Ghost  and  the  Christian  Life.  trans  by  R.  Birch  Hoyle,  (London:  Fredrick  Muller 
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Barth  delivered  the  lecture  at  Elberfeld  in  Germany  on  October  9`h  1929.1  repeat  the 
timing  of  the  lecture  is  significant.  He  gave  it  at  the  end  of  a  long  summer  holiday  of 
study  and  rest  during  which  he  had  made  the  important  decision  to  move  from 
Minster  to  Bonn,  where  he  would  remain  from  early  1930  until  he  was  expelled  from 
Germany,  by  the  Nazis,  after  their  rise  to  power.  This  lecture  is  the  summary  of  his 
mature  thought  and  all  the  concepts,  themes  and  central  ideas,  which  were  to  be  used 
in  Church  Dogmatics,  are  in  place.  It  is,  therefore,  important  for  the  study  of  Barth's 
thinking  about  the  relationship  between  the  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity  and  Christian 
ethics. 
The  lecture  answers  two  criticisms  made  against  Barth's  work:  the  first  is  that  he  had 
no  place  for  the  Holy  Spirit  in  his  theology;  the  second  is  that  he  had  Catholic 
leanings.  He  carries  his  argument  forward  on  two  fronts:  firstly,  he  refutes  the  liberal 
Protestant  theologies  of  his  time  of  immanence;  and  secondly,  he  argues  that  the 
analogia  entis,  the  foundation  of  natural  theology's  knowledge  of  God,  is 
fundamentally  wrong. 
He  conducts  a  critical  debate  with  Augustine's  theology,  whose  sanctification  by 
works,  he  says,  secretly  introduced  into  Protestant  theology  the  `sweet  poison  of 
grace.  '  By  this  he  means  Augustine's  introduction  of  justification  by  works  in  his 
prayer  that  his  will  to  will  be  strengthened  so  that  he  might  grow  in  holiness.  '  Barth 
bases  his  position  on  the  theologies  of  the  Reformers:  Luther  and  Calvin. 
The  lecture  is  in  three  sections,  which  are: 
2  Karl  Barth,  The  Holy  Spirit  and  the  Christian  Life:  The  Theological  Basis  of  Ethics,  trans.  by  R.  Birch 
Hoyle,  with  a  `Forward'  by  Robin  W.  Lovin,  (Kentucky:  John  Knox  Press,  1993) 
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1.  The  Holy  Spirit  as  Creator. 
2.  The  Holy  Spirit  as  Reconciler. 
3.  The  Holy  Spirit  as  Redeemer. 
The  translator  Birch  Hoyle,  in  the  1938  edition,  further  sub-divides  each  section, 
which  Lovin  maintains  in  the  1993  edition.  These  divisions  are  not  in  the  original 
lecture  document. 
Barth's  structuring  is  critically  important,  because  it  reflects  the  content  of  the  lecture. 
The  structure,  and  its  content,  is  in  a  dynamic  relationship,  as  the  method  expresses 
the  truth  of  the  content.  There  are  three  sections  to  the  discourse,  because  the  Holy 
Spirit  reveals  itself  in  threefold  form  as  the  Holy  Spirit  as  Creator,  the  Holy  Spirit  as 
Reconciler  and  the  Holy  Spirit  as  Redeemer.  However,  the  whole  text  expresses  the 
meaning,  to  which  each  section  contributes  and  reflects.  Further,  it  needs  pointing  out, 
that  the  form  and  content  express  a  second  dynamic  relationship  as  the  text  contains  a 
further  tripartite  layering  which  reflects  the  Trinity,  and  the  Holy  Spirit  is  the  third 
person  of  the  Trinity. 
God  reveals  Himself  in  the  actions  of  the  Holy  Spirit  and  when  Barth  is  discussing 
these  actions  we  are  to  understand  that  he  is  also  thinking  about  the  Holy  Spirit's 
unity  within  the  Trinity,  whose  actions  are  as  one. 
Barth's  writing  endeavours  to  express  the  revealing  and  unfolding  of  this  central  idea: 
the  dynamic  internal  relationships  of  the  tripartite  structure  give  the  form  of  the  text, 
which  in  turn  expresses  the  Trinitarian  content.  The  lecture  is  in  the  Hegelian  tradition 123 
of  combining  form  and  content  dialectically  that  continues  in  the  writings  of  Gadamer 
and  Habermaas. 
He  begins  with  his  central  idea:  a  definition  of  the  Holy  Spirit': 
The  Holy  Ghost  is  the  God  the  Lord  in  the  fullness  of  Deity,  in  the  total 
sovereignty  and  condescension,  in  the  complete  hiddeness  and  revealedness, 
of  God.  ' 
Section  1  is  a  discussion  of  the  separateness  and  the  distinctness  between  the  creator 
Spirit  and  the  created  Spirit  within  the  concept  of  the  Holy  Spirit  as  creator.  He 
rejects  all  positions  that  follow  in  the  tradition  of  German  idealism  particularly 
Hegelian  thought  in  which  the  Holy  Spirit  takes  form  in  human  reason. 
He  supports  Augustine's  argument  against  Pelagian  and  semi-Pelagian  ideas. 
Augustine,  who  was  aware  that  the  Holy  Spirit  is  not  identical  with  the  created  life  of 
the  spirit  or  soul,  says: 
You  are  not  the  mind  (spirit)  itself.  For  you  are  the  Lord  God  of  the  mind.  ' 
To  boast  of  the  soul  as  su  n  raunz  bonuni  ("highest  good")  he  calls  "a  carnal 
seeking  after  the  soul  (aninnam)  and  a  carnal  flight  from  the  flesh.  ' 
However,  Augustine  believes  there  is  an  image  of  God  which  is:  `Primarily  in  the 
soul,  but  forgotten,  and  can  be  called  to  memory  with  the  help  of  grace.  '  Therefore, 
the  process  of  discerning  happiness  is  the  seeking  of  this  forgotten  image.  When 
recovered  it  is  the  good  that  teleologically  defines  all  good  human  action.  Augustine 
says: 
°  Through  out  this  chapter  Holy  Spirit  replaces  Barth's  Holy  Ghost. 
5  Barth,  The  Holy  Spirit  and  the  Christian  Life.  The  Theological  Basis  of  Ethics,  p.  3 124 
How  then  am  I  to  seek  you,  Lord?  When  I  seek  for  you,  my  God,  my  God,  my 
quest  is  for  the  happy  life.  8 
In  addition,  he  says,  that  everyone  desires  the  happy  life: 
That  would  not  be  the  case  unless  the  thing  itself,  to  which  this  term  refers, 
was  being  held  in  the  memory.  9 
Augustine  believes  that  knowledge  of  God  is  a  universal  inborn  trait  available  to  us 
before  revelation.  He  says  God  is  in  the  soul,  which  is  its  proper  origin,  but  is  now 
forgotten.  He  thought,  therefore,  that  we  could  both  know  and  do  the  good  because 
memory  contains  knowledge  of  right  actions.  Memory  is  not  immediately  accessible 
to  us  and  growth  in  our  knowledge  of  God  is  a  long  ascent,  which  happens  by  the 
strengthening  of  our  will  to  want-to-want  God.  Therefore,  sanctification  is  by  human 
works  which  Barth  describes  as,  "The  sweet  poison  of  Augustinian  grace"  that  has 
entered  Protestant  theology.  He  says:  `The  great  opponent  of  Pelagianism  did  not 
realise  that  righteousness  by  works  as  such  was  contained  in  this  idea  of  God.  ' 
Opposition  to  Augustine's  views,  on  this  point,  is  fundamental  to  Barth's  entire 
theology,  as  he  is  clear  that  there  is  no  knowledge  of  God  before  revelation.  He  also 
believes  that  there  is  a  radical  discontinuity  between  the  creator  and  the  created 
revelation.  There  is  a  gap  in  knowledge,  which  we  cannot  bridge  from  our  side.  We 
can  have  no  knowledge  before  it  is  given.  God's  revelation  is  something  really  and 
utterly  new.  No  innate  awareness  of  beauty  on  man's  part  has  ever  enabled  him 
objectively  to  see  the  good.  It  is  only  God's  revelation  that  creates  the  continuity 
between  his  uncreated  spirit  and  his  created  spirit. 
6  Augustine:  Confessions  X.  xxv  (36)  p.  201. 
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In  opposition  to  Augustine's  position,  he  says  that  the  continuity  between  God  and 
His  relation  to  the  creature  is  the  true  analogia  entis.  This  relationship  he  calls  the 
analogiafidei.  He  says  human  life  does  not  have  an  original  endowment  in  its  make- 
up  but  only  as  a  second  marvel  of  God's  love,  as  the  inconceivable,  undeserved  divine 
bestowed  on  his  creature.  `For  a  Christian  life  exists  wholly  in  practicing  and 
experiencing  the  thing  which  one  hears  and  reads  from  God's  Word  daily"0  In 
addition,  he  says,  this  is  not  a  fact  of  revelation  which  we  have  once  made  our  own.  It 
does  not  become  part  of  us  but  we  must  understand  it  as  a  process,  revelation  is  not  a 
fulfilment  but  a  promise  because  we  are  in  the  between  times  created,  reconciled, 
promised  but  not  redeemed. 
If  we  do  not  find  the  good  in  the  Augustinian  theology  of  analogia  entis,  but  in  God's 
gift  of  revelation  what  then  is  the  Christian  Life?  Answering  this  question  Barth, 
building  his  comments  on  quotations  from  Luther,  says  of  the  Christian  life: 
It  runs  thus:  then,  and  just  then,  when  God  wills  to  be  and  is  gracious  to  man 
and  makes  His  grace  manifest  to  him.  Therefore  then,  and  just  then,  when  God 
speaks  His  Word  to  him,  when  Christ,  as  the  crucified  and  Risen  One,  is 
present  there  for  him,  indeed  on  his  behalf.  " 
He  says  there  is  no  analogia  entis,  no  pre-existing  image  of  the  good,  nor  anything  in 
our  human  qualities  that  could  equip  us  for  this  revelation.  For,  he  says,  it  does  not 
enter  into  consideration  that  we  somehow  open,  prepare  and  equip  ourselves  for 
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taking  part  in  this  event  at  all.  '2  It  is  the  creating  action  of  the  Holy  Spirit  which  takes 
us  into  participation  within  the  divine  life.  He  says: 
The  fundamental  significance  of  the  Holy  Ghost  for  the  Christian  life  is,  that 
this,  our  participation  in  the  occurrence  which  is  in  effect  the  Divine  action.  " 
So  that  the,  `Christian  life  is  now  also  the  created  life.  " 
Human  knowledge  of  God  is  not  one  of  our  qualities,  and,  therefore,  it  is  God  who 
makes  us  ready  for  God.  This  act  is  the  creating  action  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  which 
God  makes  the  individual  human  creature  fit  for  God.  He  says,  God  creates  us  out  of 
nothing,  and  although  we  know  our  immediate  circumstances  we  are  unable  to 
understand  our  own  existence.  We  do  not  know  if  our  practical  effort  is  in  accordance 
with  the  truth  or  whether  it  is  good.  This,  says  Barth,  has  nothing  to  do  with  sin.  This 
state  of  affairs  is  "given",  `Living  as  God's  creature  I  do  not  know  what  is  good, 
especially  "good"  as  God  views  it.  75 
Barth  criticises  all  appeals  to  inner  mystical  states  that  claim  to  be  foundational 
knowledge  of  God.  Equally,  he  rejects  all  demands  that  use  the  Bible  as  the 
foundation  for  ethical  action.  He  says  both  ideas  presume  continuity  between  the 
spirit  of  the  creature  and  the  creator,  while  on  the  other  hand,  theological  ethics  is  the 
process  of  becoming  through  divine  speech.  He  says,  we  do  not  know  directly  what 
God's  command  is  and  therefore  no  appeal  should  be  made  to  either  the  truths  of 
nature,  or  the  truths  of  the  Bible. 
12  Barth,  The  Holy  Spirit  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  19. 
13  Barth,  The  Holy  Spirit  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  20. 
"  Barth,  The  Holy  Spirit  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  20. 
15  Barth,  The  Holy  Spirit  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  22. 127 
He  insists  that  the  foundations  of  theological  ethics  are  God's  work,  and  that  they  are 
part  of  the  creative  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  he  says: 
Hearing  the  Word  of  God  the  creator,  which  makes  human  life  to  become 
Christian  life,  is  not  man's  work,  but  God's:  the  Holy  Ghost's  work.  Just  as 
our  spirit  cannot  produce  the  Word  of  God,  so  too,  it  cannot  receive  it...  it  is 
incapable,  unassisted,  of  hearing  God's  Word.  16 
Augustine  believes  the  fall  created  a  great  chasm  or  division  within  every  created 
being.  Hence  he  describes  humans  as  having  two  wills.  As  has  already  been  discussed 
he  said  the  process  of  sanctification  is  the  creation  of  the  will  to  want  to  will  the  good. 
The  external  world  also  expresses  this  divided  state,  as  there  are  two  cities  in  the 
spiritual  church,  the  City  of  God  and,  in  the  secular  world,  the  city  of  Rome.  He  says, 
both  are  God's  creation  and  He  uses  both  for  His  purposes  and  both  should  profit 
from  secular  philosophy,  which,  in  its  own  way,  is  a  kind  of  revelation.  " 
Barth,  on  the  other  hand,  believes  that  the  great  chasm,  or  division,  is  not  within  the 
creature  but  between  creator  and  created,  which  the  creator  heals  in  the  direction  of 
the  created,  for  Barth  this  process  is  nothing  to  do  with  the  fall,  or  sin,  but  is  simply 
given. 
How  then  does  Barth  know  the  form  and  content  of  the  Christian  life?  This  question  is 
not  a  question  for  him  but  a  miracle,  for  he  says: 
A  sheer  miracle  must  happen  to  him,  a  second  miracle  in  addition  to  the 
miracle  of  his  own  existence,  if  his  life  shall  be  a  true  Christian  life,  which  is  a 
life  within  the  hearing  of  God's  Word.  The  miracle  is  the  office  of  the  Holy 
Ghost.  18 
16  Barth,  The  Holy  Spirit  and  the  Christian  Life:  the  Theological  Basis  of  Ethics  pp.  24-5. 
17  St  Augustine,  City  of  God,  p.  ix. 
18  St  Augustine,  City  of  God,  pp.  26-7. 128 
This  miracle  occurs  as  we  pray,  for  we  only  hear  as  we  pray.  Yet  of  course  we  only 
pray  when  we  have  heard.  This  is  the  second  miracle  of  our  creation  and  is  the  work 
of  the  Holy  Spirit,  which  is  God's  work. 
In  the  second  section  of  the  lecture,  Barth  discusses  holiness  and  the  work  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  in  overcoming  our  resistance;  he  argues  that  the  Creator  and  Created  Spirit  are 
always  in  conflict.  The  holiness  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  not  in  `difference',  but  in 
`opposition'  to  the  radical  perversion  and  sin  of  the  created  spirit.  The  holiness  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  is  seen  in  humanity's  ability  to  oppose  the  `grace  of  God,  the  Word  and  of 
his  Creation.  '  This,  Barth  says,  is  the  `Mystery  of  iniquity'.  This  is  the  real  sin,  `we 
who  do  evil.  We  do  not  allow  the  work  of  the  Word  and  the  Spirit  to  befall  us.  79 
The  boundary  between  Creator  and  Created  fixed  by  creation  is  a  `frontier  between 
Him  who  deals  with  us  in  truth  and  righteousness  as  our  King,  and  ourselves  who  are 
like  rebels  within  His  realm.  '2'  Barth  wants  us  to  understand  the  enormity  of  the  task. 
The  Holy  Spirit  is  not  some  sort  of  spirit,  like  the  spirit  of  the  true,  the  good,  the 
beautiful,  but  for  the  first  time  is  to  be  seen  as  the  incomprehensible  Holy  Spirit  who 
is  struggling  with  humanity's  hostility  in  this  battle  and  victory  of  grace. 
At  this  point  Barth  again  takes  up  his  critical  dialogue  with  Augustinian  thought,  `the 
secret  poison  of  grace.  '  The  final  content  of  Augustine's  doctrine  is  that  the  effect  of 
sinful  man's  fellowship  with  God  is  conditional  upon  the  power  of  God's  grace  to 
bring  about  a  gradually  increasing  transformation  of  the  sinner  into  non-sinner. 
19  Barth,  The  Holy  Spirit  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  28. 
20  Barth,  The  Holy  Spirit  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  28. 129 
In  the  Augustinian  doctrine  of  holiness  the  sinner  has  the  continuous  tranquil 
assurance  of  knowing  beforehand  about  holiness,  and  the  source  and  substance  of 
their  own  truth  and  goodness.  `This  is  the  fundamental  error  of  the  Augustinian,  the 
Catholic  and  all  catholicising  doctrine  that  say  justification  means  sanctification'.  21 
Barth  says  that  it  is  only  in  the  actions  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  which  is  the  spirit  of 
holiness,  that  we  see  holiness.  The  following  two  quotations  from  Augustine's 
Confessions  enable  us  to  see  more  clearly  the  distinction  Barth  is  making  between  his 
position  and  Augustine's  when  he  claims  that  Augustine  has  introduced  the  "sweet 
poison  of  grace"  into  Western  Protestant  theology: 
I  will  therefore  rise  above  that  natural  capacity  in  a  step-by-step  ascent  to  him 
who  made  me.  I  come  to  the  fields  and  vast  palaces  of  memory  where  are  the 
treasure  of  innumerable  images  of  all  kinds  of  objects  brought  in  by  sense  - 
perception.  22 
Late  have  I  loved  you,  beauty  so  old  and  so  new:  late  have  I  loved  you.  And 
see,  you  were  within  and  I  was  in  the  external  world  and  sort  you  there,  and  in 
my  unlovely  state  I  plunged  into  those  lovely  created  things,  which  you 
made.  23 
Barth  says,  that  in  his  doctrine  of  Grace,  which  despite  the  efforts  of  the  Reformers 
has  crept  into  Protestant  theology,  Augustine  believed  that  sin  was  a  wound  that  could 
be  cured,  whereas  Barth  wants  us  to  understand  that  sin  is  not  a  sickness,  not  a  wound 
to  be  cured,  but  death.  The  only  possible  answer  is  resurrection,  and  unlike  a  cure,  we 
cannot  achieve  our  own  resurrection.  24 
Here  we  see  Barth  battling  on  two  fronts:  the  first  is his  disagreement  with 
Augustine's  theology  of  Grace,  and  the  second  is his  disagreement  with  liberal 
21  Barth,  The  Holy  Spirit  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  33. 
22  Augustine  Confessions  X.  viii  (12)  p.  185. 
23  Augustine  Confessions  X.  xxvii  (38)  p.  201. 
24  Barth,  The  Holy  Spirit  and  the  Christian  Life.  p.  33. 130 
Protestant  theology.  Dietrich  Bonhoeffer's  phrase,  `cheap  grace',  aptly  describes  the 
latter.  25  Barth  points  to  the  foundations  of  the  Reformers'  arguments  saying,  that  they 
named  the  righteousness  that  is  imputed  to  us  as,  `alien,  external  righteousness',  and 
by  that  phrase  they  meant,  with  emphasis  and  without  qualification,  a  righteousness  or 
justification  that  comes  to  us  from  without.  He  quotes  Luther  and  Calvin  to  establish 
his  point,  firstly  Luther,  "We  do  not  need  to  send  a  messenger  to  Him:  on  the 
contrary,  He  has  come  to  us  and  come  in  person.  "26  Secondly  Calvin  "God  cares  for  it 
in  such  a  way  that  there  is  nothing  from  our  side"27  `Put  briefly  their  understanding  of 
what  alone  constitutes  Christian  life  in  the  Holy  Ghost  was  their  affirmation,  that  man 
becomes  justified  for  Christ's  sake  only  through  faith.  '28 
Barth  wants  us  to  understand  that  his  view  is  firmly  established  and  grounded  in  the 
authority  of  the  foundations  of  the  Reformers'  thought.  He  is  calling  the  church  back 
to  a  true  understanding  of  the  Christian  life.  As  this  understanding  unfolds  in  his 
lecture  we  see  how  far  the  church  has  moved  from  the  Reformers'  teaching,  and  in 
consequence,  the  degree  to  which  Barth's  view  of  the  Christian  life  appears  so  radical. 
The  office  of  the  Holy  Ghost  must  be  pre-eminently,  a  reproving,  convicting  office, 
not  although  but,  indeed,  because  He  is  the  Spirit  of  God  the  Reconciler.  29  He  wants 
again  to  draw  our  attention  to  Luther  to  show  how  the  foundations  were  in  place  and 
how  far  the  church  has  deviated  from  Luther's  teaching.  To  establish  his  authority, 
and  strengthen  his  argument,  he  quotes  Luther: 
25  Bonhoeffer,  The  Cost  of  Discipleship,  p.  35. 
26  Luther,  Sermon  on  Lk.  I.  26  f.:  in  Erlangen  Edition,  II.  2,  quoted  by  Barth  in  The  Holy  Ghost  and  the 
Christian  Life,  p.  40. 
27  Luther,  Sermon  on  Gen.  xv.  6:  in  the  Latin  of  the  Corpus  Reformatonun,  23.706,  quoted  by  Barth  in 
The  Holy  Ghost  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  41. 
28  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  40. 
29  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  43. 131 
Therefore  the  grace  that  fosters  divine  salvation  shines  forth  not  only  to  help 
us,  but  to  teach  us  to  know  we  need  it.  Meanwhile,  with  His  coming  we  are 
shewn  that  our  whole  nature  is  ungodly,  graceless,  condemned.  30 
Barth  means  that  without  the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  as  reconciler  we  would  know 
neither  sin,  nor  righteousness.  We  are  unable,  as  a  benefit  of  our  creation,  to  know  if 
an  act  is  sinful  or  righteous  in  God's  eyes  unless  it  is  revealed  to  us.  There  is  no  a 
priori  knowledge  of  the  good  available  to  us.  `What  an  unreflecting  ethics  might 
simply  call  sin,  can,  in  the  sight  of  God  be  repeatedly  righteousness,  and  vice  versa.  "' 
He  argues  that  our  sin  is  unbelief,  and  self-esteem.  The  following  words  show  how  his 
idea  conflicts  with  Modernist  concepts  of  human  identity,  autonomy  and  freedom: 
In  the  sphere  where  the  term  "sin"  is  ambiguous,  i.  e.  in  the  sphere  of  our  own 
inner  and  outer  action,  there  is  no  doubt  but  that  we  can  acquire  a  relative 
sinlessness  and  righteousness.  What  comes  closer  to  us  than  our  self-esteem 
as  regards  this?  And  it  is  just  this  self-reliance  and  self-presumption  with 
regard  to  this  relative  sinlessness  and  righteousness,  using  it  as  a  safeguard 
against  the  accusations  made  by  God's  Word;  this  refusal  to  be  those  who 
have  always  to  live  by  God's  forgiving  mercy:  this  unbelief:  this  is  really  sin. 
In  comparison  with  this  sin,  all  the  rest  do  not  matter  so  much,  for  this 
unbelief  is  the  most  critical  sin  of  all  sins.  32 
Having  discussed  the  place  of  the  Holy  Spirit  and  reconciliation  as  the  second  miracle 
of  creation,  which  is  the  action  of  the  Holy  Spirit  that  makes  humanity  ready  for  God, 
he  moves  on  to  the  other  aspect  of  that  miracle  which  is  the  Holy  Spirit  and  the 
miracle  of  Faith,  which  is  the  other  phase  of  the  Christian  life. 
30  Luther,  Senn.  Tit.  ii.  II  f.,  Erl.  Ed.,  vii.  133,  quoted  by  Barth  in  The  Holy  Ghost  and  the  Christian 
Life,  p.  43. 
31  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  45. 
32  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  46. 132 
He  points  out  that  we  do  not  have  or  possess  faith  as  an  object,  because  there  is  no 
given  of  faith.  We  receive  faith  in  the  divine  act  of  continually  giving.  33  God  gives  it 
and  we  should  receive  it  gratefully  without  appropriation. 
Faith,  which  is  the  subject  of  God's  activity,  is  a  gift.  Both  the  form  and  the  content  of 
the  gift  of  faith  are  within  God  Himself.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to  receive  the  form 
and  content  of  faith.  Thus,  faith  hides  itself,  even  from  itself.  The  point  Barth  is 
establishing  with  such  certainty  is  that,  `If  we  are  justified,  we  are  so  simply  in  Christ 
and  not  in  ourselves.  '34 
Barth's  argument  is  that  the  miracle  of  faith  conceals  the  Holy  Spirit  in  both  its  form 
and  its  content,  and  it  remains  hidden  from  us,  until  God  reveals  it  to  us  in  and 
through  His  Word.  `That  it  is  really  we  who  are  yet  and  indeed  in  that  state  (ie.  of 
justification),  is  and  remains  undisclosed  to  us,  because  it  becomes  revealed  to  us  in 
and  through  the  Word  of  God.  '35  God  continually  renews  the  gift  of  faith,  and  there  is 
no  possibility  of  us  accumulating  or  appropriating  it. 
In  this  way,  Barth  relates  his  central  ideas  about  the  Holy  Spirit  and  faith  in  Luther's 
work.  He  wants  to  show  that  his  ideas  are  the  true  development  of  the  Reformers' 
views.  He  argues  that  his  central  ideas  not  only  have  a  classical  antecedent  but  also  in 
contrast  to  liberal  Protestant  ideas  are  the  present  expression  of  that  tradition.  He  also 
emphasises  the  `counter-intuitiveness'  of  faith  in  both  its  form  and  content.  He  says, 
`The  experience  of  faith  is  in  conflict  with  all  other  experiences  we  have,  with  all 
33  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  49. 
;;  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  49. 
35  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  50. 133 
practical  experiences'.  '  Barth  quotes  Luther  to  emphasise  that  his  argument  is  within 
the  tradition: 
Reason  does  not  understand  or  do  this,  viz.  that  a  man  should  have  a  joy 
beneath  the  Cross,  peace  in  the  midst  of  dis-peace.  It  is  a  work  of  God  which 
no  one  has  known  save  he  who  has  experienced  it37 
The  hiddeness  of  the  miracle  of  faith,  of  course,  reflects  the  dialectic  relationship 
between  God  and  man.  Man's  "no"  hides  God's  "yes".  Barth  again  points  out 
Luther's  contribution  to  this  argument  by  quoting  him  as  saying,  `This  Yes!  is 
fundamentally  hidden  beneath  this  No!  '  We  saw  earlier  that  man  cannot  provide  the 
synthesis  of  this  thesis  and  antithesis.  A  continual  paradox  holds  the  dialectic  in  the 
tension.  Jesus  Christ,  true  God  and  true  man  in  the  miracle  of  the  Incarnation  of  God 
is  the  only  synthesis:  " 
This  hiddeness  of  faith  is  seen  too  in  the  fact  that  the  man  convinced  by  the 
word,  into  belief,  into  his  righteousness  in  Christ,  will  never  cease  to 
acknowledge  and  confess,  in  all  seriousness,  that  his  having  been  justified  is 
utterly  not  in  himself,  and  consequently  not  in  his  human  unbelief.  39 
Another  quotation  from  Luther  further  establishes  his  traditional  credentials: 
Sin  is  truly  sin,  whether  committed  before  or  after  Christ  has  been  known,  and 
God  always  hates  sin:  indeed  every  sin  is  mortal  that  comes  into  actual  reality. 
But  what  is  not  mortal  sin  to  the  man  becomes  such  on  account  of  Christ.  40 
Barth  tells  his  audience  that  the  Christian  is  indeed  sinnul  peccator  et  justus  and  the 
surmounting  of  this  irreconcilable  contradiction  does  not  lie  in  the  Christian  not  even 
in  the  most  secret  sanctum  of  his  existence,  and  neither  does  it  happen  in  any  of  the 
36  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  the  Christian  Life,  p.  51. 
37  Luther,  Sermon  on  Phil.  Iv.  4  f.,  Erl.  Ed.,  vii.  126. 
38  Luther,  Sermon  on  Phil.  Iv.  4  f.,  Erl.  Ed.,  vii.  126.  p.  51. 
39  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  The  Christian  Life.  P.  52. 
40  Luther  Gal.,  Erl.  Ed.,  iii.  24  f. 134 
hours  of  his  life's  journey.  Again  he  quotes  Luther,  `in  death  the  Christian  becomes 
"healed"'  by  this  statement  he  deliberately  made  clear  the  great  difference  between 
the  fulfilment  of  the  promise  and  the  promise  itself.  " 
Barth  develops  his  argument  by  unfolding  the  consequences  of  this  gift  of  faith.  He 
describes  other  aspects  of  the  gift  and  always  holds  together  the  paradox  of  faith  the 
Creator's  gift  and  its  reception.  It  is  a  further  example  of  his  consistent  methodology 
of  holding  forni  and  content  together  as  is  appropriate  to  the  truth  of  the  subject. 
He  says  the  problem  of  Christian  obedience  is  contained  within  faith.  He  then  in 
unfolding  this  aspect  develops  the  statement  by  discussing  our  responsibility,  which  is 
another  aspect  of  the  miracle  of  faith  he  says: 
Although  faith  can  only  be  understood  as  the  work  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  in 
the  secrecy  of  faith  is  characterised  as  repentance  and  trust,  it  is  still  our  own 
faith.  42 
Because  reconciliation  cuts  against  the  grain  of  our  existence  all  through,  and 
is  never  at  all  to  be  comprehended  or  apprehended  by  our  existence,  it  is  a 
matter  of  importance  to  us,  it  claims  us,  it  upsets  us  and  disquiets  the  whole 
round  of  our  existence  enclosed  in  itself.  '  `This  is  the  reality  of  sanctification, 
or  the  problem  of  Christian  obedience.  '43 
He  explains  how  our  action  is  our  being,  and  how  it  is  ours,  by  saying  that  faith,  like 
obedience  is  active  which  means  that  I  exist  in  believing.  He  says  of  this  actuality  of 
faith: 
41  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  The  Christian  Life,  p  53. 
42  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  The  Christian  Life,  p  56. 
43  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  The  Christian  Life,  p  56. 135 
Faith,  together  with  its  experience  of  judgement  and  of  justification,  is  God's 
work:  totally  hidden  and  pure  miracle.  But  on  this  account  it  is  no  hypostasis, 
hovering  over  or  in  front  of  or  behind  the  actual  man 
Faith  cannot  stand-alone:  it  is  always  in  this  and  that  action  self- 
authenticating,  or  it  is  simply  not  authenticating  faith.  45 
That  faith  has  action  alongside  of  it,  means  identically  the  same  thing,  viz. 
that  faith  is  active.  And  this  being  active  takes  place  in  the  Holy  Ghost-in  the 
judgement  and  in  the  justification  of  the  Holy  Ghost.  So  far  as  the  Holy  Ghost 
is  in  the  action,  He  is  the  Spirit  of  Holiness  `' 
He  insists  that  the  source  of  holiness  is  truly  other.  He  says,  the  Holy  Spirit  gives  it  as 
a  miracle  of  our  reconciliation,  and  indeed  that  our  actions,  as  far  as  they  are  good  in 
God's  eyes,  are  the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  Yet,  he  also  insists  that  they  are  our 
actions  because  they  are  our  existence.  He  claims  that  previously  we  lived  in  untruth 
and  expresses  this  idea  as: 
I  have  every  occasion  to  know  that  my  existing,  as  such,  is  not  my  believing: 
that  I  can  only  believe  that  my  existing-in-faith  is  God's  work  and  not  mine  ." 
But  so  far  as  I  believe  I  exist  in  faith  4R 
Here  again  we  see  his  critical  dialogue  with  Augustine  and  his  reinforcement  of  his 
disagreement  about  the  source  of  holiness.  Barth  establishes  that  holiness  is  wholly 
given  and  does  not  having  giveness  or  prior  ontology.  He  means  that  the  concept  of 
holiness  cannot  tell  us  what  grace  is,  as  in  Catholic  doctrine,  and  that  Grace  does  not 
perfect  nature.  Barth  sees  this  is  a  serious  error  of  Catholic  and  catholicising  doctrine, 
which  has  its  origins  in  Augustine's  theology. 
4'  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  the  Christian  Life,  `Hypostasis  is  subsistent  entity  in  itself',  p.  57. 
45  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  The  Christian  Life,  p.  58. 
46  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  The  Christian  Life,  p.  58. 
47  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  The  Christian  Life,  p.  57. 
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At  this  point  Barth  introduces  what  becomes  one  of  his  central  ideas,  which  is  a 
theological  description  of  the  philosophical  problem  of  how  God  acts  in  time.  He 
describes  how  God's  action  is  a  vertical  intervention,  which  intersects  with  the 
horizontal  of  humanity  at  a  point.  Of  course  mathematically  in  Barth's  Euclidian 
geometry  a  point  has  no  magnitude  in  either  space  or  time.  He  says: 
the  reality  of  our  sanctification  consists  in  this  vertical  line  falling  and  cutting 
the  horizontal  line  of  our  existence.  The  point  where  our  horizontal  way 
becomes-nay,  is  cut  into  by-this  vertical  line,  there  arises  the  problem  of 
obedience  49 
Although  this  idea  replicates  Augustine's  view  of  how  an  eternal  God  acts  in  time 
Barth  does  not  refer  to  the  discussion  in  The  Confessions.  Augustine's  argument  of 
the  relationship  between  time  and  eternity  is  that  God  sees  all  things  as  eternally 
present  but  in  sequence.  This  is  called  time  A,  whereas  created  time,  time  B  has  a 
past,  a  present  and  a  future.  Augustine  uses  the  recitation  of  a  psalm  as  an  analogy  of 
time  A.  The  person  reciting  the  psalm  remembers  the  section  just  said  which  is  the 
past  present.  The  section  being  recited  is  the  present  present  and  the  section  held  in 
memory  that  is  about  to  be  recited  is  the  future  present.  The  past  present,  the  present 
present,  and  the  future  present  are  all  available  simultaneously  in  memory  and  this  is 
how  God  "sees"  time. 
Barth  follows  a  similar  argument  when  he  uses  the  Euclidian  concept  that  two  planes 
intersect  at  a  point  that  has  no  magnitude  in  time  or  space,  to  describe  the  action  of  the 
Holy  Spirit.  Therefore,  at  the  point  of  intersection,  the  a  priori  Kantian  categories  of 
space  and  time  are  irrelevant.  In  this  way,  Barth  avoids  having  an  epistemology 
before  revelation. 
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Since  the  action  of  the  Holy  Spirit  occurs  at  a  point,  and  is  ever  renewed,  it  exists  at 
an  infinite  number  of  points.  Therefore  although  acting  in  space  and  time  it  is  not 
bounded  by  their  constraints.  Being  is  forever  renewed.  Time  and  space  do  not 
appropriate  it.  Therefore,  the  vertical  Word  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  not  a  relative  but  an 
absolute  Word.  It  is  absolute  but  not  abstract.  It  is  concrete  and  is  the  ethical 
imperative: 
It  is  absolute  because  it  binds  us  to  God:  and  it  is  concrete  because  it  binds  us 
to  our  neighbotaso 
He  rejects  any  ideas  that  suggest  that  by  anamneses  memory  can  draw  forth  the  good 
and  says  the  good  is  our  acting  in  our  created  existence  at  each  point  of  intersection  of 
the  vertical  Word  of  God  in  the  Holy  Spirit  with  our  horizontal  lives  in  space  and 
time.  In  this  way,  we  become  forfeit  to  God  and  bound  to  our  duty  to  our  neighbour 
through  sanctification: 
Our  sanctification  is  actual  in  the  fact  that  we  are  challenged  as  responsible 
beings  by  a  summons  that  is  never  suspended,  but  which  is  to  the  effect  that 
we  are  appointed  to  establish  the  orders  of  creation  that  apply  to  our  existence 
as  such:  for  example,  marriage,  race  etc.;  in  the  Church  and  in  the  State,  as  in 
the  spiritual  and  secular  order  of  life  implied  in  the  Kingdom  of  grace:  i.  e.  of 
our  existence  as  simul  peccatores  et  justi.  5' 
Here  we  see  Barth  introduce  the  important  idea  that  by  sanctification,  the  good  is  part 
of  the  doctrine  of  God,  albeit  that  at  this  stage  in  his  thinking  it  is  the  orders  of 
creation  which  express  the  good.  He  argues  that  he  grounds  his  thinking  on  Lutheran 
foundations  saying  that  the  good  is  the  hidden  action  of  the  Holy  Spirit  which 
separates  the  Christian  and  quotes  Luther  in  support: 
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He  who  has  been  born  of  God  must  be  a  man  different  from  a  rational  pagan 
or  a  smart  man  of  the  world.  Faith  remains  through  all  works  and  callings 
quite  anonymous.  For  this  reason  it  makes  disciples  whom  Christ  loves.  52 
To  which  Barth,  to  underline  his  connection  with  the  tradition  exclaims: 
To  be  sure!  But  for  this  reason,  it  remains  hidden  in  all  works  and  stations  in 
life:  particularly  in  that  the  activity  of  the  disciples  is  now  actual  obedience  to 
God's  word  and  commandment.  Only  in  the  Holy  Ghost  is  it  decided  whether 
it  is  obedience  and  not  disobedience. 
He  reminds  us  that  disobedience  is  the  other  aspect  the  Christian  Life.  He  repeats  the 
methodology  of  unfolding  the  dialectic  by  giving  one  aspect  and  then  the  other;  and 
leaving  us  with  the  paradox.  Since  because  of  sin  we  are  unable  to  judge  we  do  not 
know  if  our  actions  are  obedient  or  disobedient.  The  paradox  is  not  resolved  because 
synthesis  is  not  possible  for  us.  His  argument  follows  directly  from  the  writings  not 
only  of  Luther  but  also  of  Calvin.  Barth  is  determined  to  be  seen  as  reintroducing  their 
teachings  to  the  church,  and  not  as  introducing  something  radically  different,  he  says: 
We  have  to  view  our  "imperfect"  obedience  as  put  in  God's  judgement,  and 
then,  and  to  that  degree,  understand  it  as  disobedience,  as  sin.  Calvin  reminds 
us  perhaps  more  forcefully  than  Luther,  that  at  the  question  as  to  the  reality  of 
our  obedience,  even  at  the  supposed  highest  pitch  of  all  seriousness,  not  only 
are  we  always  at  the  beginning,  but  we  have  been  flung  back  to  nothingness  s' 
The  Holy  Ghost  is  absolutely  and  alone  the  umpire  with  reference  to  what  is 
or  is  not  a  Christian  life.  For  this  reason  our  sanctification  is  reality,  but  our 
obedience  is  a  problem  that  we  cannot  solve,  into  the  darkness  of  which  we 
can  but  enter  again  and  again,  and  be  thrown  utterly  and  alone  on  God.  " 
In  the  final  section  of  the  lecture  Barth  discusses  the  Holy  Spirit  as  the  eschatological 
one.  55  It  is  in  an  eschatological  sense  that  the  Holy  Spirit  is  the  Holy  Spirit  the 
Creator,  the  Holy  Spirit  the  Reconciler  and  the  Holy  Spirit  the  Redeemer.  Theological 
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ethics  has  to  be  understood  from  the  perspective  that  Christians  are  a  people  of  the 
promise  and  live  eschatologically  in  the  now  but  not  yet.  They  are  a  people  who  are 
reconciled,  but  not  yet  redeemed  and  who  live  in  the  in-between  times,  the  time  of 
promise,  and  await  its  fulfilment. 
The  eschatological  promise  changes  both  the  boundary  lines  and  the  relationship 
between  God  and  us.  God's  revelation  promises  us  something  that  is  ultimate  and  in 
the  future  and  which  is  his  characteristic  purpose  with  us.  56  This  promise  he  says  is 
something  that  is "absolutely  final"  which  makes  it  not  only  a  future  event  but  also  a 
present  starting  point.  He  says: 
Finality  and  futurity  from  the  Beyond  of  our  existence  is  the  peculiar  quality 
to  our  redemption,  to  resurrection  and  to  eternal  life.  As  the  Word  of  God  is 
the  Word  of  the  promise  too,  so  the  Holy  Ghost  is  "the  Spirit  of  the  Promise,  " 
by  whom  we  are  "sealed  unto  the  day  of  redemption".  5' 
He  says  that  "Being  redeemed,  "  means  being  a  child  of  God  at  the  veil  of  partition 
that  remains  on  this  side  of  death.  Therefore,  theological  ethics  describes  the  life  that 
is  lived  in  the  attitude  of  receiving  the  promise  but  not  possessing  the  promise  of  its 
fulfilment.  " 
Christian  ethics  understands  that  the  eschatological  promise  means  that  in  the  Holy 
Ghost  we  have  a  conscience.  However  he  stresses  that  this  conscience  is  not  a  given 
conscience  in  the  Augustinian  sense  but  a  conscience  that  the  Holy  Spirit  gives  and 
continually  renews.  Therefore  he  says  emphatically: 
56  Barth,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  The  Christian  Life  (Luke  14.49:  Ephes.  1.13-14  :  iv.  30)  p.  72. 
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This  child  of  God  will  speak  out  and  be  a  missionary  whether  he  will  or  no, 
and  will  not  allow  himself  to  be  muzzled  by  any  tactics  of  the  Church  or  State 
manoeuvring  and  manipulation,  in  the  midst  of  which  he  lives.  '  `He  speaks 
because  he  must  speak.  59 
He  expands  on  what  this  means  for  theological  ethics  by  pointing  out  that  the 
eschatological  promise  also  means  that  in  the  Holy  Ghost  life  is  lived  in  gratitude 
because  God  the  Reconciler  freely  gives  life  and  salvation.  Theological  ethics  also 
points  out  that  he  who  is  truly  grateful  does  not  think  he  has  to  pay  back  what  he 
receives.  Therefore  theological  ethics  must  describe  the  gift  in  freedom  not 
compulsion  which  means  describing  gratitude  and  freedom. 
He  quickly  reminds  us  of  the  other  pole  of  the  dialectic  that  we  do  not  know  ourselves 
as  free  children  of  God  or  daughters  and  sons  of  the  promise  that  is  already  fulfilled 
because  we  live  in  unbelief  that  is  sin  and  he  describes  the  first  task  of  Christian  ethics 
as  prayer.  In  prayer  the  Holy  Spirit  groans  within  making  the  Christian  a  "groaner": 
The  wonder  of  prayer  -and  this  is  a  quite  different  from  the  "infused  grace"  of 
the  ability  to  pray  aright  -is  the  incoming  of  the  Holy  Ghost  to  help  the  man 
who  is  praying.  '  `Because  it  had  pleased  God  to  take  this  groaning,  sighing 
man,  together  with  his  burden,  upon  Himself.  '  `This  grave  circumstance  is  the 
presence  of  the  Holy  Spirit  of  Promise.  'bo  . 
In  conclusion,  in  his  important  lecture,  The  Holy  Ghost  and  the  Christian  Life  Barth 
discusses  his  central  ideas  about  the  part  played  by  the  Holy  Spirit  in  theological 
ethics  and  these  ideas  remain  in  an  expanded  form  in  Church  Dogmatics.  However, 
the  essential  features  of  his  thinking  on  the  place  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  theological 
ethics  are  already  in  place  as  early  as  1929.  There  are  three  aspects  to  these  features, 
which  are: 
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1.  The  Trinity  is  the  foundation  of  theological  ethics. 
2.  Luther  and  Calvin  are  the  fathers  of  theological  ethics. 
3.  Theological  ethics  is  part  of  dogmatics. 
Barth  expanded  these  three  points,  describing  them  in  more  detail  in  1938,  which  the 
following  quotations  illustrate:  ' 
The  theology  of  the  Refornlers,  at  any  rate  Luther  and  Calvin,  represents  an 
outlook  which  makes  independent  ethics  inherently  impossible' 
The  attempts  methodically  to  separate  dogmatics  and  ethics  are  dubious  even 
from  the  point  of  view  of  ethics  itself,  because  in  the  process  there  regularly 
occurs  a  change  of  focus,  a  fatal  interchange  of  the  subjects  of  God  and  man, 
which,  though  impossible  in  theology,  becomes  the  true  constitutive  principle 
of  ethics.  Appealing  to  the  supposed  consequences  of  dogmatics  as  the 
revelation  or  work  of  God  to  man,  in  ethics  we  suddenly  allow  ourselves  to 
open  a  new  book:  the  book  of  the  holy  man  which  is  the  sequel  to  that  of  the 
holy  God 
." 
Dogmatics  itself  is  ethics;  and  ethics  is  also  dogmatics.  ` 
The  lecture  illustrates  how  Barth  brilliantly  builds  complex  theological  structures  on  a 
relatively  few  central  ideas.  We  see  the  central  importance  Barth  gives  to  the  Holy 
Spirit  in  theological  ethics,  which  contradicts  those  critics  who  claim  Barth  grounds 
his  work  entirely  in  Christology.  It  also  illustrates  the  further  and  most  important 
point  that  this  was  Barth's  position  in  1929  in  the  semester  following  the  first 
presentation  of  his  lecture  series  on  ethics  at  the  University  of  Münster. 
The  lecture  shows  the  growing  complexity  of  Barth's  thinking  as  he  develops  the 
consequences  of  his  theological  ideas.  The  layering  of  ideas  must  be  kept  in  mind 
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because  at  any  point  in  the  discussion  when  Barth  is  discussing  the  Holy  Spirit  he  is 
considering  one  person  of  the  Trinity.  The  Holy  Spirit  is  the  Holy  Spirit  the  creator, 
the  Holy  Spirit  the  redeemer  and  the  Holy  Spirit  the  reconciler.  Barth  is  also 
discussing  the  actions  of  God  the  Father,  God  the  Son  and  God  the  Holy  Spirit  as  all 
Barth's  theological  ideas  are  expositions  of  the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  Trinity. 
Any  interpretation  of  Barth's  work  requires  holding  together  the  whole  and  the  part: 
only  the  whole  film  reveals  the  meaning  of  a  single  frame.  Although  his  initial  ideas 
are  simple,  the  task  of  interpretation  is  complex.  In  Barth's  1929  lecture  The  Holy 
Ghost  and  the  Christian  Life  we  see  him  revisit  and  rework  Calvin's  doctrine  of 
sanctification.  He  has  repeatedly  insists  that  grace  alone  makes  theological  ethics 
possible  arguing  that  theological  ethics  describes  the  moral  space  for  human  action. 
Theological  ethics  is  part  of  the  doctrine  of  God  the  creator,  God  the  redeemer  and 
God  the  reconciler,  and  more  specifically  the  doctrine  of  sanctification. 
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Chapter  5  Church  Dogmatics  111/4,116/59 
5.  lFreedom  in  Fellowship 
This  chapter  is  an  investigation  of  the  relationship  between  the  general  and  the 
particular  in  Karl  Barth's  moral  philosophy  and  is  a  close  examination  of  part  1, 
section  54  of  Church  Dogmatics  III/4.  This  section  of  Barth's  magnum  opus  is  called 
'Freedom  in  Fellowship',  and  is  divided  into  two  sections.  The  first  discusses  the 
relationship  between  man  and  woman.  The  second  discusses  the  relationship  between 
parents  and  children.  '  It  is  the  discussion  of  man  and  woman  that  forms  the  basis  of 
the  investigation. 
Three  preliminary  points  need  to  be  made  before  the  exploration  of  this  small  section 
from  Church  Dogmatics  can  begin.  The  first  is  that  its  description  of  the  relationship 
between  man  and  woman  is  not  the  only  criterion  on  which  to  judge  a  moral 
philosophy  or  ethical  system.  The  second  point  is  a  warning  from  Barth,  `Therefore 
let  it  be  said  as  a  definite  warning  that  the  man  who  in  reading  or  hearing  ethics 
begins  to  pay  attention  only  at  this  point  incurs  the  suspicion  of  being  a  doubtful 
character.  ''  The  third  point  is  that  this  selection  is  just  forty  pages  taken  from  a  work 
over  six  thousand  pages. 
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This  final  point  raises  the  methodological  question  of  how  it  is  that  at  whatever  point 
you  enter  Barth's  system  the  beginning  of  the  scheme  is  revealed.  The  reason  is  that 
the  structure  of  the  text  reflects  its  Trinitarian  content.  The  exposition,  although 
written  serially,  expresses  three  circles,  which  both  overlap  and  intersect  in  numerous 
planes.  The  centre  of  each  circle  is  within  the  circumference  of  all  the  other  circles. 
The  circles  have  central  focal  points,  which  as  the  text  unfolds  constantly  reappear.  In 
addition  all  the  circles  are  developments  of  the  initial  and  central  focal  point. 
Beginning  at  section  fifty-eight  and  reading  forty  pages  is  sufficient  to  encompass  the 
central  locus  and  the  focal  points  of  the  extending  circles. 
Having  considered  the  geometrical  form  of  Barth's  text,  as  three  overlapping  and 
intersecting  circles,  it  is  now  possible  to  consider  his  three  presuppositions  within  the 
geometry  of  those  circles. 
The  central  locus  expresses  the  first  and  most  important  of  Barth's  three 
presuppositions,  which  is  that  God  is  wholly  other.  This  seemingly  simple  statement 
is  the  basis  of  his  work  and  for  this  he  is  indebted  to  Kierkegaard.  Certainly, 
Kierkegaard's  vehement  criticism  of  Hegel  was  a  strong  influence  on  Barth.  This  is 
apparent  in  the  1919  edition  of  a  commentary  on  The  Epistle  to  the  Romans.  In  it  he 
says  he  has  a  debt  to  Kierkegaard  for  the  recognition  of  the  `infinite  qualitative 
distinction'  between  time  and  eternity.  The  positive  significance  that  followed  from 
this,  Barth  says,  is  Kierkegaard's  statement,  `God  is  in  heaven,  and  though  art  on 
earth.  '3  This  declaration  means  that  man  cannot  become  God.  He  has  the  freedom  to 
remain  man,  and  the  freedom  not  to  take  on  the  tasks  and  responsibilities  of  God. 
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equally  important  to  remember  that  Barth  definitely  rejects  both  Kierkegaard's 
theological  leap  of  faith  from  man  to  God  and  his  ethical  position. 
It  should  be  noted  that  Hegel  has  a  complete  chapter  in  Barth's  history  of  nineteenth 
century  theology  whereas  there  are  only  three  minor  references  to  Kierkegaard.  `  It  is 
also  important  to  note  that  Hegel's  dialectic  shapes  Barth's  method. 
Barth's  second  presupposition,  or  principle,  is  that  man  lives  in  response  to  God  his 
maker.  The  consequence  of  this  principle  is  that  man  did  not  create  himself,  but  is  a 
creature  of  God.  That  is  real  man  does  not  live  a  godless  life  without  God.  Real  man 
lives  with  God  as  his  covenant  partner.  5 
That  this  is  the  case,  that  the  man  determined  by  God  for  life  with  God  is  real 
man,  is determined  by  the  existence  of  the  man  Jesus.  Apart  from  anything 
else,  this  is  the  standard  of  what  his  reality  is  and  what  it  is  not.  It  reveals 
originally  and  definitively  why  God  has  created  man.  ' 
In  creating  man  to  be  his  covenant  partner  God  determines  man's  existence  and 
defines  his  limits.  God's  creative  act  prescribes  man's  freedom  as  a  creature  of  God. 
This  second  presupposition  is  that  creation  is  the  outward  sign  of  God's  covenant  with 
man.  The  relationship  between  man  and  woman  mirrors  God's  covenant  relationship 
with  man.  God's  act  of  covenant  determines  their  relationship.  The  dialectic  form  of 
the  content  of  Barth's  textual  exposition  reflects,  the  duality,  which  is  that  neither 
woman  nor  man  is  a  unity  alone  their  unity  is  in  God,  who  has  created  them  in  mutual 
duality. 
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The  third  presupposition  is  that  it  is  the  entry  of  Christianity  into  the  world  through 
the  birth,  life,  death  and  resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ  that  defines  the  relationship 
between  God  and  man,  and  men  and  women.  Barth  stresses  the  newness  and 
unpredictability  of  this  event.  In  this  section,  he  expands  his  ideas  on  the  relationship 
between  man  and  woman  as  a  mirror  of  the  divinity  and  humanity  of  Jesus  Christ. 
Again,  the  dialectic  expresses  the  form  of  which  the  duality  of  the  divinity  and 
humanity  is  the  content.  The  incarnation  of  Jesus  Christ  completes  the  dialect,  the 
synthesis  is  in  Jesus  Christ  in  his  humanity  and  his  divinity  completes  his  humanity. 
Prophecy  reveals  this  event,  which  human  reason  cannot  predict.  Its  occurrence 
makes  all  things  new.  That  is,  God  does  a  new  thing  so  that  humankind  may  do  a  new 
thing,  which  expresses  God's  free  desire  to  be  in  covenant  partnership  with 
humankind.  Therefore,  we  read  in  the  Book  of  Acts  of  those  who  were  privileged 
witnesses  to  God's  new  act  themselves  doing  "a  new  thing".  A  fact  not  concealed 
from  the  rabble  that  denounced  the  Christians  as,  'these  that  have  turned  the  world 
upside  down',  who,  'do  contrary  to  the  decrees  of  Caesar,  saying  that  there  is  another 
king,  one  Jesus.  "  There  is,  so  Barth  claimed,  a  form  of  life  -a  turning  "the  world 
upside  down"-  which  corresponds  to,  and  is  established  by,  the  action  of  God. 
Barth's  aphorism,  'Dogmatics  itself  is  ethics;  and  ethics  is  also  dogmatics,  '  expresses 
this  correspondence  between  divine  and  human  action!  For  Barth,  to  give  an  account 
of  the  action  of  God  it  is  also  necessarily  to  give  a  corresponding  account  of  human 
action.  In  addition,  human  action,  properly  and  necessarily  refers  to  God  who  evinces 
it. 
7  Acts  17.6-7 
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Having  the  three  initial  presuppositions  with  their  three  concentric  circles,  moving  in 
different  planes  but  having  their  centres  within  in  each  other,  in  place  we  turn  to  a 
description  of  what  this  'dogmatics'  necessarily  means  for'ethics'. 
God's  covenant  relationship  with  humankind  necessarily  determines  the  relationships 
between  people  as  beings  in  encounter.  The  encounter  with  the  other,  as  fellow- 
human,  determines  each  individual  necessarily  reflecting  God's  covenant  relationship 
with  humankind  and  this  is  the  reality  of  humankind.  Barth  says: 
God  takes  man  so  seriously  in  his  vocation  to  be  in  covenant  with  Him  that  He 
calls  him  to  freedom  in  fellowship,  i.  e.,  to  freedom  in  fellowship  with  others. 
He  calls  him  to  find  himself  by  affirming  the  other,  to  know  joy  by  comforting 
the  other,  and  self-expression  by  honouring  the  other.  ' 
The  first  and  typical  sphere  of  this  fellow  humanity,  the  relationship  between  man  and 
man,  is  that  between  male  and  female.  This  relationship,  says  Barth,  `alone  rests  on  a 
structural  and  functional  distinction.  '  Both  male  and  female  are  human.  Man  never 
exists  as  such  but  only  as  the  human  male  or  the  human  female.  This  is  necessarily 
the  case  and  man  cannot  seek  to  liberate  himself,  or  herself,  from  this  position,  'Nor 
can  he  wish  to  liberate  himself  from  the  relationship  and  be  without  woman  or  woman 
without  man.  "' 
What  does  this  mean  for  the  encounter  between  man  and  woman?  How  is  their  action 
to  mirror  the  action  of  God?  Barth  explains  that  our  human  actions  need  to  accept  and 
reflect  both  that  God  is  our  creator  and  that  we  are  His  creatures.  He  goes  on  to 
explore  how  the  relationship  between  men  and  women  expresses  God's  covenant 
relationship.  The  first  of  the  human  circles  is  the  necessary  establishment  of 
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humankind  as  male  and  female,  and  the  centre  of  this  circle  is  marriage,  which  is  the 
focal  point  of  the  relationship  between  man  and  woman.  If  marriage  is  to  be  a  human 
action  that  reflects,  confirms  and  evinces  God's  action  then  it  needs  to  be  seen  as  the 
action  of  God's  creatures  within  their  created  and  creaturely  being.  For  this  reason  he 
rejects  any  idea  of  marriage  as  a  state  that  transcends  humanity.  This  includes  any 
concept  that  marriage  has  a  metaphysical  teleology.  He  therefore  rejects  the  Roman 
Catholic  sacramental  view  of  marriage,  which,  he  says,  is  a  means  of  grace  belonging 
not  only  to  the  natural  order,  but  to  also  the  supernatural  order.  God,  he  says,  creates 
male  and  female  as  his  partners  not  as  potential  gods.  For  similar  reasons  Barth  rejects 
Schleiermacher's  neo-Protestant  view  of  marriage  as  the  metaphysical  absolute  as  an 
extreme  of  Romanticism.  "  Barth  says,  marriage  is  an  earthly  act,  'they  will  not  be 
given  in  marriage  in  heaven,  '  and  as  such  is  determined  and  should  be  understood 
without  embarrassment. 
Although  marriage  is  the  focal  point  and  the  centre  of  the  circle  of  the  relationship 
between  man  and  woman  it  is  not  the  entire  circle.  `The  sphere  of  male  and  female  is 
far  wider  than  marriage.  "'  Marriage  is  not  the  telos  of  the  encounter  between  male 
and  female,  because  it  has  no  metaphysical  component.  It  is  not  the  means  of  an 
ascent  or  transcendence  from  the  natural  to  the  supernatural  sphere.  He  calls  this  idea 
of  marriage,  placing  its  focus  in  another  world,  as  the  decentralisation  of  the 
relationship.  He  says  the  circle  is  more  than  the  centre  and  the  male  is  still  male  and 
the  female  still  female  at  all  other  points  within  the  circumference  a  refusal  to 
understand  this  is: 
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As  though  we  had  to  abandon  to  their  own  problems  all  those  who  do  not  have 
the  freedom  to  approach  the  centre,  or  who  have  the  freedom  not  to  approach 
it,  as  if  there  were  no  other  estate  but  matrimony;  as  though  the  command  of 
God  were  to  be  understood  in  a  limited  sense.  " 
Again,  we  see  the  dialectic  giving  reality  to  the  position  of  marriage,  for  he  says  that 
the  affirmation  of  marriage  depends  upon  the  serious  possibility  of  its  accompanying 
denial.  Marriage  is  a  command  of  God  who  created  man  as  male  and  female  but  it  is 
not  a  universally  obligatory  and  binding  order  of  creation: 
They  are  also  man  and  woman,  and  as  such  stand  under  the  command  of  God, 
when  they  are  unmarried  and  have  not  yet  attained  this  special  concrete  form 
of  the  sexual  encounter,  when  they  are  widowed  or  divorced  and  no  longer 
realise  it,  and  especially  for  some  reason  when  they  can  never  realise  it  at  all.  " 
In  removing  marriage  from  the  orders  of  creation  in  Church  Dogmatics  he  has  taken  a 
wider  view  than  he  took  in  the  Münster  and  Bonn  lectures.  His  new  position  provides 
space  within  the  relationship  between  man  and  woman  for  those  who  are  unmarried 
and  removes  from  them  the  requirement  of  inadequacy.  He  lifts  the  burdens  placed 
upon  men  and  women  by  the  orders  of  creation,  because  the  particular,  which  is  the 
relationship  between  man  and  woman,  follows  from  and  expresses  the  general,  which 
is  the  doctrine  of  God. 
He  moves  on  to  discuss  the  disgraceful  state  accorded  the  unmarried  in  Israel,  where 
the  procreation  of  children  was  the  decisive  issue.  Abraham's  holy  seed  carries  on 
Israel's  hope  from  one  generation  to  another.  The  truth  of  the  promise  depended  upon 
marriage  and  the  unmarried  could  have  no  share  in  the  salvation  of  the  chosen  people. 
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The  new  life  that  entered  the  world  with  Jesus  Christ  removes  the  burden  that  made 
marriage  a  necessity.  `Marriage  is  no  longer  an  absolute  but  a  relative  necessity.  "' 
Here  again  Barth  makes  the  significance  of  the  general  point  apparent  in  the  historical 
particular.  For  with  the  birth  of  Jesus  Christ  the  holy  sequence  of  generations  has 
reached  its  goal.  In  Barth's  doctrine  of  God  marriage  is  a  matter  of  special  gift  and 
vocation,  which  express  God's  covenant  relationship.  However,  humankind  can 
receive  the  special  gift  and  vocation  in  forms  other  than  marriage.  In  minoring  the 
covenant,  marriage,  because  it  receives  a  new  consecration,  retains  its  dignity  and 
validity. 
However,  he  says,  this  also  enables  an  understanding  and  appreciation  of  the 
possibility  of  abstention  from  marriage;  reminding  us  both  of: 
The  glad  affirmation  of  marriage  in  Protestant  ethics  over  and  against  the 
conflict  with  Catholic  priestly  and  monastic  celibacy. 
And  of  the  words  of  Jesus  which: 
Indicate  the  vicissitudes  of  life  may  make  it  incumbent  upon  a  man  to  remain 
unmarried  and  to  express  the  relationship  between  Christ  and  His  community 
this  way.  16 
He  says  the  latter  is  a  fact  that  Protestant  ethics  too  often  ignores.  He  points  out  that 
we  learn  from  1  Corinthians  7  that  Peter,  the  prince  of  apostles  and  the  first  pope  did 
not  take  the  way  of  celibacy  although  Paul  did  and  recommended  it  to  others.  The 
point  is  that  the  very  affirmation  of  marriage  depends  on  its  denial.  Again  we  see  the 
dialectic  shaping  the  argument,  one  thing,  marriage,  cannot  exist  in  isolation  it 
requires  its  negation  to  achieve  unity.  In  this  way  the  particular  the  married  and  the 
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unmarried  state  achieve  a  unity  in  their  mirroring  of  the  more  general,  the  covenant 
relationship  between  God  and  man.  This  argument  is  part  of  Barth's  unfolding  of  the 
concepts  that  dogmatics  is  ethics  and  ethics  is  dogmatics.  Therefore,  `the  Christian 
enters  upon  marriage  not  on  a  basis  of  natural  necessity,  but  on  that  of  a  special 
spiritual  gift  and  vocation  within  his  life  history  and  the  history  of  salvation.  "' 
He  continues  with  a  discussion  about  how  are  we  to  decide  on  good  and  evil  within 
the  sphere  of  male  and  female.  Again,  the  discussion  proceeds  from  the  general  to  the 
particular.  Firstly,  the  general  is  the  doctrine  of  God  and  what  we  know  of  God's 
actions.  Secondly,  the  particular  is  man's  ethical  response.  The  particular:  man's 
action,  reflects  the  general:  God's  action.  So  Barth  begins  with,  `Man  in  his  divinely 
created  sexuality  is  a  similitude  of  the  covenant.  '  God  in  the  covenant  relationship 
decided  he  did  not  wish  to  be  alone  but  in  a  duality,  and  man  and  woman  reflect  that 
decision.  However,  just  as  there  is  an  infinite  qualitative  difference  between  God  and 
man  so  there  is  a  reflecting,  although  incomparable  difference  in  the  relationship 
between  man  and  woman.  This  distinction  shows  us  that  human  action  is  good  only 
as  far  as  it  maintains  the  qualitative  distinction  man  and  woman.  Human  action 
becomes  evil,  in  this  context,  as  soon  as  man  does  not  accept  being  male,  and  woman 
does  not  accept  being  female.  He  says  at  this  point: 
Just  as  in  this  covenant  God  remains  true  to  His  Godhead,  and  man  and  the 
people  can  only  confess  their  Creatureliness  and  in  this  way  accept  their 
position  as  His  partners,  so  man  and  woman  -  and  this  is  the  deepest  root  of 
the  command  -  must  acknowledge  their  sex.  ' 
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Barth's  position  is  that  God's  description  of  the  relationship  between  man  and 
woman,  because  of  its  reflexive  character  is  the  prototype  I  and  Thou  relationship.  It 
is  not  possible  from  Barth's  theology  to  describe  completely  man  and  woman, 
because  it  is  unlikely  there  can  be  either  any  description  given  by  man  that  can  wholly 
describe  woman,  or  any  description  that  can  be  given  by  woman  that  can  wholly 
describe  man.  It  is,  he  says,  important  to  remember  that  we  cannot  predetermine  what 
God  chooses,  because: 
The  command  of  God,  will  find  man  and  woman  as  they  are  in  themselves.  It 
may  coincide  with  what  they  know  but  equally  it  may  disclose  something 
completely  new.  In  no  event  is  it  bound  to  any  scheme  we  know.  " 
This  means  that  ideas  and  opinions  of  man  and  woman,  although  of  interest,  are  not 
definitive  or  final.  `Therefore  not  every  apparent  offence  is  a  real  one.  '  Although 
there  are  offences,  he  says  that  arise  if  one  sex  refuses  to  acknowledge  that  it  exists  in 
right  and  dignity  only  in  relation  and  in  distinction  to  the  opposite  sex.  Within  the 
church  another  temptation  is  the  desire  to  be  neither  sex,  but  to  take-up  a  third 
position  and  aspire  to  a  higher  mode  of  being  as  an  idealistic  solution  to  the  problems 
of  the  single  man  or  woman,  and  in  so  doing  lead  a  sexually  lonely  life.  20 
Here  we  see  Barth  claiming  man  and  woman  must  have  a  proper  respect  for,  and  be 
obedient  to,  God's  command.  He  means  that  male  and  female  are  constrained  by  the 
limits  of  their  created  being  and  should  act  accordingly.  He  believes  both  that  these 
limits  should  be  accepted,  and  that  they  should  be  responded  to  in  a  positive,  hopeful 
and  joyful  way.  In  which  case,  humankind  should  accept  and  rejoice  in  being  a  duality 
having  been  created  male  and  female  and  not  attempt  to  escape  this  duality  by 
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attempting  to  become  the  One.  The  task  of  God  is  to  be  the  One  and  the  source  of 
unity  for  the  duality  of  man  and  woman,  and  this  task  is  not  to  be  usurped.  This  is  th° 
meaning  of  being  obedient  to  the  will  and  purposes  of  God.  We  can  see  Barth 
explaining  that  male  and  female  is  the  actualisation  of  humanity.  This  actualisation, 
lie  says,  must  take  place,  `in  the  realisation  of  the  fact  that  they  belong  indissolubly 
together  and  are  necessary  one  to  the  other  for  their  mutual  completion.  '2' 
In  this  section  of  Church  Dogmatics,  Barth  has  formulated  the  foundation  for  a  proper 
Christian  understanding  of  the  relationship  of  man  to  himself  and  to  woman,  and  of 
woman  to  herself,  and  to  man.  The  content  of  specific  action  has  to  remain  open.  With 
this  foundation  in  place  humankind  must  be  open  to  the  dynamic  of  possibilities,  not 
yet  thought  of  but  known  to  God.  These  possibilities  become  revealed  as  together  man 
and  woman  are  attentive  to  the  command  of  God  in  hearing  the  Word  and  receiving 
the  sacrament: 
All  is  well  so  long  and  so  far  as  man  and  woman,  as  they  seek  to  be  man 
individually  and  together  whether  in  or  outside  the  union  of  love  and 
marriage,  are  not  merely  fully  aware  of  their  sexuality,  but  honestly  glad  of  it, 
thanking  God  that  they  are  allowed  to  be  members  of  their  particular  sex  and 
therefore  soberly  and  with  a  good  conscience  going  the  way  marked  out  for 
them  by  this  distinction.  " 
This  chapter  is  not  an  attempt  to  evaluate  or  assess  Barth  sexual  ethics,  but  to  examine 
a  specific  example  of  the  relationship  between  the  general  and  the  particular.  The 
section,  'Freedom  in  Fellowship'  was  chosen  to  examine  this  relationship,  because  any 
moral  philosophy  is  at  its  most  vulnerable  when  discussing  gender  and  sexuality.  23  It 
is  not  so  difficult  to  make  abstract  hypothesis  on  questions  of  social  ethics  and  claim 
`1  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics,  111/4,  p.  158. 
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cohesion  between  the  general  and  the  particular,  but  it  is  an  altogether  more  difficult 
task  to  achieve  this  cohesion  in  the  field  of  sexual  ethics. 
Barth  has  brilliantly  achieved  a  coherent  and  a  cohesive  statement  in  his  exploration 
of  the  general,  the  doctrine  of  God,  and  the  particular,  the  actions  of  humankind.  He 
also  lifts  the  burden  imposed  by  the  belief  that  sacramental  marriage  is  the  pathway  to 
sanctification  of  the  relationship  between  men  and  women.  He  reminds  men  and 
women  of  their  creaturely  existence  and  of  the  true  significance  of  their  sexuality 
within  creation,  which  is  of  its  actuality  and  its  necessity.  He  closes  the  door  on  a 
third  way,  which  is  the  transcending  of  humanity  in  a  search  for  individual  unity,  but 
also  rescues  those  outside  the  `sanctification'  of  the  marriage  partnership. 155 
Chapter  6  Community,  State,  and  Church 
Chapter  6  discusses  Barth's  three  essays,  published  as,  Community  state  and  Chin-ch. 
Two  questions  are  examined.  First,  is  Barth's  theological  ethics  properly  grounded  in 
the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity?  Second,  is  it  a  universally  applicable  individual  ethic,  or  is 
he  guilty  of  remaining  narrowly  sectarian  in  his  ethical  position?  The  first  essay, 
`Gospel  and  Law',  is  on  individual  acts,  the  second,  `Church  and  State',  is  on  the 
relationship  between  Church  and  State,  and  the  third,  `The  Christian  Community  and 
the  Civil  Community',  and  is  on  society. 
6.1  Gospel  and  Law 
The  first  of  the  essays,  "Gospel  and  Law",  he  intended  to  deliver  himself  at  Barmen  in 
Germany  in  1935.  It  had  to  be  read  for  him,  because  the  German  police  were 
escorting  him  over  the  border  into  Switzerland.  The  government  had  suspended  him 
from  his  Bonn  professorship  for  refusing  to  take  the  oath  of  obedience  to  Hitler 
without  the  reservation:  "So  far  as  I  can  responsibly  do  so  as  an  evangelical 
Christian.  "' 
`Gospel  and  Law'  discusses  the  question  of  how,  and  on  what  basis  an  individual 
should  act?  The  essay's  title  immediately  establishes  two  important  points:  firstly, 
Gospel  and  Law  are  united  and  not  a  duality;  and  secondly,  that  the  Gospel  precedes 
1  Barth,  "Das  Evangelium  in  der  Gegenwart,  "  Theologische  Existenz  heute  25,  Munich  (1935)  extract 
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the  Law.  He  says  we  must  understand  the  Gospel  in  order  that  we  can  understand  the 
Law.  2  The  order  is  important  because  it  establishes  their  relationship.  The  iospel 
hides  the  Law,  as  does  the  ark.  3  In  addition,  the  title  points  to  the  Promise  which 
remained  concealed,  and  which  God  expresses  in  a  covenant  relationship  with  his 
people.  Barth  as  we  have  seen  describes  God's  relationship  as  a  covenant  and  not  as  a 
contract,  because  God  unilaterally  establishes  the  divine  covenant  with  humanity. 
Unlike  a  legal  contract,  it  is  not  a  mutual,  bilateral  arrangement.  God's  covenant  is 
free,  and  unconditional.  It  is  unconditioned  by  considerations  of  human  worth. 
Yahweh's  covenant  commitment  carries  equally  unconditional  obligations.  They  are 
the  apodictic  obligations  summarised  in  the  `ten  words'  of  the  Torah.  `The  indicatives 
of  grace  precede  and  sustain  the  imperatives  of  law'.  ' 
The  content  of  the  Gospel  is  God's  grace.  Therefore,  he  says,  to  speak  of  Gospel  and 
Law  is  to  speak  of  God's  Word.  Barth  does  not  provide  a  precise  definition  of  the 
Word  of  God  for  the  following  reason,  which  Hartwell  illustrates: 
The  reason  for  this  restraint  is  not  so  much  that  in  his  teaching  the  Word  of 
God  appears  in  three  different  forms  and  has  many  aspects,  but  that  an 
actualistic  quality  is  peculiar  to  it  according  to  which  the  Word  of  God  is 
never  a  datum,  something  static  which  man  can  handle,  scrutinise,  define  and 
classify  like  an  object  that  is  at  his  disposal  but  is  always  a  concrete  act  of 
God,  an  event,  a  miracle,  the  materialisation  of  which  in  each  individual  case 
is  entirely  dependent  on  the  sovereign  and  free  grace  of  God  and, 
consequently,  cannot  be  anticipated  by  any  definition  of  man's  making.  ' 
The  Word  is  the  Truth  and  combines  the  Gospel  and  the  Law  in  unity.  It  is  Grace, 
which  is  free,  non-obligatory,  and  undeserved,  and  in  which,  form  and  content,  are  the 
2  Barth,  "Gospel  and  Law"  in  Community,  State  and  church,  p.  71. 
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°I  am  indebted  to  Alan  Torrance  for  these  observations  on  the  covenant  see,  `On  Deriving'  Ought' 
fromm  'Lc':  Jesus  Christ,  Covenant  and  Koinonia.  p.  5 
5  Hartwell,  The  Theology  of  Karl  Barth,  pp.  60-61. 157 
same.  Jesus  Christ  establishes  the  unity  of  the  three  aspects  of  this  concept  of  the 
Word: 
For  this  is  God's  grace  that  the  eternal  Word  became  flesh.  It  is  above  all 
necessary  that  we  speak  of  this  content  of  the  Gospel.  God's  grace,  which  is 
this  content-which  also  includes  the  Law,  if  it  really  is  God's  Word  and  Law- 
this  grace  is  called,  and  is,  Jesus  Chi-ist.  ' 
Therefore,  he  claims  that  if  we  wish  to  know  how  to  act  we  should  look  to  Jesus 
Christ,  who,  in  his  particularity,  establishes  these  things  both  ontologically  and 
eternally.  He  has  done  it  for  all  time.  Therefore,  it  is  not  a  contingent  reality,  which  is 
born  of  necessity.  His  incarnation,  born  of  the  Virgin  Mary,  caused  a  discontinuity  in 
history.  God  breaks  into  the  world  from  above  whilst  maintaining  the  continuity  of 
history,  but  causing  an  ontological  change  for  all  time.  Sin  is  no  longer  an  ontological 
necessity,  although  it  remains  an  epistemological  necessity.  Therefore,  Barth  does  not 
believe  that  evil  is  an  absence  of  good,  or  the  expression  of  any  external  force.  Rather, 
he  defines  the  source  of  sin  as  humanity's  refusal  to  accept  its  limitations  and  to  insist 
upon  the  autocracy  of  its  own  decisions.  His  constant  prophetic  exclamation  is  that 
only  Jesus  Christ  is  the  truth  of  our  creation,  reconciliation  and  redemption.  It  is  this 
dogmatic,  which  determines  what  is  a  proper  ethical  response: 
That  this  is  true  becomes  apparent  in  man's  aversion  and  flight  precisely  from 
the  grace  of  God.  God's  answer  to  sin-this  is  also  grace-is  our  being  in  the 
flesh:  we  must  die.  If  we  would  hear  this  answer,  this  would  be  our  salvation. 
....  repent  and,  our  autocracy  destroyed,  inherit  eternal  life.  ' 
Human  hostility  meets  God's  freely  given  undeserved  gift  of  Grace.  Whereas  Jesus,  in 
his  obedience,  said  yes  to  Grace,  and  continues  to  intercede  for  us  with  our  humanity, 
employing  his  divine  power  to  utilise  love.  He  expects  no  love  in  return,  and,  of 158 
course,  finds  none,  but  he  continues  to  intercede  for  us  because  he  knows  humanity 
has  neither  the  willingness  nor  the  ability  to  believe.  The  urgency  an4i  insistence  of 
this  message  he  expresses  in  his  prophetic  call  to  the  Confessing  Churches  at  Barmen 
to  return  to  their  one  Lord  Jesus  Christ!  For  Barth  this  is  the  only  position  from  which 
action  can  be  understood  and  begin.  It  is  always  with  grateful  acceptance  of  the 
dependence  on  grace,  and  never  from  human  autocracy.  Men  and  women  have 
become  participants  in  divinity,  not  as  divinisation,  but  as  active  participants  in  God's 
creation.  Christ  lives  in  us,  and  we  have  the  mind  of  Christ. 
How  then  should  the  individual  act  as  a  result?  He  tells  us  that  we  should  start  with 
Jesus  Christ,  because  we  see,  in  his  obedience,  that  he  has  fulfilled  all  the 
requirements  of  the  Law.  We  must  remember  that  the  Law  is  the  will  of  God,  and  not 
a  manifestation  of  or  own  theories  or  philosophical  presuppositions.  This  is  why  we 
cannot  base  Christian  social  ethics  on  a  philosophical  foundation.  However,  because 
the  life  of  Jesus  Christ  manifests  the  will  of  God  we  have  both  knowledge,  and 
guidance,  about  how  to  act.  He  explains  further,  from  what  God  does  we  can  infer 
what  God  wants  from  us,  "You  shall  be  perfect,  as  your  heavenly  father  is  perfect" 
Matthew  5.48.  The  use  of  the  future  tense  indicates,  "You  shall  be!  "  Jesus  Christ 
establishes  us,  and  it  is  this  validity,  which  establishes,  "the  Ten  Commandments, 
together  with  its  exposition  in  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount,  and  its  application  in  the 
apostolic  instructions.  "' 
6  Barth,  `Gospel  and  Law'  in  Community,  State  and  Church,  p.  Barth,  "Gospel  and  Law"  in 
Community,  State  and  Church  p.  73. 
7  Barth,  "Gospel  and  Law"  in  Conununity,  State  and  Church,  p.  75. 
R  Jüngel,  Christ,  Justice  and  Peace,  "Barmen  Thesis  Number  One.  "  pp.  xx.  if 
9  Barth,  "Gospel  and  Law"  in  Community,  State  and  Church,  p.  Barth,  "Gospel  and  Law"  in 
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Barth  explains  that  the  message  of  the  New  Testament  looks  back  to  the  fulfilment  of 
the  promise,  by  repentance.  John  the  Baptist  is  the  mid-point  bet-Teen  Moses  and 
Paul,  who  points  to  the  present  Messiah,  and  testifies  to  participation  in  the  use  of  the 
future  tense,  "You  will  be  perfect". 
The  Law  meets  the  members  of  the  Church  in  its  preaching,  sacraments  and 
confessions,  which  proclaim  the  demand  for  self-denial,  obedience,  and  the  following 
of  the  Cross  for  purification,  sanctification  and  renewal.  `He  who  says,  "I  know  him" 
but  disobeys  his  commandments  is  a  liar,  and  the  truth  is  not  in  him.  '  10 
Yes,  and  further,  the  Church  would  not  be  the  Church  if,  in  her  very  existence, 
but  also  in  her  teaching  and  keeping  of  the  Law  of  God,  its  commands,  its 
questions,  its  admonitions,  and  its  accusations  would  not  become  visible  and 
apprehensible  also  for  the  world,  for  state  and  society.  " 
How  then  do  men  and  women  respond  to  this  gift?  What  should  we  do?  Does  this 
mean  our  individual  ethic  is  to  imitate  Christ?  "Certainly  not",  thunders  back  Barth  by 
establishing  and  emphasising  his  point  that  God  is  wholly  other.  He  says,  imitation  is 
impossible,  and  reminds  his  audience  they  must  always  remember  that  they  are  men 
and  that  Jesus  Christ  is  God.  He  refutes  any  form  of  a  Kantian  ethic  that  bases 
individual  moral  modelling  on  the  life  of  Christ.  He  reminds  us  that  Christ's 
fulfilment  of  the  Law  was  a  unique  act,  just  as  His  belief  was  a  unique  belief.  The 
Law  for  us  is  that  we  believe  in  Jesus  Christ,  who  commanded  his  disciples  to,  "Love 
your  enemies!  Be  careful  how  you  give  alms!  Do  not  be  anxious!  Do  not  judge!  " 
This,  he  reminds  us,  is  what  the  disciples  wanted  from  their  congregations,  and  which 
gives  the  Church  the  authority  to  confront  its  members  and  the  world.  `There  can 
never  be  claims  and  demands,  which  would  have  legal  validity  from  another  source  or 
10  1  John  2.3f. 160 
in  themselves,  there  can  only  be  witnesses.  '  12  He  says,  our  works  as  ethical  acts, 
whether  as  internal  thoughts  or  external  actions  have  validity  ^nly  in  so  far  as  they  are 
works  of  faith.  This  faith  is  the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  which  we  cannot  appropriate 
but  for  which  we  can  pray. 
Barth  goes  on  to  discuss  the  negative  use  of  the  Law.  He  says,  human  sin  demands 
autocracy  and  insists  on  representing  itself  before  God,  rejecting  Grace,  and  choosing 
self-assertion,  which  creates  our  self-separation  from  God,  and  makes  a  claim  that  we 
can  justify  ourselves  by  our  own  efforts.  He  explains  why  this  is  disobedience: 
It  is  disobedience  because  God's  claim  bears  witness  to  what  is  promised  to  us 
and  fulfilled  in  Christ,  our  justification  through  this  very  Christ.  Christ  is 
indeed  the  goal  of  the  Law  and  is  so  for  our  justification.  It  would  be 
obedience  for  us  to  subordinate  ourselves  to  this  justification,  to  live  a  life  in 
this  subordination.  But  our  lust  shoots  past  this  very  thing.  " 
He  says  that  in  this  way,  sin  triumphs  more  so  than  in  the  sins  we  think  we  know: 
idolatry,  blasphemy  and  murder,  adultery  and  robbery.  He  points  out  that  each  person 
chooses  that  portion  of  the  Law  with  which  he  decides  to  assert  himself  in  self- 
righteousness,  and  says,  for  example  one  becomes  pious,  and  another  follows  the 
academic  life.  He  gives  a  long  and  colourful  list  of  types  and  the  vividness  of  his 
descriptive  writing,  at  this  point,  expresses  his  pleasure  in  his  creation.  He  is  making 
the  point  that  the  sin  of  human  autocracy  misuses  the  Law,  making  it  a  vehicle  for 
11  Barth,  "Gospel  and  Law"  in  Community,  State  and  Church,  p.  79. 
12  Barth,  "Gospel  and  Law"  in  Community,  State  and  Church,  p.  83. 
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natural  law,  abstract  reason,  history  and  `Volks  lo,  nol'.  14  This  is  exactly  the  position 
adopted  by  "German  Christians.  "  It  produces  nomianism15  -1nd  antinomianism.  16 
Against  the  background  of  the  third  section,  which  describes  the  negative  and  the 
positive  elements  of  the  Law,  which  are  God's  gift  of  his  Word,  the  Gospel  and  the 
Law,  against  which  we  rebel  and  which  we  corrupt,  the  final  section  of  the  essay  tells 
of  God's  victory  over  sin  and  rebellion.  He  describes  this  from  three  points  of  view: 
1.  Through  the  grace  of  God. 
2.  Through  the  content  of  the  Gospel. 
3.  Through  the  gift  of  faith. 
Of  these  points,  he  says  it  is  `through  the  Grace  of  God'  that  Jesus  Christ,  himself, 
converts  the  judgement,  under  which  the  misused,  and  yet  valid  law  of  God  places  us 
into  our  justification.  He  says  that,  Jesus  Christ  `through  the  content  of  the  Gospel' 
gives  himself  to  do  what  we  cannot  do  for  ourselves,  because  we  have  neither  what  it 
takes,  nor  the  ability  to  give  it  to  ourselves.  It  comes  from  outside,  and  it  is  only 
`through  the  gift  of  faith'  that  we  receive  what  it  is  we  need. 
In  this  essay,  Barth  unites  Gospel  and  Law  in  Christ,  which  secures  a  proper  Christian 
foundation  for  his  theological  ethic.  He  expands  on  the  implications  for  theological 
14  `Volksnomoi'  people's  law. 
15  Nomianism,  should  submit  to  these  or  those  observances  and  disciplines.  Barth,  "Gospel  and  Law" 
in  Community,  State  and  Church,  p.  91. 
16  Antinomianism,  pure  inwardness,  adverse  to  every  concrete  command  and  tie.  Barth,  "Gospel  and 
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ethics  by  saying  that  through  the  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit  given  to  us  at  baptism,  Christ 
is  the  source  of  our  life,  and  our  reality.  Living  in  Chris*,  we  have  the  knowledge  we 
shall  be  perfect.  Therefore,  he  says,  our  response  to  this  covenant  gift  is  obedience  to 
God's  will  as  shown  in  the  life,  death  and  resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ  and  as  revealed 
to  us  through  the  mediation  of  the  Gospel.  He  says  therefore  that  we  know  what  to  do. 
Our  own  abilities  can  give  neither  the  knowledge  nor  act  upon  it.  It  is  God  as  the 
covenant-God,  and  therefore  God  in  Jesus  Christ  in  whom  that  covenant  was 
instituted  and  fulfilled  that  is  for  man  the  criterion  of  the  rightness  or  wrongness  of 
man's  being  and  acting.  "  Barth's  theological  ethics,  therefore,  as  an  ethics  of  grace,  is 
by  necessity  an  ethics  of  freedom. 
Barth,  in  this  essay,  has  begun,  continued  and  ended  his  discussion  of  how  the 
individual  should  act  within  the  Trinity.  Neither  philosophy  nor  social  anthropology 
provided  any  pre-suppositions  to  his  discussion.  In  his  theological  ethics,  God  gives 
everything.  His  theological  ethics  is  applicable  to  all,  not  through  a  set  of  rules 
provided  for  all  possible  circumstances,  but  by  a  given  paradigm,  which  is  the 
knowledge  of  how  to  act,  and  the  means  with  which  to  act.  On  these  grounds  his 
individual  ethics  are  a  universal  and  not  a  sectarian  ethics.  He  says,  the  Christian 
serves  God  not  in  order  to  be  saved,  but  because  he  has  been  saved  in  Jesus  Christ.  He 
obeys  God's  Law  in  recognition  and  acceptance  of  God's  grace  in  Jesus  Christ. 
Barth  says,  the  foundation  of  the  Decalogue  and  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount  provide  the 
ethic  for  a  love  of  neighbour,  which  is  the  basis  of  a  universal  and  global  ethic.  He  has 
provided  a  rational  position  for  a  theological  ethic  by  placing  ethics  within  God's 
covenantal  relationship.  Our  response  is  to  be  obedient  in  the  gift  of  faith  in  which  all 
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is  given.  Barth  establishes  ethics  as  part  of  dogmatics  for  it  speaks  of  God's  Will  as  it 
is  revealed  through  God's  Word,  and  the  revelation  ^f  God  mediated  through  Jesus 
Christ  as  proclaimed  in  word  and  sacrament  by  the  Church,  and  witnessed  to  by  its 
members  in  their  individual  and  social  ethic.  Barth  has  a  high  expectation  of  both 
individual,  and  Church  action:  they  are  to  be  perfect.  However,  this  is  not  perfection 
achieved  through  human  effort  because  God  gives  everything.  In  addition,  our  ethical 
response  is  to  be  obedient  to  the  command. 
At  this  point,  we  return  to  the  question  posed  initially:  is  Barth  guilty  of  a  sectarian 
ethic?  In  this  essay,  he,  shows  the  relationship  of  the  individual  not  to  a  universal  as 
an  ethic,  but  to  the  absolute,  which  is  Jesus  Christ.  Barth  continues,  with  Kierkegaard, 
to  use  a  dialectic  method,  but  differs  radically  with  him  in  content.  Kierkegaard  thinks 
God  gives  faith  to  all  as  a  universal  human  attribute,  agreeing  with  Lessing  that  faith 
is  available  as  a  passion  to  both  King  and  commoner.  Kierkegaard  ontologically 
unites  all  people  with  God: 
The  individual  determines  his  relationship  to  the  universal  through  his 
relationship  with  the  absolute  not  his  relation  to  the  absolute  through  his 
relationship  to  the  universal.  " 
Kierkegaard  suspends  the  ethical  as  universal  putting  it  aside,  and  establishes  it 
beyond  the  universal  in  the  absolute.  Whereas  Barth  insists  that  faith  is  God's  gift,  we 
do  not  know  why  some  have  it  and  others  do  not.  God's  gift  incorporates  the  ethical 
ontologically;  it  is  no  longer  an  external  act.  The  ethical  has  become  man's  response 
to  the  covenant  relationship  with  God.  For  Barth  the  paradox  of  faith  is  that  the 
universal  is  not  the  final  judge,  but  is  itself  under  judgement.  It  is  then  the  universal, 
IR  Soren  Kierkegaard.  Fear  and  Trembling,  trans.  by  A.  Hannay,  (Hannondsworth:  Penquin  1985)  p. 
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which  may  be  accused  of  sectarianism,  by  not  bowing  to  the  absolute.  Barth  is  never 
guilty  of  this  error. 
6.2Church  and  State 
Unlike,  writings  on  social  philosophy  which  often  open  with  a  principle  or  a  set  of 
premises,  Barth  begins  his  essay  on  the  relationship  between  church  and  state  with  an 
historical  particularity.  He  starts  with  a  set  of  recorded  events:  the  birth,  life,  death 
and  resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ,  and  continues  with  a  discussion  of  Christian  social 
ethics  and  with  the  relationship  of  men  and  women  to  these  events  as  the  Gospels 
recount  them.  His  beginning  defines  his  methodology.  He  therefore  starts  his  essay  by 
asking,  what  is  the  reconciled  individual's  relationship  to  human  law?  He  says: 
Is  there  a  connection  between  justification  of  the  sinner  through  faith  alone, 
completed  once  for  all  by  God  through  Jesus  Christ,  and  the  problem  of 
human  law?  " 
In  addition,  he  asks  the  related  question:  what  is  the  State's  relationship  to  God's 
Kingdom? 
What  is  the  connection  between  order-,  peace  and  freedom,  the  peace  order 
and  freedom  of  the  Kingdom:  the  no  longer  and  the  not  yet,  and  present 
existence  in  the  state?  '2° 
He  asks,  are  the  peace  order  and  freedom  of  the  kingdom  connected  to  the  existence 
of  the  state,  or  are  they  always  to  remain  separate?  We  need  to  know  more  than  that 
they  are  not  in  conflict,  and  we  need  to  know  the  way  in  which  they  are  connected. 
His  essay  explores  these  questions  from  within  the  Reformed  Church's  tradition  and 
19  Barth,  `Church  and  State'  in  Community,  State  and  Church,  p.  101. 
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proposes,  firstly,  an  engagement  with  its  roots,  and  secondly,  an  expansion  of  its 
position 
Barth  points  out  that  the  gap  in  the  Reformers'  teaching  at  this  point  allows  human 
justice  to  be  considered  as  an  afterthought,  and  not  part  of  divine  justice.  The 
consequence  was  the  development  of  two  alternatives:  either,  the  Church  becomes 
very  spiritual  claiming  to  expect  everything  from  God,  but  excluding  human  justice; 
or  it  constructs  a  secular  gospel  of  human  law  leading  to  a  secular  church.  These  two 
possibilities  Barth  sees  as  becoming  the  sterility  of  the  Pious  Church,  or  the  sterility 
of  the  Church  of  Enlightenment.  The  question  was,  therefore,  is  there  an  actual,  and 
therefore  inward,  and  vital  connection  between  the  two  realms?  In  1938,  this  question 
was  of  the  greatest  importance,  and  the  need  for  an  answer  was  presented  to  Barth  by 
the  ethical  crises  of  his  times.  He  believed  that  the  `German  Christians'  had  followed 
the  path  that  led  to  Enlightenment  sterility.  His  answer  remains  of  the  greatest 
significance  for  the  ordering  of  a  proper  relationship  between  the  church  and  the  state. 
Only  a  properly  grounded  theological  answer  would  have  the  power  and  authority  to 
resolve  the  consequences  that  had  arisen  in  the  relationship  between  the  Genpan 
Church  and  State.  The  problem  Barth  set  out  to  tackle  had  a  four  hundred  year 
history,  and  his  answer  gave  a  new  Reformation  to  the  understanding  of  the 
relationship  between  Church  and  State.  In  all  three  essays  discussed  in  this  chapter, 
Barth  establishes  the  foundation  of  the  relationship  in  Christ,  which  gives  a  proper 
Trinitarian  understanding  to  the  relationship,  and  establishes  a  correct  direction  for  the 
development  of  a  theology  of  the  State. 166 
Of  all  the  significant  Gospel  passages  about  the  relationship  between  Church  and 
State,  the  Reformation  writers  were  only  interested  in  the  words  of  John  [  18:  36]:  "My 
kingdom  is  not  of  this  world.  "  Barth  however,  starts  at  the  point  where  Church  and 
State  confront  each  other  in  the  encounter  between  Jesus  and  Pilate  described  in  John 
19.2.  Here  Jesus  confirms  Pilate's  claim  to  have  power  over  Him,  which  is  power 
given  "from  above.  "  This  is  power  given  by  God;  its  source  is  neither  demonic  nor  at 
enmity  with  Jesus.  Pilate,  at  this  point,  was  carrying  out  the  will  of  God,  showing  that 
the  State,  even  in  her  demonic  form,  cannot  help  rendering  the  service  it  is  meant  to 
render.  From  this  encounter,  it  is  clear  that  the  State  is  included  within  the  order  of 
Redemption.  Having  established  this  connection  between  Church  and  State,  Barth 
moves  the  argument  on  by  considering  the  essence  of  the  State.  He  does  this  by  an 
exegesis  of  Romans  13.1-7,  and  is  particularly  concerned  with  the  interpretations  that 
have  been  given  to  the  concept  of  the  subjection  of  Christians  by  earthly  rulers. 
When  the  Church  of  the  New  Testament  speaks  of  the  State,  the  emperor  or  king  their 
representatives and  activities,  it  had  in  mind  an  "angelic  power,  "  which  is  represented 
by  the  State  and  active  within  it.  Barth,  however,  claims  that  the  State,  as  represented 
by  Pilate  in  the  encounter  with  Jesus  had  become  demonic.  Jesus  was  not  condemned 
as  an  `enemy  of  the  State.  '  The  State  did  not  assert  itself  too  much,  but  not  enough. 
He  says,  `it  is  a  State  which  at  the  decisive  moment  fails  to  be  true  to  itself.  '2  It  was, 
therefore,  no  longer  a  State.  Demons  are  not  to  be  annihilated,  but  forced  into  the 
service  and  the  glorification  of  Christ,  as  indeed  was  Pilate.  `In  Christ  the  angelic 
powers  are  called  to  order  and,  so  far  as  they  need  it,  they  are  restored  to  their  original 
order.  '=2  It  follows  from  this  that  the  power  of  the  State  primarily  belongs  to  Christ. 
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22  Barth,  `Church  and  State'  in  Community,  State  and  Chinch,  p.  120. 167 
In,  and  through  Christ,  Church  and  State  are  linked.  This  is  the  first  of  Barth's  major 
contributions  to  a  theology  of  the  State;  that  Church  and  State  are  united  ontologically 
in  the  Trinity. 
Emphasis  rightly,  has  often  been  quite  rightly  placed  on  the  fact  that  the  State  should 
not  be  sought  here,  in  the  "present  age",  but  in  that  "which  is  to  come",  and  it  is  in 
this  future  State  that  Christians  have  their  citizenship  now  although  they  are  not  yet 
able  to  inhabit  it.  It  is  not  an  imaginary  ideal,  but  a  real  State  and  it  is  the  citizenship 
of  it  and  not  the  rejection  of  the  imperfections  of  the  present  State  which  makes 
Christians  strangers  within  the  present  worldly  State.  Barth  emphasises  that  it  is  this 
future  hope,  lived  in  the  present,  which  separates  the  Church  from  the  States  of  this 
world,  and  not  their  imperfections.  There  is  to  be  no  separation  of  the  two  kingdoms 
of  Church  and  State. 
Barth  reminds  us  that  in  the  New  Testament  the  description  of  the  new  age  is  of  a 
political  order.  23  `The  Church  sees  its  future  not  in  any  heavenly  image  of  its  own 
existence  but  in  the  real  heavenly  State.  '  Therefore,  the  Church  holds  the  State  in  the 
highest  of  esteem  when  it  sees  in  that  State  its  heavenly  reality  into  which  its 
terrestrial  experience  will  be  absorbed.  On  this  point,  Barth  strongly  disagrees  with 
Augustine.  Saying  the  State  is  not  to  be  defined  as  the  City  of  Cain,  because  whatever 
its  present  condition,  `it  will  one  day  contribute  to  the  glory  of  the  heavenly 
Jerusalem.  92'  The  focus  of  his  argument  is  that  the  true  system  of  law  and  State  are 
founded  upon  the  preaching  of  the  Kingdom  of  God.  Therefore  the  Church  is 
precluded  from  either  taking  on  the  role  of  the  heavenly  State,  because  only  God  can 
23  Barth,  `Church  and  State'  in  Commcrity,  State  and  Church,  p.  124. 
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bring  that  into  being,  or  from  becoming  a  State  within  a  State,  or  a  State  above  the 
State,  as  claimed  by  the  papal  State.  This  last  point  was  painfully  illustrated  in 
Germany  in  1934.  The  Roman  Catholic  Church  negotiated  directly  from  Rome  with 
the  Third  Reich  about  the  integration  of  the  Catholic  Youth  into  the  Hitler  Youth.  The 
opinions  and  strong  opposition  of  the  German  Bishops,  priests  and  people  were 
ignored.  The  Roman  Catholic  Church  acted  as  a  State,  the  Catholic  Nuncio  and  the 
Third  Reich  agreed  on  assimilation,  although  there  was  very  strong  local  opposition 
among  German  Catholics. 
Barth  has  presented  a  very  different  conception  of  the  city  to  those  of  the  ancient 
world.  He  insists  that  the  heavenly  State  remains  the  heavenly  State,  established  by 
God  and  not  man,  and  it  is  not  to  be  realised  in  this  age,  not  even  in  the  Church.  Z" 
Throughout  Barth  maintains  his  strong  Christological  position  and,  on  this  point, 
agrees  with  Augustine,  who  said,  `True  justice  is  not  to  be  found  only  in  that 
commonwealth  whose  founder  and  ruler  is  Christ'.  26 
Barth  will  not  have  us  waiting  patiently  and  passively  for  the  arrival  of  the  heavenly 
city,  as  we  are  to  proclaim  the  message  to  the  world.  `God  has  gathered  up  sinful  man 
in  the  Person  of  Jesus,  that  he  has  made  sin  and  death  his  own,  and  thus  that  He  has 
set  him  free  for  the  enjoyment  of  life  which  he  had  lost.  '2'  The  message  includes  the 
admonition  that  we  should  pray  for  all  people,  including  kings  and  rulers  so  that  we 
may  lead  a  quiet  and  peaceful  life,  not  because  we  wish  for  a  `bucolic  existence,  '  nor 
25  Barth,  `Church  and  State'  in  Community,,  State  and  Church,  p.  127. 
26  Saint  Augustine.  The  City  of  God,  trans.  by  Henry  Bettenson,  (Harmondsworth:  Penquin,  1972) 
Book  11,  Chapter  21  p.  75. 
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for  the  achievement  of  an  ideal,  but  for  the  whole  community,  so  that  the  freedom  of 
the  Church  can  be  guaranteed.  " 
This  is  a  penultimate  condition  of  the  relationship  of  the  State  to  the  Church,  which  is 
only  temporary  and  restricted  to  this  world.  Nor,  Barth  emphasises,  is  the  State 
required  to  validate  or  assess  the  effectiveness  of  the  Gospel.  The  prayers  of  the 
Church  for  the  State  are  the  very  essence  of  its  own  existence.  If  the  Church  forgets 
this  it  will  have  forgotten  its  apostolic  calling  to  proclaim  the  promised  justification  to 
all  people.  Therefore,  the  Christian  attitude  to  the  State  cannot  be  affected  by  the 
activities  of  the  State,  because  that  attitude  is  founded  on  Jesus  Christ.  The  Church  in 
its  support  of  the  Law  is  a  "good"  of  the  State. 
Of  all  those  services,  that  the  Christian  should  offer  the  State  intercession  should  have 
a  central  position.  The  Church  is  called  to  the  worship  of  God  on  behalf  of  all  people 
including  those  who  cannot  and  will  not  accomplish  it  themselves,  and  the  Church 
also  worships  on  the  State's  behalf.  The  State  obviously  cannot  become  an  object  of 
worship,  because  it  needs  prayers  on  its  behalf.  This  essential  service  reminds  the 
State  of  its  limits,  and  reminds  the  Church  of  its  freedom.  The  Church  must  freely 
give  the  service  of  intercession,  and  its  prayers  on  behalf  of  the  State  cannot  result 
from  the  worthiness  of  the  State.  The  less  worthy  the  State  the  more  the  intercession  is 
needed.  The  Church's  intercession  for  the  State  puts  a  limitation  on  the  injunction  in 
Romans  13:  1.  "Be  in  subjection.  .  ." 
It  is  within  the  framework  of  divine  ordinance 
that  respect  is  to  be  shown.  The  Church  should  expect  the  best  from  the  State,  and  has 
to  suffer  any  injustice  coming  from  an  acceptance  and  acknowledgement  of  the 
State's  power  to  be  God  given.  To  oppose  the  State  according  to  Romans  verse  2  is  to 
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oppose  the  will  of  God.  However,  this  respect  for  authority  must  not  be  separated 
from  the  priestly  function  of  the  Church,  as  the  State  may  oppose  the  divine  source  of 
its  power.  If  the  State  attempts  to  impose  limitations  on  the  Church's  right  to 
proclaim  the  Word  then  its  Christian  subjects  cannot  continue  to  conceal  their 
opposition  for  the  possibility  of  intercession  for  the  State  stands  or  falls  on  the 
freedom  of  God's  Word. 
The  necessity  of  the  prayers  of  the  Church  on  behalf  of  the  State  is  the  second  of 
Barth's  major  contributions  to  the  defining  of  a  proper  relationship  between  Church 
and  State. 
There  is  a  limit  to  what  may  be  understood  directly  from  the  New  Testament  about 
the  relationship  of  the  Church  to  the  State,  and  some  questions  which  one  wishes  to 
ask  remain  unanswered.  Having  made  two  important  definitions  concerning  the 
relationship  between  Church  and  State,  Barth,  in  the  final  section  of  his  essay,  asks 
and  answers  a  series  of  the  questions  that  remain  concerning  the  relationship.  He 
follows  the  path  of  his  exegesis  of  the  New  Testament: 
1.  Is  the  swearing  of  an  oath  one  of  the  duties  that  must  be  fulfilled?  Barth's 
answer  is: 
A  "totalitarian"  oath  (that  is,  if  it  is  rendered  to  a  name  which  actually  claims 
divine  functions).  Such  an  oath  would  indeed  imply  those  who  swear  it  place 
themselves  at  the  disposition  of  a  power  which  threatens  the  freedom  of  the 
Word  of  God  for  Christians;  therefore,  this  would  mean  the  betrayal  of  the 
Church  and  of  its  Lord.  29 
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Barth  himself  followed  the  logic  of  his  thinking  in  1936  when  he  was  forced  out  of  his 
professorship  at  Bonn  for  r'fusing  to  make  an  oath  to  Hitler  without  qualification.  As 
a  result,  German  students  were  forbidden  to  go  and  study  with  him  in  Basle, 
Switzerland. 
2.  Is  military  service  a  self-evident  duty? 
The  Christian  must  have  very  real  grounds  for  distrusting  the  State  if  he  is  to 
be  entitled  to  refuse  the  State  his  service,  and  if  the  Church  as  such  is  to  be 
entitled  and  called  to  say  "No"  at  this  point.  A  fundamental  Christian  "No" 
cannot  be  given  here  because  it  would  in  fact  be  a  fundamental  "No"  to  the 
earthly  State  as  such,  which  is  impossible  from  the  Christian  point  of  view.  3o 
Obviously,  the  grounds,  for  distrust,  would  include  cases  where  the  State  had  ceased 
to  be  a  State.  The  Third  Reich  is  just  such  a  case. 
3.  Can  the  State  make  any  legitimate  inward  claim  on  its  subjects  that  is  the 
demand  of  any  particular  philosophy  of  life? 
Barth  replies: 
According  to  the  New  Testament,  the  only  answer  to  this  question  is  an 
unhesitating  "No"!  Claims  of  this  kind  can  in  no  way  be  inferred  from 
Romans  13;  they  have  no  legal  justification  whatsoever.  On  the  contrary,  here 
we  are  very  near  the  menace  of  "the  Beast  out  of  the  abyss";  a  just  State  will 
not  require  to  make  such  claims.  " 
The  demands  of  the  Volk  as  a  teleological  ideal  for  `German  Christians'  are  examples 
of  the  State  demanding  a  particular  philosophy  of  life. 
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Barth  points  out  that  the  New  Testament  writers  understood  the  State  as  authoritarian 
and  saw  themselves  as  °ubjects,  not  citizens.  A  citizen  exercises  more  responsibility 
for  the  activities  of  the  State  than  a  subject  does.  Paying  taxes  and  remaining  passive 
is  insufficient.  Responsible  citizenship  requires  political  duties,  political  action  is 
necessary,  which  may  and  must  also  mean  political  struggle. 
In  this  essay,  "Church  and  State"  Barth  has  established  the  foundation  of  his  Christian 
social  ethic.  He  began  with  Jesus  Christ.  His  inspiration  came  from  Romans  13 
together  with  the  exhortation  to  intercession  in  I  Timothy  2.  Is  his  extrapolation  from 
New  Testament  exegesis  to  the  Germany  of  1938  valid  and  accurate?  This  depends  on 
the  interpretation  placed  on  "subjection.  "  Barth  gives  this  answer: 
If  the  prayer  of  Christians  for  the  State  constitutes  the  norm  of  their 
"subjection,  "  which  would  only  be  an  "annexe"  of  the  priestly  function  of  the 
Church,  and  if  this  prayer  is  taken  seriously  as  the  responsible  intercession  of 
the  Christians  for  the  State,  then  the  scheme  of  purely  passive  subjection 
which  apparently  -  but  only  apparently  -  governs  the  thought  of  Romans  is 
broken  32 
Serious  prayer  requires  the  corresponding  action.  Responsible  politically  active 
citizens  produce  democratic  states,  for  every  Christian  is  responsible  for  the  justness 
of  the  State.  The  Church  must  have  the  freedom  to  proclaim  divine  justification,  and 
the  State  will  be  a  just  State  in  the  proportion  it  actively  grants  this  freedom  to  the 
Church.  This  ensures  a  proper  relationship  between  Church  and  State. 
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6.3  The  Christian  Community  and  the  Civil  Community 
The  third  essay,  `The  Christian  Community  and  the  Civil  Community'  was  published 
in  1946.  In  it,  Barth  directs  the  Confessional  Churches  back  to  the  fifth  thesis  of  the 
Barmen  Declaration,  which  they  had  signed  twelve  years  earlier.  This  prophetic 
recalling  of  the  Churches  back  to  their  one  Lord  is  the  foundation  of  the  essay.  It  is  a 
theological  statement  and  not  a  prescriptive  political  demand  to  the  State. 
Each  of  the  essay's  thirty-five  paragraphs  is  a  statement  or  theses.  The  form  of  each 
statement  follows  a  consistent  pattern  beginning  with  a  statement  about  the  Church. 
There  are  no  systems  and  no  criteria,  which  apply  to  every  situation,  but  only  a  way  of 
looking  at  things.  Therefore,  the  thirty-five  paragraphs  give  only  examples,  which  are 
not  definitive  and  are  only  prolegomena. 
Barth  describes  the  relationship  between  Church  and  State  in  a  theory  of 
"community".  This  concept  is  a  development  of  his  thinking  in  the  earlier  essay, 
`Church  and  State',  in  which  the  Church  and  State  were  united  in  their  source  Jesus 
Christ,  but  continue  to  exist  as  parallel  institutions.  Now,  Barth  no  longer  refers  to  the 
Church  and  the  State,  but  to  the  Christian  Community  and  the  Civil  Community,  thus 
Church  and  State  are  now  fully  integrated  within  the  wider  concept  of  community. 
This  concept  of  community  allows  for  a  greater  differentiation  within  each  group,  as 
the  boundaries  of  Church  and  State  have  been  extended  to  become  wider  so  that  they 
are  now  fully  inclusive. 
Previously,  Barth  used  the  word  Church  to  mean  those  called  by  Jesus  Christ.  The 
entire  community  Christian  is  included  in  his  new  concept  and  it  has  become 174 
ecumenical.  All  are  included  in  the  Christian  Community,  because  the  Gospel  applies 
to  all.  In  additior,  this  concept  of  community  recognises  that  the  goal  is  not  in  an 
eternal  Church  but  a  polls  built  by  God. 
Barth  defines  the  civil  community  as  all  those  living  in  a  geographical  area,  under  one 
constitutional  government.  This  is  a  wider  concept  than  he  used  in  "Church  and 
State,  "  which  he  defined  the  State  as  government,  the  institution  that  exercises  power 
in  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order.  The  Civil  Community,  Barth  says  shares  no 
common  awareness  of  God  with  the  Christian  Community,  but  they  are  both  bounded 
by  the  State  as  their  physical  authority. 
However,  although  they  share  no  common  awareness  of  God,  the  comparison 
between  the  Church  Community  and  the  Civil  Community  should  not  be  over 
emphasised,  because  each  needs  the  other.  33  The  Christian  community  should  take  the 
State  seriously,  because  it  needs  the  order  of  law.  Christians  know  of  the  dangers  of 
human  presumption,  and  of  their  need  for  protection  from  chaos.  Without  civil  order, 
there  would  be  no  Christian  order. 
Barth  also  develops  the  statement  he  made  in  1934,  about  the  relationship  between  the 
Church  and  State: 
Fear  God,  honour  the  King!  (I  Pet.  2:  17).  Scripture  tell  us  that  by  divine 
appointment  the  State,  in  this  still  unredeemed  world  in  which  also  the  Church 
is  situated,  has  the  task  of  maintaining  justice  and  peace,  so  far  as  human 
discernment  and  human  ability  make  this  possible,  by  means  of  the  threat  and 
the  use  of  force.  The  Church  acknowledges  with  gratitude  and  reverence 
toward  God  the  benefit  of  this,  his  appointment.  It  draws  attention  to  God's 
Kingdom.  God's  commandments  and  justice,  and  those  who  rule  and  those 
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who  are  ruled.  It  trusts  and  obeys  the  power  of  the  Word,  by  which  God 
upholds  all  things  3; 
Again,  Barth,  in  contrast  with  Augustine,  emphasises  that  the  State  is  not  a  product  of 
sin.  35  The  State  is  an  instrument  of  divine  grace  and  through  the  protection  of  human 
law  gives  the  Church  time  to  preach  the  gospel.  The  State  does  this  "according  to  the 
measure  of  human  insight  and  human  capacity,  "  and  "under  the  threat  and  exercise  of 
force.  "36  As  the  State  acts  with  divine  "powers",  the  Christian  community 
acknowledges,  "The  benefaction  of  this  ordinance  of  His  with  thankful,  reverent 
hearts.  ""  The  Church  has  a  message  to  proclaim,  whereas  the  State  has  no  message, 
and  depends  on  insights  from  elsewhere.  The  importance  of  the  Christian  community 
is  to  give  these  insights  to  the  State.  They  are: 
1.  Prayer  for  the  civil  community. 
2.  To  be  responsible  before  God  for  the  civil  community;  to  work  actively  on 
behalf  of  the  civil  community. 
3.  To  recognise  civil  power  binding  on  Christians.  " 
Barth  continues  by  discussing  how  Christians  are  to  respond  to  the  recognition  that 
civil  power  is  binding  on  them.  He  translates  Romans  13.1  as  the  Christian 
community  subordinating  itself  to  the  State,  and  not  as  in  Luther's  translation  as 
3;  Barth,  Barmen  Thesis  No  5,  quoted  in  Jüngel,  Christ,  Justice  and  Peace,  p.  xxvii. 
33  The  State  is  used  throughout  `Christian  Community  and  Civil  Community'  as  a  synonym  for  the 
Civil  Community.  In  doing  this  Barth  does  not  intend  the  reader  to  understand  any  limitation  in  the 
concept  of  community. 
36  Barmen  Thesis  No  5. 
37  Barmen  Thesis  No  5. 
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subjecting  itself"  There  is  a  fundamental  difference,  as  subordination  does  not  imply 
blind  obed;  ence.  The  Christian  community  subordinates  itself  to  the  demands  of  the 
civil  power  "for  conscience  sake,  i40Barth  illustrates  this  relationship  with  concentric- 
circles.  Christians,  he  says,  are  the  centre  of  the  circles,  the  inner  circle  is  the  Church, 
and  the  outer  the  State.  The  two  circles  have  the  same  centre  in  Jesus  Christ.  This 
geometric  illustration  replaces  the  image  of  two  parallel  institutions  united  in  Jesus 
Christ  as  their  source,  which  he  used  in  `Church  and  State'.  The  image  of  concentric- 
circles  completely  integrates  the  Christian  and  Civil  Communities,  whereas  the  image 
of  parallel  lines  differentiates  the  two  communities.  This  integration,  Barth  says,  is 
necessary  because  both  the  Christian  and  the  civil  cause  are  the  same  cause,  which  is 
the  one  God. 
The  Church  community  makes  itself  jointly  responsible  for  the  civil  community,  but  it 
has  no  exclusive  political  theories,  because  there  is  no  Christian  political  system.  The 
Christian  community  because  of  its  belief  in  revelation  looks  for  the  best  of  the 
political  forms  available,  whilst  recognizing  that  they  are  all  are  limited  because  they 
are  formed,  "according  to  the  measures  of  human  insight  and  human  capacity.  ";  '  It  is 
concerned  with  politics,  and  "subordinates"  itself  to  the  civil  community  by  making 
use  of  its  knowledge  of  the  Lord,  which  enables  it  to  distinguish  between  the  just  and 
the  unjust  State;  that  is between  the  State  in  Romans  13  and  the  State  in  Revelation 
13.  Thus  by  choosing  political  alternatives,  which  flow  from  its  centre  in  Jesus  Christ, 
and  in  this  way  the  Christian  community  expresses  its  `subordination.  ' 
39  Barth  says  Luther's  translation  of  Romans  13.1  is  `subject,  '  "which  is  something  dangerously 
different  from  what  is  meant  here.  "  `Christian  Community  and  Civil  Community,  '  in  Community,  State 
and  Church,  p.  159. 
40  Romans  13.5 
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The  Christian  community  looks  to  the  centre  of  the  concentric  circles,  Jesus  Christ,  to 
find  a  d;  rection  and  a  line  in  making  political  decisions.  There  can  be  no  appeal  to 
`natural  law',  as  this  would  be  taking  a  direction  from  and  using  the  methods  of  the 
pagan  State.  42  The  Church  can  support  the  civil  community  with  honesty  and 
calmness,  because  it  does  not  seek  power  and  influence;  these  are  not  applicable 
goals.  The  Church,  says  Barth,  should  be  grateful  for  the  gifts  of  the  State,  such  as  a 
share  in  education,  broadcasting  and  financial  relief.  He  makes  the  point  that  if  the 
State  refuses  the  Church  on  these  issues  the  Church  will  look  to  itself  for  reasons  and 
not  to  the  State.  The  Church  must  first  establish  a  claim  before  it  is  considered  as  a 
factor  of  importance.  Barth  describes  how  this  claim  is  to  be  made.  He  does  this  not 
by  using  abstract  principles,  but  by  giving  concrete  examples. 
At  this  point  Barth  introduces  a  powerful  allegory  to  describe  the  relationship  between 
the  Civil  Community,  the  State,  and  the  Kingdom  of  God.  The  State  is  an  allegory,  `as 
a  correspondence  and  an  analogue  to  the  Kingdom  of  God.  "'  As  the  outer  circle  it  is 
capable  of  reflecting  the  inner  circle  of  the  Church,  but  as  this  reflection  has  not  been 
fixed  at  one  historical  moment  it  needs  continually  to  be  reinterpreted  by  the  Church 
on  behalf  of  the  State.  This  continual  interpretation  moulds  the  State  into  an  `allegory 
of  the  Kingdom  of  God  and  the  fulfilment  of  its  righteousness'.  `  The  initiative  for 
this  "moulding"  has  to  come  from  the  Church,  because  the  State  knows  nothing  of  the 
mystery  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  or  the  mystery  at  its  own  centre.  Barth  has  now 
established  how  the  Church  can  speak  to  the  State,  but  it  must  constantly  remember 
42  Natural  Law,  `By  "natural  law"  we  mean  the  embodiment  of  what  man  is  alleged  to  regard  as 
universally  right  and  wrong,  as  necessary,  permissible  and  forbidden  "by  nature,  "  that  is  on  any 
conceivable  premise.  Barth,  Statement  XI,  `Christian  Community  and  Civil  Community,  '  in 
Community,  State  and  Church,  p.  163. 
43  See  Statement  XIV  `Christian  Community  and  Civil  Community,  '  in  Community,  State  and  Church 
p.  168. 
44  Barth,  `Christian  Community  and  Civil  Community,  '  in  Community,  State  and  Church  p.  169. 178 
that  it  is  not  yet  redeemed,  and  therefore,  the  Church  is  a  penultimate  and  not  an 
ultimate.  It  can  never  become  an  ultimate,  as  the  Kingdom  of  God  is  the  task  of  the 
State.  Of  course,  the  State  neither  knows  nor  understands  its  task,  but  the  Church 
knows  of  the  Word  of  God,  and  receives  the  Word  of  God  through  Christ  in  the 
Scriptures,  in  its  own  preaching  and  through  the  sacraments.  The  Church  speaks  from 
its  interpretation  of  the  Word  as  it  is  revealed  to  it,  and  must  speak  of  this  Word  to  the 
State.  By  doing  this  honestly  and  sincerely,  the  Church  fulfils  its  task  of  moulding  the 
State,  and  does  so  by  choosing  from  among  the  political  options,  those  that  most 
closely  suggest  a  "correspondence"  to  the  "analogue". 
Barth  consistently  maintains  that  there  is  no  theological  system  guiding  the  choice  of 
political  options.  Therefore,  it  is  not,  and  never  will  be,  possible  to  provide  a  model  of 
Christian  political  order  as  there  is  no  definitive  blueprint  held  in  the  human  mind, 
because  all  human  thought  is  but  a  prolegomena.  However,  he  does  give  some 
provisional  but  not  definitive  examples: 
We  need  examples  because  we  are  concerned  to  illuminate  the  analogical,  but 
extremely  concrete  relationship  between  the  Christian  Gospel  and  certain 
political  decisions  and  modes  of  behaviour.  " 
Of  the  political  forms  available,  a  democracy  offers  the  best  analogy.  However,  there 
can  never  be  a  Christian  political  party,  because  it  would  be  in  opposition  to  other 
parties  and  the  Gospel  message  is  for  all.  Thus,  Barth  excludes  any  possibility  of  the 
Christian  message  becoming  a  sectarian  ideal. 
These  three  essays  are  most  unusual,  because  they  are  not  defending  one  position  over 
against  another  form  of  social  ethics.  If  all  is  a  prolegomena  is  it  possible  to  extract  a 179 
coherent  social  philosophy  from  them?  Yes  it  is,  if  one  remembers  that  for  Barth 
cd'gmatics  is  ethics.  The  Word  of  God  revealed  through  the  mediation  of  Jesus  Christ 
establishes  a  covenant  relationship  with  all  people  through  their  creation, 
reconciliation  and  the  promise  of  redemption  in  Jesus  Christ  as  Lord.  The  response  to 
this  gift  is  obedience  to  God's  Will,  made  possible  by  the  gift  of  Grace  through  the 
Holy  Spirit.  So  to  speak  of  ethics  is  to  speak  of  dogmatics:  the  Word  of  God.  This 
Barth  has  done  very  successfully  in  the  three  essays  considered  in  this  chapter. 
In  these  essays,  Barth  rejects  any  appeal  to  `natural  law'  as  the  foundation  for  a 
definition  of  the  State,  and  he  rejects  the  traditional  Augustinian-Reformation  view  of 
the  State  as  only  a  means  of  preservation  and  order,  because  it  separates  creation  from 
redemption.  He  has  developed  a  doctrine  of  the  State  centred  on  Christ.  In  which  there 
is  a  correspondence,  through  analogy,  between  the  heavenly  polis  and  the  earthly 
polls.  All  political  action,  for  Barth,  is  guided  by  this  analogy,  for  it  is  not  an  analogia 
entis,  an  image  from  man  to  God,  but  an  analogia  f  dei,  an  image  from  God  to  man. 
Brunner  attacked  Barth  for  his  use  of  analogy  as  content,  saying  his  argument  could 
as  well  support  other  states  than  democracy.  46  Christ  the  King  can  support  the  idea  of 
a  monarchy;  Christ  the  Lord  can  support  a  totalitarian  state  and  Barth's  final  analogy 
carries  the  possibility  of  Christ  the  servant  supporting  a  slave  State.  However,  this 
attack  misses  the  point  of  Barth's  analogy,  as  in  the  Kingdom  of  God  there  is  no  sin, 
human  autocracy  does  not  exist,  and  all  mankind  is  equal  before  the  Lord.  The  closest 
approximation  to  this  State  is  one  moulded  in  the  form  of  a  democracy,  because 
45  Barth,  `Church  and  State'  in  Community,  State  and  Church,  p.  179. 
46  Emil  Brunner,  The  Christian  Doctrine  of  Creation  and  Redemption  (Westminster,  1952)  p.  319. 180 
within  it  all  will  be  equal  before  the  law  and  all  will  be  offered  equal  protection  under 
the  law. 
The  Church  is  central  to  Barth's  social  ethic,  because  the  two  communities  are  under 
the  Kingship  of  Christ.  The  Church  reveals  the  Word  of  God,  mediated  through 
scripture,  preaching  and  sacraments.  This  Word  is  God's  Word,  and  not  a  human 
voice  peddling  rival  philosophies.  It  is  the  Word,  which  creates,  reconciles  and 
redeems.  It  is  the  source  of  unity  and  reality,  and  in  this,  Barth  has  grounded  his  social 
philosophy  for  there  is  no  other  ground  upon  which  Christian  social  ethics  can  stand. 181 
Chapter  7  Critical  readings  of  Karl  Barth's  ethics 
Criticism  of  Barth's  ethics  began  very  early;  disapproval  occurred  soon  after  the 
publication  of  the  first  edition  of  The  Epistle  to  the  Romans  in  1919.  Paul  Althaus 
writing  in  1923  said,  rather  sadly,  that  Barth's  work  was  `a  renunciation  of  Christian 
ethics  with  any  content'.  ' 
In  1938,  Cullberg  said  of  Barth's  ethical  writings,  `the  obvious  suspicion  is  that  the 
"Theo-centricity"  of  Christianity  could  be  defined  in  such  a  way  that  the  problem  of 
ethics  is  completely  eliminated'! 
von  Balthasar's  Karl  Barth:  Darstellung  und  Deutung  seiner  Theologie  (195  1)  is  the 
most  substantial  and  influential,  and  became  the  definitive  map  of  the  territory  of 
Barth's  ethics  for  over  forty  years?  He  describes  two  turning  points  in  Barth's 
theology.  The  first,  he  says,  occurs  in  the  second  edition  of  Barth's  The  Epistle  to  the 
Romans  (1922).  In  this  work  he  describes  Barth  rejecting  the  more  liberal  theology  of 
his  teachers,  and  of  his  moving  to  a  dialectic  forni.  The  second  movement  he 
identifies  as  happening  in  Barth's  work  on  Ansek  (1931),  which  von  Balthasar 
describes  as  moving  from  the  dialectic  form  to  analogy.  He  says  the  `turn  to  analogy' 
took  place  between  1927  and  1938,  and  it  appeared  in  its  `fully  developed  form'  in  the 
Church  Dogmatics.  Of  the  second  change  in  Barth's  thinking  von  Balthasar  says  that 
'  Althaus,  `Theologie  und  Geschichte',  Zeitschrift  fii  -  Systematische  Theologie  1  (1923),  p.  741. 
2  Cullberg,  J.  Das  Problem  der  Ethik  in  der  dialektischen  Theologie,  (Uppsala:  A.  B.  Lundequistska, 
1938)  p.  18. 
3  von  Balthasar,  Karl  Barth:  Darstellung  und  Deutung  seiner  Theologie.  (Köln:  J.  Hegner,  1951) 182 
Barth  replaced  the  "Word  of  God,  "  as  his  central  concept  with  "Jesus  Christ,  God  and 
man",  and  this  development  allowed  analogy  in  Barth's  theology  to  come  to  full 
expression. 
Critics,  mainly  because  of  the  map  provided  by  von  Balthasar's  reading,  described 
Barth's  theology  as  neo-orthodox,  grounding  man's  relationship  with  God  on 
doctrine.  Thus,  his  opponents  are  able  to  accuse  Barth  of  denying  the  place  of  human 
experience  in  man's  relationship  with  God. 
7.1  Cornelius  van  Til 
Cornelius  van  Til,  a  Reformed  Orthodox  Presbyterian  theologian,  in  a  work  published 
in  1946,  and  rarely  quoted  in  the  literature,  is  far  more  outspoken  in  his  criticism  of 
Barth.  '  He  makes  a  far  stronger  claim  than  those  who  say  Barth  has  no  ethics,  arguing 
that  Barth's  theology  is  not  in  the  tradition  of  orthodox  historic  Christianity,  but  is  a 
form  of  philosophical  modernism.  In  opposition  to  previous  critics,  who  claim  Barth 
based  his  work  on  doctrine  van  Til  believes  Barth  has  completely  ignored  Christian 
doctrine  in  favour  of  philosophy. 
In  using  the  phrase,  `philosophical  modernism'  and  by  calling  his  critique  The  New 
Modernists  van  Til  reads  Barth  and  Brunner's  theologies  as  part  of  the  philosophical 
tradition  of  modernity.  He  defines  the  tradition  by  its  representative  members:  Kant, 
Hegel,  Kierkegaard,  and  Heidegger,  and  says  that  belonging  to  this  "tradition"  places 
Barth  among  those  who  are,  `opponents  of  the  truths  of  the  Gospel',  as  the  "New 
4  Cornelius  van  Til.  The  new  modernism:  an  appraisal  of  the  theology  of  Barth  and  Brunner,  (London: 
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Modernists"  pursue  ideas  and  not  the  facts  of  the  Gospel.  He  describes  these  "ideas" 
as  the  increasing  autonomy  of  reason,  and  their  establishment  as  the  source  of  the 
universal  with  the  subsequent  denial  of  a  metaphysical  God. 
Of  course,  all  theology  begins  from  a  position  and  none  is  neutral.  In  relation  to  his 
criticism  of  Barth,  van  Til's  theological  position  is  interesting,  as  it  became  part  of  the 
foundation  and  purposes  of  the  Westminster  Theological  Seminary,  in  Philadelphia. 
This  seminary  broke  away  from  the  Princeton  Theological  Seminary  in  1926,  as  a 
response  to  the  wider  conflict  in  the  Presbyterian  Church  in  the  U.  S.  A.,  which  became 
known  as  the  Presbyterian  Controversy.  '  The  roots  of  the  discord  are  in  the 
fiindamentalist  -  modernist  controversy  of  the  1920's.  The  disagreement  was  primarily 
about  the  place  and  role  of  history  in  theology,  and  variant  views  of  history  eventually 
split  the  American  church.  ' 
Princeton  Seminary  was  at  the  centre  of  the  conflict  J.  Gresham  Machen  and  Henry 
Sloane  Coffin,  who  represent  the  opposing  views  of  the  Fundamentalists  and  the 
Moderates,  were  on  its  board.  '  Both  were  pastors  in  the  Presbyterian  Church  and  both 
had  studied  in  Marburg  with  Herrmann,  Barth's  teacher!  Herrmann,  in  seeking 
"certainty"  for  his  faith,  argues  that,  `the  experience  of  the  inner  life  of  Jesus,  and  not 
the  scriptural  record,  provides  assurance  for  Christians'.  '  There  are  two  reasons  why  it 
is  instructive  and  illuminative,  to  understand  Herrmann's  theology.  The  first  is  that  his 
See  Bradley  Longfield.  The  Presbyterian  Controvenvj,,  Fundamentalists,  Afodei-jd.  Vt.  V  &  Moderate.  v, 
(Oxford:  OUP,  199  1),  pp.  I-  176  for  a  detailed  discussion  and  analysis  of  the  formation  of  Westminster 
Theological  Seminary,  and  bibliographical  details  of  the  main  participants  in  the  split  from  Princeton 
Theological  Seminary  in  September  1929.  tý  6  Longf  ield,  The  Pre.  vbpei-ian  Controvenvy,  p.  89. 
7  Henry  Sloane  Coffin  was  awarded  several  honorary  degrees  including  one  from  the  University  of 
Glasgow,  see  Longfield,  B.  J.  The  Pi-e.  vbjlerian  Contl-oversy  p.  87. 
"  In  1957  Barth  referred  to  Herrmann  along  with  others  as  bein  g,  "not  afraid  to  face  modem  man.  " 
'Evangelical  Theology  in  the  Nineteenth  Century'  in  The  Humanity  of  God.  p.  16. 184 
work  focuses  attention  on  the  theological  issues  of  the  time;  and  secondly,  it  is  the 
common  theological  foundation  for  Machen,  Coffin,  and  Barth,  and  from  which  they 
developed  so  differently. 
Responding  to  pressure  from  historical  critical  biblical  scholarship  Herrmann  wanted 
to  lessen  the  scriptural  foundation  of  the  Reformed  faith.  He  said  Luther,  in  his  time, 
could  assume  all  would  agree  with  the  truth  of  God's  Word  in  Scripture,  but  this  was 
not  the  case  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century.  There  is  an  interesting  change  in  the 
subtitle  to  Herrmann's  The  Communion  of  the  Christian  with  God.  The  first  two 
editions  are  subtitled  A  discussion  in  agreement  with  Luther-,  1°  °  but  in  the  1903  edition 
this  has  been  changed  to,  Described  on  the  basis  of  Luther's  statements.  "  Herrmann 
also  says  in  the  preface  to  the  first  two  editions,  `I  have  sought  to  set  forth  and  to 
justify  that  communion  with  God  which  Luther  reached  through  his  understanding  of 
Jesus  Christ.  '  This  is  removed  from  the  later  edition  as  Herrmann  was  under  pressure, 
regarding  the  place  of  scripture,  from  more  conservative  theologians. 
The  second  English  edition12  is based  on  the  fourth  German  edition,  and  the  editor 
draws  the  reader's  attention  to,  "the  numerous  additions  and  alterations  of  the  later 
German  editions,  amounting  to  nearly  a  tenth  part  of  the  whole  book.  "  13  In  the 
preface,  Herrmann  attacks  his  accusers: 
They  wish  to  see  preserved  the  sacredness  of  the  Scriptural  tradition.  They  do 
not  notice  that  they  themselves  are  profaning  it  when  they  lay  upon  others  as  a 
ceremonial  law  what  is  in  truth  a  gift  of  God's  grace.  Nor  do  they  reflect  that 
9  Herrmann,  The  Communion  of  the  Christian  with  God,  second  English  edition  1906,  pages  74-79 
10  Wilhelm  Herrmann.  The  Communion  of  the  Christian  with  God:  A  discussion  in  agreement  with  the 
view  ofLuther,  translated  by  J.  Sandys  Stanton.  From  the  second  thoroughly  revised  edition  of  1892 
(1895). 
11  Wilhelm  Herrmann.  The  Communion  of  the  Christian  with  Go&  Described  on  the  basis  ofLuthers 
statements,  2nd  English  edition  translated  by  J.  Sandys  Stanton  from  the  fourth  German  edition  of  1903 
(1906) 
12  Published  in  1906. 
13  Published  in  1903. 185 
the  Holy  Scriptures  are  truly  reverenced  when  they  are,  first  of  all, 
investigated  in  their  historically  determined  reality;  and  when,  in  the  second 
place,  these  books  are  used,  just  as  they  offer  themselves  to  us,  so  that  we  may 
seek  out  the  revelation  of  God.  14 
Herrmann,  however,  thinks  historical  criticism  has  overturned  the  inherent  truth  of  the 
Bible.  He  wants  to  understand  the  Gospel  stories  as  a  response  to  the  inner  life  of 
Jesus,  as  in  his  opinion  the  Church  was  born  out  of  individual  responses  to  the  moral 
strength  of  Jesus.  Jesus'  behaviour,  as  seen  by  his  followers,  came  from  an  inner 
strength  unlike  that  found  in  any  other  human  being.  He  believes  that  Jesus'  inner 
strength  gave  birth  to  the  Christian  Church,  and  that  it  continues  to  live  by  it.  He  says 
that  the  witness  of  the  ouhvard  life  of  the  church  witnessing  to  the  inner  life  of  Jesus 
attracts  non-believers.  This  is  why  he  thinks  the  preaching  of  the  Word  is  so 
important.  He  says  that  the  true  importance  of  this  inner  significance  is  that  it  allows 
Christians  to  affirm  the  truth  of  doctrine.  Without  this  inner  significance  Christians 
would  not  have  begun  affirming  doctrine  in  their  faith  life.  In  addition,  the  inner 
experience  of  Jesus  is  accessible  at  any  moment  in  history,  and  in  this  way,  Herrmann 
avoids  two  problems:  firstly,  how  an  accident  of  history  can  become  a  universal  truth 
and  secondly,  he  avoids  the  historical  critical  attacks  on  the  truth  of  scripture.  His 
Christianity  needs  neither  the  historical  Jesus  nor  the  truth  of  scripture,  and  he 
expresses  these  opinions  in  the  following  passage: 
Any  conscientious  reader  of  the  gospels  will  be  constantly  questioning 
whether  the  events  actually  happened  as  they  stand  in  the  narrative.  Of  course 
we  can  forcibly  suppress  this  doubt,  and  many  a  Christian  will  think  it  as 
inevitable  necessity  to  do  so.  But  such  a  suppression  will  not  help  him.  Help 
lies  for  us,  not  in  what  we  make  of  the  story,  but  in  what  the  contents  of  the 
story  make  of  us.  And  the  one  thing  which  the  gospels  give  us  as  an 
overpowering  reality  which  allows  no  doubt  is  just  the  most  tender  part  of  all: 
it  is  the  inner  life  of  Jesus  itself.  Only  he  who  yearns  after  an  honest  fullness 
14  Hemmann.  The  Communion  of  the  Christian  with  God:  Described  on  the  basis  of  Luthers 
statements,  2nd  English  edition.  p.  x. 186 
for  his  own  inner  life  can  perceive  the  strength  and  fullness  of  that  soul  of 
Jesus,  and  whenever  we  come  to  see  the  Person  of  Jesus,  then,  under  the 
impress  of  the  inner  life  breaking  through  all  the  veils  of  the  story,  we  ask  no 
more  as  to  the  trustworthiness  of  the  Evangelists.  " 
Neither  Machen  nor  Coffin  agreed  with  Herrmann,  but  neither  did  they  agree  with 
each  other,  about  the  place  and  significance  of  scripture  for  Christians,  or  about  the 
`truths'  of  history.  They  were  divided  on  these  issues  and  on  their  greater  goal  of  the 
Christian  ethical  message. 
Machen  was  from  the  Southern  States,  and  secession,  as  a  satisfactory  way  of 
resolving  conflicts,  had  a  definite  place  in  his  thoughts.  '  Although  a  little  known 
professor  at  the  end  of  World  War  I,  by  1923,  with  the  publication  of  The  Origin  of 
Paul's  Religion  (1921)  and  Christianity  and  Liberalism  (1923),  Machen  had 
established  himself  as  a  respected  scholar  and  polemicist.  "  Machen  had  a  specific  and 
definite  view  of  the  place  of  history.  `He  believed  that  the  "facts"  of  the  past  were 
immediately  available  to  people  without  "interpretation.  ""'  For  Machen,  the  Gospels 
recorded  facts  unconditioned  by  their  historical  setting.  " 
Give  up  history,  and  you  can  retain  some  things.  You  can  retain  a  belief  in 
God 
...  you  can  retain  a  lofty  ethical  ideal.  But  be  perfectly  clear  about  one 
point  -  you  can  never  retain  a  gospel.  For  gospel  means  'good  news,  '  tidings, 
information  about  something  that  has  happened.  In  other  words,  it  means 
history.  A  gospel  independent  of  history  is  simply  a  contradiction  in  terms.  " 
15  Hem-nann,  This  passage  appears  in  both  English  translations,  first  edition  page  62  and  second  edition 
page  75.  and  shows  that  Herrmann's  attempt  at  place  Christian  faith  on  the  secure  basis  of  the  'inner' 
life  of  Jesus  remained  his  position  throughout  the  other  substantial  changes  in  his  work. 
16  Longfield,  The  Presbyterian  Controversy,  p.  52. 
17  Longfield,  The  Presbyterian  Controvei-sy,  p.  53. 
18  Marsden,  G.  M.  "J.  Gresham  Machen,  History  and  Truth,  "  Westminster  TheologicalJounial  42  (Fall 
1979):  157-75,  quoted  by  Bradley  Longfield,  p.  48. 
19  Longfield,  The  Presbj,  tefian  Controversy,  p.  102. 
20  J.  Gresham  Machen.  "History  and  Faith,  "  Princeton  Theological  Review  5  (July  1915):  pp.  337-38, 
republished  in  Machen,  What  is  Chrisfianitj,?  pp.  170-84. 187 
In  believing  history  to  be  facts,  unconditioned  by  historical  setting  and  immediately 
available  without  interpretation,  Machen  has  maintained  a  position  in  opposition  to 
his  teacher  Herrmann.  It  seems  Machen's  studies  in  Marburg  had  little  effect  upon  his 
theology.  His  problem  was  the  defence  of  Biblical  fundamentalism  against  attacks 
from  historical-critical  Biblical  study.  His  solution,  developed  by  his  pupil  van  Til,  is 
to  presuppose  that  ideas  form  history,  and  that  they  are  ultimate  truths  and  therefore 
not  open  to  criticism  from  a  higher  authority. 
Coffin  had  a  very  different  view  of  the  place  of  history.  To  Coffin  and  his  allies,  who 
had  accepted  historicist  views,  the  Scriptures  embodied  timeless  truths  in  historically 
limited  language.  21  Coffin  was  a  native  of  New  York,  whose  father  was  a  successful 
lawyer.  He  had  studied  liberal  theology  at  New  College,  Edinburgh  and  at  Marburg, 
and  became  pastor  of  Madison  Avenue  Presbyterian  Church  and  an  associate 
professor  of  the  Union  Theology  Seminary  in  New  York.  `In  1924  no  presbytery  in 
the  church  was  more  aggressively  liberal  than  the  Presbytery  of  New  York,  and  no 
Presbyterian  liberal  in  New  York  was  more  prominent  than  Henry  Sloane  Coffin.  '22 
Although  the  foundation  of  the  conflict  was  a  disagreement  about  history  as 
unconditioned  fact,  which  is  open  to  constant  re-interpretation,  there  was  more  at  risk 
for  both  conservatives  and  liberals:  the  moral  argument. 
Machen  and  his  supporters  founded  Westminster  Theological  Seminary  to  "carry  on 
and  perpetuate  the  policies  and  traditions  of  the  Princeton  Theological  Seminary,  as  it 
`1  Longfield,  The  Presbyterian  Controversy,  p.  102. 
22  Longfield,  The  Presbyterian  Controversy,  p.  79. 188 
existed  prior  to  the  reorganisation  thereof  in  the  year  1929.  "23  However,  their  purposes 
were  far  more  positive,  for  they  believed  in  the  power  of  ideas  to  change  the  world. 
Machen  said: 
The  really  great  moments  of  history  are  the  moments  which  mark  the  first 
enunciation  of  great  ideas.  Ideas,  after  all,  are  the  great  conquerors:  they  cross 
the  best  dug  trenches;  they  cut  across  the  most  intricate  barbed  wire;  they 
move  armies  like  puppets;  they  build  empires  and  pull  them  down.  " 
Here,  in  Machen's  concept  of  "ideas"  we  see  the  reason  for  the  foundation  of  the 
Westminster  Theological  Seminary:  "Ideas,  after  all  are  the  great  conquerors,  "  he  says 
and  his  "ideas"  are  the  foundation  for  a  renewal  of  a  Biblical  fundamentalist  morality 
to  be  spread  throughout  America  and  the  world.  His  "ideas"  were  to  be  disseminated 
through  the  preaching  and  teaching  of  the  "facts"  of  Scripture,  unconditioned  by 
history  or  interpretation,  by  seminarians  from  Westminster  Seminary.  The  "idea" 
comes  first,  that  is  Biblical  fundamentalist  morality,  and  the  nnedium  for  its 
dissemination  is  the  preaching  of  the  unconditioned  fact  of  the  Gospel.  In  this  way, 
the  method  of  spreading  the  idea  becomes  the  truth  of  the  idea,  whilst  concealing  the 
idea.  Machen's  understanding  of  orthodox  Christian  doctrine  becomes  the  true 
revelation  of  God,  to  be  obeyed  by  all,  and  to  be  used  to  distinguish  the  true  from  the 
false  Christian. 
We  need  to  keep  Machen's  thoughts  in  mind,  "Ideas,  are  after  all,  are  the  great 
conquerors  of  the  world,  "  when  considering  van  Til's  arguments,  because  he  follows 
in  the  tradition  of  Machen  and  his  supporters,  and  Conservative  Biblical 
23  Charter  and  Constitution  of  Westminster  Theological  Seminary  (Philadelphia,  May  1930),  15  quoted 
by  Longfield  p.  177. 
24  Longfield,  The  Pre.  vbyterian  Controver.  vy,  p.  179. 189 
fundamentalists  continue  to  be  the  most  influential  group  in  defining  the  agenda  for 
the  Christian  ethical  debate. 
[Excursus:  To  underline  this  point,  a  single,  simple,  search  of  the  internet  revealed 
three  hundred  and  sixty-nine  sites  dedicated  to  the  views  of  Machen.  These  include 
copies  of  his  writings,  biographies,  essays  and  reflections  on  the  moral  questions  of 
today.  His  complete  works  are  available  on  CD  ROM  with  an  audio  of  the  author 
delivering  his  lectures.  There  is  also  an  e-mail  list  for  discussing  van  Til's  theology. 
Members  of  the  list  must  be  in  agreement  with  van  Til's  views  before  joining.  On  1 
January  2000,  there  were  253  subscribers.  The  introduction  posted  on  the  web  site 
reads, 
The  van  Til  list  is  an  email  discussion  forum  devoted  to  the  apologetics, 
philosophy  and  theology  of  Cornelius  van  Til,  the  former  Professor  of 
Apologetics  at  Westminster  Theological  Seminary.  Intended  primarily  for 
informed  Christian  laymen,  the  aim  of  the  list  is  to  increase  the  participants' 
understanding  of  Vvan  Til's  thought  and  subsequently  to  apply  it  to  the 
various  forms  of  unbelief  manifested  in  contemporary  non-Christian 
worldviews.  Only  relatively  recently  has  Van  Til's  contribution  been  taken 
from  the  ivory  towers  of  seminary  classrooms  and  put  into  practice  in  the 
universities,  offices  and  streets  of  the  real  world  --  we  hope  that  the  list 
discussions  will  encourage  that  trend.  Above  all,  the  participants  seek  to 
glorify  with  their  thinking  the  God  in  whom  we  live  and  move  and  have  our 
being  (Acts  17:  28),  and  without  whom  there  would  be  no  thinking  whatsoever 
(Ps.  14:  1;  Rom.  1:  21-22;  1  Cor.  1:  20;  Col.  2:  3).  All  are  welcome  to  join  the 
discussion  provided  they  abide  by  the  list  guidelines  and  generally  uphold  the 
purposes  of  the  list.  It  will  be  assumed,  however,  that  the  active  participants 
will  affirm  at  least  the  major  points  of  Van  Til's  teachings,  i.  e.  Reformed 
theology  and  presuppositional  apologetics.  In  other  words,  those  who  have  an 
axe  to  grind  against  Christianity,  Calvinism  or  presuppositionalism  should 
find  somewhere  else  to  wield  it!  ] 
van  Til's  main  criticism  of  Barth  is  that  he  follows  ideas  and  not  the  truths  of  the 
gospel.  There  is  circularity  in  thinking,  which  begins  to  appear  and  further  develops 
as  van  Til's  thesis  unfolds. 190 
van  Til  was  Professor  of  Apologetics  at  Westminster.  His  theology  is  described  as 
'presuppositionalism'  as  it  requires  an  ultimate  category  of  thought  or  a  conceptual 
framework  to  be  assumed  in  order  to  make  a  sensible  interpretation  of  reality.  25  For 
example  in  theological  discussion  the  existence  of  God  and  the  truth  of  the  Bible  are 
necessarily  presupposed,  since  they  are  ultimate  truths  and  can  not  be  judged  by  any 
other  truth.  Ultimate  truths  are  presupposed  and  required  as  a  precondition  for 
epistemology.  Barth  traces  the  foundations  of  the  tradition  of'presuppositionalism'  to 
a  movement  of  rational  orthodoxy  in  the  18th  century.  26  He  identifies  its  beginnings  in 
the  work  of  the  Reformed  theology  of  Salomon  van  Til  (1643-1713). 
What  [he]  achieved,  and  all  the  leading  theologians  of  the  time  cooperated  in 
the  movement,  can  never  be  overestimated  either  in  its  basic  significance  or  in 
the  seriousness  of  its  historical  consequences.  With  these  theologians  there 
emerged  clearly  and  logically  what  was  perhaps  the  secret  telos  and  pathos  of 
the  whole  preceding  development.  Human  religion,  the  relationship  with  God 
which  we  can  and  actually  do  have  apart  from  revelation,  is  not  an  unknown 
but  a  very  well  known  quantity  both  in  form  and  content,  and  as  such  it  is 
something  which  has  to  be  reckoned  with,  as  having  a  central  importance  for 
all  theological  thinking.  It  constitutes,  in  fact,  the  presupposition,  the  criterion, 
and  the  necessary  framework  for  an  understanding  of  revelation.  27 
Cornelius  van  Til's  presuppositionalism  is  therefore  the  continuation  of  a  theological 
tradition  of  natural  religion  as  it  reflects  the  tradition  of  Kant,  Schleiermacher,  Hegel, 
Strauss,  Feuerbach,  and  Troeltsch.  The  means  of  receiving  revelation  are  presumed, 
as  are  the  methods  of  understanding  the  revelation,  and  all  is  prior  to  the  event  of 
God's  revelation.  This  theological  position  stands  on  the  same  foundations  as  any 
other  human  knowledge  as  ontological  and  epistemological  claims  are  grounded  in 
reason.  However,  natural  religion  has  a  different  content  but  the  same  form  as  all 
other  knowledge. 
25  The  New  Dictionmy  of  TheoloD,  edited  by  Sinclair  B.  Ferguson,  et  a].  Universities  and  Christian 
Colleges  Fellowship,  1988. 191 
Barth,  as  we  have  seen,  opposed  all  forms  of  natural  religion  in  his  use  of  dialectics  as 
a  method.  28  He  insists  that  there  can  be  no  presuppositions  in  theological  discussion, 
for  all  follows  from  God's  revelation,  including  the  means  of  receiving  that 
revelation: 
All  these  more  or  less  raqical  and  destructive  movements  in  the  history  of 
theology  in  the  last  two  centuries  are  simply  variations  on  one  simple  theme, 
and  that  theme  was  clearly  introduced  by  van  Til:  that  religion  has  not  to  be 
understood  in  the  light  of  revelation,  but  revelation  in  the  light  of  religion.  " 
Natural  religion  in  robbing  theology  of  its  object,  revelation.  In  taking  up  its 
stand  with  other  forms  of  knowledge  looses  its  purpose.  The  newness,  the 
recreation,  and  the  reconciliation  accomplished  in  the  birth,  death  and 
resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ  is  lost.  Theology  in  loosing  its  object  looses  its 
abilities  and  becomes  defenceless.  It  is  no  longer  an  instrument  for  turning  the 
world  upside  down,  which  is  the  true  task  of  Christian  ethics.  On  this  theme 
Barth  makes  what  seems  a  surprising  statement  we  are  defenceless  against  the 
"German  Christians"  of  our  own  time,  unless  we  know  how  to  guard  against 
the  development,  which  took  place  in  van  Til.  11 
Having  considered  van  Til's  presuppositionism  as  an  expression  of  natural  religion 
and  having  indicated  the  concerns  it  raises  for  Christian  ethics,  we  turn  to  consider 
van  Til's  claim,  that  Barth's  work  is  part  of  a  philosophical  tradition.  "  van  Til  says 
this  necessarily  excludes  Barth's  work  from  expressing  historic  orthodox  Christian 
doctrine.  He  traces  the  line  of  this  tradition  from  Kant,  Hegel,  and  Kierkegaard  to 
Barth  and  Brunner,  who,  he  says,  are  "new  modernists".  However,  Barth  was  most 
critical  of  the  Modernist  view,  he  says: 
26  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics-,  1/2,  p.  288. 
27  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics,  1/2,  p.  289. 
2'  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics,  1/2,  section  17  "The  Revelation  of  God  as  the  Abolition  of  Religion.  "  p. 
300. 
29  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics,  1/2,  p.  29  1. 
M)  Barth,  Church  Dogmafic.  v,  1/2,  pp.  290-2. 
31  van  Til,  New  Afoclet-nism,  (1946) 192 
The  Modernist  view  from  which  we  must  demarcate  ourselves  here  goes  back 
to  the  Renaissance  philosopher  Descartes  with  his  proof  of  God  from  human 
self-certainty.  '2 
van  Til's  parents  emigrated  from  Holland  to  America  in  1905,  when  he  was  aged  ten, 
bringing  with  them  the  Dutch  Reformed  tradition,  and  this  tradition  colours  his 
purposes.  His  thesis  needs  to  be  understood  in  the  light  of  the  treatment  above  of  the 
Westminster  Theological  Seminary.  He  has  a  position  to  argue,  and  it  supports  the 
one  set  out  in  the  Westminster  constitution  by  Machen  and  his  supporters. 
Presuppositionalism  follows  the  tradition  begun  by  Machen  at  Westminster  of  the 
interpretation  of  revelation  through  the  precedent  of  ideas,  but  of  course,  it  has  a 
longer  history,  as  has  been  discussed. 
van  Til  describes  Barth  and  Brunner  as  representatives  of  the  'Theology  of  Crisis'  and 
he  describes  Barth  as  the  primary  figure,  and  he  discusses  Brunner's  theology  as  it 
differs,  or  agrees,  with  Barth's  work.  He  says  Barth  is  more  "modernistic"  than 
Brunner,  and  this  is  apparent  in  the  separating  out  of  their  differences  in  the  "Barth 
Brunner  debate",  following  the  separation,  "modernism",  he  says,  becomes  more 
marked  in  Barth's  work.  He  describes  the'Theology  of  Crisis'as  being  aToe  of 
historic  Christianity': 
It  is  in  the  interests  of  plain  intellectual  honesty,  then  that  the  Theology  of 
Crisis  should  be  seen  for  what  it  is.  Both  the  liberal  and  the  believer  in  historic 
Christianity  should  know  who  is  friend  and  who  is  foe  The  Theology  of  Crisis 
is  a  friend  of  modernism  and  a  foe  of  historic  Christianity.  " 
In  the  introduction  to  Then  New  Modei-nism,  van  Til  says,  that  Barth  sets  his  theology 
against  those  who  claim  to  have  a  system  of  truth.  He  is  correct,  because  Barth  says  a 
32  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics,  I/1,  p.  195. 
33  van  Til,  The  Neig  Modernism,  p.  378. 193 
true  theology  cannot  be  systematic,  for  God  is  transcendent  and  free  and  cannot  be 
constrained  by  any  system. 
To  support  his  view  van  Til  quotes  Barth's  words  'A  true  theology  must  be 
activistic"';  that  is  'it  must  deal  with  the  freely  speaking  God.  "'  In  response  to  Barth's 
demand,  that  a  true  theology  must  be  activistic,  van  Til  states,  that  Barth's  theology  is, 
'infom-ied  by  the  principles  of  modem  critical  philosophy.  '  He  argues  that  any 
theology  that  is  moulded  in  accordance  to  the  pattern  of  modem  critical  philosophy  is 
bound  to  be  hostile  to  the  Chiristian  faith.  He  analyses  Barth's  theology  to  show  that, 
'Barth's  earliest  writings  are  completely  dominated  by  the  principles  of  Criticism.  136 
Barth  made  a  valid  and  interesting  response  to  those  who  criticise  him  for  being  too 
philosophical  and  giving  insufficient  attention  to  the  Scriptures.  He  says: 
In  reading  the  Bible,  as  in  all  other  reading  and  hearing,  we  use  some  sort  of 
key  or  scheme  of  thought  as  a  "vehicle"  in  which  to  "accompany"  it.  In  an 
exploratory  way  we  attribute  to  that  which  confronts  us,  to  the  image  arising 
from  our  observation  (we  attribute  this  to  it  already  as  it  emerges  in  the  act  of 
observation),  one  or  other  of  the  possibilities  of  meaning  already  known  to  us 
through  our  philosophy.  In  the  process  we  think  of  something  -  something 
which  we  can  think  in  terms  of  our  philosophy  -  without  regard  to  the  fact 
that  this  something  as  such  is  not  already  there  in  the  text  and  as  such  is  not 
the  object  of  our  observation,  but  is  very  properly  added  in  our  mind  if  in  the 
act  of  observation  we  are  not  to  fail  completely  to  find  possible  clues  for 
interpretation  -  for  after  all  it  is  us  who  observe.  This  process  must  certainly 
be  undertaken  with  great  care  and  circumspection.  But  it  cannot  as  such  be 
rejected  with  horror.  " 
van  Til's  argues  that  Barth  and  Brunner  are  foes  of  Christian  doctrine,  and  he  bases 
his  thesis  on  Barth  and  Brunner's  rejection  of  an  antecedent  God.  van  Til  believes 
34  Activistic,  a  doctrine  or  practices  that  emphasises  direct  vigorous  action  especially  in  support  of  or 
opposition  to  one  side  of  a  controversial  issue,  adjective,  first  recorded  use  1915. 
35  van  Til,  The  New  Modernism,  p.  xiii 
36  van  Til,  The  New  Modernism,  p.  xiii. 194 
orthodox  historic  Christianity  requires  an  antecedent  God,  who  gives  ontological 
foundation  to  reality,  who  is  the  cause  of  creation,  whose  acts  are  known  through 
history,  and  that  these  acts  are  recorded  in  the  scriptures.  It  is  the  rejection  of  this 
position,  says  van  Til,  that  shows  Barth  and  Brunner  are  expounding  a 
phenomenological  philosophy,  and  not  Christian  doctrine. 
In  his  concluding  chapter,  having  surveyed  theological  "modernism",  as  represented 
by  Barth  and  Brunner,  van  Til  gives  a  vivid  description  of  the  extent  of  their  crimes, 
saying: 
There  is  perhaps  no  instance  of  greater  intellectual  confusion  to  be  found  in 
the  annals  of  human  error  than  that  of  the  retention  of  orthodox  Christian 
forms  by  the  purely  naturalistic  theology  such  as  Modernism  is.  It  is  as  though 
carbolic  acid  were  poured  into  water  bottles  without  a  change  of  label.  " 
As  a  post-Hegelian  Barth  keeps  ontology  and  epistemology  together  in  insisting  that 
God's  being  is  the  event  of  becoming.  Therefore,  in  his  theology  there  is  no  api-ioi-i 
ontology,  described  from  the  epistemology  of  a  detached  observer.  van  Til  says  it  is 
these  positions  that  make  Barth  a  modernist  and  therefore  an  enemy. 
When  considering  Barth  and  Brunner,  van  Til  sees  Barth  as  the  more  deadly  foe.  He 
describes  Barth's  work  as  expressing  more  clearly  the  dialectic  methodology  of  the 
phenomenological  philosophers,  and  claims  that  Kierkegaard's  dialectic  method 
strongly  influenced  Barth's  earliest  work,  The  Epistle  to  the  Romans.  "  He  also  argues 
that  Kierkegaard's  dialectic  is  a  reaction  to  Hegel's  dialectics.  Therefore,  he  says,  it  is 
necessary  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  these  two  forms  of  dialectic  and 
37  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics,  1/2,  p.  729. 
38  van  Til,  The  New  Modernism,  p.  37  1. 
39  Published  in  1919. 195 
their  relationship  in  general  to  the  critical  philosophy  of  Kant.  He  gives  no  details  to 
substantiate  his  claim,  nor  does  he  describe  exactly  how  Barth  was  influenced  or 
where  this  influence  may  be  seen  in  his  writings. 
In  order  to  consider  van  Til's  claim,  that  Barth  is  a  "new  modemist"  discussion  of 
Barth's  intellectual  debt  to  Kierkegaard  needs  to  be  considered  before  a  discussion  of 
his  criticism  of  Barth's  ethics  can  take  place. 
van  Til's  recognition  of  Kierkegaard's  influence  on  Barth  is  certainly  true.  Barth 
clearly  expressed  his  intellectual  debt  to  Kierkegaard  for  the  real  isation.  that  God  is 
wholly  other,  and  cannot  be  apprehended  or  known  by  any  fonn  of  natural  theology, 
and  this  position  Barth  maintained  throughout  his  work,  believing  that  the  idea  of 
natural  theology  was  fundamentally  wrong.  "  However,  his  appreciation  of  this  point 
does  not  involve  him  in  accepting  Kierkegaard's  dialectic,  as  can  be  shown  by 
discussing  Barth's  theological  method. 
Two  points  about  Barth's  theological  method  need  to  be  made  as  a  consequence  of  the 
statement,  'God  is  wholly  other.  '  They  are,  firstly  that  no  human  endeavour  is 
definitive,  "  and  secondly  that  there  is  no  system,  '2  as  all  theology  is  necessarily 
prolegomena,  for  there  can  be  no  standpoint,  and  the  theologian  has  to  start  out  anew 
each  day.  When  asked  to  give  an  introduction  to  his  theology  Barth  said: 
'I  must  confess  to  you  that  that  which  I  call  'my  theology'  consists  finally  - 
when  I  examine  it  closely  -  in  a  single  point.  And  it  is  not  a  standpoint,  as  one 
might  demand  as  the  most  minimal  requirement  of  a  proper  theology.  Rather, 
4()  A  point  Barth  reaff  in-ned  in  1957,  see  The  Humanity  of  God,  p.  24. 
41  Barth,  The  Epistle  to  the  Roman.  v,  p.  10.  [The  Preface  to  the  Second  Edition.  ] 
42  Barth,  The  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  p.  10.  [The  Preface  to  the  Second  Edition.  ]  p.  10. 196 
it  is  a  inallientatical  point  on  which  one  cannot  stand.  It  is  merely  a 
viewpoint.  "' 
A  further  influence  on  Barth  by  Kierkegaard  is  his  refusal  to  accept  the  classical 
solution  that  all  knowledge  is  but  a  bringing  forth  of  that  which  is  already  known  that 
is  recollection  through  amenesis,  and  he  insists  that  knowledge  of  God  is  by  God's 
unnecessitated  self-revelation  mediated  through  the  Word,  Jesus  Christ,  and  the  Holy 
Spirit.  '  Still  with  Kierkegaard  Barth  also  rejects  any  possibility  of  the  objective 
reality  of  God's  existence  being  established  in  the  mind,  because  God  is  the  unknown 
God,  and,  precisely  because  He  is  unknown,  He  bestows  life  and  breath  on  all  things. 
Therefore,  the  power  of  God  can  be  detected  neither  in  the  world  of  nature  nor  in  the 
souls  of  men  "S 
van  Til  says  Barth  has  used  Kierkegaard's  concept  of  the  Individual  in  his 
Christology.  This,  "Individual"  claims  to  understand  a  principle  of  combining 
unlimited  diversity  with  a  comprehensive  unity  that  is  combining  the  many  and  the 
one.  van  Til  claims  that  Barth  employed  this  unifying  principle  in  his  first  major 
work.  "  However,  Barth  strongly  refutes  all  claims  that  he  is  basing  the  Word  of  God 
on  existentialist  philosophy,  and  he  rejects  Sigfried's  interpretation  saying:  " 
In  the  section  at  issue,  however,  this  misunderstanding  was  relatively  close, 
and  it  arose  immediately.  To  my  horror  T.  Sigfried  (p.  36)  interpreted  the 
passage  as  follows:  "On  this  foundation  (i.  e.,  the  existential  thinking 
43  Karl  Barth,  'Not  und  Verheißung  der  christlichen  Verkündigung',  in  idem,  Das  Wärt  Gottes  und  die 
Theologie,  p.  99. 
44  Soren  Kierkegaard.  'The  God  as  Teacher  and  Saviour',  Chapter  11,  in  Philosophical  Fragments,  p.  23. 
45  Barth,  The  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  p.  36. 
46  Commentaq  on  Paul's  Epistle  to  the  Romans. 
47  See  second  edition  of  Church  Dogmatics  I  volume  one.  Barth  in  pp.  125  to  13  1,  'The  Nature  of  the 
Word  of  God,  'discusses  the  interpretation  T.  Sigfried,  in  Das  JVort  und  die  Existenz,  1,1930,  pp.  35f. 
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introduced)  he  proposes  to  build  his  dogmatics.  "  This  was  not  really  my 
intention  " 
Even  though  Barth  rejects  the  antecedent  ontological  basis  of  creation  in  the  Trinity, 
van  Til  says,  that  in  using  Kierkegaard's  concept  of  the  individual  he  removes  any 
place  for  the  Holy  Spirit. 
The  'combining  of  unlimited  diversity  with  a  comprehensive  unity'  is  the  first  stage 
of  Kierkegaard's  development  of  the  dialectic;  this  is  'subjective  actuality'.  It  is  only 
part  of  the  dialectic  of  Kierkegaard's  Individual.  In  rejecting,  Hegel's  dialectic 
Kierkegaard  imposed  a  finite  limit  on  human  self-consciousness,  and  in  this 
deten-nination,  he  understood  faith  as  being  the  connectionfi-oin  man  to  God.  In  the 
"theology  of  crisis",  Barth  reverses  Kierkegaard's  movement  from  below  to  above. 
That  is,  the  connection  isfi-om  God  to  man  as  God  acts  vertically  in  time,  creating  a 
new  event.  Human  beings  are  determined  by  this  event  and  do  not  determine  it.  The 
individual  is  a  finite  circle  within  the  infinite  circle  of  God's  act,  and  in  this  way  God, 
. 
who  is  being  determined,  determines  realitY. 
van  Til's  comments  on  Barth's  methodology  follow  from  his  presupposition  that  Barth 
uses  Kierkegaard's  dialectic  of  "either/or".  On  this,  point  van  Til  has  misread  Barth,  as 
he  is  wrong  in  thinking  that  Kierkegaard's  dialectic  influenced  Barth,  who  was  far 
more  impressed  with  the  Hegelian  dialectic  "bothland.  "  This  is  clear  from  reading  his 
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chapter  on  Hegel"  in  PI-otestant  Theology  in  the  Nineteenth  Centiny,  "  in  which 
Kierkegaard"  receives  only  three  brief  mentions.  " 
Boyd's  insight  on  the  philosophical  influences  on  Barth  is  clear: 
Barth's  treatment  of  Hegel  distorts  its  subject;  but  it  also  disguises  the 
substantial  similarities  between  Hegel's  thought  and  Barth's  own  dialectical 
inversion  of  absolutism.  " 
Discussing  the  "Freedom  under  the  Word"  Barth,  says  of  Kierkegaard's  philosophy: 
If  we  elevate  the  anti-Hegelianism  of  Kierkegaard  into  a  principle,  believing 
that  the  key  to  the  mystery  of  the  old  and  the  new  covenant  is  to  be  found  in 
anxiety  about  the  limitation  of  human  existence  by  its  subjection  to  death  or  in 
its  relationship  to  the  Thou  stabilised  in  ordinances,  we  must  remember  that 
we  are  definitely  ranging  ourselves  with  those  who  "explain"  the  Bible,  i.  e., 
read  it  through  the  spectacles  of  a  definite  system  of  ideas,  which  has  the 
character  of  a  "world-view"  and  will  in  some  way  make  itself  felt  as  such 
when  we  read  and  explain  the  Bible.  If  we  hold  up  hands  of  horror  at  the  very 
idea,  we  must  not  forget  that  without  such  systems  of  explanation,  without 
such  spectacles,  we  cannot  read  the  Bible  at  all.  5' 
This  comment,  whilst  not  directly  refuting  van  Til's  criticism,  shows  both  that  Barth 
is  acutely  aware  of  the  problem  of  using  philosophical  ideas  to  interpret  Scripture,  and 
that  he  recognises  the  inevitability  of  the  process.  His  comments  about  Kierkegaard's 
worldview  are  not  favourable,  and  do  not  suggest  he  used  Kierkegaard's  philosophy 
as  an  interpretative  tool. 
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In  addition,  Barth's  dialectic  does  not  proceed  in  a  linear  form  or  make  any  attempt  at 
a  synthesis,  but  holds  the  paradox  constantly  in  tension.  However,  the  difference 
between  Barth's  dialectic  and  Kierkegaard's  is  greater  than  the  means  of  synthesis. 
Barth  proceeds  from  God's  revelation  in  Christ,  which  is  given,  to  a  discussion  of  the 
possibilities  that  are  required  for  such  a  revelation.  Growth  is  not  an  unfolding  of  the 
dialectic,  but  rather  a  statement  of  possibilities  that  must  now  be  the  case.  This  is 
important,  for  Barth's  work  does  not  flow  from  a  presupposition  providing  a 
potentiality  that  becomes  actuality.  God's  being  is  in  His  becoming  and  Barth  discuses 
what  this  tells  us  about  God  and  what  is  an  appropriate  response  to  this  knowledge.  - 
All  this  is  part  of  God's  proceeding.  It  is  an  incorrect  interpretation  of  Barth's 
methodology  to  assume  that  these  "possibilities"  could  be  known  outside  the 
becoming  of  God's  being.  This  being  is  the  Holy  Trinity,  and  Chin-ch  Doginalics  is  a 
theology  of  the  Trinity.  van  Til's  presuppositions  do  not  allow  him  to  see  the 
consequences  of  his  actions  in  trying  to  fit  Barth  into  a  template  of  what  he  believes  is 
required  from  a  Christian  theology. 
Questions  about  the  "ought"  of  human  behaviour  are  always  predicated  on  prior 
metaphysical  or  ontological  questions  about  reality.  Disagreements  about 
methodology  can  hide  this  fact,  and  it  is  important  to  recall  that  for  van  Til  reality  is  a 
pfio)-i,  whereas  for  Barth  reality  is  detennined  apostefiofi,  and  their  ethics  reflect  this 
ftindamental  difference  in  ontology. 
van  Til  says  that  following  the  Barth  Brunner  debate,  'the  theologians  emphasised 
that  which  separated  them.  '  van  Til  is  right  to  say  that  Barth  places  emphasis  on  the 
principle  of  the  "freedom  of  God",  which  is  God's  freedom  to  become  that  which  he 
is  not.  In  the  Incarnation  God's  being  is  in  its  becoming;  that  which  is  and  that  which 200 
is  not  become  neiv  in  Christ.  Reality  has  an  utterly  unpredictable  irrationality.  God  is 
free  to  choose  how  and  when  to  reveal  Himself  in  His  being.  van  Til  is  right  when  he 
says  that  Barth  puts  aside  the  attributes,  which,  in  orthodox  Christian  belief,  give 
content  by  analogy  to  God's  being. 
Barth's  use  of  the  principle  "the  freedom  of  God"  is,  van  Til  says,  'virtually  the  same 
as  that  employed  in  his  earlier  writings.  If  a  difference  may  be  noted  it  may  be 
suggested  that  as  time  has  gone  on  Barth  has  become  more  activistic  and  ever  more 
anti-metaphysical.  "'  He  claims: 
The  argument  between  Barth  and  Brunner  has,  proved  that  both  theologians 
have  been  quite  consistent  with  themselves  at  every  stage  of  their  work  in 
virtually  doing  what  the  "consciousness-theologians"  before  them  had  been 
doing,  namely,  reducing  the  revelation  of  the  God  of  historic  Christianity  to 
the  ideals  of  self-sufficient  man.  Neither  Barth  nor  Brunner  has  been  able  to 
offer  a  theology  that  is basically  different  from  that  of  Schleien-nacher.  They 
have  ultimately  drawn  their  sustenance  from  the  consciousness  of  man  as 
such.  5' 
Barth  thought  he  was  writing  a  theology  fundamentally  different  to  that  of 
Schleien-Dacher.  His  position  in  accepting  the  truth  of  Kierkegaard's  concept  of  the 
infinite  qualitative  difference  between  time  and  eternity  and  man  and  God,  which 
places  the  infinite  with  God  and  the  finite  with  man,  is  in  direct  opposition  to 
Schleiermacher's  view,  which  Barth  describes  in  this  way: 
In  contrast  to  the  Enlightenment  theology,  the  19th-century  theologians 
focused  their  attention  on  one  particular  point  in  relation  to  all  the  various 
world  views  of  their  time:  man's  supposedly  innate  and  essential  capacity  to 
"sense  and  taste  the  infinite"  as  Schleiermacher  said.  " 
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It.  is  doubtful  that  van  Til's  reading  of  Barth  on  this  point  is  correct.  Barth  is  not 
following  Schleiermacher  and  the  consciousness  theologians,  even  if  his  writings  of 
the  time  emphasise  conscience  as  the  mediator  between  God  and  man.  "  An  appeal  to 
conscience  is  not  the  same  as  claiming  that  reason  possesses  the  infinite.  This  is 
Schleiermacher's  view,  but  for  Barth,  God  remained  wholly  other.  " 
van  Til  also  claims  that  Barth's  later  work  shows  that  his  dialectic  method  was 
influenced  and  strengthened  by  Heidegger  saying:  ' 
Barth's  insistence  of  beginning  all  theological  discussion  with  the  defacto 
existence  of  God  must  be  understood  in  its  full  rationalistic  import.  With 
Criticism  in  general  Barth  wants  to  be  anti-metaphysical,  but  with  Criticism, 
too,  he  holds  in  reality  to  a  definite  theory  of  being.  The  theory  of  being  to 
which  he  is  committed  is  still  very  similar  to  that  of  Heidegger  and  the 
modem  pragmatic  philosophers  in  general,  namely,  that  of  the  ultimacy  of 
self-existent,  brute  factual  change.  He  defends  this  theory  of  reality  by  means 
of  his  conception  of  a  Rationality  that  is  all-inclusive  because  wholly  formal. 
And  at  the  back  of  all  lies  the  assumption  of  the  autonomous  man.  " 
In  the  Index  to  Church  Doginatics,  the  work  van  Til  claims  is  influenced  by 
Heidegger,  there  are  thirteen  references  to  Heidegger.  Of  these,  seven  are  simply 
references  to  the  name,  the  other  six  refer  to  a  more  explicit  discussion.  A  reftitation 
of  van  Til's  claim,  that  Church  Dogmatics  shows  Heidegger  influenced  Barth's 
dialectical  method,  requires  a  detailed  analysis  of  these  sections.  '  The  first  reference 
is  insignificant,  for  the  purposes  as  Barth  refers  to  Heidegger  in  relation  to  his  use  by 
a  third  person.  '  The  second  reference  makes  it  unnecessary  to  consider  further  van 
5"  Barth  opened  his  address,  delivered  in  the  Town  Church  of  Aarau  in  January  1916  with  an  appeal  to 
conscience. 
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Til's  criticism  that  Barth  followed  SchIcien-nacher  and  was  influenced  by  Heidegger.  ' 
The  passage  is  quoted  in  full,  because  it  shows  most  clearly  Barth's  view  of 
Schleiermacher  and  Heidegger's  anthropological  positions. 
It  is  the  same  Schleiermacher  who,  for  the  first  time,  quite  fundamentally 
connects  this  newly-discovered  and  independent  reality  of  religion  with  a 
corresponding  possibility  generally  demonstrable  on  anthropological  grounds, 
and  who  for  the  first  time  quite  ftindamentally  undertakes  to  interpret 
Christianity  itself  in  the  form  of  a  concretely  historical  analysis  of  human 
existence  along  the  lines  of  a  general  doctrine  of  man:  1.  Man's  meeting  with 
God  to  be  regarded  as  a  human  religious  experience  historically  and 
psychologically  fixable  and  2.  This  experience  to  be  regarded  as  the 
realisation  of  a  religious  potentiality  in  man  generally  demonstrable. 
Beginning  with  Schleiermacher,  and  notwithstanding  the  variety  of  types  in 
particular  interpretations,  these  arc  the  two  cardinal  propositions  in 
philosophy  of  religion  in  the  19th  and  the  20th  centuries.  The  decisive  one  is 
naturally  the  second  of  these  statements.  If  we  apply  it  to  what  in  our 
terminology  we  call  the  doctrine  of  the  Word  of  God,  it  would  mean  that  real 
knowledge  of  the  Word  of  God  iis  the  realisation  of  a  special  potentiality  of 
knowledge  proper  to  man  as  such.  If  we  affirin  this  statement,  then  we  must 
acquiesce  in  the  answer  to  the  question  of  ability,  with  which  we  are  occupied, 
being  given  from  an  anthropological  point  of  view,  where  it  is  a  matter  of 
secondary  importance,  whether  we  close  with  the  actual  anthropology  of 
Schleien-nacher  and  his  school  or  with  one  more  congenial  to  our  age  like  that 
of  M.  Heidegger.  " 
van  Til  outlines  the  basic  requirements  he  considers  necessary  for  any  Christian  ethic 
in  three  questions,  which  are: 
1.  What  should  be  the  goal  of  man's  actions? 
2.  What  should  be  the  standard  by  which  man  conducts  himself  in 
seeking  for  his  proper  goal? 
3.  What  should  be  the  motive  that  impels  him  in  seeking  this  goal?  ' 
For  van  Til  the  goal  is  the  primary  consideration  of  any  ethic.  The  goal,  necessarily, 
defines  the  ethic  teleologically.  The  goal  is  the  target  to  be  achieved,  and  the  ethical 
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life  is  directed  towards  achievement.  Aiming  at  the  target  one's  desires  and 
motivations  are  goal  directed.  The  goal  determines  the  actions.  The  idea  embodies  the 
concepts  of  potentiality  and  actuality.  A  person  by  acting  actualises  their  potential  to 
achieve  the  goal.  Their  properly  directed  will  directs  their  actions,  and  is  the  sum  of 
the  person's  motivations  and  desires.  He  wants  any  ethics  to  follow  this  Aristotelian 
model 
van  Til  by  describing  orthodox  Refonned  answers  to  the  above  three  questions  creates 
a  standard  with  which  to  judge  Barth's  ethics.  van  Til  consistently  applies  the  same 
standard  to  Barth's  work.  However,  as  van  Til  himself  so  strongly  insists,  his  method 
requires  a  goal  to  be  set  before  embarking  on  the  task.  van  Til  says  the  answers,  given 
by  orthodox  Refon-ned  theology  to  the  three  questions,  are: 
1.  Man's  goal  is  to  glorify  God  and  enjoy  Him  forever. 
2.  The  revealed  will  of  God  is  the  standard  by  which  he  is  to  reach  this 
goal.  God's  will  is  revealed  in  Scripture. 
3.  Faith  is  the  motive  and  only  God  can  give  this.  " 
Of  these  three  points  he  says: 
In  these  responses  there  is  a  presupposition  of  the  old  metaphysic,  the 
ontological  trinity,  casual  creation,  direct  revelation  in  nature  and  in  Scripture 
as  well  as  actual  experiential  knowledge  of  regeneration.  " 
These  three  requirements  require  a  fixed  body  of  knowledge  in  which  God  can  be 
known  by  analogy,  his  works  can  be  seen  in  creation  and  his  will  may  be  known  from 
the  Scriptures.  The  Christian,  van  Til  believes,  can  know  God's  being,  his  attributes, 
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and  his  will,  and  has  the  power  of  the  Holy  Spirit  to  provide  the  faith  to  motivate  and 
empower  him  to  achieve  it. 
Of  course,  van  Til  is  right,  in  saying  that  Barth  does  not  accept  this  position.  Barth's 
ethics  are  not  teleologically  defined;  they  do  not  have  a  predetennined  goal,  but  are  a 
response  to  God's  free  act  of  creation.  In  an  address,  in  Hanover,  Barth  told  of  the 
moment  when  his  break  with  van  Til's  position  and  nineteenth  century  theology  more 
generally  took  place:  " 
One  day  in  early  August  1914  stands  out  in  my  personal  memory  as  a  black 
day.  Ninety-three  Gen-nan  intellectuals  impressed  public  opinion  by  their 
proclamation  in  support  of  the  war  policy  of  Wilhelm  II  and  his  counsellors. 
Among  these  intellectuals  I  discovered  to  my  horror  almost  all  of  my 
theological  teachers"  whom  I  had  greatly  venerated.  In  despair  over  what  this 
indicated  about  the  signs  of  the  time  I  suddenly  realised  I  could  no  longer 
follow  either  their  ethics  and  dogmatics  or  their  understanding  of  the  Bible 
and  history.  For  me  at  least,  19th.  Century  theology  no  longer  held  any 
future.  " 
Barth  at  this  time  was  a  young  pastor  in  Safenwil  trying  to  preach  and  minister  to  the 
needs  of  the  local  working  community.  It  was  his  inadequacy  to  speak  from  the  basis 
of  the  theology  Herrmann  had  taught  him,  which  was  the  foundation  of  his  rupture 
with  nineteenth  century  theology.  The  break  was  a  result  of  socio-political  forces  that 
could  not  be  resolved,  or  even  addressed,  but  only  affinned  by  the  theology  of  the 
time.  T.  F.  Torrance  in  a  passage  widely  quoted  in  the  literature,  with  admiration, 
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claims  that  Barth  then  went  to  his  study  to  read  his  Bible  and  the  Word  of  God  came 
directly  to  him  from  above.  " 
Deten-nined  to  hear  the  Word  of  God  out  of  itself,  as  it  came  straight  from 
above,  unfettered  by  a  masterftil  culture,  uncontrolled  by  the  needs  and 
satisfactions  of  bourgeois  society,  and  before  it  had  been  sifted  and  diluted  by 
being  passed  through  some  general  frame  of  thought  already  worked  out  by 
man.  73 
Torrance  sees  the  theologian  as  having  a  detached  scientific  objectivity  concentrating 
only  on  his  object  and  deliberately  removing  himself  from  the  affairs  of  the  world. 
Barth,  in  his  reminiscence  quoted  above,  says  completely  the  opposite.  It  was  from 
just  such  an  engagement  with  the  world  that  caused  the  emotional,  spiritual  and 
intellectual  crisis  that  led  to  his  break  with  the  theology  of  his  teachers.  In  a  study  ftill 
of  insight,  Boyd  establishes  the  significance  of  context  for  Barth's  work  and  the 
important  point  that  Barth's  time  is  the  period  in  the  history  of  ideas  known  as 
Gen-nan  expressionism.  '  He  says,  'Attention  to  context  does  not  presuppose  hostility 
to  Barth's  theology  but  can  yield  better  theological  understanding'.  " 
From  his  position  of  Biblical  Fundamentalism  van  Til  describes  Barth  and  Brunner  as 
having  rejected  the  historic  orthodox  Christian  position  in  favour  of  the  philosophical 
method  of  dialectic,  and  claims  that  the  dialectic  is  in  itself  Christological.  He 
understands  it  as  a  closed  and  static  system  in  which  the  relationship  between  the  One 
and  the  Many  is  founded  in  an  abstract  conception  of  Christ. 
72  Willis,  The  Ethics  ofKarl  Barth,  p.  11. 
73  Thomas  Toffance,  Karl  Barth:  An  Introduction  to  His  Early  Theology,  1910-193  1,  (London:  SCM 
Press,  1962)  p.  35. 
74  1909-1924 
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He  tells  us  that,  'The  dialectical  theologians"  seek  to  be  Christological  in  their 
ethics',  "  and  uses  the  following  quotation  to  support  his  argument  that  Barth  'seeks  to 
be  Christological  in  his  doctrine  of  ethics  as  well  as  that  of  the  church':  " 
The  fact  that  ethics  are  presented  to  us  as  a  problem  means  that  the  concepts 
which  we  make  use  of  in  our  conversation  are,  as  we  have  so  often  pointed 
out,  existential  concepts;  and  it  provides  us  with  a  guarantee  that,  when  we 
repeat,  somewhat  tediously  perhaps,  the  formula  'God  Himself,  God  alone,  ' 
we  do  not  mean  by  it  some  divine  thing,  or  some  ideal  world  contrasted  with 
the  visible  world.  We  mean  by  the  formula  that'unsearchable,  divine 
relationship  in  which  we  stand  as  men.  It  is  in  the  actual  tension  and 
movement  of  human  life,  in  the  actual  being  and  having  and  doing  of  men, 
that  our  ethical  concepts  and  formulations  emerge.  " 
These  words  do  not  support  van  Til's  argument.  van  Til's  argument  as  it  is  founded  on 
the  phrase  'ethics  are  presented  to  us  as  a  problem.  '  He  has  taken  the  quotation  above 
from  the  opening  page  of  Barth's  exegesis  of  Paul's  Epistle  to  the  Ronians,  chapter 
twelve,  and  verses  one  and  two,  in  which  Paul  is  exhorting  the  Christians  in  Rome  to, 
&present  your  bodies  as  a  living  sacrifice,  holy  and  acceptable  to  God-which  is  your 
veritable  worship  of  God!  -  And  not  to  fashion  yourself  according  to  the  present  form 
of  this  world.  '  Ethics  is  a  "problem"  says  Barth  because  it  has  no  object.  In  the 
previous  sentence,  to  the  one  quoted  by  van  Til,  Barth  says: 
The  fact  that  ethics  constitutes  a  problem  reminds  us  that  the  object  about 
which  we  are  conversing  has  no  objectivity,  that  is  to  say,  it  is  not  a  concrete 
world  existing  above  or  behind  our  world;  it  is  not  a  treasury  of  spiritual 
experiences;  it  is  not  even  some  transcendental  vastness:  for  we  are  not  meta- 
physicians.  Our  conversation  is  about  men  living  in  the  world  of  nature  and 
of  civilisation;  and  moreover,  we  ourselves  are  also  men  living  of  necessity 
from  minute  to  minute  a  quite  concrete  life.  80 
76  van  Til  means  Barth  and  Brunner. 
77  van  Til,  New  Modernism,  p.  306. 
78  van  Til,  Nets,  Modernism,  p.  306. 
79  van  Til  p.  306-7  quoting  from  Barth,  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  pp.  424f. 
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Barth's  is  discussing  an  ethic  rooted  in  everyday  concrete  problems  and  not  one 
grounded  in  abstract  ideas.  It  is  not  an  example  of  a  theologian  establishing  a 
Christological  doctrine  of  ethics.  In  assuming  that  the  Christian  life  is  a  life  lived  in 
Christ  Barth  does  not  mean  that  his  ethics  are  Christological,  but  rather  they  are  part 
of  the  doctrine  of  God.  For  Barth'Dogmatics  is  ethics  and  ethics  is  dogmatics.  "'  To 
establish  his  point  van  Til  includes  the  following  quotation  from  Barth: 
Our  ethical  life,  that  is  an  event  that  centres  on  the  presence  of  God  with  man 
through  the  saving  work  in  Christ.  Even  more  particularly,  our  ethical  life  is 
the  life  we  live  in  Christ.  The  Christian  life  that  is  worth  its  name  is  not  lived 
by  us  but  is  lived  by  God  in  Christ  through  the  Holy  Spirit.  " 
These  words  show  that  ethics  is  part  of  the  doctrine  of  God.  "  Barth's  ethics  always 
come  from  his  dogmatics  and  this  is  the  case  throughout  the  Church  Dogmatics,  each 
volume  concludes  with  a  section  on  ethics.  Barth's  dogmatics  follows  from  what  we 
know  of  God,  and  his  method  follows  Anselm,  proceeding  from  the  known  to  the 
possible,  which  makes  it  quite  impossible  to  consider  Barth's  ethics  as  having  a  goal. 
Yet,  Van  Til  in  his  template  against  which  ethics  either  must  fit  or  be  rejected  asks  the 
above  three  questions.  In  looking  for  the  goal  of  Barth's  ethics  Van  Til  concludes  that, 
'Barth  interprets  it  as  lying  in  the  world  beyond.  "'  He  quotes  Barth  to  establish  this 
point: 
The  child  of  God  is  to  look  for  his  goal  of  action,  beyond  the  present,  to  the 
kingdom  of  is  father.  "s  'If  we  hear  the  gospel  of  the  kingdom,  we  realise  that 
in  it  there  is  an  end  of  our  seeking  and  sighing,  our  expectation  and  our 
81  Barth,  Church  Dogmatics,  1/2,  p.  793. 
92  Barth,  The  Christian  Life,  1930  translation  of  Voin  Christlichen  Leben,  MOnchen,  1926. 
83  The  centrality  of  ethics  in  Barth's  understanding  of  Christian  doctrine  is  stressed  in  Webster,  Barths 
Ethics  qfReconciliation,  'the  relation  to  itself  which  the  Word  of  God  establishes  for  its  human 
recipient  is  not  simply  noetic,  a  matter  of  interpretation,  but  ethical,  a  matter  of  action,  '  and 
McCormack,  Karl  Barth's  Critically  Realistic  Dialectical  Theology,  pp.  274-80. 
84  va  n  Til,  The  New  Afodernism,  p.  307. 
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striving.  "'  'We  do  not  really  seek  this  gospel.  The  gospel  seeks  us.  "'  "And 
when  she  has  found  us,  she  will  distinguish  herself  with  one  stroke  from  all 
doctrines  and  sermons  which  we  hear  otherwise  as  heaven  is  separated  from 
the  earth,  and  the  day  from  the  night.  Jesus  Christ  seeks  us  with  this  word, 
with  this  gospel  of  the  kingdom.  " 
van  Til  interprets  these  words  as  evidence  that  Barth's  ethical  goal  is  otherworldly,  but 
Barth  has  no  ethical  goal,  which  can  be  found  in  this  world  or  in  any  another  world. 
On  the  contrary,  these  words  illustrate  that  for  Barth  ethical  action  is  response  to 
revelation;  and  that  there  can  be  no  pre-existing  goal.  Had  this  point  been  true,  it 
would  make  made  van  Til's  argument  against  Barth  much  stronger,  but  van  Til  is 
forced  to  accommodate  Barth  in  a  Procrustean  bed  constructed  from  his  three 
questions. 
van  Til  does  perceive  an  ethical  goal  in  Barth's  work  saying,  'Dealing  first  with  the 
goal  of  ethics,  we  find  Barth  interpreting  it  as  lying  in  the  world  beyond'.  "  van  Til 
quotes  Barth  to  make  his  point: 
The  gospel  of  the  kingdom,  the  ethical  goal,  is  a  gift  of  grace  and  as  a  gift 
must  be  received  with  thanksgiving.  Gratitude  is  the  sum  of  obedience  that  is 
well  pleasing  to  God.  But  who  can  be  truly  grateful?  " 
This  reference  to  Barth  is  not  in  quotation  marks  nor  is  the  source  given.  It  is  an 
assumption  that  he  is  paraphrasing  Barth.  He  further  quotes  from  Barth: 
I  have  not  said  there  are  no  such  men.  I  have  not  said  that  the  Christian  is 
thankful  and  has  the  freedom  of  the  children  of  God;  that  would  once  more  be 
Augustinian  doctrine  however  Protestant  it  may  be  in  form.  " 
86  Quoted  by  van  Til  from  an  article  DasEvangeliuni  von  dem  Reich  in  Zivischen  den  Zeiten,  1932, 
p.  287. 
87  These  are  van  Til's  words  there  is  an  ambiguity  in  the  punctuation  and  they  could  be  read  as  Barth's, 
which  would  strengthen  van  Til's  position.  See,  The  New  Modernism,  p.  307. 
88  Quoted  by  van  Til  from  an  article  DasEvangeliwn  von  dent  Reich  in  Zwischen  den  Zeilen,  1932,  p. 
287. 
89  van  Til  discusses  this  in  the  next  section  of  chapter  twelve. 
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The  next  quotation  van  Til  uses  is  not  put  in  quotation  marks  but  there  is  a  footnote  to 
Barth's  work.  It  is  not  clear  therefore,  if  these  are  van  Til's  words  or  a  paraphrase  of 
Barth's  work  or  a  straight  quotation  from  Barth,  and  as  the  section  is  part  of  van  Til's 
argument  it  is  imPortant  to  know  which  of  these  three  alternatives  is  correct: 
If  we  are  to  understand  the  true  nature  of  gratitude,  we  shall  need  to  cut 
ourselves  loose  from  the  Augustinian  analogia  entis  doctrine.  God's  relation 
to  man  cannot  be  that  of  an  original  gift  of  quality  in  man;  it  must  be  the 
active  relationship  of  God  continually  giving  Himself.  " 
The  Holy  Spirit  in  the  activity  of  his  being  for  man  is  the  only  reality  of  the 
image  of  God  in  man.  This  therefore  is  not  and  does  not  become  the  attribute 
of  a  created  spirit;  it  is  and  remains  a  work  of  grace  on  the  part  of  the  creator 
with  respect  to  the  creature,  a  work  understood  only  as  a  work  of  grace.  " 
True  gratitude  can,  accordingly,  never  become  the  possession  of  man.  " 
The  gratefulness  and  freedom  of  the  children  of  God  is  truly  our  last,  our 
future  reality.  " 
van  Til  demands  that  ethics  have  a  goal,  he  claims  the  goal  of  Barth's  ethics  is 
otherworldly,  'Throughout  the  various  stages  of  his  writings,  Barth  has  consistently 
maintained  that  the  ethical  goal  of  man  is  wholly  beyond  our  reach.  "'  Of  course,  van 
Til  is  correct,  because  Barth's  ethics  describe  a  human  response  to  divine  action. 
However,  we  must  remember  that  Barth's  ethics  is  an  expression  of  God's  covenant 
relationship  and  follows  from  this  as  a  possibility.  It  does  not  seek  for  a  goal,  it 
responds  to  a  gift. 
van  Til  goes  on  to  impose  the  same  presuppositions  on  Barth's  view  of  prayer,  which 
in  Barth's  ethics  is  the  primary  human  response  to  God's  action.  He  says  that  for 
91  Zur  Lehre  voin  heiligen  Geist,  p.  103. 
92  van  Til's  footnote  at  this  point  refers  to  Zur  Leh)-e  voin  heiligen  Geist,  p.  43. 
93  Quoted  by  van  Til  from  Zur  Lehre  voin  heiligen  Geist,  p.  39,  in,  The  New  Atodel-nis171,  p.  308. 
94  van  Til,  The  New  Modernism,  p.  308. 
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Barth,  'What  is  true  of  gratitude  is  true  also  of  prayer'.  'What  he  says  in  Romans  he 
says,  albeit  in  different  ways,  in  later  publications.  '  'In  Ona-ch  Dogmatics  Barth 
connects  the  Christian  life  with  his  teaching  on  the  outpouring  of  the  Spirit'.  "  van  Til, 
to  support  his  claim  gives  a  long  quotation  from  Barth.  It  is  included  here  because  it 
illustrates  not  only  van  Til's  argument  but  also  his  methodology: 
The  freedom  of  God  for  us  becomes  our  freedom  for  God  through  the  work  of 
the  Holy  Spirit.  As  God  wholly  denies  His  being  to  make  Himself  one  with 
our  state  and  fate,  so  we,  through  the  Spirit  become  wholly  one  with  the  being 
of  God.  And  the  two  ideas  are  involved  in  each  other.  As  God  does  not  exist 
except  in  His  revelation  to  man,  so  we  do  not  exist  except  in  becoming  part  of 
the  revelation  of  God  to  Himself.  For  our  response  to  God's  revelation 
constitutes  an  aspect  of  that  revelation.  This  is  Barth's  notion  of  the 
outpouring  of  the  Spirit.  It  is  in  accord  with  this  when  he  speaks  of  love  as 
being  exclusively  eschatological.  Love  is  something,  he  says,  that  takes  place 
only  in  the  promise  that  the  children  of  God  exist. 
In  a  footnote  to  this  passage,  van  Til  gives  Barth's  Church  Dogmatics  1/2  page  429 
here,  but  no  quotation  marks.  "  Obviously,  from  the  content,  some  words  are  van  Til's, 
but  it  is  not  clear  which  are  his,  or  which  are  a  quote  from  Barth.  The  1956  English 
translation  of  this  passage  contains  part  of  a  discussion  on  the  neighbour.  It  is  part  of 
Chapter  11  in  the  section  on,  The  life  of  the  Children  of  God,  in  which  Barth  discusses 
the  outpouring  of  the  Holy  Spirit  and  more  particularly  the  Holy  Spirit  as  the 
subjective  possibility  of  revelation.  Barth  is  here  discussing  the  task  of  the  Holy 
Spirit.  This  he  will  go  on  to  expand  in  the  sections  of  Church  Dogmatics  that  discuss 
special  ethics,  but  van  Til  takes  this  as  evidence  that  Barth  has  a  dialectical 
concePtion  of  sinninuin  bonum.  van  Til  demands  and  seeks  the  sinninuin  bonuin  from 
all  ethics  and  in  his  search  misses  the  point  of  Barth's  discussion.  van  Til  sees  the 
same  evidence  in  Barth's  exposition  of  the  Scottish  Confession,  "Barth  expresses 
96  van  Til,  New  Modernism,  p.  309. 
97  van  Til,  New  Modernism,  p.  309. 
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himself  in  a  similar  vein".  "  From  this  discussion,  he  concludes  that  the  goal  of  Barth's 
ethics  is: 
Built  upon  the  general  principle  of  Dialecticism  as  expressed  in  Barth's  idea  of 
the  freedom  of  God.  This  implies  therefore  the  critical  idea  of  the  negative 
instance.  Man's  sinninum  boninn  is  wholly  beyond  man,  says  Barth.  Man's 
life  is hid  with  Christ  in  God.  This  is  to  say  that  reality  has  a  brute  factual 
aspect.  As  there  is  nowhere  a  direct  revelation  of  God  and  a  creed  that  gives 
us  the  essential  system  of  doctrine  of  such  a  revelation,  so  there  is  nowhere  a 
definitely  given  content  of  instruction  that  sets  man's  goal  before  him.  All 
system  is  correlative  to  the  utterly  uninterpreted.  " 
What  van  Til  sees  as  the  absence  of  a  goal  in  Barth's  ethical  thought  he  interprets  as 
an  attack  on  orthodoxy.  He  says,  'For  Barth  the  Bible  contains  no  direct  revelation  for 
action  any  more  than  for  belief  This  accounts  for  his  opposition  to  every  idea  of 
Christian  programme.  ""  van  Til  explains  this  is  only  one  side  of  the  story  of  Barth's 
attack  on  orthodoxy.  The  other  side  is  the  absence  of  an  ethical  goal  as  expressed  in 
the  Creed.  van  Til  believes  these  show  that  Barth  follows  Schleiermacher.  Barth,  he 
says,  gives  conscience  the  role  of  the  final  interpreter  of  life: 
As  God's  will  for  man's  deeds  is  revealed  nowhere,  so  it  is  revealed 
everywhere.  The  God  who  is  exhaustively  hidden  is  also  exhaustively 
revealed.  As  no  creed  contains  the  system  of  truth,  any  creed  may  point  to  the 
truth.  As  God  does  not  spurn  revealing  Himself  through  the  contradictions  of 
the  Bible,  so  He  does  not  spurn  revealing  Himself  through  the  contradictory 
deeds  of  men.  Indeed,  God  does  realise  Himself  through  His  revelation,  for 
His  revelation  is  His  being.  Thus  though  it  appears  there  is  to  be  no  natural 
theology,  conscience  is  to  be  the  final  interpreter  of  life.  " 
van  Til's  second  main  question  to  be  asked  of  any  ethic  is,  what  is  the  standard,  how 
is  it  to  be  judged?  He  finds  Barth's  ethics  completely  lacking,  as  it  has  no  standard. 
99  van  Til,  The  New  Modernism,  p.  309. 
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There  is  no  creed  nor  any  rule  thus  the  imperative  is  reduced  to  the  indicative,  says 
van  Til,  he  quotes  from  Barth  to  prove  his  point: 
"But  what  is  it  possible  for  us  to  do,  "  asks  Barth,  "in  order  that  the  sacrifice, 
by  which  men  are  overcome  and  God  is  glorified,  may  shine  forth  in  our 
actions?  How  can  we  ensure  that  our  deeds  are  fully  ripened  fruit  and  not 
mere  empty  husks?  ""'  "  What  are  we  to  demand  of  men?  And  to  what  are  we 
to  invite  and  exhort  them?  "  And  the  answer  is  given,  "Since  the  truth  lies  in 
the  ambiguity  of  human  existence,  we  must  exhort  them  to  affirm  that 
ambiguity.  "" 
van  Til  continues: 
With  respect  to  the  standard  of  ethics,  then,  as  with  respect  to  its  goal,  Barth 
falls  prey  to  his  enemies.  Each  time  he  rejects  their  direct  systematising 
tendency.  He  describes  this  as  their  immanentism.  Over  against  it  he  would 
set  the  will  of  the  absolutely  other  God.  Then  comes  the  question  as  to  the 
content  of  this  will.  What  is  it  and  where  may  it  be  found?  It  cannot  be  by 
direct  revelation,  for  if  it  were  we  should  again  fall  back  on  system.  The  net 
result  is  that,  for  Barth,  the  will  of  God  is  really  a  pure  forrn  and  nothing 
more.  Its  content  depends  upon  what  men  put  into  it.  And  since  this  is  true, 
every  man  may  with  equal  right  put  his  own  content  into  it.  With  the  best  of 
will  Barth's  position  cannot  escape  the  ethical  individualism  he  so  rightly 
dreads.  "' 
van  Til  has  shown  that  Barth  has  neither  a  goal  nor  does  he  have  a  standard  for  his 
ethic,  thus  Barth's  ethic  has  failed  two  of  van  Til's  three  requirements. 
The  third  and  last  of  van  Til's  measuring  devices  is  the  motive  of  ethics.  He  began  by 
asking  three  questions  about  ethics,  and  the  third  of  these  was  "What  should  be  the 
motive  that  impels  him  in  seeking  this  goal?  "  To  this  question,  van  Til  gives  the 
answer,  "Faith  is  the  motive  and  only  God  can  give  this.  "  If  we  are  to  assume  the 
discussion  between  van  Til  and  Barth  is  taking  place  within  the  community  of  faith 
then  we  may  move  to  the  next  stage  of  van  Til's  disagreement  with  Barth.  The  ethical 
103  van  Til,  p.  313,  quoting  Barth,  Romans,  p.  436. 
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imperative  is  to  love  our  neighbour  as  ourselves.  What  then  is  the  character  of  true 
self  that  is  to  be  expressed  by  love  of  neighbour?  It  is  on  the  character  of  self-l(,  ve  that 
van  Til  disagrees  with  Barth.  He  begins  by  laying  out  his  requirements  for  a  true  self- 
love: 
If  the  true  self-love  has  been  made  one  with  God's  being  through-the 
incarnation  and  the  outpouring  of  the  Spirit,  the  empirical  self  must  lift  itself 
in  the  scale  of  being  until  it  reaches  its  high  destination  of  identity  with  its 
ideal  self.  "' 
In  his  definition,  he  gives  two  selves:  the  empirical  self,  the  ideal  self,  and  the  task  of 
moving  from  one  to  the  other.  He  describes  the  method  of  movement  as,  'the 
empirical  self  must  lift  itself.  '  Again,  in  his  methodology,  we  see  actuality,  (the 
empirical  self),  and  potentiality,  (the  ideal  self),  and  the  ethical  task  is  in  moving  from 
actuality  to  potentiality.  This  model,  which  van  Til  has  taken  from  Aristotle  and  not 
the  Bible,  he  applies  to  Barth's  ethics. 
van  Til  extracts  from  Barth's  work  two  concepts  to  fit  his  model.  Self-love  is  the  first, 
and  represents  what  earlier  was  described  as  actuality  in  van  Til's  methodology.  Love 
of  God  and  neighbour  are  the  second,  and  represent  what  I  have  called  potentiality. 
van  Til  correctly  says  Barth  argues  that  self-love  is  inherently  wrong.  The  next  step  in 
van  Til's  argument  is  problematic,  because  he  then  deduces  that  'To  reach  the  realm 
of  the  true  self  that  has  its  identity  with  God,  we  must  altogether  deny  the  self  as  we 
now  know  it.  '  Thus,  van  Til's  methodology  has  forced  him  to  read  conclusions  into 
Barth's  ethics,  which  are  false. 
van  Til,  elaborates  his  point,  by  quoting  Barth: 
105  van  Til,  page  314-5,  paraphrasing  Barth,  Church  Do,  -malics,  1/2,  p.  420. 214 
The  love  of  God  and  the  neighbour  lie  on  a  different  level  from  this  unholy 
affection.  When  we  are  told  to  love  our  neighbour  as  ourselves,  we  are  not  to 
take  this  as  a  justification  for  self-love.  There  is  no  commandment  to  love 
ourselves.  Where  self-love  starts  love  of  neighbour  stops  and  where  love  of 
neighbour  starts  self-love  stops.  "' 
Finding  that  Barth  does  not  fit  the  model  of  linear  progress  from  actuality  to 
potentiality  van  Til  interprets  Barth's  phrase,  "a  different  level"  as  problematic.  The 
two  levels  for  Van  Til  mean  two  worlds,  the  ideal  world,  and  the  empirical  world,  and 
his  next  step  is  to  place  his  category,  potentiality,  in  the  ideal  world.  Having  done  this 
he  then  refers  to  Barth,  critically,  as  an  idealist,  who  is  following  the  tradition  of  Kant 
and  Hegel.  'In  the  true  idealist  fashion,  Barth  pictures  man's  ethical  strife  as  being 
due  to  the  fact  that  he  is  a  member  of  two  hostile  worlds.  "" 
Having  placed  Barth's  ethical  goal  in  an  abstract  ideal  world  van  Til  can  then  say,  that 
for  Barth,  self-love  exists  in  an  unreal,  empirical  world  of  non-being.  Self-love  is 
unreality,  and  in  the  unreal  hostile,  empirical  world  van  Til  says  it  is  impossible  for 
Barth  to  express  love  of  neighbour,  He  quotes  Barth,  'If  I  gave  him  what  I  give 
myself,  I  should  give  him  destruction'.  He  then  comes  to  the  conclusion  that, 
according  to  Barth,  man's  inability  to  love  is  not  due  to  any  historical  fall,  but  to  the 
basic  determination  of  the  two  worlds.  'Man's  being  by  himself  alone  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  he  is  a  member  of  the  world  of  the  entirely  individual  thing,  the  world  of 
irrationality.  "' 
What  is  to  be  said  about  van  Til's  conclusion?  Even  if  we  restrict  ourselves  to  the 
works  of  Barth  that  van  Til  quotes  to  come  to  his  conclusion,  it  is  impossible  to  agree 
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with  him.  In  the  very  section  from  Clun-ch  Dogmatics  from  which  van  Til  draws  his 
quotations,  Barth's  exegesis  of  the  Good  Samaritan  is  a  model  of  concrel-- 
practicality.  "'  The  man  who  fell  among  thieves  received  benefits  enabling  the  actions 
of  a  benefactor: 
My  neighbour  is  the  man  who  emerges  from  amongst  all  my  fellow  men  as 
the  one  thing  in  particular,  my  benefactor.  I  myself,  of  course,  must  be 
sumn-loned  by  Jesus  Christ,  and  I  must  be  ready  to  obey  the  summons  to  go 
and  do  likewise,  that  is  to  be  myself  a  benefactor,  if  I  am  to  experience  as  such 
the  emergence  of  a  fellow-man  as  my  benefactor,  and  therefore  to  see  and 
have  him  as  my  neighbour.  "' 
Here  Barth  is  being  completely  practical  and  concrete,  and  arrives  at  this  ethical 
position  on  the  solid  basis  of  scriptural  exegesis,  and  his  method  remains  consistently 
dialectical.  The  benefactor  requires  an  object  to  be  complete,  and  the  object  requires  a 
benefactor  to  become  a  benefactor,  thus  the  truth  is  in  the  method.  Of  course  van  Til's 
truth  is  also  in  his  method,  but  is  van  Til's  criticism  of  Barth  simply  that  they  disagree 
about  method?  No,  because  as  has  already  been  stated  van  Til  does  not  consider  Barth 
to  be  a  Christian,  because  he  follows  a  philosophical  tradition.  Yet,  in  his  criticism  of 
Barth,  van  Til,  the  biblical  ftindamentalist,  does  not  use  a  method  of  scriptural 
exegesis  to  ground  his  position,  whereas  for  Barth"the  philosophical  discourse  is 
through  scriptural  exegesis.  Is  the  disagreement  between  theology  and  philosophy?  Is 
van  Til  the  theologian  opposed  to  Barth  the  philosopher?  Again  the  answer  is  no. 
Although  van  Til,  as  a  theologian,  is  most  concerned  to  be  true  to  Biblical  foundation 
he  begins  his  discussions  with  philosophy,  and  Barth,  whom  van  Til  claims  is  a 
philosopher  begins  with  Biblical  exegesis,  thus  the  real  problem  is  one  of 
prolegomena. 
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By  discussing  what  must  be  said  before  theology  can  begin  he  requires  from  Barth  a 
prolegomena,  and  reads  Barth's  theology  as  if  it  were  an  apologetics.  Of  course, 
Barth's  theology  is  a  prolegomena,  but  a  prolegomena  not  of  what  must  be  said 
befoi-e,  but  of  what  must  be  saidfii-st.  van  Til  discusses  rational  arguments  that  give 
evidence  and  proofs  of  the  Christian  religion,  whereas  Barth  is  speaks  to  the 
community  of  faith,  and  therefore  refuses  to  talk  of  what  must  come  befoi-e,  but  only 
of  what  comesfirst.  van  Til  and  Barth  have  different  tasks,  but  both  in  Christian 
theology  are  referred  to  as  prolegomena. 
In  concluding,  in  a  section  on  the  state,  van  Til  pays  tribute  to  Barth  for  his  opposition 
to  the  Third  Reich,  but  sees  the  opposition  being  in  spite  of  Barth's  incorrect 
theological  position,  not  because  of  it.  He  says: 
We  may  admire  Barth  for  his  brave  stand  in  the  political  situation  of  the  day. 
The  only  question  that  interests  us  at  this  time,  however,  is  whether  in  the 
theology  of  Barth  there  is  any  foundation  other  than  a  personalist  philosophy 
of  a  naturalist  sort  on  the  basis  of  which  his  views  can  have  intelligible 
content.  The  answer  must  be  negative.  As  has  been  shown,  Barth  has  no  right 
whatsoever  to  make  distinctions  in  the  empirical  realm.  " 
Finally  two  points:  the  first,  van  Til's  theological  criticism  of  Barth  is  a  philosophical 
disagreement,  and  the  second  is,  that  all  theology  begins  from  a  position,  thus  there  is 
no  theology  which  is  not  intimately  related  to  philosophy. 
van  Til's  criticism  of  Barth  is  in  the  intellectual  world  of  ideas.  As  a  writer  of 
apologetics,  van  Til  is  an  expert  in  ideas,  but,  of  course,  the  truth  of  the  Christian  faith 
is  not  to  be  found  in  ideas.  Faith  has  its  source  and  truth  in  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the 
revelation  of  the  hiddeness  of  God.  Those  who  receive  it  know  of  it,  but  do  not  know 
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how  to  convey  it  to  others.  Having  received  it  they  accept  its  truth,  but  could  not  have 
received  its  truth  through  rational  argument.  All  this  makes  van  V's  task  somewhat 
meaningless.  Barth's  response  to  such  criticism  is: 
There  is  not  much  point  in  theological  criticism  if  it  rests  only  on  the 
affirmation  that  the  theological  statement  under  consideration  betrays  more  or 
less  obvious  traces  of  the  philosophical  culture  of  its  author,  and  that  it  makes 
use  of  a  certain  philosophical  system  of  ideas.  If  a  criticism  of  this  kind  invites 
the  reader  or  hearer  of  the  statement  to  beware  and  be  on  his  guard,  he  will 
have  to  confess  at  once  that  he  himself  is  very  definitely  involved  in  a  similar 
system,  and  as  an  inhabitant  of  this  glasshouse  he  certainly  has  no  cause  to 
throw  stones.  "' 
There  must  be  some  other  way  of  proceeding  than  throwing  stones  inside  a 
glasshouse.  van  Til  did  not  have  access  to  Barth's  ethical  writings  published  after 
1945,  and  the  way  of  proceeding  now  is  with  a  close  reading  of  those  works. 
As  has  been  shown  van  Til  criticises  Barth's  ethics  by  claiming  that  he  is  following  in 
a  philosophical  tradition  that  necessarily  rejects  the  foundations  of  the  Christian 
ethics,  which  are  the  truth  of  the  Bible,  and  Christian  doctrine.  Robinson  takes  an 
opposing  view  to  van  Til  and  claims  that  Barth  has  no  ethics  because  he  begins  his 
theology  with  doctrine  and  not  the  human  experience  of  God,  and  it  is  to  him  that  we 
now  turn. 
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7.2Norman  H.  G.  Robinson 
Norman  H.  G.  Robinson,  who  was  Professor  of  Systematic  Theology  in  the  University 
of  St.  Andrcws,  is  representative  of  those  who  read  Barth  in  such  a  way  as  to  preclude 
any  possibility  of  Barth  having  an  ethic.  His  objections  concentrate  on  problems  of 
human  experience,  particularly  as  they  relate  to  the  concept  of  human  freedom.  "' 
He  argues  strongly  that  Barth  allows  no  space  for  the  T  of  human  experience:  the 
person  who  receives  and  acts  upon  the  divine  revelation.  Barth,  in  response  to  similar 
criticisms  made  by  G.  Wobbermin"'  who  speaks  from  a  Modernist  viewpoint,  says, 
'the  I-experience  establishes  for  man  the  surest  certainty  of  reality  that  he  can 
conceive  of  or  that  is  possible  for  him  at  all.  ""  Robinson's  criticisms  of  Barth  reflect 
Wobbermin's  position,  and  the  following  response,  which  Barth  made  to  Wobbermin, 
applies  equally  to  Robinson: 
One  might  ask  whether  this  Cartesianism  is  really  as  impregnable  as  it  usually 
purports  to  be  even  on  the  philosophical  plane.  But  that  is  not  our  present 
concern  and  we  must  beware  of  opposing  to  it  a  philosophy  more  suited  to  our 
theological  interest  or  of  so  wearying  of  Descartes  that  we  throw  ourselves 
into  the  arms  of,  e.  g.,  Aristotle  or  Thomas.  Suspicious  of  the  other  side  too, 
we  simply  make  the  point  that  at  any  rate  in  theology  one  cannot  think  along 
Cartesian  lines.  '  17 
Robinson  says,  Paul,  Augustine  and  Aquinas  in  their  conversions  acted  from  direct 
personal  experience  of  God.  Paul  was  on  the  road  to  Damascus,  Augustine  was  in  a 
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Milanese  garden  and  Aquinas  in  his  monastery,  who  unlike  the  others  kept  his 
personal  experiences  veiled,  because  he  followed  monastic  ýradition. 
From  a  reading  of  Barth,  using  Von  Balthasar's  map,  supplemented  by  the  influential 
work  of  T.  F.  Torrance,  who  supports  the  two-movement  hypothesis,  Robinson  makes 
the  claim  that  Barth  has  no  ethics.  He  says: 
It  is  maintained  that  Barthianism,  while  it  is  an  evangelical  theology,  is  to  be 
more  precisely  characterised  within  that  field  as  a  type  of  evangelical  theology 
that  is  non-ethical,  metaphysical  and  radically  empirical.  '  18 
He  claims  that  Barth's  description  of  the  covenant  relationship  between  God  and  man 
provides  an  inadequate  account  of  human  experience.  He  makes  the  further  claim  that 
all  Christian  theology  necessarily  begins  with  a  personal  experience  of  God.  Speaking 
of  Barth's  concept  of  the  relationship  between  God  and  man,  he  says: 
From  this  point  of  view  revelation  must  be  understood  as  in  evely  way 
creating  its  own  response.  This  is  a  highly  paradoxical  position,  and  it  does 
seem  plain  that  it  leaves  no  room  at  all  for  a  personal  relationship,  for  a 
relationship  that  is  personal  in  something  more  than  name.  "' 
His  second  objection  questions  the  nature  and  task  of  Barth's  theology,  for: 
Even  when  the  very  method  and  principle  of  rationalism  are  condemned  and 
firrnly  set  to  one  side,  and  when  the  recognition  of  a  personal  relationship  is 
allowed  to  come  into  its  own,  there  are  varying  degrees  of  adequacy  with 
which  it  is  represented  as  a  personal  relationship.  This  in  fact  is  the  crucial 
question  which  confronts  the  most  influential  theological  school  of  the  present 
time,  that  of  Barthianism,  for  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether,  in  its  way  of 
regarding  the  personal  relationship  between  God  and  man  which  it  is  so 
concerned  to  stress,  this  theology  does  conceive  of  it  in  a  manner  adequate  to 
its  personal  character.  And  this  doubt  is  only  expressed  in  other  words  when  it 
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is  questioned,  as  it  may  well  be  questioned,  whether  the  Barthian  theology  is 
an  ethical  theology.  "' 
His  argument,  that  Barth's  ethics  cannot  be  an  ethic  hangs  on  the  central  peg  of 
human  experience.  The  principal  concern  of  this  section  of  the  thesis  is  to  discuss  the 
place  and  nature  of  human  experience  in  the  relationship  between  God  and  man  and 
the  place  of  human  freedom  within  that  relationship. 
One  of  the  most  significant  ideas  of  the  movement  known  as  the  Enlightenment  is  the 
centrality  of  human  moral  freedom  in  any  understanding  of  modem  identity.  If  this 
conception  of  human  autonomy  is  to  be  maintained  then  human  experience  has  to  be 
central  to  any  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  God  and  mankind.  Taylor 
traces  the  ideas  of  the  Reformers  as  one  of  three  important  strands  that  contributed  to 
the  formation  of  modem  identity  with  its  stress  on  moral  freedom.  "'  Therefore,  in 
modem  thought,  the  work  of  any  theologian  who  attempts  to  deny  human  moral 
freedom,  and  therefore  the  place  of  human  experience,  is  unlikely  to  receive  serious 
consideration  as  a  moral  theology.  This,  as  Robinson  has  so  clearly  stated,  is  the  case 
against  Barth's  theology.  The  problem,  as  Robinson  sees  it,  with  Barth's  work  is  that 
not  only  does  God  give  the  revelation  but  he  also  provides  the  only,  means  of 
receiving  that  revelation,  thus  precluding  any  sense  of  the  existing  T  of  human 
experience  in  the  reception  of  that  revelation.  Barth  responds: 
We  are  asking  how  man,  for  whom  it  is  impossible  to  begin  the  Christian  life 
by  human  judgment,  is  nevertheless  enabled  by  divine  possibility,  to  will, 
commence  and  do  this.  The  mystery  and  miracle  of  the  event  of  which  we 
speak  consists  in  the  fact  that  man  himself  is  the  free  subject  of  this  event  on 
the  basis  of  a  possibility,  which  is  present  only  with  God.  "' 
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It  seems  from  this  statement  that  human  autonomy,  or  freedom  in  the  sense 
understood  by  modernity,  is  restricted  by  Barth's  quaFfication,  'on  the  basis  of  a 
possibility,  which  is  only  present  with  God.  '  Therefore,  there  is  no  place  for  the 
conscious  T  of  human  experience.  Robinson  argues  that  as  there  is  no  room  for 
human  responsibility  then  there  can  be  no  ethics  in  Barth's  theology.  He  says  if  all  is 
given  how  could  anyone  be  responsible  for  an  act  over  which  he  or  she  has  no 
apparent  control.  Robinson  defines  self-consciousness  as  the  origin  of  human  self- 
determination,  whilst  Barth  says  self-consciousness  is  but  one  aspect  of  human 
determination  and  that  revelation  determines  all  of  human  existence.  He  says: 
Human  existence  means  human  self-determination.  If  experience  of  God's 
Word  involves  the  determination  of  human  existence  and  hence  also  of  human 
self-determination  by  the  Word  of  God,  then  by  self-determination  we  are  to 
understand  the  exercise  of  all  the  faculties  in  whose  exercise  man  is  man 
without  basic  emphasis  upon  and  also  without  basic  repudiation  of  any 
specific  human  possibility.  In  this  context  all  such  emphasis  and  repudiations 
are  to  be  resisted  already  on  the  score  of  method,  since  they  are  the  results  or 
presuppositions  of  a  general  philosophical  anthropology  by  whose 
constrictions,  however  right  or  wrong  they  may  be  in  their  own  sphere,  we 
cannot  allow  to  be  influenced  here.  From  different  angles  the  determination  of 
human  existence  by  God's  Word  can  be  understood  just  as  much  as  a 
determination  of  feeling,  will,  or  intellect,  and  psychologically  it  may  actually 
be  more  the  one  than  the  other  in  a  given  case.  The  decisive  point  materially, 
however,  is  that  it  is  a  determination  of  the  whole  self-determining  man.  "' 
Barth  discusses  the  question  of  the  deten-nination  of  human  self-determination  in 
Chin-ch  Dogmatics,  a  work  that  Robinson  has  not  consulted,  even  though  it  has  been 
available  in  English  translation  since  nineteen-thirty 
S  iX.  12'  Here  Barth  responds 
specifically  to  the  criticism,  as  exemplified  in  the  writings  of  G.  Wobbermin  and 
E.  Schaeder: 
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There  cannot  really  be  any  dispute  as  to  whether  regard  should  be  had  to  the 
"intimate  personal  experience  of  faith"  or  whether  the  nature  of  man  should  be 
"taken  into  account"  or  whether  an  exaggerate-1,  i.  e.,  an  "absolute"  protest 
should  be  made  against  the  place  and  validity  of  the  ego.  125 
Later  in  the  same  volume,  Barth,  discussing  the  place  of  faith  in  human  self- 
determination,  says: 
The  possibility  of  faith  as  it  is  given  to  man  in  the  reality  of  faith  can  be 
understood  only  as  one  that  is  loaned  to  man  by  God,  and  loaned  exclusively 
for  use.  The  moment  we  regard  it  as  a  possibility  which  is  in  any  sense  man's 
own,  the  opposite  statement  regarding  man's  incapacity.  But  for  this  reason 
there  can  be  no  objection  from  the  standpoint  of  man's  possibilities  when  we 
say  that  in  faith  there  takes  place  a  conforinity  of  man  to  God.  We  do  not  say  a 
deification  but  a  conformity  to  God,  i.  e.,  an  adapting  of  man  to  the  Word  of 
God.  In  faith,  as  he  really  receives  God's  Word,  man  becomes  apt  to  receive 
it.  If  one  were  to  deny  this  one  could  no  longer  describe  and  understand  faith 
as  the  act  and  experience  of  man  nor  man  as  the  subject  of  faith.  But  if  we 
ascribe  to  man  this  aptness  which  is  not  his  own  but  is  loaned  to  him  from 
God,  which  is  not  to  be  contemplated  but  simply  used  in  faith,  an  aptness  to 
receive  the  word  of  God,  then  we  cannot  shrink  from  speaking  of  a  conformity 
126 
Robinson's  work  appeared  in  1956  and  since  then  material  from  Barth  has  been 
published  that  answers  some,  but  not  all,  of  Robinson's  criticisms.  In  1956  Barth  gave 
a  lecture  on,  "The  Humanity  of  God,  "  which  Nvas  published  in  an  English  translation 
in  1961.  In  this  lecture  he  expresses  clearly  the  development  of  his  thinking  about  the 
relationship  between  God  and  humanity  and  between  humanity  and  God.  He  also 
gives  an  explanation  of  his  one  sided  treatment  of  the  relationship  in  his  earlier  work, 
saying: 
What  began  forcibly  to  press  itself  upon  us  about  forty  years  ago  was  not  so 
much  the  humanity  of  God  as  His  deity  -a  God  absolutely  unique  in  His 
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relation  to  man  and  the  world,  overpoweringly  lofty  and  distant,  strange,  yes 
even  wholly  other.  127 
He  goes  on  to  say  that  he  would  have  been  embarrassed  if  in  1920  he  had  been  asked 
to  speak  on  the  topic,  "The  Humanity  of  God.  "  At  that  time,  all  theological  efforts 
were  concentrated  on  changing  the  direction  of  theology,  but  he  reminded  his 
audience  that  change  is  part  of  theology.  By  1956,  he  defined  the  theological  task,  as 
deriving  'the  knowledge  of  the  humanity  of  God  from  the  knowledge  of  His  deity.  ' 
Barth  makes  fun  of  his  former  seriousness  and  more  illuminatingly  makes  fun  of 
those  who  take  him  as  the  defining  word.  He  says,  talking  of  the  period  Robinson  is 
criticising: 
What  expressions  we  used  -  in  part  taken  over  and  in  part  newly  invented! 
-  above  all,  the  famous  "wholly  other"breaking  in  on  us  "perpendicularly 
from  above,  "  the  not  less  famous  "infinite  qualitative  distinction"  between 
God  and  man,  the  vacuum,  the  mathematical  point,  and  the  tangent  in  which 
alone  they  must  meet.  "And  as  she  warbled,  a  thousand  voices  in  the  field 
sang  back.  ""' 
Barth  now  wants  to  make  the  point  clearly  and  forcefully  about  the  development  of 
Christology  in  his  thinking  saying:  "Jesus  Christ  is  in  His  one  Person,  as  true  God, 
man's  loyal  partner,  and  as  true  man,  God'S.  "  The  birth,  life,  death,  and  resurrection 
of  Jesus  Christ  are  the  defining  reality,  and  Christian  theology  begins  with  what  God 
has  chosen  to  reveal  of  himself  in  becoming  that  which  He  was  not  and  in  so  doing 
determining  humanity's  freedom  to  be  itself  Barth  expresses  these  Christological 
ideas  in  the  statement: 
It  is  precisely  God's  deitj,,  which,  rightly  understood,  includes  his  hinnallity. 
How  do  we  come  to  know  that?  What  pen-nits  and  requires  this  statement?  It 
127  Barth,  The  Humanitj,  of  Gocl,  p.  37  "This  lecture  translated  by  John  Newton  Thomas,  was  delivered 
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is  a  Christological  statement,  or  rather  one  grounded  in  and  to  be  unfolded 
from  Christology.  "' 
The  point  that  Barth  wants  to  emphasise  is  that  the  humanity  of  God  is  the  start  of 
theological  and  ethical  reflection.  'God  is  hunian.  "  From  this  statement  we  must 
move  to  an  affirmation  of  humanity,  which  recognises  that  'Nietzsche's  statement  that 
man  is  something  to  be  overcome  is  an  impudent  lie.  '  132  All  humanity  is  included  in 
the  affirmation  that  God  is  human,  and  that  this  affin-nation  is,  therefore,  an  ethical 
statement: 
On  the  basis  of  the  eternal  will  of  God  we  have  to  think  of  all  humanity  of 
eveiy  hunian  being,  even  the  oddest,  most  villainous  or  miserable,  as  one  to 
whom  Jesus  Christ  is  Brother  and  God  is  Father;  and  we  have  to  deal  with  him 
on  this  assumption.  "' 
Barth  theologically  establishes  the  reality  of  human  existence  and  human  behaviour 
on  a  christological  foundation,  having  its  only  foundation  in  Jesus  Christ.  An 
exploration  of  the  strength  of  this  position  and  the  unfolding  of  its  consequences  are 
the  purpose  of  this  thesis.  This  brief  discussion  of  Barth's  lecture  does  not  resolve  all 
the  points  made  by  Robinson,  but  it  does  point  to  a  new  and  important  development 
from  which  to  begin  to  engage  with  the  theological  task  of  defining  human  freedom. 
7.3Robert  E.  Willis 
Robert  Willis  presented  his  study,  The  Ethics  ofKarl  Barth,  as  a  thesis  at  the  San 
Francisco  Theological  Seminary,  which  trains  pastors  for  the  American  Presbyterian 
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Church.  "'  The  thesis  was  written  during  the  late  nineteen  sixties  which  was  a  time  of 
social  upheaval  in  the  United  States  of  A  -nerica,  when  responses  from  the  civil  rights 
movement  to.  racism,  conscription,  and  the  Vietnam  War,  erupted  into  civil 
disobedience  in  many  American  cities.  It  was  therefore  a  time  ripe  for  Christian  social 
ethicists  to  speak,  and  Willis,  with  a  set  of  political  requirements,  turned  to  Barth  for 
insights.  He  did  not  find  what  he  sought,  and  his  thesis  ends  in  a  disappointed  and 
frustrated  tone.  Of  the  thesis  Webster  says: 
The  analysis  gives  a  wider  view  of  the  place  of  human  experience  in  Barth's 
ethical  writings.  However  it  is  hard  for  Willis  to  continue  to  find  room  for  this 
view  as  his  work  develops,  and  he  continues  in  Cullberg's  line  when  he  says 
,  the  total  elimination  of  the  world,  including  human  action,  so  that  one  can 
speak  only  of  the  reality  of  God'.  "' 
Willis  quotes  James  Baldwin  in  his  introduction:  "' 
It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  whoever  wishes  to  become  a  truly  moral  human 
being  (and  let  us  not  ask  whether  or  not  this  is  possible;  I  think  we  must 
believe  that  it  is  possible)  must  first  divorce  himself  from  all  the  prohibitions, 
crimes,  and  hypocrisies  of  the  Christian  church.  If  the  concept  of  God  has  any 
validity  or  use,  it  can  only  be  to  make  us  larger,  freer,  and  more  loving.  If  God 
cannot  do  this,  then  it  is  time  we  got  rid  of  Him.  "' 
In  opening  an  academic  work  on  Christian  social  theological  ethics  with  these  words 
Willis  is  providing  a  context  within  which  his  investigation  will  take  place.  Two 
forces  shape  Willis's  inquiry  of  Barth's  ethical  thought:  racism  and  communism. 
Willis's  ethical  concerns  are  the  struggle  against  racism.  and  the  fight  against 
communism.  James  Baldwin  is  the  focus  for  the  first  and  the  Vietnam  War  for  the 
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second.  Willis  is  hoping  to  establish  a  foundation  for  autonomous  human  action  in  the 
first  case  and  a  theological  statement  -igainst  communism  in  the  second.  He  assumes 
autonomous  action  is  possible,  desirable  and  necessary,  for  free  and  therefore 
responsible  human  action.  He  believes  freedom  to  be  the  unconstrained  choice 
between  courses  of  action.  Responsibility,  for  Willis,  requires  such  a  concept  of 
freedom  and  this  is  what  he  means  by  autonomous  behaviour.  These  are  his 
presuppositions.  He  does  not  question  that  these  assumptions  might  be  problematic 
for  an  engagement  with  Barth's  ethics.  He  assumes  a  subjective  self  that  is  the  source 
of  its  own  determination,  and  which  acts  to  express  itself.  Barth,  of  course,  assumes 
the  i-evei-se,  that  determination  and  expression  are  part  of  acting.  Freedom  for  Barth  is 
not  an  unconstrained  choice  between  goods,  but  behaviour  in  conformity  with  God's 
action.  Willis's  position  places  his  thinking  in  the  Enlightenment  tradition  as  part  of 
modernity.  He  fails  to  recognise  that  Barth  has  faced  the  demands  of  Hegel,  the 
apotheosis  of  Enlightenment  thinking,  and  gone  beyond,  and  through  them  to  a  new 
ontological  and  epistemological  position  as  he  incorporated  these  concepts  within  his 
thinking  and  expressed  them  theologically.  Willis  approaches  Barth  with  a  set  of 
contextual  presuppositions  with  which  to  fight  racism  and  communism,  as  he  believes 
these  battles  may  be  won  by  establishing  individual  and  national  freedom.  His  notion 
of  freedom  is  expressed  as  individual  responsible  action  within  a  democracy,  and  he 
wants  to  show  sceptical  American  theologians  that  Barth  has  some  thing  to  offer  to 
the  social  conflicts  of  North  America.  Willis  is  a  victim  of  old  battles  that  arose  from 
the  reluctance  of  Anglo-American  philosophers  and  theologians  to  step  out  of  their 
analytical  framework  and  consider  the  tradition  of  modem  European  thought. 227 
Willis  has  organised  his  material  on  Barth's  ethics  historically  beginning  with  Barth's 
writings  from  around  1911  and  en-ling  with  Chin-ch  Doginatics  IVA.  This  mctliod 
causes  Willis  to  interpret  Barth's  later  writings  through  his  earlier  writings,  and  thus 
his  method  restricts  his  reading,  as  early  Barth  needs  to  be  read  with  the  later  Barth  in 
mind,  and  the  later  with  the  earlier  in  mind,  keeping  the  two  in  relationship.  Without 
this  understanding  the  temptation  is  to  presuppose  progress,  which  creates  two 
problems:  first,  a  tendency  to  look  for  changes  or  developments,  such  as  the  supposed 
move  from  dialectic  to  analogy  that  has  caused  so  much  confiision;  and  second,  to 
assume  our  present  position  is  more  enlightened  because  it  is  later  in  time. 
We  now  turn  to  consider  racism,  which  is  the  first  of  Willis's  political  concerns.  Until 
1966,  the  Civil  Rights  Movement  had  Onited  widely  disparate  elements  in  the  black 
community  along  with  their  white  supporters  and  sympathisers,  but  in  that  year  signs 
of  radicalism  began  to  appear  in  the  movement  as  younger  blacks  became  impatient 
with  the  rate  of  change  and  dissatisfied  with  purely  non-violent  methods  of  protest. 
This  new  militancy  split  the  ranks  of  the  movement's  leaders  and  alienated  some 
white  sympathisers,  a  process  that  was  accelerated  by  a  wave  of  rioting  in  the  black 
ghettos  of  several  major  cities  in  1965-67.  After  the  assassination  of  Martin  Luther 
King  in  April  1968  and  further  black  rioting  in  the  cities,  the  movement,  as  a  cohesive 
effort  disintegrated,  and  a  broad  spectrum  of  leadership  emerged  advocating  different 
approaches  and  varying  degrees  of  militancy.  It  is  important  to  keep  this  political 
position  in  mind  when  assessing  Willis's  criticisms  of  Barth's  ethics,  particularly  in 
his  search  for  the  autonomous  self. 
Willis's  concerns  about  communism,  his  second  political  presupposition,  take  place 
against  the  backdrop  of  the  Vietnam  War,  which  ensured  that  discussions  on  the 228 
justness  of  a  war  and  of  the  legitimacy  of  conscription  and  civil  disobedience  were 
prominent  in  the  early  writings  in  the  United  States  on  applied  ethics.  There  was 
considerable  support  for  civil  disobedience  against  unjust  aggression  and  against 
unjust  laws  even  in  a  democracy.  This  is  the  context  in  which  Willis  turns  to  Barth  to 
seek,  by  his  reading,  to  rescue  Barth  from  the  dismissed  position  his  work  had  been 
placed  by  American  theologians.  Willis  makes  the  following  observation: 
Within  the  context  of  American  theological  and  cultural  modes,  the  challenge 
of  providing  some  indication  of  the  viability  of  Barth's  ethics  is  particularly 
acute.  To  be  sure  he  has  met  with  criticism  from  his  own  Continental  brethren, 
but  there  is  present  in  this  country  both  a  resolute  and  a  tentative  rejection  of 
Barth  which  argue  either  that  he  is  irrelevant  to  the  complex  issues 
confronting  the  Western  world  as  a  whole,  or  that  the  cultural  peculiarities  of 
the  American  scene  render  his  high  powered  treatment  of  ethics  within  the 
context  of  dogmatics  innocuous.  "' 
Willis  quotes  hostile  comments  on  Barth's  ethics  from  Reinhold  Niebuhr  and  William 
Hamilton  and  lie  recognises  and  acknowledges  the  criticism  of  Barth's  ethics: 
It  is  the  ethical  adequacy  of  Barth's  theology  and  public  utterances  which  is 
most  often  labelled  deficient  or  irrelevant,  the  enterprise  of  getting  clear  what 
his  ethics  comes  to  is  timely,  appropriate,  and  well  worth  the  effort.  "' 
It  is  these  negative  readings  that  Willis  sets  out  to  redress  and  he  begins  on  an 
optimistic  note.  Initially  he  is  sure  that  his  positive  reading  of  Barth's  ethics  will  bring 
the  balance  to  equilibrium.  He  expresses  this  belief  in  the  opening  pages  in  claiming: 
Barth's  approach  to  theology,  and  the  ethical  thrust  which  is  imparted  to  it,  far 
from  bypassing  or  transcending  man  and  the  world,  are  designed  to  lend 
structure  and  substance  to  both.  "' 
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He  is  meticulous  in  rccognising  the  importance  of  Barth's  methodology  before 
beginning  his  own  detailed  -nalysis.  He  says  of  his  approach: 
It  is  imperative  that  Barth's  own  methodology  be  kept  clearly  in  mind,  at  two 
points  in  particular:  (i)  his  insistence  on  grounding  the  whole  of  dogmatics  in 
Christology;  (ii)  his  refusal  to  divide  dogmatics  and  ethics  into  two  separate 
disciplines.  "' 
Whereas  one  wants  to  applaud  Willis's  for  realising  the  importance  of  methodology 
one  also  wants  to  criticise  him  for  not  expanding.  on  this  insight.  He  accepts  the  maps 
given  to  Barth's  methodological  territory  by  the  readings  of  Van  Balthasar  and 
Torrance.  "'  He  believes  Barth  to  have  moved  methodologically  from  dialectics  to 
analogy,  and  he  sees  the  turning  point  taking  place  in  Barth's  work  on  Anselm.  These 
incorrect  readings,  of  both  Balthasar  and  Barth,  are  motivated  by  his  reluctance  to 
accept  the  influence  of  Hegel  and  Schleiermacher,  and  thus  Willis  reads  Barth  in 
isolation  from  his  German  tradition,  choosing  to  believe  that  Barth  worked  in  a  sacred 
vacuum.  He  praises  Torrance  for  his  understanding  that  the  Word  of  God  came 
directly  to  Barth  from  above  unencumbered  by  social  mediation. 
We  must  now  return  to  our  discussion  of  Barth's  engagement  with  the 
problematics  of  preaching,  for  it  was  this  which  finally  drove  him  to  a 
thorough  reconsideration  of  the  sources  of  all  theology  and  preaching,  the 
Bible. 
Shortly  after  his  withdrawal  from  the  Socialist  movement,  Barth  began  a 
program  of  intensive  biblical  and  theological  study  with  Eduard  Thurneysen, 
who  was  at  the  time  pastor  of  a  congregation  in  the  neighbouring  town  of 
Lentwil.  It  was  out  of  this  activity  of  sustained  exegetical  and  theological 
reflection  that  the  way  was  cleared  for  a  dramatic  new  awareness  of  the 
"strange  new  world"  of  the  Bible,  and  of  the  sovereignty  of  God  over  against 
all  human  contrivance.  As  T.  F.  Torrance  rightly  observes,  Barth  at  this  time 
became,  "determined  to  hear  the  Word  of  God  out  of  itself,  as  it  came  straight 
from  above,  unfettered  by  masterful  culture,  uncontrolled  by  the  needs  and 
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satisfactions  of  bourgeois  society,  and  before  it  had  been  sifted  and  diluted  by 
being  passed  through  some  general  frame  of  thought  already  worked  out  by 
modem  man.  ""' 
This  encourages  and  authenticates  Willis's  wish  to  disregard  Barth's  social  context, 
and  indeed  his  own.  This  is  problematic,  because  Willis  eliminates  context  in  a  work 
of  social  ethics,  and  predicable  because  he  writes  from  the  Anglo-American  analytical 
perspective.  For  Willis,  Barth's  theology  is  an  object  that  the  detached  observer,  as 
subject,  may  study.  These  assumed  and  unstated  presuppositions  lead  to  his  final 
disappointments  in  Barth's  ethics.  The  disappointment  due  to  his  reading  Barth  from 
an  analytical  position,  and  yet  he  quotes  from  the  political  reflections  that  provoked 
Barth's  turn  from  nineteenth  century  theology: 
Barth  placed  the  end  of  nineteenth  century  theology  for  him,  personally,  in  a 
proclamation  issued  by  a  group  of  German  intellectuals  in  August  1914,  in 
support  of  the  war  policies  of  Kaiser  Wilhelm.  " 
Willis  persists  with  the  view  that  the  Word  operates  in  a  social  vacuum.  This  allows 
him  to  see  Barth  moving  from  dialectic  to  analogy  and  the  dismissal  of  what  Willis 
describes  as  the  Hegelian  categories: 
There  is  also  discernible  in  the  second  of  these  lectures  a  motif  which  will 
become  increasingly  dominant,  and  which  will  attain  its  most  intensive 
statement  in  the  second  edition  of  the  R6merbrief.  the  utilisation  of  dialectic. 
This  may  be  seen  here,  in  somewhat  germinal  form,  in  the  employment  of 
Hegelian  categories,  in  the  tension  between  temporal  and  the  external,  and  in 
the  alternation  between  acceptance  and  the  criticism  of  existing  social  forms, 
which  in  itself  constitutes  a  mirroring  of  the  activity  of  God.  "' 
Willis  connects  dialectical  method  with  Hegel  and  therefore  sees  the  turn  from 
dialectic  to  analogy,  which  he  believes  happened  at  the  time  of  Barth'  s  work  on 
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Anselm,  as  the  end  of  Hegel's  influence  on  Barth's  methodology.  Willis  uses  the 
phrase,  'Hegelian  cat-gories',  without  definition,  but  implies  something  unhelpful. 
Here  is  another  example  of  Willis's  refusal  to  see  Barth  as  a  follower  of  a  tradition  in 
the  belief  that  the  Word  of  God  came  unmediated  by  social  context.  The  idea  that 
Barth  stands  outside  of  his  world  is,  in  Willis's  view,  established  by  his  use  of  the 
dialectic: 
Ethically  the  emergence  of  dialectic  in  Barth's  method  will  have  two 
consequences;  (1)  It  will  enable  him  to  approach  the  issue  of  the  ethical 
without  falling  into  or  adopting  a  particular  world-view  or  ideology.  As  we 
shall  see,  this  has  important  consequences  during  the  years  of  Barth's  struggle 
with  National  Socialism,  and  it  is  not  without  importance  for  an  understanding 
of  his  later  shift  from  dialectic  to  analogy.  146 
Here  Willis  claims  that  dialectic  has  a  positive  use  as  it  stands  outside  its  social 
context.  Earlier  Willis  had  claimed  that  Barth  had  moved  from  dialectic  to  analogy 
before  1934,  but  at  this  point  Willis  is  using  dialectic  as  a  foundation  for  proposing 
that  Barth  had  a  subject  object  relationship  with  his  social  context.  In  addition, 
dialectic  is  now  being  referred  to  positively  by  Willis  with  no  mention  of  'Hegelian 
categories'. 
More  recently,  scholars  have  pointed  to  the  importance  of  context  in  Barth's 
writing.  "'  Richard  Roberts  says: 
It  is  the  understanding  and  positive  interpretation  of  the  function  of  Barth's 
theological  agency,  understood  in  its  particular  socio-cultural  context,  that 
remains  a  matter  of  continuing  concern  to  us.  "' 
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In  a  footnote  to  this  comment  Roberts  expands: 
We  thus  disagree  with  those  commentators  upon  Barth  who  try  to  divorce  his 
theology  from  its  context,  declaring  the  latter  a  virtual  irrelevance.  We  wish  to 
capture  a  ftiller  understanding  of  the  socio-rhetorical  function  of  theological 
texts  in  context  and  we  regard  this  as  a  necessary  step  in  the  generation  of 
theological  argument  itself"' 
Willis  in  the  discussion  of  Barth's  'early  period',  in  chapter  one,  shows  a  confusing 
use  of  term  dialectic,  which  is  caused  by  not  appreciating  that  truth  and  method  are  in 
symbiotic  relationship  causes  coriftision,  and  this  misunderstanding  is  evident  in  these 
words: 
We  shall  need  to  indicate  the  content  of  the  Krisis  under  which  man  stands, 
and  the  methodological  significance  of  dialectic  as  a  vehicle  for  getting  this 
expressed.  "O 
Here  dialectic  is  a  'vehicle'  for  expressing  content,  as  Willis  understands  the  dialectic 
as  different  in  substance  to  the  content.  This  is  a  misunderstanding  as  there  is  no 
separation,  because  dialectic  is  the  content.  Willis  quotes  from  Torrance  to  support  his 
view,  but  here,  Torrance  uses  "dialogical"  as  a  synonym  for  "dialectic"  that  further 
illustrates  the  confusion: 
Theological  thinking  is  inescapably  dialectical  because  it  must  be  thinking  by 
man  not  from  a  centre  in  himself  but  from  a  centre  in  God,  and  yet  never 
seeks  to  usurp  God'  own  standpoint.  It  is  dialogical  thinking  in  which  man 
remains  man  but  in  which  he  meets  God,  listens  to  him,  answers  him,  and 
speaks  of  him  in  such  a  way  that  at  every  point  he  gives  God  the  glory. 
Because  it  is  dialogical,  it  can  only  be  fragmented  on  his 
* 
side,  for  it  does  not 
carry  its  coordinating  principle  in  itself,  but  derives  it  from  beyond  itself  in 
God's  Word.  "' 
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Willis  ftirther  quotes  Barth's  well-known  position  on  the  absence  of  presuppositions, 
and  the  inabilit-  of  humanity  to  appropriate  revelation  and  thus  build  a  body  of 
knowledge,  with  the  aim  of  applying  it  to  other  cases  to  support  his  views: 
This  does  not  mean  that  man  is  given  the  capacity  to  recognise  and  grasp  this 
as  pi-esupposition,  after  which  he  independently  deduces  the  appropriate 
consequences,  making  application  of  it  in  varying  situations  evoking  decision 
and  action.  "' 
The  opposite  of  this  position  applies  to  Willis's  analysis  of  Barth's  ethics,  as  Barth 
insists  that  ontology  and  epistemology  is  given  in  the  event  of  revelation.  The  reasons 
for  this  decision  are  discussed  elsewhere  in  the  text.  Willis  assumes  that  both  ontology 
and  epistemology  exist  as  given  before  revelation.  Willis  believes  that  he  can  as 
subject;  examine  Barth's  ethics,  as  an  object,  without  difficulties.  Yet  it  is  just  this 
discredited  position  that  Barth's  theology  addresses. 
As  a  subject  examining  an  object,  Willis  understands  the  'method'  of  the  dialectic  to 
cause  the  problem  of  human  autonomy.  He  anticipates  the  move  from  dialectic  to 
analogy,  and  the  resolution  of  the  difficulties  he  believes  Barth's  early  work  raise 
about  human  responsibility: 
The  upshot  of  our  discussion  is  that  the  almost  exclusive  emphasis  which  is 
placed  on  the  priority  and  transcendence  of  God  in  his  revelation,  and  the 
eschatological  reality  of  the  human  as  grounded  in  Christ,  raise  serious 
questions  about  the  existential  identity  of  man  in  his  historicity,  and  thus 
about  the  possibility  for  there  being  meaningful  ethical  actions  which  move 
beyond  the  primary  action  of  repentance.  To  be  sure,  Barth  undertakes  to 
speak  to  these  points.  The  results,  however,  remain  dubious.  Whether  his 
subsequent  shift  from  the  dialectical  categories  to  a  use  of  analogy  allows  a 
more  convincing  treatment  of  human  remains  to  be  seen.  "' 
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Willis  defines  what  he  believes  to  be  the  difficulty,  and  this  definition  becomes  the 
test  to  apply  to  Barth's  next  work: 
The  difficulty  now  turns  on  whether,  in  addition  to  the  Ki-isis  inaugurated 
upon  the  world  by  God,  and  the  ensuing  eschatological  transformation  which 
results,  there  remains  room  for  speaking  convincingly  of  the  existential 
structure  and  function  of  the  human.  "' 
Having  set  the  problem,  Willis  reads  back  into  the  early  work.  "'  He  finds  the  early 
period  suffers  from  the  dialectic  as  a  method  and  claims  Barth  was  looking  for  a  new 
theological  method  as  a  vehicle  to  express  his  ideas,  but  he  gives  no  evidence  to 
support  his  argument: 
The  period  from  the  publication  of  the  second  Rdinerbilef  to  the  appearance  of 
the  first  volume  of  the  Chin-ch  Dogmatics  displays  Barth's  continued  search 
for  an  adequate  theological  method.  "' 
Again  Willis  uses  the  traditional  map  of  the  territory  and  approvingly  quotes  Torrance 
who  believes  that  there  was,  'a  fundamental  methodological  weakness  in  Christian 
Dogmatics  1927'.  This  'weakness'  was,  'grounded  in  phenomenological  and 
existential  thinking'.  "'  Willis  takes  this  as  established  truth,  but  does  not  explain  what 
he  means  by  a  methodological  weakness,  nor  explain  what  he  means  by 
phenomenological  and  existential  thinking.  He  assumes  that  the  absence  of  an 
autonomous  subject  is  a  weakness  in  Barth's  thinking,  identifying  Kierkegaard's 
influence  in  Barth's  'phenomenological  and  existential  thinking'.  Later,  Willis 
expects  Barth  to  give  up  this  early  position;  yet,  it  is  a  position  that  Willis's  reading 
creates.  Willis  says  that  the  solution  to  the  problem  of  theological  method  was  in 
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Barth's  study  of  Anselm  in  1929,  and  that  it  was  the  move  to  analogy.  "'  In  an  aside, 
he  says  tilat  dialectics  allowed  Barth  sufficient  distance  to  criticise  National 
Socialism.  There  is  no  evidence  that  Kierkegaard's  dialectic  method  influenced  Barth, 
but  Willis  wants  1929  to  be  the  date  of  transition  from  dialectic  to  analogy  and  as  he 
wants  dialectic  to  be  means  of  Barth's  criticism  of  National  Socialism.  The 
implication  is  that  Barth  moved  from  dialectic  before  the  Bannen  Declaration  of 
1934,  but  this  dating  does  not  fit  with  Willis's  hypothesis. 
Willis  sees  a  hope  for  the  autonomous  human  subject  in  a  lecture  delivered  by  Barth 
in  1927,  but  it  is  the  smallest  of  hopes,  as  it  is  based  only  on  the  tense  of  a  verb: 
I  wish  to  note  the  transition  involved  in  moving  from  the  Rimel-bfiefto  the 
Christian  Doginatics.  Ethically,  it  is  a  bit  difficult  to  deten-nine  precisely  what 
this  shift  entailed.  It  is  partly  discernible  in  an  address  delivered  by  Barth  at 
the  conference  of  student  Christians  held  at  Aarau  in  1927.  The  title  of  this, 
"Following  the  Command",  is  suggestive  at  two  points.  First,  the  verb 
employed,  "following",  is  active,  and  thus  contains  at  least  the  possibility  of  a 
positive  delineation  of  the  options  open  to  man  as  an  ethical  agent.  "' 
Willis  does  not  discuss  the  Mfinster  Ethics  of  1928  in  detail  but  does  make  some 
important  observations.  He  says,  'This  is  especially  interesting,  since  it  approximates, 
in  general  outline,  the  development  of  ethics  in  the  Chin-ch  Doginatics',  and 
continues:  " 
This  lecture,  (Mfinster  Ethics  1928),  is  significant,  even  in  outline,  for  it 
provides  a  rather  complete  delineation  of  the  way  a  theological  ethic  would  be 
developed  within  the  context  of  dogmatics.  It  is  not  too  fanciful  to  suggest,  in 
this  respect,  that  this  might  eventually  have  found  its  way  into  the  unfinished 
volumes  of  the  Clun-ch  Dogmatics.  One  major  difference  appears  to  be  that  in 
this  outline  the  category  of  freedom  is  introduced  only  under  the  command  of 
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redemption,  whereas  in  the  Chin-ch  Dogmatics  it  plays  a  central  role  in  the 
special  ethic  of  creation.  "' 
There  are  two  points,  which  were  discussed  in  chapter  6,  to  be  made  about  Willis's 
comment:  first,  to  recognise  his  affirmation  of  the  importance  of  the  Mfinster  Ethics 
for  an  overall  understanding  of  Barth's  ethics;  and  second,  to  raise  a  question  over 
freedom  being  restricted  to  the  special  ethic  of  creation.  162  Barth  discusses  the  freedom 
to  become  baptised  as  the  first  Christian  act. 
It  is  disappointing  that  Willis  has  so  little  to  say  about  the  MOnster  Ethics.  Of  course, 
the  material  was  not  available  to  him  as  the  lectures  were  first  published  in  German  in 
1973  and  1978,  and  the  English  translation  did  not  appear  until  1981,  whereas 
Willis's  study  was  published  in  1971.  However,  Willis.  does  discuss  a  lecture  that 
Barth  gave  in  1928,  the  year  before  the  MEnster  Ethics,  which  was  published  in  1930. 
Of  Zur  Lehi-e  voin  Heiligen  Geist  Willis  writes: 
This  was  written  in  1930  in  collaboration  with  his  brother,  Heinrich  Barth, 
who  contributed  a  discussion  of  "The  Idea  of  the  Spirit  in  Gen-nan  Idealism.  " 
Barth's  discussion  of  "The  Holy  Spirit  and  Christian  Life"  marks  an  important 
stage  in  the  development  of  his  thinking  about  ethics.  Here  he  concerns 
himself  specifically  with  the  relation  between  justification  and  sanctification, 
and  the  problem  of  obedience,  which  emerges  within  faith.  "' 
Here  Willis  makes  a  serious  misreading  that  resulting  from  his  presuppositions.  He 
says  of  the  work  that  it  was  written  with  Heinrich  Barth.  This  is  a  misunderstanding. 
The  brothers  produced  two  very  different  papers  on  the  place  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  " 
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Willis's  comments  that  Heinrich  and  Karl  collaborated  on  this  material  is  a  serious 
m;  -;  reading,  because  Willis  claims  by  implication  that  Karl  Barth  shared  Heinrich's 
desire  to  return  to  Kant.  Of  course,  such  a  misreading  is  understandable  given  Willis's 
presuppositions.  He  sums  up  his  thoughts  about  Barth's  lecture  by  again  drawing  out 
the  absence  of  human  autonomy  and  believing  this  is  caused  by  the  faulty  method  of 
the  dialectic.  From  his  faulty  reading,  Willis  make  the  following,  rather  sad, 
comment: 
At  this  point  one  is  left  to  wonder  how  far  Barth  has  moved  beyond  the 
position  of  RdInel-bfief.  To  be  sure,  the  stringent  dialectic  given  expression 
there  has  ceased  to  dominate,  and  the  distinction  between  reconciliation  and 
redemption  provides  a  sort  of  stability  to  the  human  that  was  not  present 
earlier.  The  question  remains,  however,  whether  the  shifts  that  mark  Barth's 
thinking  from  the  Chi-islian  Dogmatics  to  this  present  writing  (and  it  should 
be  recalled  that  this  brings  us  within  two  years  of  the  Chin-ch  Dogmatics) 
result  in  any  substantive  revision  of  his  ethics.  "' 
Willis  said,  of  the  MUnster  ethics  of  two  years  earlier  it  was  not  fanciful  to  suggest  it 
would  have  made  the  content  of  the  unwritten  ethical  section  of  the  Church 
Dogmatics.  He  now  sees  no  substantial  revision  in  Barth's  ethics.  The  problems  that 
Willis  has  delineated  would,  he  predicts,  have  dominated  Chin-ch  Dogmatics.  Given 
the  opinion  that  Willis  shares  with  Webster  regarding  the  importance  of  this  lecture 
for  predicting  the  shape  of  the  ethic  in  the  section  of  the  Church  Dogmatics,  which 
was  never  written,  the  misunderstanding  is  serious.  It  casts  a  shadow  of  doubt  over 
Willis's  reading  of  Barth's  ethics,  and  therefore  Willis's  project.  He  moves  on  to 
discusses  Barth's  Dortmund  lecture  of  1929.  "  He  says: 
This  lecture  manifests  a  decisive  movement  towards  the  theological 
orientation  of  the  Chin-ch  Dogmatics.  It  rejects  any  immanent  criterion, 
whether  objective  or  subjective.  It  recognises  the  unavoidability  of  certain 
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philosophical  motifs  within  theology,  but  places  these  at  all.  points  under  the 
word  of  God,  that  is  under  Jesus  Christ.  Finally,  theology  is  understood  to  be 
essentially  Christology.  Indeed  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  definition  of 
theology  given  here  receives  precise  embodiment  in  the  volumes  of  the 
Church  Doginatics.  " 
Having  established  that  the  fonn  and  content  of  the  future  Chta-ch  Dogmatics  was 
fixed  by  1928  Willis  has  really.  established  his  own  position  in  relation  to  Barth.  Self- 
referring  autonomous  humanitY,  which  Willis  sees  as  a  requirement  for  a  Christian 
ethic,  is  missing  from  Barth's  work  at  this  point,  and  he  predicts  it  will  continue  to  be 
missing  from  the  entire  corpus: 
An  ethic  grounded  in  the  free  electing  grace  of  God,  which  encounters  man  as 
command  in  his  particular  giveness  and  determination,  would  be  expected  to 
exhibit  a  corresponding  freedom  from  fixed  categories  of  response  and  action. 
There  is  a  problem  in  this,  which  has  to  do  with  those  ordinary  stabilities  and 
orderings  which  surround  man  in  his  creaturely  life.  Barth  has  indicated  an 
awareness  of  this  in  the  1928  outline  of  ethics,  which  included  a  section 
devoted  to  the  place  of  order  within  an  ethic  of  creation. 
When  the  point  about  the  freedom  of  grace  in  revelation  and  the  implication 
that  this  carries  for  ethics  has  been,  a  fijrther  question  presses  for  an  answer. 
To  what  extent  is  man,  as  a  creature  enabled  through  the  Holy  Spirit  to 
respond.  to  God's  gracious  love,  capable  of  realising  the  possibilities  open  to 
him  as  an  ethical  agent?  Here  I  have  suggested  a  certain  lack  of  clarity.  To  be 
sure,  there  is  discernible  a  somewhat  more  hopeful  treatment  of  this  issue  in 
the  writings  after  the  Rdinei-bi-ief.  It  still  appears  to  be  the  case,  however,  that 
the  eschatological  reality  of  the  human,  as  promise,  even  though  a  future  in 
the  present,  is  provided  with  no  meaningful  point  of  contact  with  man's 
giveness  and  his  need  to  act  now.  It  is  possible  that  a  subsequent  deepening 
and  extension  of  Christology  in  the  Church  Dogmatics  will  take  us  beyond 
what  seems,  at  present,  an  impasse.  "' 
It  is  not  surprising  that  as  Willis  deepens  his  study  of  the  ethical  sections  of  Church 
Doginatics  that  he  becomes  gradually  less  enthusiastic.  He  accuses  Barth.  of 
misappropriating  language  and  of  having  a  disregard  for  philosophy.  On  the  first  point 
Willis  chooses  to  express  his  disbelief  that  Barth  in  Church  Dogmatics  discusses  the 
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improper  and  pictorial  function  of  language  with  the  following  footnote.  119  'Barth 
actually  advances  the  astonishing  assertion  that  such  words  as  "arm"  and  "Mouth"  are 
to  us,  'as  such,  incomprehensible.  ""  This  is  an  unreasonable  comment  from  Willis, 
Barth  obviously  knew  the  meaning  of  these  words,  and  used  them  in  his  daily  life.  On 
the  second  point,  Willis  criticises  Barth  for  giving  insufficient  regard  to  philosophy. 
In  Chin-ch  Dogmatics  there  are  pages  of  footnotes  where  Barth  is  in  discussion  with 
philosophers.  In  an  interesting  footnote  Willis  makes  the  following  revealing 
comment: 
Barth's  description  of  the  common  involvement  of  theology  and  philosophy 
with  "the  one,  total  Truth"  indicates  his  reading  of  philosophy  in  terms  of 
idealism,  where  a  definite  metaphysical  concern  of  this  sort  (i.  e.,  unity  and 
inclusiveness)  is  expressed.  It  is  interesting  to  speculate  how  Barth  would 
view  the  decisive  thrust  in  British  and  American  philosophy  away  from  this 
sort  of  concern  toward  an  almost  exclusive  interest  in  empirical  and  linguistic 
analysis.  "' 
At  the  end  of  his  thesis  Willis  has  a  section  of  Questions  and  Issues  in  which  he 
surnmarises  his  conclusions.  In  this  section  under  the  title,  The  Unity  of  Barth's 
Ethics  Willis  comes  to  the  core  of  his  disagreement  with  Barth's  individual  and 
political  ethic.  He  says: 
By  insisting  on  virtually  identifying  dogmatics  and  ethics,  Barth  fails,  at 
points,  to  make  an  effective  transition  out  of  the  context  of  "divine  ethics"  and 
into  the  empirical  framework  where  the  stuff  of  human  decision  and  action 
must  be  wrestled  with.  The  motifs  of  transcendentalism  and  actualism  that  run 
through  his  presentation  do  not  clearly  make  contact  with  the  human,  and  such 
contact  as  they  do  manage  is  vitiated  by  the  relation  Barth  sets  up  between 
created  and  reconciled  human  nature.  The  result  of  this  is  a  certain  ambiguity 
about  the  status  and  meaning  of  Christian  ethics,  and  human  action  generally, 
beyond  the  one  inclusive  action  of  God  in  Christ.  To  this  extent,  at  least,  it 
would  appear  that  the  difficulties  noted  in  the  ethics  of  the  R&ntei-bi-ief  and  the 
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shorter  writings  that  follow  it,  have  not  been  completely  overcome  in  the 
Doginatics.  "' 
The  problems  defined  by  Willis  lead  him  to  the  conclusion  that  in  specific  cases  of 
social  ethics  Barth  does  not  give  sufficient  concern  to  individuals  but  concentrates  on 
ideology.  For  example,  Willis  says  of  Barth's  perspective  on  the  State: 
The  major  concern  manifested  in  Barth's  encounter  with  both  National 
Socialism  and  Communism  appears  to  lie  more  at  the  level  on  the  ideological 
bearing  these  have  on  the  self-understanding  of  the  Church  than  the  question 
of  their  impact  on  persons.  "' 
Of  course,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  Willis  did  not  have  access  to  Barth's 
MOnster  and  Bonn  lectures.  The  quotation  from  Willis  above  suggests  that  access  to 
the  Mfinster  Ethics  would  have  made  little  difference  as  the  problems  persisted  into 
the  Church  Doginatics.  It  is  as  if  Barth  and  Willis  are  from  different  worlds  and  speak 
different  languages,  Willis  tries  to  judge  Barth  from  an  Anglo-American  perspective, 
and  although  within  this  context  he  is  scrupulously  fair  in  his  reading  of  Barth,  his 
project  is  doomed  to  failure.  Willis's  study  is  an  illustration  of  the  lack  of 
comprehension  of  Barth's  work  by  Anglo-American  theologians.  How  far  Willis 
would  have  been  able  to  temper  his  disappointment  with  Barth's  ethics  had  he  read 
the  MOnster  ethics  cannot  be  known.  However  Willis's  meticulous  work  is  a  fine 
example  of  the  work  that  needs  to  be  done  on  a  close  study  of  Barth's  writings  that 
have  become  recently  available.  Such  studies  need  to  be  aware  of  historical  and 
contextual  constraints.  There  is  evidence,  as  has  been  suggested  earlier  in  this  thesis, 
that  this  task  has  begun,  and  indeed  this  work  is  intended  as  part  of  the  process  of 
reassessing  Barth's  contribution  to  theological  social  ethics. 
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Part  of  this  task,  in  relation  to  the  criticisms  of  Wills  and  others  is  answering  the 
question:  is  it  possible  to  defend  Barth  against  the  charge  that  he  has  made  his  ethics 
immune  from  criticisms?  In  answering  this  question,  there  are  two  features  of  Bar-th's 
ethics  to  consider:  they  are  foundation  and  method.  The  Mfinster  and  Bonn  Ethics 
establish  the  foundations  of  theological  ethics  in  the  Word  of  God.  Barth  can  be 
criticised  for  beginning  ethics  with  dogmatics.  However,  it  has  to  be  remembered  that 
he  is  discussing  a  science  in  which  the  method  has  to  be  appropriate  to  the  object  of 
study.  The  object  defines  the  method.  Unlike  any  other  science,  the  object  of 
theological  study  is  unique.  Judgments  of  Barth's  ethics  have  to  be  made  on  whether 
the  method  of  study  is  appropriate  to  the  object.  Therefore,  it  is  not  possible  to 
evaluate  Barth's  method  against  the  method  used  in  other  sciences.  In  this  thesis,  it 
has  been  argued  that  the  use  of  orders  of  creation  in  the  Minster  and  Bonn  ethics  is 
contrary  to  the  method.  It  has  also  been  pointed  out  that  Barth  emphasised  the 
individual  at  the  expense  of  wider  political  concerns.  The  use  of  the  "plank"  argument 
for  disagreements  between  states  needs  further  elaboration.  Establishing  theological 
ethics,  as  science  is  not  beyond  criticism,  indeed  the  two  ethicists  discussed  in  the 
next  section  begin  not  in  dogmatics  but  in  historical  narrative.  As  will  be  seen 
anthropological  foundations  assume  the  human  capacity  to  make  judgements  about 
the  object  of  study  from  a  neutral  position.  Barth  does  not  accept  this  position. 
If  theology  is  a  science  then  criticism  needs  to  focus  on  the  appropriateness  of  the 
method,  whereas,  if  it  is  not  a  science  then  the  foundation  of  Barth's  work  is  open  to 
criticism.  The  foundation  is  in  God's  revelation,  and  so  the  criticism  assumes  a 
neutral  position  from  which  God  might  be  judged.  Again,  this  is  exactly  the  position 
that  Barth's  work  refuses  to  accept.  The  criticism  that  Barth's  work  is  immune  from 242 
criticism  assumes  too  high  a  regard  for  the  traditional  Enlightenment  view  of  the 
detached  observer,  which  assumes  that  theology  is  similar  to  all  other  areas  of  human 
knowledge  and  that  God's  revelation  can  be  judged. 
7.4  Alternative  Ethical  Projects 
A  brief  discussion  of  the  two  alternative  ethical  projects  by  Donald  Shriver  and 
Miroslav  Volf  is  included  at  this  point,  which  focuses  attention  on  two  questions: 
1.  What  foundations  are  proper  for  the  discussion  of  theological  ethics? 
2.  What  methodology  is  appropriate  to  the  articulation  of  the  truth  of  theological 
.  ethics? 
The  focal  point  of  the  assessment  of  these  alternative  approaches  is  Barth's  claim  that 
theology  is  a  science.  Frotn  the  previous  discussion,  we  have  seen  that,  for  Barth,  the 
foundations  of  a  science  have  to  be  authenticated  by  the  object  of  study.  In  addition, 
the  truth  of  the  object  of  study  determines  what  is  an  appropriate  methodology.  These 
conditions  establish  that  theological  ethics  is  part  of  dogmatics.  Barth  is  not  so  naive 
to  believe  that  his  theological  ethics,  although  necessary,  is  also  unique.  He  realises 
theological  ethics  may  assume  other  possible  forrns  and  shapes.  Shriver  and  Volf 
provide  two  alternative  perspectives.  However,  the  two  questions  above  are  the 
criteria  by  which  the  appropriateness  of  any  theological  ethics  is  judged. 
The  critiques  of  Shriver  and  Wolf  are  from  the  perspective  of  a  reading  of  Barth's 
ethical  writings,  and  the  discussion  of  them  draws  attention  to  the  need  to  establish 
suitable  criteria  for  the  foundations  and  the  methodology  of  any  theological  ethic,  and 243 
Shriver  and  Volf's  works  illustrate  problems  concerning  the  foundations  and 
methodology  of  theological  ethics.  The  discussion  shows,  from  the  perspective  of 
Barth's  work,  the  importance  of  establishing  the  foundation  of  theological  ethics  in 
revelation.  As  a  result,  the  discussion  stresses  the  importance  for  Barth  that 
theological  ethics  develops  a  methodology  appropriate  to  its  object  of  study. 
Therefore,  there  can  be  no  presuppositions  brought  to  the  task  from  anthropology  or 
any  other  human  source. 
7.4.1  Donald  Shriver 
Shriver  begins  by  quoting  the  poet  Robert  Frost's  observation:  "To  be  social  is  to  be 
forgiving.  ""'  These  words  aptly  expresses  the  first  theme  of  the  work  in  which 
Shriver  argues  for  the  reclaiming  of  forgiveness,  from  being  an  individualised 
concept,  to  its  re-establishment  as  a  social-political  concept.  Shriver,  in  the  middle  of 
his  work  states,  'Our  past  in  your  present  threatens  your  future'.  These  words  express 
the  second  theme  under  discussion  and  succinctly  express  the  pragmatic  reason 
Shriver  gives  for  undertaking  the  study  which  is  the  healing  of  memories. 
Shriver  writes  from  his  personal  experiences  as  a  pastor  of  a  small  congregation  in 
North  Carolina,  and  in  his  introduction  says  of  his  purpose  in  writing  the  book: 
The  principal  purpose  of  the  whole  study  is  to  identify  both  the  need  and  the 
actual  presence  of  forgiveness  in  political  history,  and  thus  to  encourage 
readers,  as  citizens,  to  consider  the  political  wisdom  inherent  in  this  neglected 
virtue.  "' 
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His  second  purpose  is  to  reclaim  forgiveness  as  a  social  concept  he  further  developed 
these  ideas  during  his  graduate  work  in  a  mental  hospital.  His  interest  developed 
further  into  the  exploration  of  forgiveness  as  a  political  concept  in  the  1960's  as  an 
active  participator  in  the  civil  rights  movement. 
Both  the  timing  and  the  context  are  important  for  any  understanding  of  Shriver's 
study.  Although  his  work  was  published  in  1995  Shriver's  thoughts  were  germinating 
in  the  sixties  in  the  seedbed  of  an  evangelical  community  and  a  mental  institution. 
The  1960's  were  a  time  of  political  upheaval  and  of  hope.  In  1960,  JOrgen  Moltmann 
was  writing  a  theology  of  hope,  but  by  the  1970's  he  was  eloquently  expressing  the 
loss  of  that  hope  and  expounding  a  theology  of  suffering.  "'  The  1960's  were  also  the 
time  of  the  Cuban  missile  crisis  and  the  heat  of  the  Cold  War.  However,  Shriver's 
study  expresses  the  optimism  of  the  1960's  and  he  seems  unaware  of  the  difficulties 
caused  by  the  loss  of  this  optimism,  nor  its  interrelation  with  the  wider  world  political 
scene. 
The  phenomenological  studies  of  mental  institutions  by  Erving  Goffman  profoundly 
affect  our  understanding  of  the  social  relationships  within  mental  institutions,  and 
Shriver  implies  that  the  socialisation  of  the  concept  of  forgiveness  would  address 
these  difficulties.  "'  He  appears  to  be  unaware  of  the  complications  that  were  very 
much  part  of  the  seventies  socio-political  debate.  This  also  suggests  that  the  views  he 
expressed  in  An  Elhicfbi-  Enemies  were  formed  in  the  nineteen  sixties  and  express  the 
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optimism  of  the  time.  Shriver  also  has  a  moral  purpose,  which  is  to  call  Americans  to 
confession. 
Shriver  says  that  three  questions  underlie  his  study,  they  are: 
1.  What  moral  wrongs,  and  what  memories  of  them,  do  we  bring  to  our 
conflicts  with  other  human  beings? 
2.  What  difference  does  a  process  of  listening  to  other  people's  experience  of 
hurt  make  to  the  building  of  some  new  communal  relation  between  them? 
3.  And  if  the  building  of  relationships  is  at  the  heart  of  ethics,  how  can  that 
goal  be  served  rather  than  frustrated  by  the  moral  judgements  which  hostile 
groups  often  make  about  each  other? 
Shriver's  use  of  pronouns  in  the  first  two  questions  suggests  he  is  speaking  about 
individual  transactions.  However,  moving  from  a  particular  experience  to  a  general 
political  statement  is  problematic.  This  problem  persists  throughout  his  study,  and 
relates  directly  to  his  third  question,  which  he  begins  with:  'if  the  building  of 
relationships  is  at  the  heart  of  ethics'.  For  Shriver  then  the  foundation  of  ethics  is  the 
building  of  relationships  and  his  ethical  reflections  begin  from  historical  events.  For 
this  methodology  Shriver  says  he  is  indebted  to  H.  Richard  Niebuhr,  who,  he  says, 
taught  him  the  meaning  of  ethics  focused  on  the  mutuality  of  value  and  interests  in  the 
webs  of  history. 
Shriver  writes  from  his  experiences  as  a  pastor  and  a  member  of  the  Christian 
community.  Of  course,  it  is  possible  to  begin  ethical  reflections  from  historical 
experiences,  but  he  wants  to  write  Christian  social  ethics.  What  is  to  distinguish 
Shriver's  Christian  social  ethics  from  any  other  social  ethics?  What  is  it  that  makes  it 
specifically  Christian?  Shriver  does  not  address  this  question.  Nor  does  he  attempt  to 246 
justify  his  method.  His  work  assumes  his  methodology  is  not  problematic  and  this 
assumption  leads  him  into  difficulties  when  he  tries  to  ground  his  work  in  the  life  of 
the  early  church  and  then  transposes  his  reading  to  the  twentieth  century. 
Forgiveness  is  the  central  concept  in  Shriver's  study  of  reconciliation.  He  says: 
The  concept  of  forgiveness,  which  is  customarily  relegated  to  the  realms  of 
religion  and  personal  ethics,  belongs  at  the  heart  of  reflection  about  how 
groups  of  humans  can  move  to  repair  the  damages  that  they  have  suffered 
from  past  conflicts  with  each  other. 
Forgiveness  might  be  an  element  in  achieving  the  aim  of  the  reconciliation  between 
groups,  but,  if  Shriver  wants  to  ground  his  Christian  social  ethics  in  the  New 
Testament  witness  of  the  early  church,  then  the  concept  of  non-propriatorial  rights 
would  have  a  stronger  claim,  as  they  are  the  major  theme  of  the  New  Testament. 
Richard  Hays  says:  'the  challenge  of  the  New  Testament  is  clear:  from  Matthew  to 
Revelation,  the  New  Testament  writers  bear  witness  passionately  about  the  economic 
imperatives  of  discipleship'.  "'  Certainly,  non-propriatorial  rights  are  an  outstanding 
feature  of  the  early  church  as  described  in  Acts.  Property  claims  for  land,  goods,  or 
people  are  the  major  source  of  conflict  in  and  between  societies,  but  Shriver  does  not 
consider  such  claims  as  a  source  either  of  conflict,  or  as  a  means  of  restoration  and 
reconciliation  of  which  forgiveness  would  be  an  element.  Forgiveness  as  a  concept, 
in  his  study,  has  been  elevated  above  all  other  ideas,  in  the  process  of  reconciliation. 
This  is  because  of  Shriver's  underlying  aim,  which  is  to  call  Americans  to  make 
confession  for  racism. 
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He  says  of  his  task:  'Urgency  compels  communication,  the  narrative  is  fictional 
historical  which  seems  to  meet  the  requirements'.  By  basing  his  work  in  Christian 
social  ethics  on  historical  descriptions,  he  is  conscious  that  the  person  who  controls  a 
society's  stories  controls  their  present  and  their  future.  He  reports  that  South  Africans 
reminded  him  that  they  had  suffered  already  from  othel-s  writing  their  history.  In 
addition,  Shriver's  interpretation  of  historical  events  is  open  to  question.  Not  all 
historians  would  agree  with  him  that  the  economic  effects  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
were  the  only  foundation  of  the  Third  Reich.  Nor  indeed  would  all  accept  his  views 
on  the  post  War  World  11  relationship  between  America  and  Gerniany.  He  chooses 
three  stories,  which  he  calls  narrative  history  and  asks,  'What  do  these  stories  tell  us 
about  forgiveness?  '  The  stories  are: 
1.  American  hostility  toward  Germany. 
2.  America's  confrontation  with  Japan. 
3.  American  injustice  upon  African  Americans. 
Shriver  first  wants  to  establish  that  in  the  past  forgiveness  was  central  to  the  social 
and  political  life  of  communities.  He  later  discusses  how  forgiveness,  as.  a  social 
concept,  became  forgiveness  for  individual  acts,  and  he  places  much  of  the  blame  for 
this  change  on  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  who,  he  claims,  institutionalised  what  he 
refers  to  as  "the  sacrament  of  penance",  but  which  practising  Catholics  would  call  the 
"sacrament  of  reconciliation".  This  is  a  significant  terminological  change  because  the 
emphasis  becomes  one  of  repairing  of  the  relationships  with  God  and  neighbour. 
To  construct  his  foundation  Shriver  uses  Greek,  Hebrew  and  Christian  sources.  The 
Greek  source  is  the  tales  of  Aeschylus  and  Thucydides.  The  Hebrew  is  the  saga  of 248 
Joseph,  which  is  an  example  of  forgiveness  in  a  political  setting.  The  Christian 
narrative  is  the  New  Testament  account  of  the  internal  life  of  the  early  church.  in 
these  stories  Shriver  shows  how,  in  three  different  societies,  forgiveness  was  practiced 
as  a  community  activity,  then,  in  reflecting  on  the  three  twentieth  century  stories  that 
he  has  chosen,  he  asks,  and  answers,  two  questions: 
1.  How  has  forgiveness  came  to  have  such  a  minor  place  in  political  ethics? 
2.  In  a  pluralistic  ethical  culture,  can  we  in  our  time  agree  on  any  ethical 
standards? 
Shriver  wants  to  be  able  to  draw  implications  from  his  historical  case  studies  for, 
'future  thinking  and  behaviour  of  American  political  leaders  and  their  constituents  in 
the  upcoming  century.  ' 
He  uses  his  sources  to  illustrate  that  forgiveness  is  a  community  activity,  and  not  a 
private  one.  However  he  is  using  diverse  ancient  texts  and  does  not  recognise  the 
difference  between  them.  He  assumes  they  are  all  available  to  interpretation  by  the 
same  hermencutical  process,  as  they  are  ancient  historical  sources  and  he  assumes  that 
each  text  has  an  equal  force  in  proving  his  point.  He  makes  no  suggestion  there  may 
be  some  hermeneutic  problems.  He  takes  the  sources  and  uses  them  as  mirrors  to 
reflect  his  three  chosen  twentieth  century  histories  of  conflict.  This  is  a  problematic 
way  of  grounding  a  Christian  social  ethic,  because  it  begins  in  anthropology.  Ethics 
can  begin  with  these  foundations,  but  what  then  makes  it  Christian  ethics?  How  does 
it  relate  to  church  doctrine?  How,  for  example,  does  it  express  a  theology  of 
Redemption?  Shriver  does  not  attempt  to  answer  these  questions  from  the  perspective 
he  has  chosen,  his  foundations  are  problematic  even  if  they  were  to  be  the  source  of 
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In  his  first  chapter,  Shriver  discusses  revenge  as  the  enemy  of  politics  and  gives  as  his 
first  example  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  saying: 
Almost  every  observer  of  that  first  half  of  our  century  acknowledges,  ruefully, 
that  the  seeds  of  the  "second  round"  were  sown  in  the  Versailles  Treaty,  as  a 
clear  an  illustration  of  vengeful  international  politics  as  the  century  was  to 
yield.  "' 
Many  historians  argue  that  the  harsh  economic  penalties  imposed  on  Germany  as  part 
of  the  Versailles  Treaty  led  to  World  War  11  but  not  all  historians  agree.  Others  see 
the  loss  of  territory  as  far  more  traumatic.  Shriver  assumes  that  the  size  of  the 
reparation  payments  demanded  by  the  Treaty  caused  the  collapse  of  the  German 
economy,  but  most  of  the  payments  were  never  made,  and  the  amount  given  to 
Germany  exceeded  her  reparation  payments.  The  collapse  had  more  to  do  with  the 
huge  debts  accumulated  during  the  First  World  War,  and  its  cause  is  more  open  to 
debate  than  Shriver  chooses  to  admit.  To  refer  to  it  as,  'a  clear  illustration  of  vengeful 
international  politics  as  the  century  was  to  yield'  is  somewhat  disingenuous.  It  can  be 
argued  that  propriatorial  claims  over  lost  territories  were  the  greatest  source  of 
bittemess. 
Shriver  goes  on  to  say,  'Revenge  destroys  political  community.  '  Here  Shriver  has  a 
strong  argument  for  the  supporting  forgiveness  as  a  political  and  social  concept.  The 
idea  that  the  main  function  of  Christian  social  ethics  is  the  building  of  community  is  a 
strong  argument,  if  it  is  grounded  in  the  Doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  This,  however,  is  not 
the  path  that  Shriver  has  chosen  to  follow,  because,  as  already  stated,  he  wants  to 
begin  in  history. 
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Shriver's  work  may  be  thought  of  as  a  prolegomena:  a  beginning.  The  work  of 
reconciliation  between  communities  is,  as  he  says,  urgent.  It  is.  of  the  utmost 
importance  but  it  needs  a  more  detailed  theological  understanding  if  it  is  to  provide  a 
foundation  from  which  to  be  in  dialogue  with  others.  For  this  is,  what  Shriver  hopes 
to  achieve,  is  finding  an  ethic  that  enemies  that  can  be  agree  upon  in  a  pluralistic 
world. 
In  his  second  chapter,  Shriver  discusses  forgiveness  in  politics  in  the  Christian 
tradition  of  the  ethical  teachings  of  Jesus,  he  says: 
Jesus  forgiveness  has  to  be  learned  in  a  community  that  seems  basic  to  the 
ethical  teachings  of  Jesus.  "' 
Secondly  his  comment  on  Paul's  letter  to  the  Corinthians  is: 
Here  the  early  Christian  community  is  a  long  way  from  institutionalising  its 
repair  of  relations  in  formal  rules  and  offices  that  one  day  would  be  called  the 
sacrament  of  penance.  Authority  to  forgive  rests,  as  Jesus  seems  to  have 
intended,  in  a  body  of  people. 
He  uses  the  qualifier  "seems"  in  both  quotations,  and  its  use  weakens  his 
pronouncements.  He  tries  to  base  his  argument  for  forgiveness  as  apolitical  concept 
by  showing  how  the  early  church  used  it.  It  is  important  for  establishing  his  point,  but 
even  though  it  is  a  central  point  he  lets  his  argument  slip  away.  He  does  not  give  any. 
examples  showing  how  Jesus  understood  forgiveness  to  be  a  political  construct.  He 
simply  says  forgiveness  was  learnt  in  the  community.  Learning  forgiveness  in  a 
community  is  not  the  same  thing  as  forgiveness  being  a  political  construct,  which  is 
used  between  conu-nunities.  Shriver,  of  the  latter,  gives  us  no  evidence.  Shriver  says, 
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of  Jesus.  However,  a  new  prominence  is  not  the  same  as  making  it  a  central  point  in 
the  resolving  of  conflicts  between  groups.  Shriver  does  explain  his  vagueness  on  this 
point: 
The  new  prominence  does  not  mean  that  "forgiveness"  is  the  most  important 
word  in  the  vocabulary  of  the  New  Testament  ethics  or  that  forgiveness, 
divine  or  human,  is  the  essence  of  the  New  Testament  faith.  In  the  sermons  of 
Acts  as  in  the  writings  of  Paul,  the  new,  transfon-ned  life  of  the  Christian  goes 
by  many  names  -  salvation,  justification,  life  in  the  spirit.  In  this 
transfon-nation,  forgiveness  has  an  indispensable  place,  but  it  is  not  the 
umbrella  word  for  all  things  true  and  celebrated  in  the  new  faith  and  its 
churches.  "' 
The  question  remains  whether  Shriver  has  shown  that  Jesus  and  his  followers  in  the 
earlY  church  were  practising  forgiveness  as  a  political  ethic.  That  is,  were  the 
followers  of  Jesus  practising  forgiveness  between  groups  in  conflict?  Shriver  gives  no 
evidence  that  during  the  first  two  centuries,  the  time  of  the  parting  of  the  ways  of 
Christianity  from  Judaism,  that  the  followers  of  Jesus  were  practicing  such  political 
forgiveness.  He  extracts  this  belief  from  his  assertion  that  the  followers  of  Jesus' 
learnt  of  forgiveness  within  their  community  and  practiced  it  there. 
Assuming  that  forgiveness  was  part  of  the  political  life  of  the  early  church  Shriver 
makes  the  following  two  points:  the  first  is  that  forgiveness  became  institutionalised; 
and  the  second,  that  the  Reformation  individualised  forgiveness.  The  first  point  is 
true,  repentance,  penance  and  absolution  became  expressions  of  the  power  of  the 
institutionalised  church  after  its  fusion  with  the  State  in  Western  Christianity.  The 
church  administered  this  power  for  both  good  and  ill,  but  this  is  not  Shriver's  point  as 
he  is  arguing  that  this  process  by  becoming  institutional  ised  i-einoved  forgiveness 
from  political  discourse.  Forgiveness,  he  says,  became  an  individualised  concept.  The 
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church  pardoned,  reconciled,  absolved  and  forgave  individuals,  and  he  claims  that 
there  were  no  possibilities  for  political  or  public  forgiveness.  Is  this  true?  It  may  be 
that  Shriver  is  choosing  to  ignore  the  place  of  forgiveness  in  the  public  domain,  but 
the  rules  of  engagement  for  war  contained  strict  codes  of  behaviour  for  both  sides. 
When,  on  the  22  nd  September  1416,  Henry  V  laid  siege  to  Harfleur,  Deuteronomy 
[20:  10]  provided  his  rules  of  engagement. 
When  you  draw  near  to  a  town  to  fight  against  it,  offer  it  tenns  of  peace.  If  it 
accepts  your  terms  of  peace  and  surrenders  to  you  all  the  people  in  it  shall 
serve  you  at  forced  labour.  (Deut.  20.13) 
The  French  received  Henry's  ambassadors  fed  and  entertained  them,  and  returned 
them  safely  to  Henry  the  following  day.  After  receiving  the  acceptance  of  his  terms  of 
surrender  Henry  spared  the  town  and  the  lives  of  its  inhabitants  and  his  words  taken 
from  Shakespeare's  play  reflect  the  influence  of  Deuteronomy: 
Open  your  gates. 
Come,  Uncle  Exeter, 
Go  and  enter  Harfleur.  There  remain, 
And  fortify  it  strongly  against  the  French, 
Use  mercy  on  them  all.  182 
Shakespeare's  use  of  the  word  "mercy",  a  potent  Christian  concept,  is  central  to 
medieval  rules  of  engagement.  Western  Christianity  became  the  global  ethic  from 
which  theories  of  a  just  war  were  established.  The  rules  provided  for  forgiveness  as  a 
political  concept  within  certain  parameters,  and  taking  action  outside  the  rules  was 
unforgivable.  In  the  twentieth  century  this  remained  the  case.  Many  Americans  could 
not  forgive  Japan  for  attacking  Pearl  Harbour  withoulfh-st  giving  wai-ning,  which 
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suggests  the  concept  of  forgiveness  is  part  of  the  political  arena.  Of  course,  all  arenas 
have  boundaries,  and  forgiveness  like  all  other  political  concepts  can  only  operate 
within  limits.  There  is  a  need  for  a  global  ethic  and  this  need  is  for  defining 
international  law.  Political  forgiveness  may  be  part  of  that  discourse.  Shriver, 
however,  fails  to  establish  in  his  work  that  forgiveness  was  a  political  concept  for  the 
early  church,  and  fails  to  show  how  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  institutionalised  it. 
The  third  part  of  his  argument  about  the  Refonnation,  is  stronger: 
Solidly  at  home  in  the  personal  and  churchly  realms,  the  Lutheran  reformation 
left  forgiveness  more  insulated  than  ever  from  legitimate  political  expression. 
It  remained  in  captivity  in  the  church  and  a  stranger  to  politics.  "' 
And: 
The  assurance  of  divine  forgiveness  of  personal  sin  was  the  heart  of  the 
Protestant  Reforniation.  "' 
This  is  true  of  the  Lutheran  Refonnation  individual  conscience  and  not  the  rules  of  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church  became  the  arbiter  of  morality.  The  "good"  became  an 
expression  of  an  individual's  inner  life  and  not  an  act  in  society.  The  separation  of 
church  and  state  is  the  main  reason  that  the  Confessing  Churches  theological 
statement  in  opposition  to  the  rise  of  the  Ffihi-eipi-inzip  did  not  become  political 
action  following  the  Barmen  Declaration.  For  this  reason  Shriver's  argument  is 
extremely  important  as  forgiveness  needs  to  be  transferred  from  the  individual  and 
returned  to  the  public  domain.  However,  this  is  part  of  a  wider  argument  of 
establishing  the  proper  relationship  between  the  church  and  the  state. 
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Shriver  says  the  Calvinists  in  the  16  th  and  17  th  centuries  abolished  penance  as  a  fonual 
institution  and  located  it  once  again  in  the  life  of  the  congregation,  and  that,  'The 
good  of  the  whole  community'  was  a  constant  theme  of  Calvinist  ethics.  "'  He 
reintroduced  the  Christian  individual  to  a  vocation  for  civic  reform  in  a  "political 
theory  of  church  government.  ""'  However,  Calvin  and  his  followers  developed  little 
explicit  thinking  on  forgiveness  as  a  public  virtue.  "' 
Shriver,  discussing  the  consequences  of  the  Enlightenment  for  a  political  concept  of 
forgiveness,  makes  the  important  point  that  such  a  concept  is  relative  to  a  belief  in 
human  autonomy  and  freedom.  'Can  a  conflict  prone  society,  proud  of  its  personal 
freedoms,  persist  when  individual  consciences  have  no  agreement  on  what  the 
"common  good"  is?  "" 
He  points  out  that  more  people  were  killed  in  war  in  the  twentieth  century  than  in  the 
precedipg  five  thousand  years  combined,  and  it  is  against  this  background  that  he  calls 
for  a  globalisation  of  moral  protest,  claiming  that,  'the  cry  for  ethics  in  the  late  20'h 
century  is  a  cry  for  life.  ""  For,  he  says,  'We  can  afford  to  dabble  in  ethical  relativism 
only  if  we  are  not  relativistic about  the  values  of  human  life  itselU.  "  However,  how 
is  this  globalisation  of  moral  protest  to  be  established?  He  suggests  through  the  shared 
belief  that: 
The  preservation  of  our  neighbour's  life  is  the  first  rule  of  politics,  we  might 
contribute  to  a  new  politics  of  life  by  accurately  recollecting  what  the  politics 
of  death  did  to  them  or  their  ancestors.  This  painful  study  of  pain-filled 
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history  is  the  beginning  of  forgiveness  in  politics.  To  begin  to  forgive  one's 
political  enemies  past  and  present  is,  first  of  all,  to  identify  what  there  is  to 
forgive,  and  to  identify  it  in  the  utmost  possible  detail.  Three  "exercises"  in 
that  sort  of  historical  study  -  which  I  commend  to  fellow  Americans  - 
constitutes  the  rest  of  this  book.  "' 
In  response,  he  makes  two  points:  firstly,  he  asks  can  we  and  do  we  learn  from 
histor3iý  Secondly,  he  says  is  speaking  only  to  Americans  although  a  few  paragraphs 
earlier  calls  for  a  global  response  to  the  horrors  of  the  twentieth  century.  His 
justification  is  that  he  is  an  American  and  is  therefore  only  qualified,  morally,  to 
speak  to  other  Americans.  It  is  necessary  to  ask  if  he  is  reprimanding  his  fellow 
countrymen  for  their  earlier  behaviour  and  is  he  therefore  calling  them  to  repent  and 
seek  forgiveness?  Even  though  he  has  limited  his  boundaries  to  America  Shriver 
nevertheless  begins  the  next  section  of  his  work  with  some  universal  questions: 
Can  Nations  Remember,  Repent  and  forgive?  'Can  whole  nations  repent? 
Forgive?  Engage  in  processes  that  eventuate  in  collective  repentance  and 
forgiveness?  "' 
He  does  not  attempt  to  answer  any  of  these  questions  on  a  universal  or  global  basis, 
which  he  earlier  demanded,  but  says: 
Rather  than  arguing  theoretically  for  an  answer  of  "yes"  to  those  crucial 
questions,  the  rest  of  this  book  will  examine  at  length  the  history  of  three 
twentieth-century  enmities  that  have  profoundly  shaped  the  lives  of  every 
living  American:  our  wars  with  Germany  and  Japan  and  our  centuries  old 
internal  struggle  for  just  relations  between  African  Americans  and  the  country 
as  a  whole.  "' 
Initially  Shriver  described  the  purpose  of  his  study  to,  'encourage  readers,  as  citizens' 
At  this  point  Shriver  directs  himself  to  Americans  and  spends  the  remainder  of  the  his 
book  recounting  his  version  of  the  three  American  stories  he  has  mentioned  above.  Is 
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the  book  addressed  to  readers  outside  North  America?  Can  a  universal  theological 
ethic  be  established  on  the  base  of  a  particular  narrative?  The  answer  initially  was  yes 
but  having  limited  his  position  to  that  of  an  American  talking  to  Americans  his  move 
to  narrative  history  becomes  a  problem,  because  he  also  moves  from  a  descriptive  and 
historical  account  of  forgiveness,  which  he  sees  as  a  political  concept,  to  making  a 
universal  statement.  Another  reason  that  his  turn  to  narrative  history  is  a  problem,  and 
this  is  implicit  throughout  his  work,  is  his  desire  to  bring  Americans  to  a  state  of 
repentance  enabling  them  to  seek  forgiveness. 
In  the  three  histories  Shriver  goes  on  to  recount  that  racism  is  the  underlying  source  of 
both  the  conflict  and  of  the  creation  of  enemies.  If  his  analysis  is  correct,  his  work 
serves  as  an  excellent  prolegomena  to  a  future  ethic,  but  much  work  remains  to  be 
done.  Theological  work  is  needed  to  provide  a  foundation  for  such  an  argument. 
Beginning  Christian  social  ethics  with  history  is  unsatisfactory  as  it  is  not  possible 
then  to  move  from  the  many  to  the  one,  the  problem  of  how  a  particular  of  history 
becomes  a  universal  of  reason.  Philosophical  work  is  needed  to  discuss  the  part  and 
role  of  the  other.  Hegel's  master  and  slave  argument  and  subsequent  forms  of  defining 
the  self  need  exploring,  such  as  Barth  use  of  Hegel's  concept  in  the  "plank" 
argument.  "'  As  Shriver  says  work  on  an  ethic  for  relating  to  enemies  is  vitally 
important  and  is  needed  urgently,  and  his  work  is  immensely  valuable  because  it 
directs  us  to  these  questions.  His  weakness  is  in  analysis  and  in  not  providing  a 
theoretical  structure  in  which  the  concept  of  forgiveness  can  be  explored,  and  what  he 
has  begun  others  must  continue,  for  as  he  says: 
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Forgiveness  in  politics  is  a  relatively  new,  fragile  subject  of  investigation.  `5 
7.4.2  Miroslav  Volf 
Volf  s  work  forms  the  second  ethical  project.  Volf,  who  is  a  native  Croatian,  and  the 
Henry  B.  Wright  Professor  in  Theology  at  Yale  Divinity  School,  writes  from  firsthand 
experience  of  teaching  in  the  fonner  Yugoslavia.  His  book  on  the  ethics  of 
reconciliation  has  been  well  received.  "'  George  Newlands  describes  it  as  'an 
outstanding  work'.  "'  Volf  identifies  with  Jfirgen  Moltmann's  perspective  of  the 
theology  of  suffering.  "'  Following  in  his  tradition  Volf  engages  in  a  theological 
discussion  with  current  intellectual  ideas  of  post-modem  thought  in  an  exciting  and 
challenging  way. 
Using  a  dialectic  form  of  methodology,  he  considers  contrasting  pairs  of  concepts  and 
brings  them  to  a  synthesis  through  a  narrative  discourse  founded  on  biblical  theology. 
His  thinking  is  dialectic  analysing  opposing  concepts  together  for  example,  exclusion 
and  embrace,  distance  and  belonging,  separating-and-binding. 
He  begins  his  discussion  of  the  ethics  of  reconciliation  with  the  concept  of  separation, 
which  he  makes  a  foundational  concept.  In  the  first  part  of  his  discussion  he  uses  two 
Biblical  narratives  as  illustrations  of  the  concept,  and  these  form  the  first  half  of  his 
methodology.  He  defines  Biblical*  theology  as  the  use  of  biblical  texts  in  relation  to 
the  theological  themes  of  self-donation  and  the  reception  of  the  other.  He  is,  he  says, 
participating  in  the  salutary  revival of  biblical  theology  within  the  field  of  systematic 
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theology.  Of  course,  as  has  been  discussed  earlier  Barth,  spent  much  of  the  Mfinster 
Ethics,  and  even  more  of  the  Church  Dogmatics  in  an  exegesis  of  Biblical  passages. 
However,  for  Barth,  unlike  Volf,  the  passages  are  pointei-s  to  ethical  action.  Barth 
says  biblical  narratives  are  the  accounts  of  those  who  witnessed  the  revelation,  and 
were  concrete  events  to  them;  whereas  for  those  who  have  subsequently  read  the  texts 
they  may  point  to  action,  but  do  not  define  it.  Here  then  is  a  disagreement  between 
Volf  and  Barth  about  the  use  of  biblical  narratives  as  foundations  for  a  concept  of 
theological  ethics. 
In  his  second  methodology  Volf  engages  with  modem  thinkers.  However,  before 
discussing  this  methodology  it  is  important  to  consider  the  use  of  biblical  theology  as 
a  methodology  for  the  foundation  of  theological  social  ethics.  Using  the  story  of 
Abraham  and  the  revelation  of  Paul  as  his  narratives  Volf  identifies  separation  as  the 
central  concept  in  both  narratives.  In  the  Abraham  story  the  separation  is 
geographical,  and  in  describing  the  Abraham  story  as  a  departure,  he  says: 
The  narrative  of  Abraham's  call  underlines  that  stepping  out  of  enmeshment 
in  the  network  of  inherited  cultural  relations  is  a  correlate  of  faith  in  one 
God.  " 
He  also  refers  to  the  Christian  tradition  as  a  departure  saying  that  it  is,  'part  and  parcel 
of  Christian  identity.  "  His  second  biblical  narrative  is  Paul's  conversion  which  is  the 
opposite  of  Abraham's;  or  rather,  the  stories  are  the  two  sides  of  the  same  coin.  Volf 
says,  for  Paul  the  separation  was  not  geographical  but  internal  for  Christ  lives  in  him. 
The  word  Paul  himself  used  to  describe  this  act  is  "crucified".  Here  we  see  Volf's 
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method,  which  is  the  definition  of  the  polarity  of  two  events,  in  this  case  the  external 
and  the  internal  departures.  Paul,  in  his  particularity,  relates  internally  to  the  absolute. 
The  new,  'departed'  life  of  the  Christian  has  become  the  place  where  the  One  relates 
to  the  Many.  In  Abraham's  story  the  relationship  takes  place  externally.  What  exactly 
does  Volf  have  in  mind  when  he  considers  that  Paul  has  undergone  a  separation 
analogous  to  that  of  Abraham?  To  explain  Volf  uses  the  concept  of  de-centering.  He 
says  faith  and  baptism  both  de-centre  and  re-centre  the  self  The  centre  is  not  erased, 
nor  has  it  been  replaced,  for,  if  Christ  lives  in  me,  Volf  says,  then  I  must  have  a  centre 
that  is  distinct  from  Christ  the  centre.  After  an  internal  departure  in  the  new  life,  there 
is  a  synthesis  of  the  I  with  the  other.  This  process  Volf  calls  re-centering,  which 
entails  no  self-obliterating  denial  of  the  self. 
Volf  says  there  is  no  dissolving  of  the  self  in  Christ.  He  compares  the  inner  change  of 
re-centering  with  other  changes,  such  as  the  relationship  of  the  "father,  "  the 
"husband,  "  the  "nation,  "  or  the  "church,  "  these  unlike  re-centering  are  definitive  role 
changes.  He  then  claims  that  this  difference  indicates  that  re-centering  does  not 
legitimise  other  such  dissolutions.  On  the  contrary  re-centering  establishes  the  most 
proper  and  unassailable  centre  that  allows  the  self  to  stand  over  against  persons  and 
institutions  that  may  threaten  to  smother  it.  20  '  Re-centering  protects  the  self  from 
loosing  itself  in  relationships.  These  roles,  which  are  no  longer  detennining,  such  as 
being  a  father,  a  husband,  or  a  member  of  a  nation  and  a  church,  become  peripheral  to 
identity.  Volf  suggests  that  individuals  are  separated  from  these  roles  as  definitive  of 
identity  in  an  internal  departure.  This  is  an  act  of  faith  that  has  de-centered  and  re- 
centered  them  in  Christ.  Volf  is  discussing  two  changes:  the  first  is  the  inner  departure 
and  separation  in  Christ,  which  is  a  real  change,  the  second  is  a  relational  change  for 260 
example,  becoming  a  father,  a  husband,  a  member  of  a  nation,  or  a  church.  Volf 
points  out  that  real  change  does  not  obliterate  the  self,  whereas  relational  changes 
ovenvhelm  identity. 
The  concept  of  bi-polarity  expresses  the  departure  of  the  self  from  the  self  to  a  new 
life  in  Christ.  There  is  a  befom,  followed  by  a  depanum,  and  arriving  at  a  new 
pi-esent,  which  is  the  separation  from  the  old  self  by  the  new  self.  Bi-polarity  is  the 
central  concept  in  Volf  s  idea  of  departure,  and  he  expresses  it  thus: 
Christian  children  of  Abraham  can  "depart"  from  their  culture  without  having 
to  leave  it.  Departure  is  no  longer  a  spatial  category;  it  can  take  place  withill 
the  cultin-al  space  one  inhabitS.  212 
The  experience  of  departure  is  not  only  a  historical  specific  for  Christian,  but  is  also 
in  Volf's  description  a  universal.  However,  this  is  not  the  experience  of  all  Christians, 
to  have  one  foot  in  their  culture  and  the  other  outside.  For  the  Indian  who  becomes  a 
Christian  in  the  church  of  South  India,  conversion  involves  a  departure  and  a 
separation  from  the  culture  that  is  both  radical  and  total. 
Volf  s  idea  of  departure  as  a  bi-polarized  concept  restricts  the  development  of 
different  understandings  of  the  way  in  which  the  self  relates  to  the  other.  Assuming, 
that  one  can  remain  in  one's  culture,  but  not  to  be  part  of  it  is  to  underestimate  how 
the  self  is  detennined.  Volf  describes  the  process  of  the  Christian  response  to  the  call 
of  the  Gospel  as,  'they  have  stepped  as  it  were,  with  one  foot  outside  their  culture 
while  with  the  other  remaining  firmly  planted  in  it.  '  They  are,  to  quote  an  oft-repeated 
phrase,  'of  the  world  but  not  in  it.  '  This  suggests  an  internal  separation  in  the  self  and 
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a  separation  of  the  self  from  the  culture  and  both  separations  are  a  denial  of  how  the 
self  is  determined.  However,  this  concept  leads  to  a  bi-polarity  between  the  self  and 
the  other.  In  Volf's  model  of  separation  and  self,  there  is  insufficient  understanding 
of  the  relationship  between  the  individual  and  society.  His  model  reflects  the 
behaviour  of  the  American  adolescent  who  rebels  against  the  family  leaves  home  and 
becomes  an  independent  autonomous  adult  by  rejecting  the  nest.  Yet  parents  and 
society  expect  this  rebellion  it  is  a  tradition  an  expected  rebellion  and  it  is  a  pattern  of 
behaviour  that  has  arisen  from  particularly  Protestant  readings  of  biblical  narratives.  211 
Miroslav  Volf  s  concept  of  departure  and  separation,  as  illustrated  in  the  biblical 
narratives  of  Abraham  and  Paul,  follows  in  a  long  Christian  tradition,  from  Augustine 
through  to  Luther  and  Calvin. 
Shriver  and  Volf  establish  the  foundations  of  Christian  ethics  in  anthropological 
concepts.  Shriver  wants  to  take  historical  narrative  as  a  starting  point,  and  sees  the 
biblical  narratives  and  Greek  myths  as  paradigmatic  models  for  the  foundation  of  a 
universal  political  ethic.  He  extrapolates,  from  his  chosen  narratives,  forgiveness  as 
the  central  concept,  which  then  becomes  the  foundation  of  a  theological  ethic.  He 
expresses  this  process  within  a  desire  that  the  United  States  of  America  make 
confession  for  its  past  actions  against  Gen-nany,  Japan  and  African-Americans.  He 
believes  that  if  forgiveness  and  reconciliation  were  re-instated  as  political  concepts 
the  healing  of  memories  would  be  enabled,  and  differences  resolved.  Volf's  analysis 
however,  is  more  sophisticated  in  its  discussion  of  the  other.  His  work  is  part  of  the 
movement  that  wishes  to  integrate  Biblical  and  systematic  theology,  and  both  of  these 
aims  are  to  be  applauded.  Even  so,  Volf  begins  his  discussion  with  anthropological 
concepts,  such  as  separation  and  embrace. 262 
Karl  Barth's  work  in  theological  ethics  argues  that  the  reconciling  of  divisions  can 
only  be  accomplished  if  theological  ethics  begin  from  the  doctrine  of  God.  He  says: 
To  understand  God  from  man  is  either  an  impossibility  or  something  one  can 
do  only  in  the  form  of  Christology  and  anthropology  (not  even  a  Christology 
translated  into  anthropology).  There  is  a  way  from  Christology  to 
anthropology,  but  there  is  no  way  from  anthropology  to  ChriStology.  204 
In  the  opening  lecture  of  the  Mfinster  and  Bonn  Ethics  Barth  explains  why  the 
foundations  of  theological  ethics  cannot  begin  in  anthropology.  He  describes  ethics  as 
equivalent  to  morals,  which  traditionally  has  been  the  study  of  the  psychology  of  the 
will,  of  habits  and  the  law.  However,  he  says  that  the  real  question  of  ethics  points 
beyond  the  natural  as  the  study  of  the  psychology  of  will;  the  historical  as  the  study  of 
habits  and  legal  possibilities  lead  to  the  question:  are  they  valid? 
The  morality  or  goodness  of  human  conduct  which  ethics  investigates  has  to 
do  with  the  validity  of  what  is  valid  for  all  human  action,  the  origin  of  all 
constancies,  the  worth  of  everything  universal,  the  rightness  of  all  rules.  "' 
What  is  it  that  makes  Shriver  and  Volf  s  positions  valid?  How  are  they  to  be  judged? 
What  makes  them  true?  Are  Shriver  and  Volf  describing  what  is  valid  for  all  human 
action?  In  his  fourth  lecture,  Barth  gives  criteria  for  answering  these  questions  . 
2'  He 
opens  with  the  statement  that,  'the  truth  of  God  is  not  a  general  and  theoretical  and 
consequently  a  conditioned  truth'.  All  other  truths  are  general,  conditioned  and 
theoretical  and  are  therefore  constantly  open  to  the  question,  what  makes  them  valid? 
This  is  the  question  to  be  put  to  Shriver  and  Volf.  What  makes  their  ethics,  which 
begin  in  anthropology  concepts,  valid?  Any  answer  to  the  question  is  reiterative 
unless  it  can  provide  a  universal  validity  for  why  something  should  be  understood  as 
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valid.  The  reiteration  can  only  be  avoided  by  beginning  ethics  with  the  universal  truth 
of  God,  which  has  been  revealed  in  Jesus  Christ  and  continues  to  be  revealed  in  and 
through  the  Word  of  God.  Therefore,  Barth  insists  in  beginning  theological  ethics 
with  God's  Word  as  it  has  been  revealed  in  the  threefold  fonn  of  creation, 
reconciliation  and  redemption.  His  lectures  are  an  exposition  of  what  this  means  for 
the  Christian  life. 
He  recognised  that  there  are  other  forms  of  Christian  ethics  and  at  the  beginning  of  his 
lectures  gave  a  careful  analysis  of  the  three  main  types,  paying  particular  attention  to 
the  Roman  Catholic  position  on  morals,  which  he  believed  to  be  the  most  serious 
reflection  on  the  Christian  life.  However,  it  is  not  a  position  that  Barth,  following  in 
the  Refon-ned  tradition  wishes  to  accept  because  it  does  not  take  seriously  enough  the 
Cluistian  doctrine  of  the  fall,  and  states  that  reason  is  capable  of  knowing  God  and  the 
good.  Barth's  position  within  the  tradition  is  clear  and  did  not  need  to  be  spelt  out  to 
his  audience,  so  he  concentrates  his  words  on  a  philosophical  discussion  about 
universal  truth. 
Barth  also  rejects  any  appeal  to  the  Bible  as  foundational.  Since  he  thinks  the  Bible  is 
a  record  of  the  witness  of  those  who  received  the  revelation,  which  was  concrete 
command  for  them,  but  for  us  is  relative.  Barth  does  take  Biblical  exegesis  extremely 
seriously,  but  he  resists  any  attempt  to  extract  concepts  from  Biblical  narrative  and 
make  them  foundational.  Foundational  positions,  such  as  those  of  Shriver  and  Volf, 
presuppose  human  knowledge  before  revelation,  and  even  though  such  knowledge 
obviously  exists,  it  does  not  become  true  until  determined  by  revelation. 
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The  works  of  Shriver  and  Volf  are  admirable  attempts  at  Christian  ethics  because  they 
take  seriously  the  desire  to  further  integrate  biblical  scholarship  with  systematic 
theology,  but  they  have  finally  to  be  rejected  because  they  begin  with  presuppositions. 
They  have  been  included  in  the  thesis  to  illustrate  the  problems  that  their 
methodologies  create  for  a  theological  ethic  that  is  true  to  the  scientific  study  of  its 
object. 265 
Chapter  8  Conclusion 
The  thesis  has  argued  that  the  time  is  right  for  a  reassessment  of  Barth's  social 
philosophy,  and  two  reasons  have  been  given:  the  publication  of  new  material  from 
his  early  period,  1918-1933,  and  a  change  of  attitude  among  a  few  theologians  in  the 
Anglo-American  tradition. 
The  newly  available  material  from  Barth's  collected  works,  which  has  been 
examined,  is  the  posthumously  published  lectures  on  ethics,  given  at  the  University  of 
Mfinster  in  1929/30  and  the  University  of  Bonn  in  1930/3  1.  The  lectures  were 
published  in  English  in  1981  as  Ethics.  It  has  been  argued  that,  in  the  main,  scholars, 
in  the  Anglo-American  theological  traditions  have  ignored  this  body  of  work. 
However,  they  are  important  for  the  study  of  Barth's  social  philosophy  because  they 
show  him  establishing  theology  as  a  science  and  ethics  as  a  necessary  part  of 
dogmatics. 
In  addition,  alongside  the  Ethics  a  previously  published  lecture,  The  Holy  Sph-it  and 
the  Christian  Life,  has  also  been  considered  and  discussed.  The  lecture  is  important 
because  it  answers  those  critics  who  claim  that  Barth's  ethical  writings  are  so 
dominated  by  Christology  that  there  is  no  room  for  pneumatology.  In  addition,  in  this 
lecture,  Barth  rejects  all  teleological  goals  for  theological  ethics.  The  timing  of  the 
lecture  is  important,  it  falls  between  the  two  semesters  at  Mfinster  in  which  the 
lectures  on  ethics  were  delivered.  It  was  given  in  October  1929.  After  Barth  had  spent 
a  long  summer  at  a  retreat  at  Bergli.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that  Charlotte  von 
Kirschbaum  was  also  among  the  guests  and  that  after  this  holiday  she  joined  Barth's 266 
household.  It  has  been  argued  in  the  thesis  that  von  Kirschbaum  knew  of  the  content 
of  both  sets  of  lectures  and  that  it  is  likely  she  had  some  influence  both  over  the 
content  and  the  decision  not  to  publish  them  during  Barth's  lifetime.  It  is  not  possible 
to  provide  evidence  for  this  suggestion,  and  it  must  remain  as  a  speculation.  There  has 
recently  been  some  recognition  of  von  Kirschbaum's  abilities  as  a  theologian,  and  the 
thesis  has  suggested  that  her  influence  on,  and  contribution  to  Barth's  work  in  the 
main  has  been  disregarded.  There  is  a  need  for  her  correspondence  to  be  translated, 
edited  and  published  so  that  she  may  receive  recognition  for  her  contribution. 
The  second  reason  given  for  the  claim  that  the  time  is  right  for  a  reassessment  of 
Barth's  social  philosophy  is  that  in  Anglo-Saxon  theology  interest  in  Barth's  ethical 
writings  has  recently  intensified.  This  interest  has  been  generated  by  the  publications 
of  the  scholars  Nigel  Biggar,  John  Webster,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  Bruce  McConuack. 
Central  to  this  renewal  of  interest  has  been-John  Webster's  works,  Bai-th'S  Ethics  of 
Reconciliation,  (1995)  and  Barth'S  Moral  Theology  Human  Action  in  Barth's 
Thought,  (1998).  John  Webster's  work  stimulated  the  examination  of  Barth's  Mpnster 
and  Bonn  Ethics. 
The  structure  of  the  thesis  reflects  the  overall  aim  of  the  work  which  is  a  reassessment 
of  Barth's  social  philosophy  based  on  his  work  from  the  period  1918-1933.  The  thesis 
is  in  four  main  sections.  The  first  two  chapters  form  an  introduction.  Chapters  three 
and  four  are  an  explanation  and  discussion  of  the  Ethics  and  the  lecture  The  Holy 
Spirit  and  the  Christian  Life.  It  is  in  this  section  that  the  claim  has  been  made,  which 
has  been  substantiated  with  evidence  from  primary  sources  that  Wilhelm  Herrmann's 
influence  remained  throughout  this  period.  The  significance  of  this  claim  is  apparent 
in  two  respects:  the  first  is  the  continuation,  as  late  as  193  1,  of  natural  theology  as  a 267 
foundation  for  Barth's  ethics,  as  the  orders  of  creation  are  a  form  of  natural  theology. 
They  are  available  to  reason,  and  therefore  presumably  would  have  been  accessible  to 
the  natives  of  New  Holland.  Yet  they  are  specifically  contextual:  marriage,  the  family, 
work  and  leadership.  The  second  respect  is  associated  with  Wilhelm  Herrmann's 
continuing  influence  and  individualism  which  is  to  say  that  Ethics  is  concerned  with 
the  individual's  moral  response.  It  may  be  remembered  it  was  Herrmann  who 
understood  the  individual's  moral  life  as  evidence  of  a  relationship  with  the  inner  life 
of  Jesus.  Barth's  arguments  are  about  individuals  as  either  men  or  women  in  the 
Genesis  story  or  individuals  confronting  each  other  on  a  plank.  States  are  tre  ated  as 
individuals.  It  is  not  until  the  essay  on  'Church  and  Community'  in  1946,  which  is 
discussed  in  chapter  six,  that  Barth  moves  to  the  wider  concept  of  community. 
Individualism  is  a  severe  restriction  on  Barth's  thinking  about  social  philosophy  in 
Ethics.  During  the  period  under  discussion,  1918-1933,  his  ethical  writing  appears 
detached  from  the  surrounding  social  events.  The  letter  about  unemployment  from  his 
friend  Eduard  Thurneysen  had  little  effect  on  Barth's  view  of  work.  '  Unemployment 
and  continuing  inflation  in  Germany,  during  this  period,  also  appeared  to  have  little 
influence  on  Barth's  thinking.  In  addition  Barth's  view  of  marriage  during  this  period 
is  idealistic  and  he  does  not.  develop  it  into  a  wider  concept  until  the  C11111-ch 
Dogmatics.  Marriage,  then,  becomes  the  centre  of  the  circle  that  describes  the 
relationship  between  men  and  women,  but  not  the  whole  circle.  This  again  shows 
what  now  appears  to  be  a  detachment  from  both  his  context,  and  his  relationship  with 
Charlotte  von  Kirschbaum.  This  detachment  it  is  suggested  is,  in  part,  caused  by 
social  ethics  being  grafled  on  to  individual  morality,  which  it  has  been  claimed  is 
evidence  of  Barth's  inheritance  from  Herrmann.  It  must  also  be  recognised  that  Barth 
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was  primarily  interested,  at  this  period,  in  establishing  a  new  foundation  for  theology 
and  theological  ethics.  This  preoccupation  appears  to  have  excluded  an  engagement 
with  the  world  and  when  such  an  engagement  did  begin  in  1930  it  was  addressed  to 
the  internal  life  of  the  church.  These  two  problems  make  Barth's  ethics  during  this 
period  somewhat  abstract  and  detached,  but  for  all  that,  they  should  not  be  dismissed 
for  they  have  much  of  importance  to  say. 
Chapter  seven,  which  is  the  fourth  section  discusses  three  critical  readings  of  Barth's 
ethics  and  two  alternative  ethical  projects,  with  the  intention  of  holding  a  mirror  of 
criticism  to  the  foundations  of  Barth's  early  ethical  thought.  The  three  critics 
particularly  van  Til,  whose  criticism  of  Barth  has  not  previously  been  discussed  in  the 
literature,  focus  the  sources  of  hostility  and  misunderstanding.  Much  of  this  criticism 
is  about  the  relationship  between  theology  and  philosophy.  Barth  recognises  these 
problems,  and  has  been  quoted  earlier  in  the  thesis  as  asking,  'which  theology  is  not 
jostled  by  philosophyT  It  has  been  suggested  in  the  discussion  of  van  Til's  work  that 
he  shows  little  appreciation  of  the  philosophical  influences  in  his  own  criticism.  All 
three  critics  have  been  unable  to  accept  the  idea  that  has  been  proposed  in  this  thesis 
that  a  proper  appreciation  of  Barth's  work  requires  an  understanding  of  the  German 
theological  tradition. 
However,  the  central  and  most  important  work  of  the  lectures  on  ethics  is  the 
achievement  of  the  integration  of  dogmatics  with  ethics  a  symbiosis  that  remained 
throughout  all  Barth's  theological  work.  It  is  at  this  point  that  they  have  their  greatest 
significance.  Ethics  is  part  of  the  doctrine  of  God,  because  God  chose  to  reveal 
himself  in  the  revelation  of  Jesus  Christ  as  creator,  redeemer  and  reconciler.  Here  is 
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the  brilliance  of  Barth's  thought,  which  is  both  prophetic  and  poetic  in  what  seems 
retrospectively  such  an  obvious  and  simple  move.  It  was  a  complete  relocation  of 
thought,  yet  it  took  place  within  the  tradition  of  the  intellectual  structures  of  his  time 
and  this  is  Barth's  brilliance. 
The  foundations  of  the  ideas  in  the  MOnster  and  Bonn  Ethics,  which  have  been 
discussed  in  this  thesis,  are,  in  summary: 
1.  God's  revelation  in  Christ  is  a  new  creation,  which  re-detenuines  all  things. 
2.  Theology  is  a  science. 
3.  The  object  of  study  determines  the  method  of  study. 
4.  Theological  ethics  is  necessarily  part  of  the  doctrine  of  God. 
5.  The  Command  of  God  is  the  sole  content  of  theological  ethics. 
6.  Theological  ethics  is  the  church's  task. 
7.  Prayer  is  the  first  act  of  theological  ethics. 
8.  Prayer  involves  action. 
Barth,  in  both  the  Mfinster  and  Bonn  Ethics  and  the  lecture,  The  Holy  Sph-it  and  the 
Chi-istian  Life,  follows  the  Reformed  tradition  of  Luther  and  Calvin.  This  tradition 
Barth  appropriates  for  his  own  purposes  and  at  times  he  appeals  to  Luther  and  Calvin 
as  authorities,  giving  added  emphasis  and  weight  to  his  argument.  For  example  in  the 
lecture,  The  Holy  Spirit  and  the  Christian  Life,  when  he  wants  to  reject  the 
Augustinian  ideas  of  grace  perfecting  nature  he  appeals  to  Luther's  justification  by 
faith.  He  uses  a  similar  technique  in  the  Mfinster  and  Bonn  Ethics  where  he  wants  to 
reject  the  concept  of  amenesis. 270 
The  two  sets  of  lectures  show  Barth's  ethical  thought  grounded  in  the  Trinity.  The 
foundation  of  his  ethical  discussion  is  the  doctrine  of  sanctification,  and  his  works 
show  that  at  this  point  in  his  thinking  he  is  closer  to  Luther's  thought  than  to  Calvin's. 
In  following  Luther's  doctrine  ofjustification  by  faith  Barth  rejects  any  possibility  of 
making  holiness  private  neither  does  he  accept  any  form  of  elitism  in  the  Christian 
life.  Equally  holiness  is  not  to  be  based  in  an  idea  of  other  worlds  or  that  its 
acquisition  is  a  perilous  ascent  during  which  the  slightest  mistake  will  send  the  seeker 
to  hell.  Barth  always  insists  that  the  holy  person  is  also  a  sinner. 
However,  on  other  occasions  Barth  is  ready  to  move  away  from  well-established 
Reformed  theology.  As  has  been  pointed  out  he  does  this  by  rejecting  the  four 
hundred-year-old  Lutheran  tradition  of  separating  the  Church  and  the  State  and  in 
radically  altering  Calvin's  doctrine  of  predestination.  Whereas,  it  might  be  supposed 
that  a  theologian  writing  within  the  Reformed  tradition  would  do  the  fon-ner  the  later 
move  is  surprising.  These  moves  suggest  that  Barth  uses  the  tradition  both  positively 
and  negatively  to  develop  his  own  system  which  although  it  falls  loosely  within  the 
traditional  framework  is  undoubtedly  a  unique  structure. 
In  his  opening  lecture,  Barth  defined  theology  as  a  science,  which  like  all  other 
sciences  has  an  object  of  stUdy.  In  addition  like  all  other  sciences  the  form  and  the 
method  of  investigation  must  be  appropriate  to  the  object.  Unlike  all  other  sciences  in 
theology  the  object  defines  the  subject  which  is  human  experience,  and  that  becomes 
the  object  of  revelation  as  God  provides  both  the  revelation  and  the  means  of 
receiving  it.  Revelation  defines  itself.  No  Pre-existing  human  presuppositions  define 
it.  Barth  states  that  God's  act  of  revelation  determines  human  experience. 271 
The  concept  of  life  being  determined  is  central  to  any  understanding  of  Barth's  view 
of  human  freedom,  and  we  have  seen  how  he  establishes  human  freedom  as 
obedience.  Of  course,  Jesus  was  obedient  to  the  Father,  but  Barth  forcefully  reminds 
us  that  human  obedience  is  not  to  be  modelled  on  the  life  of  Jesus.  He  continually 
reminds  us  that  we  are  human  and  suffer  from  inherent  sin,  and  that  our  actions  only 
become  obedient  through  the  action  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  The  concepts  discussed  in  this 
section  are  not  to  be  understood  separately.  Barth  describes  God's  action  in  the  world 
as  event,  and  an  event  is  an  act  of  God's  revelation  in  which  God's  being  is  in  his 
becoming.  Human  action  is,  'by  analogy,  an  event  in  which  our  being  is  in  becoming. 
Therefore,  our  acts  of  will  are  constitutive  of  ourselves. 
This  means  each  action  cannot  be  understood  and  examined  for  its  ethical  content  in 
the  abstract,  but  as  an  event  that  takes  place  as  part  of  a  sequence.  Baptism,  the  first 
ethical  response,  is  the  first  event,  and  to  be  baptised  is  to  be  bom  again  in  Christ  and 
to  become  a  member  of  the  church.  All  subsequent  action  takes  its  orientation, 
significance  and  deten-nination  from  this  primary  event.  Our  acts,  in  analogy,  create 
our  being  in  becoming.  We  are  what  we  do.  This  may  appear  similar  to  the 
Aristotelian  view  so  vividly  expressed  by  Dante  that  our  habits  become  our  character, 
but  this  is  not  the  case.  The  difference  is  that  in  Barth's  account  there  can  be  no  telos, 
no  aim  or  goal,  because  sanctification  has  already  taken  place,  and  our  lives  must  be 
ordered  in  acceptance  of  this  reality.  This  is  the  life  lived  in  freedom,  and  ethical  acts 
take  place  within  its  boundaries  and  at  its  direction.  We  are  our  acts,  therefore,  our 
actions  must  be  obedient  to  created  reality  if  they  are  to  be  real  and  we  are  to  be  free. 
Barth  claims  that  the  task  of  theological  ethics  is  to  raise  questions  about  human 
existence  and  for  these  questions  to  provide  a  framework  within  which  responsible 272 
choices  may  be  made.  Some  will  say  of  Barth's  approach  that  it  lacks  the  ability  to 
accumulate  a  body  of  ethical  thought,  which  apply  in  other  situations,  and  allýough 
this  is  true,  two  points  are  relevant.  The  first  point  is  that  time  and  context,  to  some 
extent,  bind  all  ethics.  The  second  point  is  that  the  questions  generated  by  Barth's 
method  provide  not  only  a  boundary  to  the  moral  space  but  give  a  direction  for  future 
aetion. 
On  the  first  point:  Barth  considered  transatlantic  flight  as  very  dangerous  and  that  to 
take  such  a  flight  places  one's  life  in  danger  and  that  such  an  action  can  be  compared 
to  suicide.  Such  thoughts  now  seem  quaint  and  amusing.  On  the  second  point:  he 
deals  with  a  broader  framework  that  is  not  caught  in  the  web  of  time.  His  theological 
insight  that  life  is  a  gift,  or  perhaps  even  a  loan,  has  enon-nous  significance.  If  life  is  a 
gift  which  cannot  be  possessed  it  must  be  treated  by  its  recipient  and  others  with  the 
greatest  respect,  and  a  proper  consideration  must  be  given  to  the  concerns  of  life,  and 
a  balance  of  work  recreation  and  rest  must  be  available  to  all  in  differing  proportions 
at  the  differing  stages  of  life.  Such  a  policy  has  obvious  implications  for  the  social 
policy  of  the  state.  The  needs  of  the  body,  Barth  lists,  as  metabolism,  sleep,  and 
sexuality  and  they  must  be  given  proper  consideration.  Therefore  the  means  to 
maintain  a  health  body  must  be  generally  available.  There  is  an  injunction  not  to 
injure  the  body  but  to  nurture  and  care  for  it  as  a  gift  from  God.  This  requirement 
arising  from  the  observation  that  life  is  a  gift  is  easily  translated  into  specific  and 
concrete  examples,  which  are  relevant  to  particular  circumstances,  although  there  is 
no  body  of  ethical  thought. 
Barth,  in  the  Mfinster  and  Bonn  Ethics,  establishes  his  position  with  regard  to  the 
content  of  theological  ethics.  He  says,  repeatedly,  that  the  command  of  God  is  the  sole 27-3) 
content  of  theological  ethics;  therefore,  theological  ethics  for  Barth  cannot  be 
concerned  with  discussions  about  the  "good"  or  the  balancing  of  outcome,  %  He  does 
not  deny  the  purpose  and  validity  of  such  discussion  and  both  recognises  and 
applauds  the  long  and  distinguished  history  of  such  debates.  He  is  also  well  aware  that 
stated  in  this  form  theological  ethics  is  a  newcomer  to  the  debate  and  will  be  regarded 
with  hostility  by  some  and  disbelief  by  others  that  such  an  activity  is  possible.  On 
these  points,  his  view  has  been  shown  to  be  correct. 
Barth  explains  that  we  know  the  command  of  God  from  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount  and 
the  Decalogue  and  by  reading  and  meditating  on  the  scriptures.  However  he  is 
adamant  that  the  Bible  is  the  record  of  those  who  witnessed  the  revelation  and  was  to 
those  witnesses  a  concrete  command.  To  us  such  records  become  relative.  It  is  not 
possible  to  read  ethical  injunctions  straight  from  these  records  and  Barth  refutes  all 
attempts  to  establish  Biblical  fundamentalism.  He  also  wants  to  establish  a 
henneneutic  based  on  revelation.  As  we  take  part  in  the  life  of  the  church  and  in 
worship,  and  receiving  the  sacraments  and  meditating  on  the  scriptures,  the  command 
of  God  comes  to  us  in  concrete  form.  The  Holy  Spirit  informs  conscience.  God  acts 
vertically  in  our  horizontal  passage  of  time.  The  Word  is  a  sacrament  and  contains 
Kierkegaard's  concept  of  contemporaneity.  Of  course,  as  has  already  been  discussed, 
this  reception  does  not  take  place  as  an  isolated  action.  It  is  part  of  the  passage  of  a 
life  and  takes  place  within  a  series  of  actions,  which  are  determining  of  the  life. 
Life  is  lived  avoiding  extremes,  whilst  realising  that  extremes  of  action  may  be 
commanded.  Since  the  command  comes  to  individuals,  it  is  not  possible  to  judge  an 
individual's  response  to  God's  command.  These  scem  extremely  wise  and  useful 
ethical  boundaries.  Of  course,  the  corollary  is  that  it  is  not  possible  to  build,  or 274 
presume  to  know,  a  body  of  knowledge,  nor  is  it  possible  to  speculate  about  what 
God's  command  might  be  in  particular  abstract  cases,  Barth's  theolog;,  -!  al  ethics  is 
personal  and  concrete. 
Some  will  find  Barth's  position  difficult  to  accept  for  how,  they  might  ask,  do  we 
know  what  to  do  in  a  given  situation?  Such  questions  implicitly  assume  the  possibility 
of  abstracting  action  from  the  situation  and  the  individual.  The  action  is  considered  in 
isolation  from  both  individual  life,  and  previous  action,  and  has  no  significant  part  to 
play  in  future  action.  Barth  refutes  such  abstraction  he  always  speaks  of  the  concrete 
Word  of  God  spoken  to  the  individual  in  their  past,  present,  and  future  action.  In 
addition,  as  Barth  has  pointed  out,  our  lives  are  not  lived  in  isolation,  but  in 
relationships.  For  Barth  relationships  take  place  within  the  context  of  the  church, 
which  is  involved  in  the  continuous  process  of  discerning  the  command  of  God. 
Therefore,  theological  ethics  is  the  task  of  the  church,  and  it  can  undertake  this  task, 
because  theological  ethics  is  necessarily  part  of  the  doctrine  of  God.  Barth  provides 
the  whence  and  the  whethei-  of  theological  ethics  within  the  doctrine  of  God.  It  is  only 
because  we  know  whom  God  is,  he  says,  that  we  know  how  to  act,  as  the  indicative 
precedes  the  imperative. 
The  following  quotation  from  Karl  Barth's  Church  Dogmatics  11/2  appears  on  the  title 
page  of  the  thesis: 
The  enterprise  of  theological  ethics  is  not  one  with  which  to  trifle.  it  must  be 
taken  up  properly  -  and  this  can  mean  only  on  the  assumption  that  the 
command  of  the  grace  of  God  is  its  sole  content  -  or  it  is  better  left  alone.  2 
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These  words  remind  us  that  for  Barth  the  task  of  theological  ethics  is  undertaken  in 
and  from  prayer.  Serious  prayer  involves  action,  and  together  pray-r  and  action 
become  an  event.  Each  event  determines  the  actors  and  their  future  actions.  A  series 
of  events  deten-nines  the  activity  and  life  of  the  Christian  community,  in  both  church 
and  university,  and  defines  the  self-detennination  of  the  participants  and  their 
institutions.  Theological  ethics  established  on  these  foundations  cannot  be  seen  as  just 
another  subject  to  be  studied  in  university.  It  will  not  readily  be  recognised  that 
theological  ethics  is  the  reason  for  the  study  and  pursuit  of  knowledge  within  a 
university.  This  is  Karl  Barth's  understanding  of  theological  ethics  and  one  that  this 
thesis  shares.  The  point  is  that  Barth's  theological  ethics  is  undertaken  with  the 
understanding  that  its  content  is  grace  and  that  the  context  of  its  study  is  the  life  of  the 
worshipping  community.  These  points  need  making,  because  they  are  part  of  Barth's 
merit  to  point  them  out  as  they  are  neither  obvious  nor  self-evident. 
Serious  prayer  involves  action,  prayer  and  the  resulting  action  becomes  the  event,  in 
which  prayer  and  action  are  united.  Each  event  becomes  the  foundation  for  the  next 
undertaking  of  prayer  and  action.  In  this  way,  Barth  understands  event  as  an 
ontological  activity,  which  is  the  person.  The  task  of  theological  ethics  is  to  raise 
questions  about  events.  It  follows  that  prayer  and  thought  are  the  activity  of  the  life  of 
the  community  in  the  church  and  in  the  study  of  theological  ethics  in  the  university. 
Barth  does  not  reject  or  disregard  the  power  of  reason  but  answers  it  theologically 
with  the  priority  of  revelation.  In  so  doing,  his  ethics  are  established  on  the  absolute 
and  not  on  the  universal.  They  are  therefore  an  ethic  for  all  men  and  women,  for  all 
are  included  in  the  revelation  of  God's  love.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that  there  are 
methodological  problems,  because  Barth  assumes  created  order  is  known  by  reason 276 
before  revelation  and  is  confirmed  by  revelation.  The  orders  of  work,  marriage, 
family,  state  and  leadership  have  already  been  criticised  in  the  týcsis  and  as  is  well 
known  were  firmly  rejected  by  Barth.  However,  it  has  been  pointed  out  this  rejection 
did  not  occur  until  after  193  1. 
Barth  in  the  lectures  has  established  the  foundations,  methodology  and  given  a 
preliminary  content  to  a  new  subject:  theological  ethics.  Clearly,  it  is  possible  to 
establish  fon-ns  of  Christian  ethics  on  different  foundations  and  the  discussion  of  the 
work  of  the  scholars  Shriver  and  Volf  illustrate  this  point.  Obviously  there  are  those 
who  consider  that  Barth  is  not  undertaking  the  task  of  a  Christian  theologian,  van  Til 
is  one  but  there  are  many  others.  Others  criticise  Barth  for  not  giving  due 
consideration  to  human  autonomy,  freedom  and  responsibility  and  in  this  thesis 
Robinson  represents  such  views.  Therefore,  it  must  be  possible  to  compare  and 
contrast  these  different  approaches.  However,  it  is  not  possible  to  assess  the 
comparable  merits  of  the  differing  structures  from  an  external  and  independent 
position. 
Having  accepted  Barth's  starting  point,  God's  revelation  in  Christ,  then  criticism  of 
Barth  can  be  undertaken  from  inside  the  unfolding  of  his  system.  The  thesis  has 
pointed  out  inconsistencies  in  the  orders  of  creation,  and  an  apparent  lack  of  ethical 
engagement  in  society  during  the  period  1918  to  1933.  His  use  of  the  Genesis  story  as 
the  foundation  of  the  relationsh  ip  between  men  and  women  has  been  criticised, 
because  it  is  seen  as  a  type  of  natural  religion.  However,  the  thesis  wants  to 
acknowledge  that  in  the  Mfinster  and  Bonn  Ethics  Barth  has  established  the 
foundations  and  methodology  of  theological  ethics.  He  has  produced  the  finest  work 
of  moral  theology  since  Thomas  Aquinas,  and  his  stature  is  directly  comparable  with 277 
Hegel.  Like  Hegel,  from  a  single  standpoint,  he  has  surveyed  God's  work-,  and  has 
produced  a  theological  ethic,  which  assimilates  the  concerns  )f  the  eighteenth  and 
nineteenth  centuries  and  redefines  them  in  and  through  God's  revelation. 
There  is  a  need  for  further  research  to  be  undertaken  in  relating  the  Minster  and  Bonn 
Ethics  to  the  themes  that  emerge  in  the  Chin-ch  Dogmatics,  which  makes  the 
development  more  explicit.  It  would  be  an  enormous  contribution  to  work  in  this  area 
if  von  Kirschbaum's  correspondence  and  papers  could  be  studied,  edited,  translated 
and  published.  In  addition,  work  needs  to  be  undertaken  on  the  concerns  of  the  group 
of  which  Barth  was  a  member  during  his  time  in  MEnster.  The  group  may  have  kept 
minutes  or  notes  of  their  meetings,  one  of  their  members  was  the  editor  of  the  local 
paper,  and  it  would  be  of  interest  to  know  what  was  being  discussed  as  local  concerns 
at  the  time.  Roman  Catholic  theologians  made  regular  contributions  to  the  group  and 
it  would  be  interesting  and  useful  to  know  of  their  thoughts  on  the  relationship  with 
the  Reich  Church.  Aspects  of  the  Mfinster  and  Bonn  Ethics  suggest  that  Barth  had 
some  admiration  for  Catholic  moral  theology.  Research  is  needed  to  discover  if  the 
group  kept  minutes  or  letters  as  there  is  much  work  that  needs  to  be  done  on  this 
aspect  of  the  Barth's  life  in  Mfinster.  The  thesis  has  tried  to  emphasise  the  intellectual 
debt  that  Karl  Barth  owes  to  Hegel.  His  essay  on  Hegel  conceals  rather  than  reveals 
their  relationship,  and  there  is  much  that  needs  to  be  done  to  establish  the  connections 
and  make  them  explicit. 
The  Minster  and  Bonn  Ethics  show  how  the  movement  from  a  foundation  in 
theological  ethics  to  an  acted  out  political  theology  might  occur.  Barth's  discussion 
about  the  place  of  sin  is  in  the  Augustinian  tradition,  and  finds  expression  in  his 
illustration  of  the  will  to  power  in  the  plank  argument.  The  implications  of  this 278 
position  for  social  policy  are  radical.  His  lectures  do  not  make  explicit,  except  in  a 
few  cases,  how  this  position  may  be  worked  out,  however  that  is  a  task  for  each 
Christian  ethicist  to  undertake  for  his  own  time.  Barth's  description  in  his  later  work 
that  the  kingdom  will  be  constituted  from  the  redeemedpolis  not  the  ecclesia  is  an 
important  message  for  all  to  hear,  both  inside  and  outside  the  church.  His  ethical 
demands  upon  the  individual  are  extreme,  and  call  for  complete  political  involvement. 
He  argues  that  no  individual  can  disassociate  themselves  from  the  decisions  and 
actions  of  their  government. 
In  this  thesis,  the  description  of  personal  relationships  in  the  Ethics  has  been 
criticised,  because  describing  marriage  as  an  order  of  creation  limits  the  unmarried. 
Barth's  later  movement  which  describes  marriage  as  the  focus  and  not  the  whole 
circle  that  describes  the  relationship  between  men  and  women  is  important.  He 
reminded  his  audience  that  marriage  does  not  have  teleological  goals  that  it  is  not  a 
sacrament  and  that  there  will  be  no  marriage  in  heaven.  Therefore,  what  might 
properly  constitute  the  Christian  life  lived  in  relationship  demands  further  exploration. 
Although  Barth's  theological  ethics  are  the  task  of  the  church  they  are  not  limited  by 
the  walls  of  the  building.  The  Ethics  show  how  Barth  walks  through  the  walls  of  the 
building  he  has  created  into  the  fresh  air  of  the  world  beyond.  The  theological  ethical 
task  has  to  be  undertaken  afresh  in  every  generation.  Barth  has  provided  a  foundation 
and  a  method  for  carrying  out  this  task. 279 
Bibliography 
Adorno,  Theodor,  Hegel:  Thi-ee  Studies  trans.  by  Shierry  Weber  Nicholsen 
(Cambridge,  MA:  MIT  Press,  1994) 
Augustine,  Saint,  Bishop  of  Hippo.  Confessions,  trans.  by  Henry  Chadwick,  (Oxford: 
OUP,  1991) 
The  City  of  God,  trans.  by  Henry  Bettenson,  (Harmondsworth:  Penquin,  1972) 
Banner,  Michael,  Tw-ning-  the  woi-ld  ipside  down  (andsonte  othei-  lasksfoi-  dogniatic 
Christian  ethics.  )  An  inaugural  lecture  from  the  Department  of  Theology  & 
Religious  Studies  King's  College,  London  by  Michael  Banner,  F.  D.  Maurice 
Professor  of  Moral  &  Social  Theology  delivered  onl  6  October  1996. 
Barth,  Karl,  Church  Doginatics,  Volume  I  The  Doctrine  of  the  Word  of  God,  part  I 
trans.  by  G.  W.  Bromiley,  2  nd  edn,  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark,  1975) 
, 
Church  Dogmatics,  Volume  I  The  Doctrine  of  the  Word  of  God,  part  2,  trans. 
by  G.  T.  Thompson  and  H.  Knight,  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark  1956) 
, 
Church  Doginatics,  Volume  II  The  Doctrine  of  God,  part  1,  trans.  by 
T.  H.  L.  Parker,  et  al  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark  1957) 
Church  Doginatics,  Volume  II  The  Doctrine  of  God,  part  2,  trans.  by 
G.  W.  Bromiley,  et  al  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark  1957) 
Church  Doginatics,  Volume  III  The  Doctrine  of  Creation,  part  3,  trans  by 
G.  W.  Bromiley  and  T.  F.  Torrance  (Edinburgh:  T.  &  T.  Clark,  1960) 
, 
Church  Doginatics,  Volume  III  The  Doctrine  of  Creation,  part  4,  trans.  by 




State  and  Chia-ch,  trans.  by  R.  Smith,  (Gloucester,  MA:  Peter 
Smith,  1968) 
0-edo,  trans.  by  J.  S  McNab,  (London:  Hodder  &  Stoughton,  1936) 
, 
Dei-  RZ;  inerbi-ief,  I"  edn,  (B  ern,  1919) 
,  Dei-  N;  inei-bi-ief,  2  nd  edn,  (Munich,  1922) 
,  Dogniatics  in  Outline,  trans.  by  G.  T.  Thompson,  (London:  SCM  Press  1949) 
, 
Ethik-I.  Vorlesung,  Münster,  Sommersemester  1928,  ed.  Dietrich  Braun 
(Zurich:  TVZ,  1973) 
9 
Ethik-  II.  Vorlesung,  Münster,  Wintersemester  1928/29,  ed.  Dietrich  Braun 
(Zurich:  TVZ,  1978) 280 
Karl  Barth,  Ethics,  trans.  by  G.  W.  Bromiley,  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark,  198  1) 
'Evangelical  Theology  in  the  Nineteenth  Century'  in  The  Humallity  of  God, 
trans.  by  J.  Thomas  and  T.  Wieser,  (Collins:  London,  196  1) 
_, 
Fides  quaei-ens  intellectuin  :  Ansehn's  Beiveis  dei-  Existenz  Gottes  im 
Zzisanulzenhang  seines  theologischen  Pi-ograinms,  (Munchen  :  Kaiser,  193  1) 
Piotestant  Theology  in  the  Nineteenth  Centiny:  its  back-gi-ound  and  histoiy. 
The  first  complete  translation  of  Die  Pi-otestantische  Theologie  im  19. 
Jahi-ehundert  (Evangelischer  Verlag,  Zollikon,  Zfirich,  1952)  Chapters  2,5, 
6,7,8,9,10,11,19,19,29  trans.  by  Brian  Cozens  and  revised  by  the 
editorial  staff  of  SCM  Press;  the  remainder  trans.  by  John  Bowden, 
(London:  SCM  Press,  1972) 
Revolzitionaty  theology  ill  the  making,  Bai-th  Thurneysen  col-I-espondence, 
1914-1925  (London:  Epworth  Press,  1964) 
The  Chi-istian  Life  (Fragment)  Baptism  as  the  Foundation  of  the  Christian 
Life,  Church  Dogmatics,  IV,  4,  (Edinburgh:  T&T.  Clark,  1969) 
The  Chi-istian  Life,  Church  Dogmatics  IV,  4,  Lecture  Fragments,  trans.  by 
G.  W.  Bromiley,  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark,  1981) 
The  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  trans.  by  E.  C.  Hoskins,  (London:  OUP,  1933) 
The  Hunianity  of  God,  trans.  by  J.  N.  Thomas  and  T.  Wieser,  (London: 
Fontana,  1967) 
The  Holy  Ghost  and  the  Chi-istian  Life.  trans  by  R.  Birch  Hoyle,  (London: 
Fredrick  Muller,  1938) 
The  Holy  Sph-it  and  the  Christian  Life:  The  Theological  Basis  ofEthics, 
trans.  by  R.  Birch  Hoyle,  (Kentucky:  John  Knox  Press,  1993) 
'The  Righteousness  of  God'  in  The  Moi-d  of  God  and  the  Moi-d  ofMan,  trans. 
by  D.  Houghton,  (MA,  USA:  The  Pilgrim  Press,  1928) 
'The  Principles  of  Dogmatics  According  to  Wilhelm  Herrmann',  in  Theology 
and  Church,  trans.  Louise  Pettibone  Smith  (London:  SCM  Press,  1962) 
The  Theology  ofJohn  Calvin,  trans.  by  G.  W.  Bromiley,  (Grand  Rapids,  MI: 
Eerdmans,  1995) 
Theology  and  Chin-ch,  trans.  by  Louise  Pettibone  Smith  (London:  SCM 
Press,  1962) 
Berger,  Peter  and  Thomas  Luckman,  The  social  consh-uct  ofi-eality:  a  ti-eatise  ill  the 
sociology  oftnowledge,  (Harmondsworth,  Penguin  1967) 
Biggar,  Nigel,  The  Hastening  that  TFaits,  (Oxford:  Clarendon,  1993) 
Bonhoeffer,  Dietrich,  The  Cost  ofDiscipleship,  trans.  by  R.  H.  Fuller,  (London:  SCM 
Press,  1959) 281 
Boyd,  Ian,  'Dogmatics  among  the  ruins:  the  relevance  of  German  expressionism  and 
the  enlightenment  as  contexts  for  Karl  Barth's  theological  development', 
unpublished  doctoral  thesis,  (University  of  Edinburgh,  1996) 
Brunner,  Emil,  Dogmatics,  v.  2.  The  Christian  docirine  ofcreation  and  redemption 
(London  :  Lutterworth  Press) 
and  Karl  Barth,  Natural  Theology,  trans.  by  Peter  Fraenkel,  (London:  The 
Centenary  Press  1946) 
Busch,  Eberard,  Karl  Barth:  His  lifeftom  Letters  andAutobiographical  Texts,  trans. 
by  John  Bowden  (London  SCM,  1976) 
Butin,  Phil,  'Review  of  Karl  Barth's  The  Theology  of  John  Calvin',  in  Scoths-h 
-Journal  of  Theology  51,1998 
Caird,  John,  Thefiindamental  ideas  of  Christianity,  (Glasgow:  James  MacLehose, 
1899) 
Cornwell,  John,  Hitlers  Pope:  The  Secret  Histoij,  ofPius  AW,  (Harmondsworth: 
Viking:  1999) 
Cullberg,  J.,  Das  Prohlem  der  Ethik-  in  der  dialek-tischen  Theologie,  (Uppsala:  A.  B. 
Lundequistska  1938) 
Gadamer,  Hans-George,  Hegel's  Dialectic,  trans  by  P.  Smith  (New  Haven:  Yale 
University  Press,  1976) 
,  Ti-tith  and  Method,  (London:  Sheed  &  Ward,  1996) 
Goffman,  Ervin,  The  pi-esentation  of  the  self  in  eveiyday  life,  (Doubleday:  1959) 
_, 
Asyhnns:  essays  on  the  social  situation  of  mentalpatients  and  othei-  inniates, 
(Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  1968) 
Gorringe,  Timothy,  Kai-l  Bai-th  against  hegeniony,  Chi-istian  theology  in  context, 
(Oxford:  O.  U.  P,  1999) 
Gunton,  Colin,  A  bilef  theology  ofi-evelation,  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark,  1995) 
'An  English  Systematic  Theology?  '  in  the  Scottish  Jow-nal  qf  Theology  46 
(1993),  pp.  479-96 
The  One,  the  Thi-ee  and  the  Many  God,  0-eation  and  the  cultia-e  of 
Modei-nity,  (Cambridge:  C.  U.  P.  1993) 
Theology  thi-ough  the  Theologians,  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark  1996) 
Hardy,  Daniel,  'The  English  Tradition  of  Interpretation  and  the  Reception  of 
Schleiermacher  and  Barth  in  England',  in  Bai-th  andSchleiei-inachei-. 
Beyond  the  Impasse,  edited  by  J.  Duke  and  R.  Streetman,  (Ausberg:  Fortress, 
1988) 
Hartwell,  Herbert,  The  theology  ofKail  Bai-th,  (London:  Duckworth,  1964) 282 
Hays,  Richard,  The  Moi-al  Vision  ofthe  Neit,  Testalnent:  A  Conteinpoi-ai3, 
Inti-oduction  to  New  Testatnent  Ethics,  (T&T  Clark:  Edinburgh  1997) 
Hegel,  G.  W.  F.,  The  Encjclopaedia  ofLogic  Part  I  of  the  Encyclopaedia  of 
Philosophical  Sciences  with  Zus5tze,  trans.  by  T.  F.  Geraets,  (Indianapolis: 
Hackett,  1991) 
The  Phenomenology  ofSph-it,  trans.  by  A.  V.  Millar,  (Oxford:  OUP  1977) 
The  Philosophy  ofRight,  trans.  by  T.  M.  Knox,  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press, 
1952) 
. 
Heidegger,  Martin,  Being  and  lime  trans.  by  John  Macquarrie  and  Edward  Robinson, 
(London:  SCM  Press,  1962) 
Herberg,  Will,  'The  Social  Philosophy  of  Karl  Barth',  in  Karl  Barth,  Coininunity, 
State  and  Chin-ch,  trans.  by  R.  Smith,  (Gloucester,  MA:  Peter  Smith,  1968) 
Herrmann,  Wilhelm,  The  Coninnazion  of  the  Chi-istian  with  God.  Desci-ibed  oil  the 
basis  ofLuthej-'s  stateinents,  trans.  by  J.  Sandys  Stanyon  2  nd  edn,  (London: 
Williams  and  Norgate  1906) 
Johnson,  William  Stacy,  The  Mysteij,  of  God.  -  Kat-1  Bai-th  and  the  Postinodei-n 
Foundations  of  Theology,  (Kentucky:  Westminster  John  Knox  Press  1997) 
Jfingel,  Eberhard,  Chi-ist,  Justice  and  Peace:  Toit,  ai-d  a  Theology  of  the  State,  trans.  by 
D.  B.  Hamill  and  Alan  J.  Torrance,  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark  1992) 
, 
God  as  the  Mystejy  of  the  Moi-ld:  Oil  thefoundation  of  the  Theology  of  the 
Ct-zicified  One  in  the  Dispute  between  Theisin  and  A  theisin,  (Edinburgh: 
T&T  Clark  1983) 
, 
God's  Being  Is  in  Beconzing  The  Trinitarian  Being  of  God  in  the  Theology  of 
Karl  Barth,  trans.  by  John  Webster,  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark  2001) 
Kant,  Immanuel,  0-itique  ofPzn-e  Reason,  2  nd  edn.,  trans.  N.  K.  Smith,  (London: 
Macmillan,  1933) 
Kierkegaard,  Soren,  Few-  and  Ti-einbling,  trans.  by  A.  Hannay,  (Han-nondsworth: 
Penquin  1985) 
Philosophicalfi-agnients;  oi-  afi-agnient  ofphilosophy  by  Johannes  Clinlacus, 
(Princeton,  N.  J.:  Princeton  University  Press,  1962) 
Longfield,  Bradley,  The  Pl-esbyleilan  Conti-ovei-sy,  Fundainentalists,  Model-nists  & 
Modei-ates,  (Oxford:  OUP,  1991) 
Lovin,  Robin,  'Forward'  in  Karl  Barth,  The  Holy  Sph-it  and  the  Chl-istiall  Life, 
(Kentucky:  John  Knox  Press,  1993) 
Luther,  Martin,  Oil  the  Fi-eedoni  of  a  Chi-istian,  Martin  Luther  Selections  from  his 
writings,  ed.  by  J.  Dilinger,  (New  York:  Doubleday,  196  1) 
Seculai-  A  uthoi-ity:  to  what  extent  should  it  be  obej,  ed.  Martin  Luther 
Selections  from  his  writings,  ed.  Dilinger,  (New  York:  J.  Doubleday,  1961) 283 
McCormack,  Bruce,  Karl  Barlhs  critically  realistic  dialectical  1heology:  its  genesis 
anddevelopment,  1909-1936,  (Oxford:  OUP,  1997) 
'The  Mystery  of  God:  Karl  Barth  and  the  Postmodern  Foundation  of 
Theology  by  William  Stacey  Johnson',  Theology  Today,  55  (1998-99) 
Moltmann,  JOrgen,  The  Crucified  God,  trans.  by  R.  A.  Wilson  and  J.  Bowden,  (London: 
SCM  Press,  1974) 
Theology  of  hope:  on  the  ground  and  the  implications  of  a  Christian 
eschatology;  trans.  by  James  W.  Leitch,  (London:  SCM  Press,  1967) 
Newlands,  George,  GodIn  Christian  Perspective,  (Edinburgh;  T&T  Clark,  1994) 
,  The  Princeton  Seminmy  Bulletin  Volume  XX  Number  2.1999. 
Oppenheimer,  Helen,  'Barth:  Ethics'  in  Theology  1982  no.  85 
Roberts,  Richard,  A  Theology  on  Its  May?  Essays  on  Karl  Barth,  (Edinburgh:  T&T 
Clark,  1991) 
Robinson,  Norman,  Christ  and  conscience,  (London:  Nisbet,  1956) 
Rupp,  Gordon,  The  Rightemisness  of  God,  Luther  Studies,  (London:  Hodder  and 
Stoughton,  1953) 
Scholder,  Klaus,  The  Churches  and  the  Third  Reich,  Volume  One:  'Preliminary 
History  and  the  Time  of  Illusions,  '  trans.  by  John  Bowden,  (London:  SCM 
Press,  1987) 
The  Churches  and  the  Third  Reich,  Volume  Two:  'The  Year  of 
Disillusionment  1934  Barmen  and  Rome'.  trans.  by  John  Bowden,  (London: 
SCM  Press,  1988) 
Shakespeare,  William,  The  OxfordShak-espeare:  The  complete  works,  ed.  by  Stanley 
Wells  and  Gary  Taylor'Henry  V',  (Oxford:  OUP,  1998) 
Shriver,  Donald,  An  ethicfor  enendes,  (Oxford:  OUP,  1995) 
Taylor,  Charles,  Hegel,  (Cambridge:  CUP,  1997) 
Sources  of  the  seý(-  The  inaking  of  modern  identity,  (Cambridge:  CUP,  1989) 
Torrance,  Alan,  Persons  in  Coinnizinion:  an  essay  on  Trinitarian  description  and 
hinnan  participation:  with  special  reference  to  Volinne  One  ofKarl  Barth  Is 
Church  Dogmatics,  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark,  1996) 
Torrance,  Thomas,  Karl  Barth:  An  Introduction  to  His  Early  Tlleolog),,  1910-193  1, 
(London:  S.  C.  M.  Press,  1962) 
The  Christian  Doctrine  of  God  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark,  1996) 
van  Til,  Cornelius,  The  new  inodernism:  An  appraisal  of  the  Theology  ofBarth  and 
Brunner,  (London:  J.  Clarke,  1946) 284 
Volf,  Miroslav,  Exchision  and  Enibi-ace:  A  Theological  Explol-ation  ofidelltit),, 
Othei-ness,  andReconciliation,  (Nashville:  Abingdon  Press  1996) 
von  Balthasar,  Hans  Urs,  Karl  Bai-th:  Darstelhing  undDeutting  seinel-  Theologie 
(K61n:  J.  Hegner,  1951) 
The  Theology  of  Karl  Barth:  Exposition  andInteipiVation  trans.  by  Edward 
Oakes  (San  Francisco:  Ignatius  Press,  1992) 
von  Kirschbaum,  Charlotte,  The  Question  of  ff"onian.  The  collected  Ivi-itings,  of 
Charlotte,  von  Kii-schbawn  trans.  by  John  Shepherd  (Michigan:  Eerdmans 
1996) 
Ward,  Graham,  Bank  Dei-i-ida  and  the  language  of  theology,  (Cambridge:  CUP, 
1995) 
Webster,  John,  Bai-th's  Ethics  ofReconciliation,  (Cambridge:  CUP,  1995) 
Barth's  Moi-al  Theology:  Human  Action  in  Bai-ths  Thought,  (Edinburgh: 
T&T  Clark,  1998) 
God's  Being  is  in  Becoming,  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark:  2001) 
Willis,  Robert  E.,  The  Ethics  ofKai-I  Bai-th,  (Leiden:  E.  J.  Brill  197  1) 